Post-Erlinger ACCA Limits and Clerical-Error Remands: § 924(e) Cannot Appear in the Judgment When the ACCA Was Not Triggered

I. Introduction

United States v. Nathaniel Broughton (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) is an unpublished per curiam decision reviewing an 87-month sentence imposed for felon-in-possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The appeal centered on whether the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Procedurally, Broughton challenged the Guidelines calculation—arguing that Georgia aggravated assault is not a “crime of violence” and that state drug convictions should not qualify as “controlled substance offenses” if the substance is not federally scheduled. Substantively, he argued the district court insufficiently weighed mitigating evidence (mental illness, intellectual limitations, health, upbringing).

The decision is notable for two practical postures:

  • It reflects the district court’s application of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) in declining to impose the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement because the “different occasions” fact was not admitted.
  • It orders a limited remand to correct a clerical error where the written judgment improperly cited 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) despite the ACCA not applying.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 87-month sentence, holding:

  1. No procedural error: Binding circuit precedent compelled the conclusion that Georgia aggravated assault qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2(a)(2).
  2. The court did not reach the “controlled substance” argument because the base offense level was correct regardless (two crimes of violence sufficed).
  3. No substantive unreasonableness: A mid-range Guidelines sentence was within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes,” and the district court permissibly emphasized public protection and criminal history over mitigating evidence.
  4. Limited remand: The written judgment’s reference to § 924(e) was a clerical error because the oral pronouncement and sentencing ruling rejected ACCA application.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sentencing review framework and standards

  • United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): The court applied Trailer’s “two-step process”—procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness. This structured the entire appellate analysis.
  • United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of Guidelines interpretation/application, reinforcing that whether an offense is a predicate is a legal question.
  • United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019): Hicks supplies de novo review for “crime of violence” determinations; Bishop does the same for “controlled substance offense” determinations.
  • United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016): The prior-panel-precedent rule was central—because Hicks and Morales-Alonso were binding, the panel treated Broughton’s arguments as foreclosed rather than open for re-litigation.

2. Georgia aggravated assault as a “crime of violence”

  • United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018): Morales-Alonso held that Georgia aggravated assault is “substantially the same” as generic aggravated assault, making it a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines enumerated-offense clause. This case is the backbone of the panel’s procedural holding.
  • United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024): Hicks specifically addressed (and rejected) the mens rea-based overbreadth argument that Broughton renewed here. The panel used Hicks to dispose of the claim that Morales-Alonso left mens rea unresolved.

3. Avoiding unnecessary issues (mootness/harmlessness logic)

  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976): The panel relied on Bagamasbad to justify declining to decide the “controlled substance” question because it would not alter the Guidelines range once the “crime of violence” predicates independently supported the base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2).

4. Substantive reasonableness (deference to district courts)

  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Butler provided the abuse-of-discretion lens, the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” formulation, and the three recognized modes of substantive unreasonableness.
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Quoted through Butler for the “ballpark” phrasing and the non-substitution principle.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): Used both for the defendant’s burden and for the expectation that within-Guidelines sentences are ordinarily reasonable.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Reinforced the abuse-of-discretion framework for substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025), United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): These cases supported the proposition that a court need not give equal weight to every § 3553(a) factor, need not expressly discuss every mitigating point, and that acknowledging consideration of the factors and arguments is typically enough.
  • United States v. Castaneda, 997 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Castaneda reinforced the reasonableness expectation for within-range sentences; Dougherty supported using the statutory maximum as a reasonableness indicator.

5. Clerical error correction; oral pronouncement controls

  • United States v. James, 642 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2006): These cases recognize the appellate court’s ability to notice and correct clerical errors, including via limited remand.
  • United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1990) and Patterson v. United States, 386 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1967): Establish the controlling rule that when oral and written sentences conflict, the oral pronouncement controls.
  • United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc): Cited for the broader principle that the written judgment is not itself “the sentence.”
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Explained why the Fifth Circuit’s Patterson decision binds the Eleventh Circuit.

6. ACCA backdrop and post-Erlinger tension

  • Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): The district court (and the panel’s description of proceedings) treated Erlinger as requiring that, to “trigger ACCA,” the government must prove (or the defendant must admit) that qualifying convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Although the Eleventh Circuit did not decide an ACCA merits issue on appeal, Erlinger is a key contextual driver: it explains why ACCA fell out of the case.
  • United States v. Cobia, 41 F.3d 1473 (11th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617 (11th Cir. 1995): Noted in a footnote as pre-Erlinger circuit precedent stating that ACCA penalties must be applied “automatically.” The panel expressly declined to address whether those decisions “remain good law” because the government did not appeal the district court’s ACCA ruling.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Guidelines calculation (procedural reasonableness)

After sustaining objections that removed ACCA and the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, the district court calculated:

  • Base offense level 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) (two prior “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offenses”);
  • Minus 3 for acceptance under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)-(b);
  • Total offense level 21;
  • Criminal history category VI (23 points);
  • Range 77–96 months;
  • Sentence 87 months (mid-range).

