Post-Bruen Validity of NFA Registration for Short-Barreled Rifles: Miller Remains Controlling

I. Introduction

United States v. Jamond Rush (7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025) addresses whether 26 U.S.C. §5861(d)—the National Firearms Act (“NFA”) provision criminalizing the receipt or possession of certain unregistered firearms—unconstitutionally burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment after the Supreme Court’s methodological shift in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

The defendant, Jamond M. Rush, was charged with possessing an unregistered Anderson Manufacturing AR-15 rifle with a 7.5-inch barrel, i.e., a short-barreled rifle regulated by the NFA. Rush moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, arguing that Bruen renders §5861(d) unconstitutional. The United States opposed, emphasizing that United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) upheld an analogous NFA registration regime against a Second Amendment challenge.

The core issues on appeal were: (1) whether Miller controls Rush’s facial challenge to §5861(d); and (2) whether Bruen is incompatible with Miller such that §5861(d) fails under modern Second Amendment doctrine.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Rush’s motion to dismiss and upheld his conviction. The court held that binding Supreme Court precedent—United States v. Miller—forecloses Rush’s argument. It further explained that Bruen does not overrule Miller by implication and, even applying the Bruen framework, §5861(d) is consistent with historical firearm regulation traditions, particularly as a registration-and-tax regime targeting weapons with heightened criminal misuse concerns.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Binding-effect and stare decisis framework

  • Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989): The court invoked the rule that lower courts must follow Supreme Court decisions that have “direct application” even if later reasoning elsewhere seems inconsistent. This supplied the doctrinal bridge to treat Miller as dispositive unless the Supreme Court itself repudiates it.
  • Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023) and United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited for the Seventh Circuit’s reaffirmation that it must “resist invitations” to find Supreme Court decisions implicitly overruled. White framed the panel’s approach: apply controlling Supreme Court precedent and leave overruling to the Court.
  • Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005): Used to justify adherence to the circuit’s own precedent (Bevis) absent a clear basis to depart.
  • United States v. Cote, 504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007): Provided the standard of review—constitutionality questions reviewed de novo.

2. Facial-challenge standards

  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987): The court emphasized that a facial challenge requires showing “no set of circumstances” under which the statute would be valid, framing Rush’s claim as an uphill battle independent of the Second Amendment merits.

3. Second Amendment doctrine and weapons classification

  • United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): The keystone precedent. The panel treated Miller as having upheld an NFA registration requirement for a short-barreled shotgun, including discussion of historical barrel-length regulation, supporting the conclusion that similar NFA regulation of short-barreled rifles is constitutional.
  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Used as the modern doctrinal link to Miller. The court highlighted Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” and “common use for lawful purposes” principles, and its reliance on Miller, to rebut the claim that Bruen displaced Miller.
  • N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Central to Rush’s theory. The panel applied Bruen’s two-step (text, then history) framework, but only to test whether Bruen undermines Miller; it concluded it does not.
  • Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023): The court relied on Bevis for two propositions: (i) “bearable” does not mean every transportable weapon is protected; and (ii) weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes—explicitly including “short-barreled shotguns”—fall outside the Second Amendment’s protected class. Bevis also supported rejecting purely numerical “commonality” arguments.
  • Harrel v. Raoul, 144 S. Ct. 2491 (2024): Mentioned to show Bevis remains binding circuit law despite certiorari denial accompanied by separate writings.
  • Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994): Cited for the “quasi-suspect character” of certain NFA-regulated items (machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, artillery), reinforcing the legitimacy of heightened regulation for particular weapons types.
  • United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992): Cited (plurality) for the NFA’s objective of regulating concealable weapons likely to be used for criminal purposes, linking §5861(d)’s “why” to historical “breach of the peace” regulations.
  • Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024): Used to describe why short-barreled long guns are viewed as dangerous (concealability + power) and to emphasize that “common use” alone is not sufficient without lawful-purpose linkage.
  • United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2018): Cited to support the proposition that a short barrel increases concealability and thus criminal appeal, bolstering the “why” justification for regulation.
  • State v. Langford, 10 N.C. 381 (1824): Used as historical evidence for the “dangerous and unusual weapons” limitation and breach-of-the-peace logic, supporting the existence of historical analogues.
  • Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013): Quoted via Bruen’s footnote to illustrate the acceptability of “shall-issue” style licensing focused on ensuring applicants are law-abiding and responsible.
  • Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223 (D.C. Cir. 2024) and United States v. Price, 111 F.4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024): Cited to show sister-circuit agreement that Miller remains good law post-Bruen, especially regarding regulation of unusually lethal or uncommon weapons.

4. NFA as tax/registration scheme and related Seventh Circuit authority

  • Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937): Confirmed the NFA’s taxing scheme is within Congress’s taxing power, supporting the characterization of §5861(d) as a tax-registration enforcement mechanism rather than a categorical prohibition.
  • United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2008): Cited for the view that §5861(d) violations can be understood as a form of tax evasion—reinforcing the “licensing/tax” framing rather than a ban on possession.
  • United States v. Lim, 444 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1997): Used to show the established understanding that Congress may penalize possession of an unregistered firearm to aid collection of transfer/making taxes.
  • United States v. Holton, 639 F. Supp. 3d 704 (N.D. Tex. 2022): Cited in a string cite accompanying scholarship on historical registration/muster practices.

5. “Commonality” and numerical popularity

  • Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015): Used to reject the idea that prevalence alone confers constitutional protection, offering the Thompson submachine gun example and warning against numbers-only reasoning.

