Date: Sep 12, 2026

Police-Pursuit Substantive Due Process Requires “Intent to Harm”; TTCA Claim Must Be Reassessed When Federal Claims Drop Out

I. Introduction

In Valadez v. City of Jacinto City (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), plaintiff Claudia Valadez sued Jacinto City Police Officer Jose Juarez-Aguilera, Police Chief J.M. Ayala, and the City of Jacinto City after she was critically injured when a fleeing truck—being pursued by the officer— ran a red light and collided with her vehicle.

Valadez brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, along with claims for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York and related theories against the Chief. She also asserted a state-law negligence claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), invoking the statute’s motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity.

The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit: (1) affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 theories and the denial of leave to amend; but (2) vacated and remanded the TTCA dismissal, because the district court did not expressly address whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims were gone.

II. Summary of the Opinion

§ 1983 substantive due process (police pursuit): Dismissal affirmed because, under Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, a high-speed chase violates substantive due process only if the officer acted with an “intent to harm” unrelated to a legitimate law-enforcement objective; Valadez alleged “deliberate indifference” and “reckless pursuit,” not intent to harm.
State-created danger: Dismissal affirmed; the Fifth Circuit again declined to recognize the doctrine, relying on Fisher v. Moore and Joiner v. United States, and found Valadez’s briefing insufficient to support adopting a “new theory.”
Monell and supervisory liability / negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention: Dismissal affirmed because these theories require an underlying constitutional violation, which was not plausibly alleged.
TTCA claim: Vacated and remanded because, once the federal claims were dismissed, the district court did not expressly address whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.
Leave to amend: Denial affirmed; a bare request in an opposition brief, without particular grounds or a proposed amendment, is insufficient.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading and review standards

Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.: De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: Complaint must plead enough facts to make the claim “plausible on its face.”
Fisher v. Moore (quoting De La Paz v. Coy): On appeal, well-pleaded facts are taken as true and viewed favorably to plaintiff.
Ironshore Eur. DAC v. Schiff Hardin, L.L.P.: Federal court interpreting state law must decide as the state’s highest court would.

2. Elements of § 1983 and constitutional baseline

McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston): § 1983 requires a constitutional violation plus action under color of state law.

3. Substantive due process in police pursuits

Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex.): Executive action violates substantive due process only if it is “arbitrary” in a “conscience shocking” sense. In high-speed chases to apprehend a suspect, liability requires an “intent to harm” unrelated to legitimate arrest objectives.

4. State-created danger (non-recognition in the Fifth Circuit)

Fisher v. Moore (quoting Joiner v. United States): The Fifth Circuit has “repeatedly declined to recognize” the state-created danger doctrine and is reluctant to create a new constitutional-liability theory absent robust briefing.

5. Qualified immunity (not reached)

Pearson v. Callahan (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald): Qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate clearly established rights; the panel noted that a plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation to overcome the defense, but did not reach the issue because no violation was plausibly alleged.

6. Municipal and supervisory liability require an underlying violation

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York: Municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy/custom causes a constitutional deprivation.
Von Derhaar v. Watson (quoting Turner v. Lieutenant Driver): Supervisors can be liable if personally involved or causally connected to the constitutional violation.
Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys (quoting Becerra v. Asher): Without an underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability fails.
Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex.: Supervisory liability fails absent an underlying constitutional violation.

7. Supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims

Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Products, Inc.: General rule—often decline supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims are eliminated before trial, but it is discretionary, not mandatory.
John Gannon, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp.: The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 lies in the district court’s sound discretion.

8. Leave to amend (Rule 15(a)) and what is required

Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG (quoting Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp.): Leave to amend is discretionary; denials reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co. (quoting United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc.): A bare request to amend in a motion-to-dismiss opposition—without particular grounds—does not qualify as a proper Rule 15(a) request.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “intent to harm” gatekeeping rule controls police-pursuit substantive due process

The core holding is a straightforward application of Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis. When officers engage in a high-speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender, the substantive due process threshold is not “deliberate indifference” or “recklessness,” but purposeful harm: only “intent to harm” physically (or to worsen legal plight) unrelated to legitimate law-enforcement objectives is “conscience shocking.”

Valadez alleged “deliberate indifference” and a “reckless vehicle pursuit.” The panel treated those allegations as legally insufficient under Lewis, because they do not plead that the officer acted with the required harmful purpose. This functions as a categorical pleading barrier for many third-party-injury pursuit cases: absent nonconclusory facts supporting intent-to-harm, the claim cannot proceed past Rule 12(b)(6).