On appeal, Broughton attacked the base offense level by disputing whether Georgia aggravated assault qualifies as a crime of violence. The panel held the argument was foreclosed: Morales-Alonso already equated Georgia aggravated assault with generic aggravated assault, and Hicks specifically rejected the mens rea overbreadth challenge. Under White’s prior-panel-precedent rule, the district court “was bound” to treat Georgia aggravated assault as a crime of violence.

2. Declining to decide the controlled-substance definition

Broughton also urged a federal-schedules-only definition of “controlled substance.” The Eleventh Circuit avoided the issue under Bagamasbad because, even if Broughton were correct, the base offense level remained 24 due to the “crime of violence” predicates. This is a practical example of appellate minimalism: where one independent predicate sustains the Guidelines result, the court will often leave broader definitional disputes for a case where the answer matters.

3. Substantive reasonableness (why 87 months was upheld)

The panel emphasized traditional reasonableness markers:

  • The sentence was within the properly calculated Guidelines range (Gonzalez; Castaneda);
  • It was below the 10-year statutory maximum (Dougherty; Gonzalez);
  • The district court explicitly referenced the § 3553(a) goals and identified the key drivers: seriousness, deterrence, respect for law, public protection, disparity avoidance, and especially Broughton’s extensive criminal history.

The court rejected the claim that mitigating evidence was ignored. Under Amedeo and Sarras, the sentencing judge’s acknowledgement of consideration plus discussion of the defendant’s background generally suffices; Olson and Butler reinforce that the judge may assign greater weight to public-protection and criminal-history concerns than to mitigation. Applying Butler/Rosales-Bruno, the 87-month term fell within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes.”

4. Limited remand to correct the judgment

Although ACCA was not applied at sentencing, the judgment cited 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The panel treated this as a clerical discrepancy: under Khoury and Patterson, the oral pronouncement and actual sentencing ruling control. Relying on James and Massey, it issued a limited remand solely to correct the erroneous statutory reference.

C. Impact

1. Post-Erlinger ACCA administration (practical consequences)

While the panel did not resolve an ACCA merits dispute, the case illustrates how Erlinger v. United States is reshaping sentencing practice: district courts may decline to apply ACCA where the “different occasions” requirement was not admitted (and presumably not established in the manner Erlinger requires). The opinion also flags an unresolved tension: the footnote notes pre-Erlinger decisions (United States v. Cobia; United States v. Gibson) suggesting ACCA must be imposed “automatically,” but the panel leaves their continuing vitality unanswered due to the government’s non-appeal.

2. Continued foreclosure of Georgia aggravated assault challenges

For Guidelines litigation in the Eleventh Circuit, the decision underscores that Hicks and Morales-Alonso effectively close the door—at least absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention—on arguments that Georgia aggravated assault is not a “crime of violence” under the enumerated-offense clause based on mens rea overbreadth.

3. Issue avoidance: controlled substance disputes may be strategically moot

Defendants pressing the “federal schedules only” definition of “controlled substance” should note the Bagamasbad move: if two “crime of violence” predicates independently set the base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2), the controlled-substance question may not be reached. This affects appellate strategy and preservation: litigants may need to show the issue is outcome-determinative to obtain a merits ruling.

4. Judgment accuracy and correction mechanisms

The limited remand reinforces the operational importance of ensuring the written judgment matches the oral sentence, especially in firearm cases where an erroneous ACCA reference can have collateral consequences (BOP classification, later proceedings, or misunderstandings about statutory authority). The panel’s approach confirms the Eleventh Circuit will correct such errors sua sponte.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • ACCA (§ 924(e)): A statute that increases penalties for certain § 922(g) defendants if they have three qualifying prior convictions committed on different occasions. If ACCA applies, the sentencing framework changes dramatically (including a 15-year mandatory minimum).
  • “Different occasions” requirement: The priors must be separate criminal episodes. Post-Erlinger v. United States, the case was treated as requiring appropriate proof/admission of that separateness before ACCA can be triggered.
  • “Crime of violence” under the Guidelines: A category that triggers higher offense levels. Here, Georgia aggravated assault counted because circuit precedent equates it with “generic” aggravated assault.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural focuses on correct method (Guidelines calculation, factor consideration, factual accuracy, explanation). Substantive asks whether the final length is reasonable given the facts and § 3553(a).
  • Oral sentence controls: If the judge says one thing at sentencing but the written judgment says another, the spoken sentence wins; the writing can be corrected as a clerical error.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Broughton’s 87-month sentence as both procedurally and substantively reasonable, primarily because binding precedent (United States v. Morales-Alonso; United States v. Hicks) required treating Georgia aggravated assault as a “crime of violence,” sustaining the base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). It declined to decide the controlled-substance definitional dispute as unnecessary under INS v. Bagamasbad. The panel also reinforced deferential substantive review principles (especially United States v. Butler and United States v. Rosales-Bruno), concluding the mid-range Guidelines sentence properly reflected the § 3553(a) factors.

Most concretely, the case highlights two postures likely to recur: (1) the operational effect of Erlinger v. United States on ACCA eligibility determinations, and (2) the Eleventh Circuit’s willingness to order a limited remand to correct judgments that erroneously reference 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) when ACCA was not imposed.