Post-Deed Notice Cannot Cure Failed Pre-Deed Notice: Jones v. Flowers Applied to New Hampshire Municipal Tax Deeds

1. Introduction

In Manutsom v. Town of Hollis, 2026 N.H. 27, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the Town of Hollis (Town) provided constitutionally sufficient notice before (and in connection with) enforcing unpaid property taxes against property owned by Wisarat Manutsom, Trustee of the Farley Road Realty Trust (Trust).

The dispute arose after the Town ultimately deeded the property to itself under the municipal tax-deed procedure (see RSA 80:76, I), following years of delinquent taxes and multiple unsuccessful mailed notices. The plaintiff alleged Fourteenth Amendment due process violations based on (1) inadequate notice of an impending tax deed for unpaid 2016 taxes, and (2) inadequate notice of two tax liens (2016 and 2018). The core question was what “reasonable” notice requires when certified-mail notices are returned undeliverable and the municipality has other ways to contact the taxpayer.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded:

  • Tax deed notice (2016 taxes): Reversed. Where certified-mail notices of an impending tax deed were returned undeliverable, due process required the Town to take additional reasonable steps before executing the deed. Post-deed letters and later communications—despite occurring before the repurchase period expired—did not satisfy the pre-deprivation notice obligation.
  • 2016 tax lien notice: Reversed. Mailing the impending lien notice only to a California address—when prior notices to that address had repeatedly failed and the Town had other contact avenues (including an agent address and email)—was not “reasonably calculated” to apprise the plaintiff of the lien.
  • 2018 tax lien notice: Affirmed. Mailing certified notice to both the Manchester address (where notices had been successfully received in the past) and the Maine address requested by the plaintiff was “reasonably calculated” to provide notice, even though the letters were returned undeliverable in this instance.

The case was remanded for the trial court to determine an appropriate remedy consistent with the opinion.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Polonsky v. Town of Bedford, 171 N.H. 89 (2018) and Polonsky v. Town of Bedford, 173 N.H. 226 (2020)

Polonsky supplied the standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment and confirmed de novo review of legal application. The 2020 Polonsky decision was also important substantively: it noted that the court had previously “assumed, without deciding,” that a “taking” occurs when the collector executes a tax deed under RSA 80:76. In Manutsom, that assumption becomes practically decisive: the court treats the execution of the deed as the moment of deprivation for federal due process timing and rejects the Town’s attempt to rely on later notice within the repurchase period.

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)

Jones is the opinion’s central federal precedent. The New Hampshire court applied Jones for the rule that when mailed notice of a tax sale (or analogous property-taking event) is returned unclaimed/undeliverable and the government learns its attempt failed before the taking, the government must take “additional reasonable steps” if practicable.

The court emphasized Jones as a pre-deprivation notice case: due process requires “adequate notice of the impending taking” before the government forces satisfaction of tax debts by forfeiture. This framing enabled the court to reject the Town’s position that later notice (after the deed but before repurchase expired) could cure the failed pre-deed notice.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002)

These cases supplied the general due process standard for notice: whether the method was “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” the affected party. The court used this framework primarily for the tax-lien notice analysis, where the constitutional demand is less exacting than for an outright transfer of title by deed.

Hogaboom v. Jenkins, 93 A.3d 131 (Vt. 2014); Investment Corp. of Virginias v. Acquaviva, 302 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Morris v. LandNPulaski, LLC, 309 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009)

These out-of-state decisions were used to address an issue not resolved in Jones: whether a follow-up notice sent after an initial foreclosure-type event, but during a redemption period, can satisfy due process. The New Hampshire court found the reasoning of Hogaboom and Acquaviva persuasive in cautioning against treating post-event notices as adequate, particularly where costs or burdens increase after the event. It distinguished Morris because, in that case, title had not yet transferred on the sale date; by contrast, here, the court found the Town’s deed execution divested ownership immediately.

White v. Lee, 124 N.H. 69 (1983)

White was cited (in a footnote) to show the court had previously upheld New Hampshire’s tax sale process against due process challenge in part because statutes required notice at multiple stages (pre-sale and pre-deeding to the purchaser after redemption). The court did not treat White as controlling because this case involves a different statutory route (municipal tax deed under RSA 80:76) and hinges on the constitutional adequacy of actions taken after returned mail in light of Jones.

First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 138 N.H. 319 (1994)

First NH Bank supported the proposition that a tax lien and a tax deed impose materially different burdens on property rights. The court used that comparative framework to justify a lower due process “level of notice” for liens than for deeds—while still requiring notice methods that are reasonably calculated under the circumstances.

George v. Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. 123 (2011)

This case was cited for the court’s practice of addressing an issue likely to arise on remand and fully briefed by the parties—here, the sufficiency of notice for the 2016 and 2018 tax liens.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Tax deed notice: additional steps must occur before the deed execution

The Town’s pre-deed certified mailings to the plaintiff’s known addresses were returned undeliverable. Under Jones, once the government becomes aware its notice attempt failed before the taking, it must take additional reasonable steps if practicable. The court focused on timing: the deed’s execution is the operative “taking” because it “conveys 100% ownership to the Town” and strips the former owner of access and control.

