Post-Deadline “Corrected” Summary-Judgment Filings Require Both Good Cause and Excusable Neglect; Title VII Promotion Claims Must Tie Discriminatory/Retaliatory Motive to the Actual Decisionmaker

I. Introduction

In Maritza Reyes v. Florida A&M University Board of Trustees (FAMU), No. 25-10453 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Florida A&M University’s Board of Trustees on a law professor’s Title VII claims for (1) discrimination (race/sex), (2) retaliation, and (3) hostile work environment. The court also affirmed two procedural rulings: denial of a motion to replace an already-filed summary-judgment response with a “corrected” one after the deadline passed, and denial of a motion to reopen discovery.

The appeal presented three linked themes common in employment cases: (a) strict enforcement of scheduling and filing deadlines; (b) the evidentiary burden to show discriminatory or retaliatory intent in a promotion decision—especially where an identified decisionmaker provides a nondiscriminatory rationale; and (c) the requirement that additional discovery be tied to a truly dispositive factual dispute.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Corrected response: Because Reyes sought relief after the response deadline had expired, she had to show both “good cause” (Rule 16(b)(4)) and “excusable neglect” (Rule 6(b)(1)(B)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding she was not diligent after receiving three extensions (48 days total), filing an incomplete response, and waiting 44 days to move to replace it.
  • Title VII merits: Summary judgment was proper because Reyes failed to (a) establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework and (b) present a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination or retaliation. Critically, she offered no evidence that the delegated decisionmaker, Provost Maurice Edington, acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent; the record reflected a scholarship-based reason for denying promotion.
  • Hostile work environment: Reyes failed to show severe or pervasive race-based harassment altering the terms of employment, and the cited testimony did not show race-based conduct.
  • Reopen discovery: The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen discovery because substantial discovery had occurred and Reyes did not identify additional discovery that would resolve a dispositive evidentiary issue.

III. Analysis

A. Procedural Gatekeeping: Post-Deadline Filings and the Dual Requirements of Rules 16 and 6

1. Precedents Cited

  • Jimenez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 146 F.4th 972 (11th Cir. 2025): Used to define “good cause” as diligence—an inability to meet the deadline despite acting diligently.
  • Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2004): Emphasized that repeated extensions diminish claims of diligence; illness, after multiple continuances, may not justify yet another extension.
  • United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147 (11th Cir. 2025): Provided the circuit’s excusable-neglect factors (prejudice, length/impact of delay, reason/control, good faith).

2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion treats Reyes’s request to “replace” her response as, in substance, a request for relief from an expired deadline. That framing triggers two independent constraints: Rule 16(b)(4) (modifying a scheduling order requires “good cause,” i.e., diligence) and Rule 6(b)(1)(B) (extending time after expiration requires “excusable neglect”). Relying on Jimenez v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Young v. City of Palm Bay, the court found lack of diligence because Reyes had three extensions and still filed an incomplete response. The additional 44-day delay in seeking substitution further undermined “excusable neglect” under United States v. Beaufils.

The practical lesson is that a medical issue may explain an acute lapse, but it does not automatically establish diligence where a party has already received multiple extensions, and it does not excuse a long delay in promptly seeking relief once the problem is known.

3. Impact

Even though the disposition is unpublished, the reasoning reinforces a consistent Eleventh Circuit approach: litigants seeking post-deadline relief must satisfy both the scheduling-order standard (diligence) and the excusable-neglect standard (a multifactor equitable inquiry), and repeated extensions significantly raise the bar. In employment cases—where summary-judgment briefing is often decisive—this holding incentivizes early requests for accommodations and immediate motions when impairments arise.

B. Summary Judgment on Title VII: Comparator Rigor, “Convincing Mosaic,” and Decisionmaker-Centered Proof

1. Precedents Cited

  • Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752 (11th Cir. 2025): Restated the McDonnell Douglas framework and clarified that failure to make out a prima facie case does not end the inquiry if a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination exists.
  • Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243 (11th Cir. 2022): Defined “similarly situated in all material respects” for comparator evidence (similar conduct, same policies/supervisors, similar history).
  • Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021): Reinforced that pretext focuses on the employer’s honest belief, not the employee’s view of reality; the question is what was in the decisionmaker’s head.
  • (Framework) McDonnell Douglas: Referenced as the governing burden-shifting structure for summary judgment in employment discrimination claims.

2. Legal Reasoning (Discrimination)

The court held Reyes failed the prima facie case because her proposed comparator, Yolanda Jones, was not shown to be “similarly situated to her in all material respects” under Jenkins v. Nell. That prevented inference of disparate treatment from comparator evidence.

The opinion then proceeded to the alternative pathway recognized in Ismael v. Roundtree: whether the record nonetheless formed a “convincing mosaic of intentional discrimination.” The key move was to identify the operative decisionmaker. Reyes did not dispute that President Larry Robinson had authority but delegated the promotion decision to Provost Maurice Edington. Consequently, evidence of discriminatory intent had to connect to Edington’s decision.

