Date: Jun 25, 2026

Post-Dispositional Improvement Period Requires a Substantial Post-Adjudicatory Change; Serious Safety Violations and Dishonesty Support Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

1. Introduction

In re H.S. and A.S. is a West Virginia abuse-and-neglect appeal in which Petitioner Mother J.C. challenged the Circuit Court of Barbour County’s dispositional order terminating her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights. The underlying case began with the children living with the mother in a homeless shelter and escalated after the mother allegedly concealed the children from Child Protective Services (“CPS”), neglected medical care to keep them hidden, and facilitated contact between the children and their father after the father’s parental rights were terminated.

The mother was adjudicated as an abusing and neglecting parent by stipulation and received a post-adjudicatory improvement period with a specific “no contact” order regarding the father. At disposition, evidence showed the mother maintained daily contact with the father, concealed that contact, and disclosed the time and location of a supervised visit—after which the father appeared armed and threatened to kill those present, forcing them to barricade themselves until law enforcement intervened.

The key issues on appeal were whether the circuit court (1) abused its discretion by denying a post-dispositional improvement period, and (2) erred by terminating rights rather than using a less restrictive alternative.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed in a memorandum decision. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-dispositional improvement period because the mother failed to demonstrate the statutory prerequisites—particularly a “substantial change in circumstances” since the post-adjudicatory improvement period and a likelihood of full participation—and because an additional period would jeopardize the children’s best interests.

The Court also affirmed termination, concluding that the evidence supported the finding of “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” in the near future, and therefore termination could be ordered without employing less restrictive alternatives.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2026 WL 1362143 (W. Va. May 15, 2026) (Syl. Pt. 1): Provided the overarching standards of appellate review in abuse-and-neglect appeals—abuse of discretion for substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo review for legal issues. This framing constrained the mother’s appeal because her arguments largely sought reweighing of evidence and credibility.
In re K.A., 251 W. Va. 626, 915 S.E.2d 520 (2025) (Syl. Pt. 1): Reinforced that granting or denying an improvement period is reviewed for abuse of discretion, supporting affirmance absent a clear discretionary error.
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004): Established that improvement periods are discretionary and not an unconditional entitlement. These cases supported the Court’s rejection of any notion that service participation alone compels an additional improvement period.
State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) and In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000): Emphasized that credibility determinations are for the trier of fact (the circuit court). This insulated the circuit court’s finding that the mother lacked insight and was dishonest, particularly where the mother’s account conflicted with the record of prohibited contact and concealment.
State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 836 S.E.2d 472 (2019) (Syl. Pt. 3, in part): Anchored the best-interests limitation: improvement periods should be granted only when they will not jeopardize a child’s best interests. The Court relied on this to affirm denial where the mother’s conduct placed the children in “extreme danger.”
In re Jonanthan Michael D., 194 W. Va. 20, 459 S.E.2d 131 (1995): Supported the principle that compliance with discrete case-plan tasks can coexist with a failure to achieve meaningful parental improvement, countering the mother’s argument that therapy/classes/drug screens should outweigh her no-contact violation and dishonesty.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025): Reinforced the appellate court’s refusal to reweigh evidence—critical where the mother framed the case as the circuit court “overemphasizing” a single violation.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (Syl. Pt. 5) (quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (Syl. Pt. 2)): Provided the controlling termination rule: termination may be ordered without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected. This precedent directly supported affirmance of termination once the circuit court made the requisite findings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Post-dispositional improvement period—statutory standard and discretion. The Court focused on the governing statute for a post-dispositional improvement period: W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(3)(D), which requires the parent to demonstrate (1) a “substantial change in circumstances” since the initial post-adjudicatory improvement period and (2) that, due to that change, the parent is likely to fully participate. The Court noted the mother “fails to reference the proper statutory standard on appeal,” and it deferred to the circuit court’s factual finding—made after hearing the mother’s disposition testimony—that she lacked insight and could not be trusted to follow orders.

