Post-Conviction Fingerprint/DNA Testing: No Procedural Due Process Violation Absent a Cognizable Liberty-Interest Deprivation, and “Reasonable Probability” May Be Assessed Against the Trial Record

I. Introduction

Parties and posture. In Tony Von Carruthers v. Jonathan Skrmetti, Tony Carruthers—a Tennessee capital prisoner scheduled for execution on May 21, 2026—brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021 (“Fingerprint Act”), the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“DNA Act”), and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12.4(E). The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief; Carruthers appealed and moved to stay execution.

Background. A jury convicted Carruthers in 1996 of three counts of first-degree murder and imposed three death sentences. The Sixth Circuit previously summarized the crimes in Carruthers v. Mays, describing an assault, robbery, and burial alive of three victims.

Key issues. The appeal raised whether Tennessee’s statutory and rule-based post-conviction procedures for fingerprint/DNA testing (and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s constructions of them) violate federal procedural due process, and whether the alleged limitations also violate the First Amendment-based right of access to courts. A consequential remedial issue was whether Carruthers was entitled to a stay of execution pending the litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (per curiam) affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction and denied Carruthers’s motion to stay execution. Without resolving jurisdictional objections (including references to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Article III standing), the court held that Carruthers failed on the merits: (1) his procedural-due-process challenges failed because he did not show deprivation of a protected liberty interest and, in any event, Tennessee’s procedures were not “fundamentally inadequate”; (2) his right-to-access-the-courts theory failed because he received “a litigating opportunity” and identified no cognizable access-to-courts obstruction; and (3) under the equitable stay factors, he could not show likelihood of success on the merits, which foreclosed a stay despite the obvious irreparable harm of execution.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and Their Influence)

  • Arizona v. Biden (6th Cir. 2022): Supported the panel’s choice to decide the appeal on the merits even while noting jurisdictional questions (standing/Rooker-Feldman) raised by appellees.
  • Lifestyle Communities., Ltd. v. City of Worthington (6th Cir. 2026): Provided the general definition of procedural due process as requiring “fair procedure” before deprivation of protected interests.
  • Reed v. Goertz (U.S. 2023): Supplied the two-part procedural due process framework: deprivation of a protected interest plus inadequate state process; also underscored that federal actions for post-conviction DNA testing are “severely limit[ed].”
  • Gutierrez v. Saenz (U.S. 2025): Recognized that state-law regimes can create a “liberty interest” in demonstrating innocence with new evidence—while not expanding the federal role beyond narrow procedural review.
  • Skinner v. Switzer (U.S. 2011): Framed the “slim room” available for § 1983 procedural challenges in the post-conviction testing context; rejected substantive due process expansion here.
  • Dist. Att'y's Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne (U.S. 2009): The central substantive constraint. Osborne instructed that a convicted prisoner has a limited post-conviction interest; states have flexibility; and federal courts may intervene only when state procedures “offend[]” fundamental principles or are “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.”
  • Dowling v. United States (U.S. 1990) and Mooney v. Holohan (U.S. 1935): Defined “fundamental fairness” narrowly and tethered it to “fundamental conceptions of justice.”
  • Howell v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2023): Treated DNA Act interpretations as “persuasive authority” for interpreting the later-enacted Fingerprint Act due to parallel structure and language.
  • Powers v. State (Tenn. 2011): The key Tennessee interpretation of “reasonable probability”: courts “begin with the proposition” that testing will be exculpatory, then assess how that exculpatory assumption would interact with the trial evidence.
  • Griffin v. State (Tenn. 2006): Confirmed the DNA Act contains no filing deadline, supporting the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of Carruthers’s “extratextual deadline” theory.
  • Carruthers v. State (Tenn. May 19, 2026) (per curiam): The contemporaneous Tennessee Supreme Court decision that clarified Rule 12.4(E) did not create original jurisdiction for DNA testing motions and affirmed denial under the DNA Act framework.
  • Alley v. Key (6th Cir. May 14, 2006): Direct Sixth Circuit authority that Tennessee’s DNA Act requirements “do not themselves create any unconstitutional deprivation.”
  • Reed v. Goertz (5th Cir. 2025): Persuasive authority rejecting the argument that due process requires state courts to consider post-trial evidence rather than limiting the “reasonable probability” analysis to the trial record.
  • Cullen v. Pinholster (U.S. 2011) and Smith v. Phillips (U.S. 1982): Reinforced the logic that limiting review to the trial record is constitutionally permissible in other contexts, making it difficult to claim due process requires more from state post-conviction systems.
  • Black v. Strada (Tenn. 2025) (per curiam): Supported the Rule 12.4 framework: only the Tennessee Supreme Court can change execution dates; and after a date is set, a stay requires showing “a likelihood of success on the merits.”
  • Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB (U.S. 1983), Swekel v. City of River Rouge (6th Cir. 1997), Bounds v. Smith (U.S. 1977), Christopher v. Harbury (U.S. 2002): Provided the doctrinal architecture for access-to-courts claims, distinguishing forward-looking (pre-filing) from backward-looking (post-filing) claims and emphasizing meaningful “litigating opportunity.”
  • Ex parte Hull (U.S. 1941) and Johnson v. Avery (U.S. 1969): Canonical examples of unconstitutional pre-filing barriers.
  • Bell v. City of Milwaukee (7th Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Russ v. Watts (7th Cir. 2005), and Foster v. City of Lake Jackson (5th Cir. 1994): Examples where official misconduct (coverups, concealment) can support access claims.
  • Sampson v. Garrett (6th Cir. 2019): Required a showing that the requested relief could matter to a “nonfrivolous challenge” to the conviction.
  • Hill v. McDonough (U.S. 2006), Nken v. Holder (U.S. 2009), In re Black (6th Cir. 2025) (order), and Bedford v. Bobby (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam): Governed the stay-of-execution analysis and highlighted that likelihood of success and irreparable injury are “most critical.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s merits-first approach despite jurisdictional objections

