Post-Expiration Conduct Cannot Support Supervised-Release Revocation After Rico (No Absconder Tolling)

Introduction

In United States v. Hassan-Nur Mohamed (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a district court may treat a defendant’s new federal conviction—based on conduct occurring years after the scheduled end of supervised release—as a supervised-release violation when the defendant had previously absconded. The issue arose against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. 609 (2026), which rejected the theory that supervised release automatically “tolls” (is extended) during absconding absent statutory authorization.

The parties were the United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) and Hassan-Nur H. Mohamed (Defendant-Appellant). Mohamed’s supervised release (imposed after a 2007 conviction) was scheduled to expire in September 2017. He fled to Canada in 2017 while under supervision. In 2025, after returning to the United States, he was convicted of aggravated re-entry. The district court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to nine months, treating the 2025 conviction as a supervised-release violation (at least in part).

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit vacated the revocation judgment and remanded for resentencing. Applying Rico v. United States, the court held that Mohamed’s supervised-release term expired in 2017 and therefore the district court erred by treating his 2025 aggravated re-entry conviction as a supervised-release violation.

The court further held the error was not harmless because the record did not provide the necessary confidence that the same sentence would have been imposed had the district court not treated the 2025 conviction as any supervised-release violation at all. Separately, the Sixth Circuit rejected Mohamed’s claim that the district court inadequately explained its response to his mitigation arguments, finding no reversible error on that point.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. 609 (2026)
    • Role in this case: The decisive authority. Rico held the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize automatic extension/tolling of supervised release during absconding and that courts may adjudicate only matters arising before the supervised-release term expires.
    • How it controlled: Because Mohamed’s 2025 re-entry conduct occurred long after September 2017, it could not lawfully be counted as a supervised-release violation, even if his earlier flight impeded supervision.
  • United States v. Rico, No. 24-2662, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12130 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026) (order)
    • Role in this case: A procedural reference showing how lower courts implemented the Supreme Court’s Rico decision—vacatur and remand for resentencing when post-expiration conduct was improperly treated as a violation.
  • United States v. Xu, 114 F.4th 829 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018)
    • Role in this case: These cases supply the Sixth Circuit’s framework for reviewing procedural reasonableness and identifying procedural error (e.g., miscalculating the Guidelines, relying on impermissible factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and failing to adequately explain).
    • How they mattered: The panel classified the district court’s reliance on the 2025 conviction as procedural error under the Rayyan criteria, because it distorted the violation grading and Guidelines framework.
  • United States v. Morrison, 852 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2017); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016); United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Rosales, 990 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2021))
    • Role in this case: These authorities govern harmless-error review for Guidelines miscalculations. Morrison recognizes harmlessness where the record shows the same sentence would be imposed regardless of the correct range; Molina-Martinez cautions that using the wrong range usually affects the sentencing framework even if the imposed sentence falls within both the correct and incorrect ranges; and Gates/Rosales places the burden on the government to show the error did not matter.
    • How they mattered: The panel applied Molina-Martinez to reject the government’s claim that overlap between ranges alone establishes harmlessness, and applied Gates to hold the government had not met its burden.
  • United States v. Cox, No. 21-5222, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36066 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (citing United States v. Schock, 862 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2017)); United States v. Householder, 137 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2025)
    • Role in this case: The government relied on these cases to argue harmlessness.
    • How the panel distinguished them:
      • Householder: Guidelines disputes were “academic” because the range would have been at or above the statutory maximum regardless.
      • Cox/Schock: The sentencing explanation demonstrated reliance on factors independent of the Guidelines.
      The panel found neither scenario fit: Mohamed’s Guidelines issue was not academic, and the record did not show a clearly independent basis because the district court’s “serious violations” rationale included a violation that, under Rico, was not a violation at all.
  • Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
    • Role in this case: These cases govern the adequacy of sentencing explanations.
    • How they mattered: The panel held the district court’s explanation and its confirmation that it considered mitigation arguments sufficed under Rita and Vonner, even though the explanation was brief.

Legal Reasoning

1) The supervised-release term expired; post-expiration conduct could not be treated as a violation

The Sixth Circuit’s central move was straightforward application of Rico v. United States. Mohamed’s supervised release began in September 2013 and was “set to expire” in September 2017. His 2025 aggravated re-entry conduct occurred more than seven years later. Under Rico, absconding does not automatically extend the supervised-release term; therefore, the district court lacked authority to treat the 2025 conviction as a supervised-release violation.