The record on Edington’s motivation consisted of: (1) his affidavit disclaiming discriminatory intent, and (2) his denial letter citing lack of scholarship. Reyes argued her scholarship met standards reflected in the “Nunn Memo” (a memo authored by law professor Kenneth Nunn) and the faculty handbook. But the court held that disagreement with the evaluation did not create a triable issue absent evidence that Edington’s stated belief was insincere—an application of Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist.. In short, without evidence of dishonesty, shifting explanations, irregularities tied to bias, or comparable proof undermining the “honest belief,” Reyes could not show pretext.

3. Legal Reasoning (Retaliation)

Using the retaliation prima facie elements described in Ismael v. Roundtree—protected activity, material adverse action, and causal connection— the court found Reyes offered no evidence that Edington denied promotion to penalize her for complaints. Because the record did not support a causation inference tied to Edington’s motive, both the prima facie case and any “convincing mosaic” theory failed.

4. Impact

The opinion underscores three evidentiary realities in academic promotion disputes litigated under Title VII:

  • Comparator evidence remains demanding: Plaintiffs must establish material similarity, not merely shared job titles or generalized circumstances.
  • “Convincing mosaic” is not a lower standard: It is an alternative method of proof requiring record evidence that supports an inference of discriminatory intent without presumption.
  • Decisionmaker focus is decisive: Where authority is delegated, proof must connect discriminatory/retaliatory intent to the delegate’s decision, not merely to institutional actors generally.

C. Hostile Work Environment: Race-Based, Severe or Pervasive Harassment Must Be Evident in the Record

1. Precedents Cited

  • Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2018): Provided the five-element hostile work environment test, including race-based harassment and severity/pervasiveness.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court emphasized two deficiencies: (1) the absence of evidence of severe or pervasive conduct (including no physically threatening conduct and no showing of interference with job performance), and (2) the absence of evidence tying the complained-of acts to race. The deposition testimony Reyes cited (from Robinson, Dean LeRoy Pernell, and Professor Patricia Broussard) did not, in the court’s view, indicate race-based actions in selecting standards, handling complaints, or evaluating scholarship.

3. Impact

The decision reflects the Eleventh Circuit’s insistence that hostile environment claims be grounded in concrete evidence of discriminatory harassment— not merely workplace conflict, adverse professional judgments, or dissatisfaction with internal processes—unless those matters are linked to protected-class animus and meet the severity/pervasiveness threshold.

D. Reopening Discovery: The “Dispositive Issue” Requirement

1. Precedents Cited

  • Artistic Entm't, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003): Approved denial of reopening discovery where significant discovery occurred and additional discovery would not help resolve dispositive issues (including questions of law).
  • Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991): Held additional discovery unnecessary where parties had ample time and further discovery would not change the dispositive analysis.
  • United States v. Undetermined Quantities of All Articles of Finished and In-Process Foods, 936 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2019): Stated the abuse-of-discretion standard for review of denial to reopen discovery.
  • Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021): Used again to show that even if additional proof established the “correct” policy, it would not matter absent evidence the decisionmaker disbelieved his stated reason.

2. Legal Reasoning

Reyes argued discovery should reopen because FAMU filed an answer to the operative complaint after discovery closed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial because the parties had conducted “significant discovery” (four depositions; over 1,000 pages of evidence), and Reyes failed to identify any additional discovery that would resolve a dispositive disputed evidentiary issue.

Importantly, the court examined the specific items Reyes sought (e.g., establishing that the Nunn Memo contained the governing promotion policies; tenure-track status; the race/gender makeup of the committee) and concluded those facts would not change summary judgment because they did not bear on Edington’s motive or show insincerity under Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist..

3. Impact

The ruling reinforces that motions to reopen discovery must be tethered to how the requested discovery would defeat summary judgment on an element that is genuinely outcome-determinative. Procedural irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient absent a showing of concrete prejudice tied to a dispositive factual dispute.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Good cause” (Rule 16): A scheduling deadline is changed only when the party acted diligently but still could not meet the deadline.
  • “Excusable neglect” (Rule 6): A post-deadline extension depends on equitable factors—prejudice, delay length/impact, reason and control, and good faith.
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A burden-shifting method where the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case; the employer then provides a legitimate reason; the plaintiff must show pretext.
  • Comparator (“similarly situated in all material respects”): Another employee used to show disparate treatment must be materially similar (same standards, similar history, same supervisors, similar conduct).
  • “Convincing mosaic”: An alternative proof method where circumstantial evidence, viewed together, permits a reasonable inference of discrimination without relying on the prima facie presumption.
  • Pretext / “honest belief”: Courts ask whether the decisionmaker honestly believed the stated reason, not whether the reason was correct.
  • Hostile work environment “severe or pervasive”: Harassment must be sufficiently intense or frequent to change the conditions of employment, and must be tied to a protected trait (here, race).
  • Material adverse action (retaliation): An action that might deter a reasonable person from complaining (here, denial of promotion qualified, but causation was missing).

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Reyes is a procedural-and-evidentiary reaffirmation in three respects: (1) after a deadline passes, a party seeking to replace or supplement a summary-judgment response must satisfy both “good cause” and “excusable neglect,” and repeated extensions make that difficult; (2) Title VII promotion claims—whether framed through McDonnell Douglas or a “convincing mosaic”—must present evidence that the actual decisionmaker acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent, or that the stated reason was not honestly believed; and (3) reopening discovery requires a showing that the additional discovery would address a dispositive factual dispute, not merely fill in background facts or correct perceived procedural unfairness.