(b) Best interests as a limiting principle. Even where services are being completed, the Court treated best interests as a hard constraint. Applying State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, it upheld the circuit court’s conclusion that another improvement period would not be in the children’s best interests because the mother’s conduct created an acute safety risk—continuing prohibited contact and enabling a violent, armed confrontation at a supervised visit—demonstrating that additional time would “jeopardize” the children.

(c) “Compliance” versus meaningful correction. The mother argued she substantially complied by attending therapy and classes and submitting to drug screening. The Court responded with the principle from In re Jonanthan Michael D.: parents may comply with tasks yet fail to improve their overall parenting approach. Here, the critical deficiency was judgment and protection: the mother’s repeated dishonesty and continued association with the terminated father—despite explicit court orders—was evidence of ongoing inability to protect the children.

(d) Termination and the “no reasonable likelihood” finding. The Court affirmed termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), which defines “no reasonable likelihood” as an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on one’s own or with help. The record supported that definition: despite acknowledging at adjudication the need for better judgment and honesty, the mother concealed prohibited contact during services and facilitated circumstances that exposed the children to extreme danger.

Once the circuit court found (1) no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and (2) termination necessary for the children’s welfare, termination was authorized by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). Under In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., the court was not required to employ less restrictive alternatives.

(e) Appellate posture and the record. The decision also underscores appellate realities: the Court noted that the mother failed to include the dispositional transcript, contrary to Rule 7(d)(5) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, requiring reliance on the motion and dispositional order. This made it especially difficult to overturn the circuit court’s fact-driven determinations.

3.3. Impact

Reinforcement of strict scrutiny of “no-contact” violations in improvement periods. The decision signals that violation of a court-ordered no-contact condition—especially one that foreseeably endangers children—can outweigh participation in services and can independently justify denial of additional time.
Dishonesty as evidence of lack of insight and non-correctability. The Court treated repeated deception (to CPS and the court process) not as a collateral issue but as central to whether a parent can correct conditions and protect children, supporting “no reasonable likelihood” findings.
Service completion is not the same as safety. The opinion strengthens the doctrinal divide between “checking boxes” and demonstrating safe protective capacity—important for future litigants framing compliance-based appeals.
Permanency and stability. By affirming termination where children “deserve permanency and stability” and adoption was the plan, the decision aligns improvement-period doctrine with permanency timelines and child-safety imperatives.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication vs. disposition: “Adjudication” is the stage where the court determines whether abuse/neglect occurred and whether a parent is an abusing/neglecting parent (here, by stipulation). “Disposition” is the stage where the court decides the remedy—such as improvement periods, custody outcomes, or termination.
Improvement period (post-adjudicatory vs. post-dispositional): An improvement period is a court-supervised opportunity to correct problems. A “post-adjudicatory” improvement period occurs after adjudication and before final disposition. A “post-dispositional” improvement period is an additional opportunity after disposition is being determined; it requires a heightened showing under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(3)(D) (substantial change in circumstances plus likely full participation).
“No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected”: A legal finding under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d) meaning the parent has shown an inadequate capacity to fix the abuse/neglect problems, even with help. This finding is a key gateway to termination.
Standards of review: “Abuse of discretion” means the appellate court will not reverse unless the trial court made a decision outside the range of reasonable choices. “Clear error” means the appellate court defers to factual findings unless firmly convinced a mistake was made. “De novo” means the appellate court reviews legal questions fresh, without deference.
Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., temporary guardianship, extended improvement periods). Under In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., these are not required when “no reasonable likelihood” exists.

5. Conclusion

In re H.S. and A.S. affirms a child-safety-centered application of West Virginia’s improvement-period and termination statutes: a post-dispositional improvement period is not granted based on generalized claims of “transformation,” but on a proven substantial change in circumstances and a demonstrated capacity to comply—especially with protective orders. The Court also reaffirmed that when a parent’s conduct shows an ongoing inability to protect children and no reasonable likelihood of correction, termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives to secure permanency and stability.