The panel also emphasized that the district court did, in fact, factor the 2025 conviction into the revocation calculus: it deemed the violation “Grade B” but then purported to “exercise[] discretion” to impose a sentence that would fit within the Grade C range—still using the conviction as a violation, merely discounting its weight. Because Rico makes the conviction not a violation at all, that approach infected the Guidelines calculation and sentencing framework and therefore constituted procedural error under the court’s procedural reasonableness cases (including United States v. Rayyan).

2) Harmless-error review: overlap of ranges was not enough

The government argued harmlessness because a nine-month sentence fell within both the Grade B (4–10 months) and Grade C (3–9 months) ranges, and the court stated the sentence would be appropriate “whether” Grade B or Grade C. The panel rejected that argument for two related reasons.

  • Wrong framework matters: Under Molina-Martinez v. United States, using an erroneous Guidelines range often suffices to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome because the range anchors the proceeding—even if the ultimate sentence would have been permissible under the correct range.
  • Insufficient record certainty: Under United States v. Gates (quoting United States v. Rosales), the government must show confidence the same sentence would have been imposed with a correct calculation. Here, the district court’s rationale that “the violations are . . . serious” included the 2025 conduct, which Rico removes from the violation set entirely. The panel thus could not be confident the same sentence would have been selected.

The court distinguished the government’s harmlessness authorities—United States v. Householder (Guidelines dispute “academic” due to statutory maximum) and United States v. Cox (sentence based on independent factors, citing United States v. Schock)—because neither condition was present.

3) Explanation of mitigation: brief but adequate

Although the court found reversible error on the Guidelines/violation issue, it rejected Mohamed’s separate claim that the district court failed to address mitigation. Citing Rita v. United States and United States v. Vonner, the panel held the district judge’s statements—plus the explicit confirmation, after objection, that the mitigation points were considered—satisfied the requirement that the judge consider the parties’ arguments and articulate a reasoned basis.

Impact

  • Revocation practice after absconding: Within the Sixth Circuit, district courts must treat Rico as foreclosing “absconder tolling” under the Sentencing Reform Act. Revocation may proceed only on violations occurring before the supervised-release term’s expiration.
  • Charging and grading violations: Probation offices and prosecutors must carefully separate (i) pre-expiration supervised-release violations from (ii) later criminal conduct that may be punishable independently but cannot be packaged as a supervised-release violation.
  • Harmless error will be harder to prove: Even where a sentence falls within both the correct and incorrect ranges, a conclusory “same either way” statement may not suffice if the sentencing rationale relies on conduct that should not have been counted in the first place.
  • Resentencing focus on the remaining violations: On remand, the sentencing court must recalibrate the revocation sentence based solely on the valid, pre-expiration Grade C violations (e.g., leaving the district without permission; failing to answer inquiries truthfully), applying the correct Guidelines framework and § 3553(a) considerations for revocation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release
A post-prison monitoring term imposed in a federal sentence. Violating conditions can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment.
Absconding
Leaving supervision or cutting off contact with probation. After Rico, absconding does not automatically pause/extend (“toll”) the supervised-release clock under the Sentencing Reform Act.
Tolling / automatic extension
The idea that time stops running on supervised release while someone is unavailable. Rico rejected this as an automatic rule absent statutory authorization.
Violation Grades (Grade B vs. Grade C)
Guideline classifications that affect the recommended imprisonment range upon revocation. Here, the 2025 conviction was treated as Grade B, while the earlier supervision violations were Grade C.
Procedural reasonableness
Whether the sentencing process was done correctly (right Guidelines calculation, proper factors, adequate explanation), as described in cases like Rayyan.
Harmless error
Even if a mistake occurred, an appellate court may affirm if it is confident the same outcome would have happened without the mistake. The government bears that burden here (per Gates), and overlap of Guidelines ranges does not automatically make the error harmless (per Molina-Martinez).

Conclusion

United States v. Hassan-Nur Mohamed operationalizes the Supreme Court’s rule in Rico v. United States within Sixth Circuit revocation sentencing: supervised release is not automatically extended by absconding, and post-expiration criminal conduct cannot be treated as a supervised-release violation. The decision also underscores that harmless-error analysis requires more than overlapping ranges or a generalized assertion that the same sentence would apply; the record must show the sentencing rationale did not depend on the legally impermissible “violation.” The case returns for resentencing anchored to the valid pre-expiration violations alone.