PLRA Three-Strikes Clarified: Jurisdictional (Rooker-Feldman) and Rule 21 Misjoinder Dismissals Do Not Count as Failure-to-State-a-Claim Strikes

Introduction

In Larry Harrison v. FNU Douglas, Counselor (6th Cir. May 20, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit reversed a Western District of Michigan order denying prisoner Larry Harrison leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Harrison alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a prison staff member (“Counselor Douglas”), claiming she filed a false misconduct report to deter grievances or litigation.

The district court did not reach the merits. Instead, it held Harrison had accumulated three PLRA “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), based on prior dismissals in Harrison v. City of Detroit, Harrison v. Palmer, and Harrison v. Collette. The appellate issue was whether those prior dismissals properly qualified as strikes— which determines whether Harrison may pay the filing fee in installments (IFP) or must prepay the entire fee.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that two of the three prior cases relied upon by the district court (Harrison v. Palmer and Harrison v. Collette) were not dismissals “for failure to state a claim” within the meaning of § 1915(g). Because those cases were wrongly counted as strikes, the denial of IFP status could not stand, and the court reversed.

The panel declined to decide whether a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey in Harrison v. City of Detroit necessarily counts as a failure-to-state-a-claim strike, noting the question was unnecessary to reversal and the case was “not a good vehicle” to resolve it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The governing strike framework: Taylor v. Stevens and Crump v. Blue

  • Taylor v. Stevens, 146 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2025) supplied the standard of review: whether a dismissal is a § 1915(g) strike is reviewed de novo.
  • Crump v. Blue, 121 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2024) provided the decisive rule: an “action” counts as a failure-to-state-a-claim strike “only when all of its claims are dismissed” for failure to state a claim. This “all claims” rule is what made Harrison v. Collette ineligible as a strike once the court identified that some dismissals were for reasons other than merits insufficiency.

2) Jurisdictional dismissals are not merits strikes: VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., Kitchen v. Whitmer, and Crump v. Blue

  • In assessing Harrison v. Palmer, the panel emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional, relying on VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2020) and Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525 (6th Cir. 2024).
  • The court then applied Crump v. Blue for the proposition that a jurisdictional dismissal is not a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(g).

3) Strike “labels” do not bind later courts: Simons v. Washington and Burley v. Gagacki

  • The district court had relied on the prior court’s statement in Harrison v. Palmer that its dismissal was “a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),” and on the Sixth Circuit’s earlier appellate description that the complaint had been dismissed for failure to state a claim in Harrison v. Palmer, 2016 WL 11849271 (6th Cir. Oct. 19, 2016).
  • The panel rejected that reliance, citing Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2021): a district court’s strike notation is non-binding; the PLRA “leaves it to a fourth or later court” to make the binding strike determination.
  • It also cited Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016) to discount “passing description” of the basis for dismissal in prior appellate language, focusing instead on the actual grounds of the prior judgment.

4) Immunity plus misjoinder does not equal a strike: Crump v. Blue and Taylor v. Stevens

  • In Harrison v. Collette, the district court dismissed one defendant on absolute judicial immunity grounds (which it treated as failure to state a claim) and dismissed the remaining claims for improper joinder.
  • The Sixth Circuit relied on Crump v. Blue to hold that Rule 21 misjoinder dismissals are not substantively akin to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals: misjoinder says claims should not proceed together, not that the claims are legally insufficient.
  • Responding to the concern that prisoners could “avoid” strikes by adding unrelated claims, the panel pointed to Crump v. Blue and Taylor v. Stevens: courts can address gamesmanship by dismissing strategically added claims as frivolous and assessing strikes on that basis—yet the Collette court did not find frivolousness.

5) The unresolved question: Heck v. Humphrey and Harrison v. City of Detroit

  • The panel recounted that Harrison v. City of Detroit was dismissed because success would “necessarily imply” invalidity of Harrison’s conviction, citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
  • But the court expressly declined to decide whether a Heck dismissal is “necessarily” a failure-to-state-a-claim strike under § 1915(g), leaving that question open in this circuit for another case.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory baseline: Under § 1915(a)-(b), prisoners may pay filing fees in installments if IFP—unless barred by the § 1915(g) three-strikes rule.
  2. Functional, not formal, inquiry: The panel treated “strike” status as turning on the actual ground of dismissal, not a court’s label (“a dismissal as described by § 1915(g)”) or shorthand descriptions in later opinions.
  3. Palmer analysis: Because part of Harrison v. Palmer rested on Rooker-Feldman (jurisdiction), and jurisdictional dismissals are not failure-to-state-a-claim dismissals, Palmer could not be a strike. The opinion thus reinforces a key PLRA distinction: jurisdictional barriers do not equate to merits insufficiency.
  4. Collette analysis: Even accepting that absolute immunity dismissals can be treated as failure-to-state-a-claim for strike purposes, Crump v. Blue requires that all claims be dismissed on qualifying grounds. Because the remaining claims were dismissed for misjoinder under Rule 21 (a non-merits, case-management ground), the “action” was not dismissed entirely for failure to state a claim—so no strike.
  5. Avoiding unnecessary holdings: The court declined to reach the contested Heck-strike question, applying a restraint principle: decide only what is necessary to resolve the appeal.

Impact

  • Narrows strike counting in mixed-dismissal cases: The decision operationalizes Crump v. Blue in a concrete setting: if any portion of the action is dismissed on non-§ 1915(g) grounds (e.g., jurisdiction or misjoinder), the action is not a failure-to-state-a-claim strike.
  • Reinforces that strike determinations are revisitable: By leaning on Simons v. Washington, the panel underscores that strike labels are not self-executing; later courts must independently assess the dismissal grounds.
  • Guidance for district courts handling sprawling prisoner complaints: Courts may use Rule 21 to sever or drop misjoined claims without inadvertently converting a case-management decision into a PLRA strike—while retaining tools (frivolousness findings) to counter manipulation, as explained in Crump v. Blue and Taylor v. Stevens.
  • Leaves an important question open: The circuit still lacks a definitive published resolution on whether Heck v. Humphrey dismissals categorically (or presumptively) count as strikes—inviting continued litigation on that point.

Complex Concepts Simplified

In forma pauperis (IFP)
A status allowing an indigent litigant to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee; under the PLRA, prisoners typically pay in installments.
PLRA “three strikes” (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g))
If a prisoner has three prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, the prisoner generally must prepay filing fees (absent imminent danger).
Failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6))
A merits-based dismissal concluding that, even accepting the facts alleged, the law does not provide a remedy.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
A jurisdictional rule barring federal district courts from acting as appellate reviewers of state-court judgments; because it is jurisdictional, it is not a merits ruling.
Rule 21 misjoinder
A procedural mechanism allowing a court to drop or sever parties/claims that do not belong in the same case; it is about case structure, not legal sufficiency.
Quasi-judicial / absolute judicial immunity
Immunities that protect judges (and sometimes court officials performing judge-like functions) from damages liability for acts within their judicial roles.
Heck v. Humphrey bar
A rule preventing § 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction, unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Conclusion

Larry Harrison v. FNU Douglas, Counselor reinforces a disciplined approach to PLRA strike counting in the Sixth Circuit: courts must look past strike “labels” and determine whether the prior action was dismissed entirely on § 1915(g) grounds. Applying Crump v. Blue, the panel held that jurisdictional dismissals (including Rooker-Feldman) and Rule 21 misjoinder dismissals do not count as failure-to-state-a-claim strikes, and reversed the denial of IFP status accordingly. The opinion also highlights an unresolved frontier—whether Heck v. Humphrey dismissals are strikes—left for another day.