Post-Esteras Clarification on Consecutive Revocation Sentences: United States v. Reynoso, 24-214 (2d Cir. June 30, 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Reynoso, decided by the Second Circuit on June 30, 2025, addresses the substantive reasonableness of a consecutive sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release (VOSR) where the defendant had already received a substantial prison term for the new offense that triggered the violation. Although promulgated as a “Summary Order” (and therefore non-precedential in the Second Circuit’s formal sense), the decision is significant for two reasons:

  • It reaffirms the long-standing “breach-of-trust” rationale that justifies consecutive revocation sentences under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f).
  • It is the first Second Circuit opinion to apply—albeit indirectly—the Supreme Court’s June 2025 decision in Esteras v. United States, clarifying how courts may reference the defendant’s underlying criminal conduct without violating Esteras’s limitation on “retribution” considerations at revocation.

The appellant, Pedro Reynoso, argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 24-month prison term to run consecutive to an 84-month sentence for brandishing a firearm during a carjacking—the very conduct that formed the supervised-release violation. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Chin, Sullivan, and Merriam) held:

  • The district court did not abuse its discretion because it adhered to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), which recommends consecutive terms for revocation sentences, and thoroughly weighed the statutory factors.
  • The 24-month sentence was not “shockingly high” under the “range of permissible decisions” test articulated in United States v. Ortiz, 100 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2024).
  • Even assuming Esteras applies, any reliance on the “backward-looking purpose of retribution” was neither clear nor obvious; therefore, no plain error occurred.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020) – Established that revocation sentences are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that consecutive sentences advance the breach-of-trust objective. Reynoso quotes Ramos’s language that revocation is meant to sanction the breach, not the underlying offense itself.
  2. United States v. Ortiz, 100 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2024) – Supplies the “shockingly high/low” formulation for substantive-reasonableness review. The panel applies this yardstick to find the 24-month consecutive term permissible.
  3. United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2009) – Emphasize deference to district courts on weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. The panel invokes these cases to reject Reynoso’s argument that the judge gave insufficient weight to his mental-health and addiction struggles.
  4. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) – Upholds enhanced revocation sentences where a defendant “repeatedly betrays” earlier leniency. Reynoso analogizes Reynoso’s rapid recidivism to that pattern of betrayal.
  5. Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483, 2025 WL 1716137 (U.S. June 20, 2025) – The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution) is off-limits in VOSR sentencing. At oral argument Reynoso claimed the district court violated Esteras. The Second Circuit said the argument was forfeited and, even if reached, failed under plain-error review because the record did not unmistakably show a reliance on retribution.
  6. Other summary affirmances—McLarty (2024), Dantzler (2023), Kyzer (2021)—demonstrate the court’s consistent acceptance of consecutive revocation sentences.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review – Substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion lens. The appellant has a “heavy burden.”

2. Guidelines Policy Statement – U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) creates a default rule for consecutiveness. While Chapter 7 is advisory, district courts routinely follow it, and appellate courts treat adherence as strongly indicative of reasonableness.

3. Breach-of-Trust Paradigm – Citing Ramos, the panel underscores that the revocation penalty is not about punishing the new carjacking but about “the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust.” Reynoso’s immediate non-compliance (unreported address, drug use) and six violent carjackings aggravated the breach.

4. Comparative Proportionality – The court contrasted: (i) the original merciful 366-day sentence for the Hobbs Act extortion (far below the 70–87-month Guideline range) and (ii) Reynoso’s rapid and escalated violent conduct. This history justified a sterner response at revocation.

5. Handling of Mitigation – The district judge explicitly acknowledged Reynoso’s mental health and substance-abuse issues but found they did not outweigh public-safety and trust considerations. On appeal, the panel deferred to that weighing.

6. Interface with Esteras – The panel held that any suggestion of retributive purpose was too fleeting to constitute “clear or obvious” error. This implicitly guides district courts: references to past wrongdoing remain permissible when linked to deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, but judges should avoid framing them as payback.

C. Potential Impact

  • Sentencing Practice – District judges in the Second Circuit will likely continue to impose consecutive revocation sentences where the breach is severe. Reynoso shows such sentences will survive appellate scrutiny if the judge cites § 7B1.3(f) and tracks the § 3553(a) factors other than (2)(A).
  • Post-Esteras Landscape – Defense counsel may increasingly allege that judges are slipping into impermissible retribution. Reynoso sets a high bar for proving plain error and signals that cursory mention of underlying conduct will not suffice to reverse absent explicit retributive language.
  • Guideline Amendment Discussions – The decision may temper calls to modify § 7B1.3(f) because the panel again validated the policy’s rationale.
  • Appellate Strategy – The forfeiture point illustrates the importance of raising Esteras-based objections both below and in opening briefs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised Release – A period of court oversight that follows imprisonment. The defendant must abide by conditions (report to probation, law-abiding behavior, etc.).
  • Violation of Supervised Release (VOSR) – When those conditions are breached, the court may revoke release and impose new penalties.
  • Consecutive vs. Concurrent – Consecutive sentences start after completion of the prior sentence; concurrent sentences run at the same time.
  • Breach-of-Trust Rationale – The theory that revocation sanctions are aimed at the violation of the court’s trust rather than the new criminal conduct.
  • Abuse-of-Discretion Review – A deferential appellate standard; reversal occurs only if the sentence falls outside the range of reasonable decisions.
  • Plain-Error Review – Applied when an argument was not preserved; requires (1) an error, (2) that is clear/obvious, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • § 3553(a) Factors – Statutory list guiding sentencing. In revocation, courts may consider all except (2)(A) (retribution), per Esteras.

Conclusion

United States v. Reynoso offers a concise yet potent reaffirmation of the Second Circuit’s approach to revocation sentencing. It underscores that:

  • Consecutive sentences under § 7B1.3(f) remain the norm when defendants commit serious violations shortly after release.
  • Appellate courts will not disturb such sentences absent truly “shocking” disparities or unmistakable legal error.
  • Esteras does not bar courts from mentioning the defendant’s past crimes, so long as the discussion is tied to permissible goals like deterrence, public safety, or rehabilitation.

Practitioners should view Reynoso as a practical roadmap: district courts must articulate non-retributive grounds when citing past misconduct, and defense counsel must preserve Esteras-based objections early. Although labeled a “summary order,” the opinion will likely influence future arguments over consecutive revocation sentences and the evolving contours of post-release supervision jurisprudence.