Post-Delligatti: Intentional Injury “By Any Means,” Including Omission, Qualifies as “Use of Physical Force” for Guidelines Crime-of-Violence

Case: United States v. Victorious Minter (3d Cir., Jan. 16, 2026) (precedential)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Core holding: In light of Delligatti v. United States, a prior offense that requires the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury—even if theoretically achievable by omission—categorically involves the “use of physical force” and qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’ elements clause.

I. Introduction

Victorious Minter appealed both his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the calculation of his advisory Guidelines range. The underlying incident arose from a reported road-rage encounter in Scranton, Pennsylvania; officers stopped Minter shortly afterward and observed a loaded Glock .22 pistol in plain view. Because Minter had prior felony convictions (and remained on state parole), he was charged and ultimately convicted under § 922(g)(1).

The appeal presented three main issues:

• Conviction challenges (preserved only): (a) whether the interstate-commerce element of § 922(g)(1) can be satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce; and (b) whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied.
• Sentencing challenge (dispositive): whether Minter’s prior Virginia conviction for “unlawful wounding” qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the enhanced base offense level in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).

The Third Circuit affirmed. The conviction challenges were foreclosed by circuit precedent. The sentencing challenge failed because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Delligatti v. United States repudiated the Third Circuit’s earlier omission-based rationale in United States v. Mayo.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit held:

• Conviction affirmed: Minter’s interstate-commerce and Second Amendment arguments were acknowledged as preserved but barred by binding Third Circuit precedent.
• Sentence affirmed: Although Minter relied on United States v. Mayo to argue that “unlawful wounding” could be committed by omission and thus fall outside the “use of force” clause, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Delligatti v. United States held that knowingly or intentionally causing injury or death—“whether by act or omission”—necessarily involves the use of physical force against another. As a result, Mayo was “no longer good law,” and Minter’s Virginia conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Foreclosure of conviction challenges

• United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001): The panel reiterated that the interstate-commerce element of § 922(g)(1) is satisfied by proof that the firearm “ha[s] traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past.” This foreclosed Minter’s commerce-element challenge.
• United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215 (3d Cir. 2025): The panel cited Quailes for the proposition that “§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on parole or probation,” foreclosing Minter’s Second Amendment argument given his parole status.
• 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1: The panel emphasized intra-circuit stare decisis—one precedential panel decision binds later panels—explaining why Minter’s arguments could be preserved but not granted.

2. Standards of review and issue preservation

• United States v. Payo, 135 F.4th 99 (3d Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of legal conclusions, including whether a conviction is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines.
• Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017): Used to note forfeiture/waiver principles; the court declined to consider an argument Minter did not renew on appeal (his challenge to whether a prior Pennsylvania drug conviction was a “controlled substance offense”).

3. The categorical approach framework

• United States v. Vines, 134 F.4th 730 (3d Cir. 2025): Invoked to underscore the “much-maligned categorical approach” required for elements-clause determinations.
• United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. 2023): Quoted for the rule that courts presume the conviction rested on the “minimum conduct criminalized” by the statute, ignoring the defendant’s actual behavior.
• Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016): Cited for the principle that the “means” of commission are irrelevant under the categorical approach.

4. Divisibility, modified categorical approach, and Shepard limits

• United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2018): The government suggested Virginia’s statute might be divisible (potentially permitting a “modified categorical approach”), but the panel refused to entertain that route because the government did not raise it below and did not provide Shepard documents. The citation to Peppers reflects a practical constraint: without proper records, courts generally cannot narrow the offense to a particular statutory alternative.

5. Omission-based “force” disputes pre- and post-intervention

• United States v. Mayo, 901 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2018): Minter’s central authority. Mayo held Pennsylvania aggravated assault was not categorically a violent felony under the elements clause because it could be violated by omission (e.g., starving a child) and, in the Third Circuit’s view at the time, omission did not necessarily entail “violent force.”
• United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014): Mayo acknowledged Castleman’s statement that causing bodily injury necessarily involves force in a “common-law sense,” but treated Castleman as not resolving whether that logic extends to “violent force” formulations.
• United States v. Harris, 68 F.4th 140 (3d Cir. 2023) and United States v. Jenkins, 68 F.4th 148 (3d Cir. 2023): Cited to show Mayo’s rule had been reaffirmed and also widely criticized as counterintuitive under the categorical approach’s formalism.
• Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025): The decisive intervening precedent. Delligatti held that the “knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.” The Third Circuit treated Delligatti as rejecting Mayo’s attempt to cabin Castleman and as controlling across similarly worded elements clauses.
• Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024): Cited for the principle that circuit precedent must yield when it conflicts with later Supreme Court authority; this supplied the doctrinal basis to declare Mayo “no longer good law.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the conviction issues were easy (but still preserved)

The panel treated Minter’s two conviction arguments as “colorable” only in the sense that they are recognized lines of attack in firearms cases, but both were squarely foreclosed by existing Third Circuit precedent (Singletary and Quailes). The court therefore affirmed while noting the arguments were raised to preserve them for possible en banc or Supreme Court review.