The appellees raised jurisdictional defenses (including Rooker-Feldman and standing), but the panel—citing Arizona v. Biden—proceeded to deny preliminary relief on the merits. Practically, this reflects a common appellate move in emergency capital litigation: where time is short and the merits are clearly lacking, a court may assume arguendo it can reach merits to decide whether extraordinary equitable relief is warranted.

2. Procedural due process: no successful showing of a protected-interest deprivation, and no fundamental inadequacy

The opinion is anchored in Osborne and Skinner: after a valid conviction, a prisoner’s liberty interest is limited, and due process review of state post-conviction testing procedures is exceptionally constrained. The panel framed Carruthers’s claims as attempts to fit within the “slim room” for procedural challenges.

a. Fingerprint Act: “reasonable probability” and fundamental fairness

Carruthers attacked the “reasonable probability” requirement, arguing Tennessee’s authoritative construction imposed an “insurmountable burden.” The panel rejected that characterization by relying on Powers v. State, which requires courts to assume exculpatory results and then evaluate how those assumed results would have interacted with the evidence presented at trial.

Importantly, the Sixth Circuit viewed this methodology as the opposite of stacking the deck against the prisoner: the presumption of exculpatory results is pro-petitioner, while the “interaction” analysis is a rational materiality-like inquiry tied to the state’s legitimate interest in finality. Under Osborne and the narrow “fundamental fairness” conception in Dowling and Mooney, the panel held Tennessee’s approach is not “inconsistent with the traditions and conscience of our people.”

b. DNA Act: no extratextual deadline; trial-record comparator upheld

Carruthers argued the Tennessee Supreme Court invented a filing deadline when it denied his Rule 12.4(E)-filed motion as untimely. The panel read the Tennessee Supreme Court’s action differently: it was a jurisdictional ruling (no original jurisdiction), not an atextual limitations period. Griffin v. State supported the broader point that the DNA Act contains no deadline, while the Tennessee Supreme Court’s own statement emphasized procedural vehicle and forum rather than timeliness.

On the core due process question—whether it is fundamentally unfair to measure “reasonable probability” against only the trial evidence rather than also post-trial evidence—the panel followed Reed v. Goertz (5th Cir. 2025), analogized to Cullen v. Pinholster, and relied on Smith v. Phillips for the proposition that due process does not demand state systems do more than what federal habeas constraints already tolerate. Combined with Alley v. Key and Osborne, the court concluded Tennessee’s DNA Act procedures are not “fundamentally inadequate.”

c. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12.4(E): no new original jurisdiction; no due process deprivation

Carruthers argued Rule 12.4(E)’s text led him to file DNA motions directly in the Tennessee Supreme Court and that the court’s later clarification deprived him of promised process. The panel’s answer was categorical: Rule 12.4(E) governs collateral litigation that “would potentially affect the method or timing of execution.” A stand-alone DNA testing request does not itself “affect the timing” of the execution; it is, at most, a step that might support later relief. Therefore, the rule did not apply, and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was the process due.

