PLRA Strike Counting Requires Qualifying Dismissal Grounds, Filing-Date Timing, and Actual Litigation

Case: Tyrelle Henderson, Jr. v. Kent Cnty., Mich.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Decision: November 10, 2026
Opinion: Judge Griffin, joined by Judges Bush and Nalbandian; separate concurrence by Judge Bush.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses how courts must count prior dismissals under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s three-strikes provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). It reinforces an important distinction: a prisoner’s unsuccessful lawsuit does not necessarily constitute a statutory “strike.” The actual grounds for dismissal, the timing of that dismissal, and the procedural circumstances of an earlier strike determination all matter.

Tyrelle Henderson, a Michigan state prisoner, brought constitutional claims against Kent County and Sheriff Michelle LaJoye-Young, whom he sued in her official and personal capacities. He requested permission to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court determined that he had accumulated three qualifying strikes, found the imminent-danger exception inapplicable, and denied his request. When Henderson did not pay the filing fee, the court dismissed the action without prejudice.

Henderson appealed only the three-strikes determination. He argued that two supposed strikes included claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, which ordinarily fall outside § 1915(g). The defendants, collectively described as “the County,” defended the strike classifications, identified additional dismissals, and argued that a prior judicial determination prevented Henderson from contesting the classifications again.

The Sixth Circuit rejected those arguments, vacated the dismissal, and remanded. Its decision concerns access to the IFP procedure—not the merits of Henderson’s underlying constitutional claims.

2. Statutory Framework and Summary of the Decision

Section 1915(g) restricts IFP status when a prisoner has, on at least three prior occasions, brought a federal action or appeal dismissed as:

  • frivolous;
  • malicious; or
  • failing to state a claim.

A prisoner with three qualifying strikes may nevertheless proceed under the statutory exception for “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Henderson did not challenge the district court’s rejection of that exception.

The court’s principal conclusions were:

  1. The entire action must qualify. Under circuit precedent, an action counts as a strike only when every claim was dismissed on a ground enumerated in § 1915(g).
  2. Eleventh Amendment immunity is not itself an enumerated ground. An immunity dismissal does not automatically become a failure-to-state-a-claim dismissal or a finding of frivolousness or maliciousness.
  3. Alternative merits language cannot overcome an operative jurisdictional dismissal. Once the court had concluded that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the relevant claims, it lacked authority to issue an alternative merits ruling on those claims.
  4. Later dismissals cannot retroactively supply missing strikes. The County could not rely on a dismissal entered after Henderson filed this action and sought IFP status.
  5. An uncontested, sua sponte strike determination did not establish issue preclusion. The earlier classification had not been “actually litigated.”

The appellate court therefore removed the three-strikes ruling as a basis for the dismissal. It did not direct judgment for Henderson on his constitutional claims or conclusively resolve every other requirement for IFP treatment.

3. The Prior Actions and Their Significance

Prior action Relevant disposition Effect in this appeal
Henderson v. County of Kent (County of Kent I), 2024 WL 4661399 Included official-capacity damages claims against state prosecutors dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment, without an express frivolousness or maliciousness finding concerning those claims. Not a strike.
Henderson v. Conrad, 2020 WL 7345656 Included official-capacity damages claims dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, accompanied by failure-to-state-a-claim language. Not a strike; the additional language did not create a valid alternative merits disposition after the jurisdictional ruling.
Henderson v. County of Kent, 2024 WL 4540459 The parties agreed that this dismissal qualified. One undisputed strike.
Henderson v. Peterson, 2026 WL 717279, report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 716373 Dismissed almost eight months after Henderson filed the present action and requested IFP status. Too late to count for this action.
Henderson v. County of Kent (County of Kent II), 2025 WL 750306 The court independently classified earlier cases as strikes; the parties did not raise or contest the issue. No issue-preclusive effect on the disputed classifications.