2. The Fifth Circuit again refuses to adopt state-created danger—especially without developed briefing

Valadez also invoked the state-created danger theory. But the Fifth Circuit relied on Fisher v. Moore and Joiner v. United States to reiterate that it has “repeatedly declined to recognize” the doctrine. Importantly, the panel added a prudential point: because Valadez did not explain how the doctrine would operate on these facts, the court considered it “especially unwise” to “fashion a new theory” of constitutional liability. In practice, the decision reinforces that a litigant must do more than cite “state-created danger” as a label; they must present a developed doctrinal framework and application—yet even then, the Fifth Circuit’s baseline position remains non-recognition.

3. Municipal and supervisory theories fail automatically when the underlying constitutional claim fails

The court disposed of Monell and supervisory-liability theories as derivative: without a plausible underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation, there is no constitutional deprivation to be “caused” by a municipal policy/custom or by a supervisor’s causal connection. Citing Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys (and Becerra v. Asher) as well as Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., the panel treated the absence of an underlying violation as fatal to the municipal/supervisory claims.

4. The TTCA dismissal was vacated because the district court did not address supplemental jurisdiction

After affirming dismissal of all federal claims, the Fifth Circuit confronted the TTCA claim. It cited Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Products, Inc. and John Gannon, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp. for the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because the district court “did not expressly address” whether it would retain jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim once the federal claims were gone, the panel vacated the TTCA ruling (including the analysis of the TTCA motor-vehicle exception) and remanded.

Notably, this is not a holding that the TTCA claim is adequately pleaded (or not); it is a procedural correction requiring the district court to: (a) decide whether to keep the TTCA claim under § 1367; and (b) if it keeps it, decide the TTCA issues with jurisdiction clearly established.

5. Denial of leave to amend: “bare request” doctrine applied

The panel affirmed denial of leave to amend because Valadez made only a conclusory request asserting non-futility, without specifying proposed changes. Under United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co. (quoting United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc.), that kind of undeveloped request is not the kind of Rule 15(a) invocation that obligates a district court to permit amendment.

C. Impact

Police pursuit cases (Fourteenth Amendment): The decision reinforces a stringent pleading and proof regime for bystander injuries arising from high-speed chases: unless a plaintiff can plausibly allege Lewis “intent to harm,” substantive due process claims will be dismissed, even if the pursuit is framed as reckless or deliberately indifferent.
State-created danger in the Fifth Circuit: The opinion adds to the growing line of Fifth Circuit decisions (e.g., Fisher v. Moore, Joiner v. United States) signaling that state-created danger remains a nonstarter—and that underdeveloped briefing further forecloses any possibility of doctrinal movement.
Case management of state claims after federal dismissal: The TTCA remand underscores that district courts should explicitly address supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims are dismissed—particularly when the court has already reached merits questions on state-law immunity.
Pleading practice (leave to amend): The holding warns litigants that “please let me amend” language in an opposition brief is insufficient; they should identify specific proposed amendments (often by attaching a proposed amended complaint) to preserve amendment arguments.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive due process / “conscience shocking”: A narrow doctrine that condemns only the most egregious executive misconduct. In police pursuit cases, Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis sets a very high bar: negligence, recklessness, and even deliberate indifference generally do not suffice.
“Intent to harm” (in a chase): A purpose to cause injury (or worsen legal plight) for reasons unrelated to legitimate law enforcement. It is more than knowingly taking risks; it is purposeful harmfulness detached from arrest objectives.
Monell liability: A city is not automatically liable for its employees. A plaintiff must show a municipal policy/custom that caused an actual constitutional violation. If there is no constitutional violation, the Monell claim collapses.
State-created danger: A theory recognized in some circuits where the state’s affirmative conduct creates or increases danger. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly declined to recognize it, and this case continues that approach.
Supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367): The ability of federal courts to hear state-law claims connected to federal claims. When federal claims disappear early, courts often dismiss state claims without prejudice, but the decision is discretionary and should be addressed explicitly.
TTCA motor-vehicle exception: A statutory gateway that can waive Texas governmental immunity for certain injuries arising from motor-vehicle use by government employees. The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether it applies here; it required the district court first to address whether it should even decide the TTCA claim.
Leave to amend (Rule 15(a)): Courts often allow amendment, but a party must explain what it would change and why. A vague request—without proposed facts or claims—is commonly rejected.

V. Conclusion

Valadez v. City of Jacinto City chiefly reinforces three practical rules in the Fifth Circuit: (1) for high-speed police pursuits, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process liability requires Lewis “intent to harm,” not allegations of recklessness or deliberate indifference; (2) absent an underlying constitutional violation, Monell and supervisory theories fail as a matter of law; and (3) when federal claims are dismissed, district courts should explicitly analyze whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction before adjudicating state-law immunity questions—here prompting vacatur and remand of the TTCA ruling. The case also reiterates a procedural lesson: a bare, unspecific request to amend does not preserve a right to replead.