3. Right of access to courts: opportunity to litigate, not entitlement to win

The panel treated Carruthers’s access claim as doctrinally mismatched to the allegations. Under Bounds v. Smith, Swekel v. City of River Rouge, and Christopher v. Harbury, an access-to-courts claim usually targets systemic pre-filing barriers or egregious misconduct that destroys an existing case. Here, Carruthers challenged judicial denials and jurisdictional channeling—actions that still left him with a “litigating opportunity” (he filed motions; he appealed; he invoked the correct statutory vehicle after clarification). The court underscored that access doctrine does not constitutionalize a favorable outcome.

4. Stay of execution: likelihood of success is dispositive

Applying Nken v. Holder and Hill v. McDonough, the court acknowledged irreparable harm (In re Black) but denied a stay because Carruthers could not show likelihood of success on the merits. The panel noted it therefore “need not reach” the remaining factors, though it observed they favored the State’s strong interest in finality and enforcement of criminal judgments.

C. Impact

  • Reinforcement of Osborne’s “narrow lane.” The decision reiterates that federal procedural due process challenges to state post-conviction testing regimes will rarely succeed, especially where the state provides a structured mechanism that resembles those approved in Dist. Att'y's Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne.
  • Validation of “assume exculpatory, then weigh against trial proof.” By endorsing Tennessee’s Powers v. State methodology, the opinion signals that a state may legitimately demand a materiality-like showing—focused on the trial record—before ordering forensic testing.
  • Rule-channeling is not a due process violation. The holding on Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12.4(E) cautions litigants that execution-date procedural rules do not necessarily expand substantive post-conviction remedies or confer new original jurisdiction for evidentiary testing requests.
  • Access-to-courts claims remain misconduct-centered. The panel’s treatment suggests that, absent obstruction, concealment, or systemic pre-filing barriers (as in Ex parte Hull or Johnson v. Avery), disappointed litigants generally cannot repackage adverse state-court rulings as First Amendment access violations.
  • Practical effect in capital litigation. In late-stage capital cases, the decision underscores that even grave, time-sensitive circumstances will not produce a stay unless the underlying federal claim is likely to succeed—placing a premium on earlier filing and on claims that fit squarely within recognized constitutional limits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural due process. A constitutional requirement that the government use fair procedures before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property. In the post-conviction testing context, the question is not “is testing a good idea,” but whether the state’s process is fundamentally unfair or fundamentally inadequate.
  • “Liberty interest” created by state law. Even after conviction, a state can create a protected interest by giving prisoners a statutory entitlement (or conditional entitlement) to seek testing. But federal courts still review only the procedure, and only in a very limited way.
  • “Reasonable probability” standard. A materiality-like threshold: the prisoner must show that if the testing came back favorable, there is a reasonable probability the prosecution, conviction, sentence, or verdict would have been different (depending on the statute’s mandatory vs. discretionary provision).
  • Original jurisdiction. A court’s power to hear a matter first, rather than on appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court’s message (as read by the Sixth Circuit) was that Rule 12.4(E) did not give it original jurisdiction to decide DNA-testing motions in the first instance.
  • Right of access to courts. A right to meaningful opportunity to bring nonfrivolous claims—not a right to win them. It is typically violated by barriers that prevent filing or by misconduct that destroys a case.
  • Stay of execution (equitable remedy). A discretionary pause. Even where harm is irreparable, a stay usually requires a strong showing that the underlying claim is likely to succeed.

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion consolidates a restrictive but clear rule for § 1983 challenges seeking post-conviction fingerprint and DNA testing: under Skinner v. Switzer and Dist. Att'y's Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, federal due process review is narrow, and Tennessee’s “reasonable probability” framework—assuming exculpatory results while assessing their effect against the trial evidence—does not cross the high bar of “fundamental unfairness” or “fundamental inadequacy.” The court further held that Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12.4(E) does not create original jurisdiction or a new testing pathway, and that adverse state-court decisions (without obstruction or misconduct) do not become access-to-courts violations. With no likelihood of success on the merits, the court denied the extraordinary remedy of a stay despite the undeniable irreparable harm associated with execution.