The County also offered another action as an additional strike. Because its alternative argument required both that action and Henderson v. Peterson to qualify, the court did not decide the other action’s status. Accordingly, the opinion establishes one qualifying strike among the three cases originally relied upon; it does not purport to classify every lawsuit Henderson has filed.

4. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents

A. Strike status depends on the grounds Congress actually listed

The central authority was Crump v. Blue, 121 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2024). That decision supplied two controlling propositions: every claim must have been dismissed on a qualifying statutory ground, and Eleventh Amendment immunity is not itself such a ground. It also rejected treating an immunity dismissal as inherently equivalent to failure to state a claim.

The distinction follows the statute’s structure. Section 1915(g) identifies particular reasons for dismissal; it does not impose strikes for every legally unsuccessful or procedurally defective action. Thus, an action containing both qualifying dismissals and a nonqualifying immunity dismissal ordinarily falls outside the three-strikes rule.

Taylor v. Stevens, 146 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2025), reinforced the treatment of immunity dismissals and supplied the de novo standard of review. The appellate court independently decided whether the earlier actions met the statutory definition, without deferring to the district court’s legal classification.

Neither precedent makes immunity-based claims categorically strike-proof. As the majority explained, relying on Crump v. Blue, a court may expressly find an immunity-barred claim frivolous. But that is a separate determination; immunity alone does not establish frivolousness. The challenged dismissals contained no relevant finding that Henderson had frivolously or maliciously disregarded the immunity defense.

B. Courts examine what the dismissing court did—not what it could have done

In Henderson v. County of Kent (County of Kent I), the relevant official-capacity damages claims against state prosecutors were dismissed because the prosecutors acted as state agents and the Eleventh Amendment barred damages claims against the state in federal court.

The County argued that the dismissal also contained traces of failure-to-state-a-claim reasoning. The Sixth Circuit rejected that attempt to reconstruct a different disposition. It relied on Daker v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016), and Fourstar v. Garden City Grp., Inc., 875 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2017), for the principle that strike classification examines the dismissal actually entered, rather than a qualifying dismissal the earlier court might have entered.

This principle limits retrospective relabeling. A later court cannot convert an express immunity ruling into a merits dismissal merely because the complaint may also have been vulnerable on another ground. The operative rationale, not an imagined alternative, controls.

C. An immunity ruling cannot be followed by an effective alternative merits ruling on the same claims

Henderson v. Conrad presented a harder question because the dismissal stated that the official-capacity claims were “barred by the Eleventh Amendment and fail to state a claim.” The County characterized this as two independent holdings, either sufficient to support a strike.

The court rejected that argument for both contextual and jurisdictional reasons. First, the earlier court’s substantive discussion concerned Eleventh Amendment immunity. Its only potential merits observation was a passing statement that the complaint connected no specific allegations to the prosecutor.

Second, and more fundamentally, Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037 (6th Cir. 2015), described the Eleventh Amendment as “a true jurisdictional bar.” Once the court concluded that the immunity barred those claims, it no longer possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate their merits.

The court then invoked Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), to explain why an alternative merits ruling would be ultra vires—outside the court’s lawful authority. Merely adding failure-to-state-a-claim language could not create a valid strike-producing merits judgment after jurisdiction had been found absent.

This is a significant application of the earlier immunity cases. The decision does not merely distinguish statutory grounds; it explains why the order of adjudication matters. An operative immunity ruling cannot be neutralized by an additional merits label.

D. Strike counting is fixed at the relevant filing point

The County’s reliance on Henderson v. Peterson failed because that dismissal occurred after the present litigation began.

Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015), supplied the statutory framework requiring qualifying dismissals on prior occasions. The court then relied more specifically on:

  • Taylor v. Grubbs, 930 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2019), which states that strikes are counted as of the filing of the complaint or appeal; and
  • Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655 (3d Cir. 2019), which identifies dismissals already entered when the litigant applies for IFP status and submits the complaint or notice of appeal.

Because Henderson v. Peterson was dismissed almost eight months after Henderson had both filed this action and requested IFP status, it could not supply a missing strike here. The court did not need to decide whether its grounds would otherwise qualify.