6. Judicial restraint and deciding on narrow grounds

  • Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023): Acknowledged the “weighty” constitutional issues, but did not alter the result where binding precedent controls.
  • Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 852 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2017) and Fessenden v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 927 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2019): Cited to justify resolving the appeal on the narrow dispositive basis that Miller controls.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The opinion’s core holding: Miller forecloses Rush’s facial challenge

The panel treated the case primarily as an exercise in hierarchical stare decisis. Because Miller upheld an NFA provision requiring registration of a short-barreled shotgun, the Seventh Circuit concluded it had “direct application” to Rush’s prosecution for possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The court rejected an effort to cabin Miller to its precise weapon (shotgun versus rifle), emphasizing the shared characteristic that drove NFA coverage: a shortened barrel increasing concealability while retaining long-gun power.

2. Relationship between Miller, Heller, and Bruen

The court reasoned that modern Second Amendment cases do not repudiate Miller; instead, they incorporate it. It stressed Bruen’s reaffirmation of Heller’s limits, including the historical tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” and protecting weapons “in common use” for lawful purposes. Because Heller itself relied on Miller, and Bruen relied on Heller, the panel treated Rush’s claim as requiring an impermissible inference of implicit overruling.

3. The court’s application of the Bruen framework (without treating it as a clean-slate inquiry)

Although the panel deemed Miller dispositive, it addressed Bruen for “completeness” and to assess claimed incompatibility:

  • Step One (plain text coverage): The court declined to find, on this record and under Rush’s theories, that possession of an unregistered short-barreled rifle is conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s text. Central to this was the “common use for lawful purposes” limitation and the court’s view that Rush did not connect alleged modern prevalence to lawful self-defense use. The panel also noted, in a facial-challenge posture, that §5861(d) functions as a condition of lawful possession (register and pay tax), not an outright ban, and therefore may not be an “infringement” in the first instance.
  • Step Two (historical tradition): The court credited the government’s analogues: colonial and early state barrel-length requirements cited in Miller; muster/recording practices; fines/taxes and licensing-like restrictions; surety and “going armed” traditions; and the general historical principle that the polity may impose special burdens on weapons likely to be used to breach the peace. It characterized §5861(d)’s burden as modest: registration plus tax, with criminal punishment triggered by noncompliance.

4. Treatment of “common use” evidence

Rush cited an ATF statistic (532,725 registered short-barreled rifles in 2021) to argue contemporary commonality. The court rejected a “numbers alone” approach (relying on Bevis and Friedman) and emphasized that constitutional protection hinges on common use for lawful purposes like self-defense, not mere prevalence.

C. Impact

  • Continued enforceability of §5861(d) in the Seventh Circuit: The decision strengthens the government’s position in future NFA registration prosecutions involving short-barreled rifles (and by extension, likely similar NFA categories), by anchoring outcomes in Miller and treating Bruen as compatible rather than disruptive.
  • Framing matters—registration/tax regimes vs. bans: The opinion repeatedly distinguishes licensing/registration schemes (especially those aimed at confirming law-abiding status and not imposing “exorbitant fees”) from outright prohibitions. Litigants challenging firearm regulations in the circuit should expect heightened skepticism where the law is cast as a compliance condition rather than a categorical disarmament measure.
  • Evidence burden on “common use” will be purpose-sensitive: The court’s insistence on connecting “common use” to lawful uses—particularly self-defense—signals that statistical ownership evidence alone may not carry step-one or step-two disputes without functional/use-context evidence.
  • Institutional restraint: By emphasizing that only the Supreme Court may overrule its decisions, the panel channels many post-Bruen NFA challenges into a single bottleneck: unless and until the Supreme Court revisits Miller, lower courts are likely to treat it as controlling where analogous NFA categories are involved.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Facial challenge: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in all its applications—not just as applied to one person. Under United States v. Rahimi (citing United States v. Salerno), that is exceptionally hard to prove.
  • Bruen’s “text-and-history” test: (1) Ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct (e.g., possessing/carrying a weapon). (2) If it does, the government must show the regulation matches the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, meaning it is “relevantly similar,” not identical, to historical analogues.
  • “Dangerous and unusual weapons”: A historically grounded limitation (highlighted in Heller and Bruen) allowing regulation of weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. The court treated short-barreled long guns as fitting this concern because they combine concealability with high power.
  • “Common use” (and why numbers may not be enough): The court emphasized that constitutional protection depends on common use for lawful purposes (especially self-defense). Ownership counts, without lawful-use context, may not establish constitutional coverage.
  • Registration/tax requirement vs. ban: Section 5861(d) penalizes possessing an NFA firearm that is not registered; it does not categorically prohibit owning the item. The court treated this as closer to licensing regulation than to an outright prohibition.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Jamond Rush reinforces a clear rule for post-Bruen litigation in the Seventh Circuit: United States v. Miller remains controlling authority supporting the constitutionality of NFA registration requirements as applied to short-barreled long guns. The opinion frames §5861(d) as a historically supported, modest compliance regime—registration and taxation—aimed at weapons with heightened criminal-misuse risks, and it rejects the claim that Bruen implicitly displaced Miller.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its methodology: it couples a strong hierarchical stare decisis stance with a purpose- and tradition-based historical analysis that is receptive to analogical regulation (surety, “going armed,” barrel-length requirements, and taxation/fees) and skeptical of arguments that rest on prevalence statistics untethered to lawful self-defense use.