2. The sentencing issue turned on the elements clause and the categorical approach

The Guidelines enhancement at U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) required (among other things) two prior qualifying felonies: either “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offense[s].” The court focused on whether Virginia “unlawful wounding” under Va. Code. Ann. § 18.2-51 is a “crime of violence” under the elements clause definition in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)—i.e., whether it has as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

Under the categorical approach, the court had to assume the “minimum conduct criminalized” by the Virginia statute. Minter’s strategy was to hypothesize a least-culpable way to violate § 18.2-51—specifically, causing bodily injury “by any means” without an affirmative act (an omission)—and then argue that this hypothetical would not satisfy “use of physical force,” relying on Mayo’s omission rationale.

3. Delligatti displaced Mayo’s omission/force distinction

The panel declined to decide whether Virginia unlawful wounding can, in fact, be committed by omission. Instead, it held that even if it can, the argument no longer matters after Delligatti v. United States. Delligatti’s rule—intentional or knowing causation of injury “whether by act or omission” necessarily involves the use of force—directly defeats the conceptual move that drove Mayo.

The panel acknowledged a textual difference: § 924(c)(3)(A) can be satisfied by force against property, whereas § 4B1.2(a)(1) and the ACCA clause require force against a person. But it found no reason that distinction would change Delligatti’s force-by-omission principle for this appeal.

4. The court’s treatment of divisibility arguments signaled a litigation lesson

The government floated that Va. Code. Ann. § 18.2-51 might be divisible (potentially allowing reliance on the “shooting, stabbing, cutting, or wounding” language). The panel refused to consider it because it was not raised below and was unsupported by Shepard materials. This underscores that categorical-approach disputes are often won or lost not only on doctrine, but on record development and preservation.

C. Impact

1. Immediate impact: omission-based challenges to “use of force” are dramatically weakened

The opinion’s practical consequence is to remove (or sharply narrow) a once-viable Third Circuit argument: that intentional causation-of-injury offenses may fall outside “use of force” if they can be committed by omission. After Minter, defendants in the Third Circuit will face steep odds advancing Mayo-style theories against elements-clause enhancements where the predicate offense requires knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury.

2. Doctrinal impact: Mayo’s continuing force is curtailed

The panel’s statement that “our holding in Mayo is no longer good law” is consequential beyond the Guidelines: Mayo had been applied and reaffirmed in multiple Third Circuit decisions. Post-Delligatti, courts and litigants should expect:

• greater stability in treating intentional-injury statutes as categorically involving “use of force,” even when “by any means” language leaves room for omission hypotheticals;
• less traction for arguments that attempt to separate “causing injury” from “using force” under “violent force” elements clauses.

3. Sentencing impact: broader reach for “crime of violence” classifications

Many assaultive statutes (and some homicide-related offenses) include causation language broad enough to include omission theories. By adopting Delligatti’s principle across “similarly worded” force clauses, Minter increases the likelihood that such convictions will qualify as “crimes of violence” for:

• Guidelines enhancements (including § 2K2.1 and career-offender provisions tied to § 4B1.2), and
• statutory recidivist schemes that turn on comparable “use of force” language.

4. Firearms litigation impact: status quo maintained on commerce and Second Amendment issues

On the merits of § 922(g)(1), the decision does not innovate: it reaffirms that established Third Circuit law continues to govern the interstate-commerce element (Singletary) and as-applied Second Amendment challenges for those on parole or probation (Quailes), unless and until reconsidered en banc or by the Supreme Court.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Categorical approach: A method that looks only to the statutory elements of the prior offense, not what the defendant actually did. Courts ask whether the least serious conduct that could violate the statute still satisfies the federal definition (here, “use of physical force”).
• Elements clause / “use of force” clause: A definition that makes an offense a “crime of violence” only if the offense’s legal elements require the use (or attempted/threatened use) of physical force against another.
• Omission vs. act: Some crimes can be committed by failing to act when there is a legal duty (e.g., failing to provide food or medical care). Mayo treated omission-based injury causation as not necessarily involving “use of force.” Delligatti rejects that distinction for knowing/intentional causation of injury or death.
• Divisible statute & modified categorical approach: If a statute lists alternative elements (effectively multiple crimes), courts may consult limited court documents (Shepard materials) to determine which alternative formed the conviction. Without those materials and proper preservation, courts may not narrow the analysis.
• Shepard documents: A restricted set of reliable records (e.g., indictment, plea colloquy, jury instructions) used to identify the elements of conviction under the modified categorical approach.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Victorious Minter is chiefly a sentencing decision about the ripple effects of an intervening Supreme Court ruling. The Third Circuit held that, after Delligatti v. United States, the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury qualifies as “use of physical force” even if the statute could be violated by omission. That conclusion collapses the omission-based logic that previously allowed defendants to argue—under United States v. Mayo—that certain assault statutes were not “crimes of violence” under elements-clause definitions.

The broader significance is doctrinal and practical: Minter signals a post-Delligatti realignment in the Third Circuit’s “use of force” jurisprudence, making it easier for courts to classify intentional-injury predicates as “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and related provisions, while leaving existing Third Circuit law on § 922(g)(1)’s commerce element and certain as-applied Second Amendment challenges intact.