The Town argued that the plaintiff ultimately learned of the deed before the repurchase right expired and that post-deed mail and later certified notice (including one signed by Mark Copp) should suffice. The court rejected that approach as incompatible with Jones’s insistence on notice “before taking private property.” It also underscored that after deed execution, the burden to recover the property increased: repurchase would require payment of back taxes and additional statutory amounts, including a penalty tied to property value (citing RSA 80:89, II and RSA 80:90, I).

The court also rejected the Town’s suggestion that the plaintiff’s general awareness of tax delinquency consequences (including a two-year-old email warning that the Town might “pursu[e] a tax deed”) could substitute for constitutionally adequate notice of a concrete, impending deed.

2) Tax lien notice: “reasonably calculated” turns on what the Town knew and what options it had

For liens, the court applied Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” standard and explicitly weighed the less severe intrusion of a lien compared to a deed.

  • 2016 lien: The Town mailed the impending lien notice only to a California address despite repeated failures of delivery to that address and despite having alternative means (Mark Copp’s Manchester address and the plaintiff’s email). Under “all the circumstances,” this was not reasonably calculated to inform the plaintiff.
  • 2018 lien: The Town mailed certified notices to two addresses: (a) Manchester (where Mark Copp had signed for prior notices) and (b) Maine (requested by the plaintiff). Even though both were returned undeliverable this time, the method was still reasonably calculated. The court invoked Jones for the proposition that failure in a specific case does not by itself prove the method inadequate.

3) Email as a notice method: not required categorically, but relevant to reasonableness

The plaintiff urged that due process required email. The court declined to constitutionalize email as mandatory across the board. Instead, it assessed whether the Town’s chosen methods were reasonably calculated and, for the deed context, whether the Town took any additional reasonable steps after returned mail.

Importantly, the court also rejected the Town’s statutory argument: RSA 80:77’s requirement of “certified mail, return receipt requested” did not bar the Town from using email in addition to certified mail, and Jones cautions courts against prescribing a single rigid form of service.

C. Impact

1) Municipal tax deeds in New Hampshire: heightened operational demands once returned mail is received

The most significant doctrinal move is the court’s firm application of Jones to New Hampshire’s municipal tax-deed process: if certified mail notice of an impending tax deed is returned undeliverable, municipalities should expect that due process requires additional reasonable, practicable steps before executing the deed. Critically, the opinion signals that post-deed notice—even if given before the repurchase deadline—will not cure the constitutional defect where the owner’s deprivation occurs at deed execution.

2) Tax lien notices: address selection must reflect the municipality’s knowledge of past delivery failures

The court’s split result on the liens is a practical guide: mailing to an address with a track record of successful receipt (or to addresses requested by the taxpayer) can satisfy due process, while mailing solely to an address known to be unreliable—when other channels exist—may fail even under the less demanding lien context.

3) Litigation and remedies: remand invites questions about the appropriate cure

The court did not decide the remedy, leaving the trial court to determine appropriate relief. Future cases may develop remedies ranging from invalidation of the deed, restoration of rights, or other equitable/statutory relief tailored to the due process violation. The opinion’s remedy posture may encourage municipalities to adopt robust pre-deed notice protocols to reduce the risk of deed invalidation and transactional uncertainty for later purchasers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Due process notice (Fourteenth Amendment): The government must use methods that are reasonably likely to inform you before it takes action that deprives you of property. If the government learns its attempt failed, it may have to try additional reasonable steps.
  • Tax lien vs. tax deed: A tax lien is a legal claim against property to secure unpaid taxes; it burdens ownership but does not automatically transfer title. A tax deed transfers ownership (here, to the Town), which is a more severe deprivation and demands more rigorous notice protections.
  • “Reasonably calculated” notice: Courts do not require perfect success; they assess whether, given what the government knew at the time, the method chosen was sensible and likely to reach the person.
  • “Additional reasonable steps” (from Jones): If mail comes back undelivered and it’s practical to do more, the government must try something more (examples in Jones include re-mailing by regular mail, posting notice, or addressing to “occupant”). The precise step is fact-dependent.
  • Redemption/repurchase period: A statutory window in which the former owner can reclaim the property by paying specified amounts. This opinion treats the period as insufficient to substitute for constitutionally required notice where the owner has already been deprived of title.

5. Conclusion

Manutsom v. Town of Hollis establishes a clear operational constitutional rule for New Hampshire municipalities: when certified notice of an impending municipal tax deed is returned undeliverable, due process requires additional reasonable steps taken before the deed is executed; later notices during the repurchase period do not satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s pre-deprivation notice requirement. The decision also clarifies that while tax liens demand a somewhat lower level of procedural protection than tax deeds, municipalities must still choose notice methods that are actually reasonable in light of known delivery failures and available alternatives. Together, these holdings push New Hampshire tax-foreclosure practice toward more responsive, multi-channel notice efforts—especially where the government has reason to suspect the mailed notice did not reach the owner.