The resulting rule prevents a pending action’s initial IFP eligibility from being retroactively defeated by later developments in unrelated litigation. It does not determine how those later dismissals should be counted in future filings.

E. Additional litigation records may be considered when procedurally appropriate

Henderson argued that Taylor v. Stevens prohibited consideration of the County’s additional proposed strikes. The court distinguished that decision because its jurisdictional limitation did not apply here.

The court also recognized that judicial notice may permit consideration of a litigant’s prior actions. It cited Edwards v. Gaul, 40 F. App'x 970 (6th Cir. 2002); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692 (9th Cir. 2022); Fletcher v. Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010); and Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 369 F. App'x 36 (11th Cir. 2010), together with Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1).

These authorities supported examining relevant litigation records, not treating every prior dismissal as a strike. The County lost because the additional dismissal was too late, not because consideration of additional cases was categorically forbidden.

F. Issue preclusion requires actual litigation of the strike question

The County’s final argument relied on Henderson v. County of Kent (County of Kent II), where a court had already classified the disputed actions as strikes. The Sixth Circuit held that this earlier determination did not bind Henderson.

Hammer v. INS, 195 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1999), supplied the decisive requirement: the issue must have been “actually litigated and decided” in the earlier action. A judicial statement alone does not necessarily meet that standard.

The court drew on Fischer v. Thomas, 176 F.4th 470 (6th Cir. 2026), for the proposition that an issue is usually actually litigated when the parties raise it, rather than when a court addresses it independently. Janjua v. Neufeld, 933 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019), and Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 430 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1970), supported the same distinction. The court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, comment e.

The County conceded that the parties had neither raised nor contested the strike issue in the earlier action. That concession defeated the actual-litigation requirement.

By contrast, Thomas v. Sepulveda, 2014 WL 5409064 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014), illustrated circumstances in which a three-strikes issue had been actually litigated: defendants raised it by motion, and the plaintiff opposed it.

The holding is therefore narrower than a universal rule that court-initiated determinations can never have preclusive effect. Here, the uncontested, sua sponte classification did not satisfy a necessary element of issue preclusion. The court had no need to resolve the doctrine’s remaining requirements.

5. Judge Bush’s Concurrence: Screening Choices and Proposed Reform

Judge Bush joined the majority but emphasized the practical difficulty of addressing repetitive prisoner litigation under the existing statutory language. His concurrence contains procedural recommendations and proposals for legislation; these should be distinguished from the court’s binding holdings.

A. Courts need not always raise sovereign immunity first

The concurrence observed that the government in Henderson v. Conrad had not raised sovereign immunity as a threshold jurisdictional defense. The district court instead raised it during screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Relying on Does v. Whitmer, 69 F.4th 300 (6th Cir. 2023); Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes; and Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2006), Judge Bush explained that the court was not required to introduce sovereign immunity on its own before screening the complaint for failure to state a claim.

That observation reconciles the concurrence with the majority. The majority addressed what follows after a court rules that immunity deprives it of jurisdiction. The concurrence addressed whether the court must choose that ground in the first place. Where legally permissible and supported by the complaint, a merits-based screening dismissal could produce a strike without an intervening immunity ruling.

B. Procedural dismissals illustrate the statute’s limited reach

Judge Bush identified seven federal actions dismissed for failure to prosecute:

  • Henderson v. Dart, No. 1:20-cv-01722;
  • Henderson v. Doe, No. 1:20-cv-03651;
  • Henderson v. Doe, No. 1:20-cv-03704;
  • Henderson v. Hodal, No. 1:20-cv-03709;
  • Henderson v. Tezko, No. 1:20-cv-03705;
  • Henderson v. Dart, No. 1:20-cv-03713; and
  • Henderson v. Tezko, No. 1:20-cv-04307.

He also identified state-court dismissals for failure to serve defendants: three actions titled Henderson v. Cnty. of Kent, Nos. 25-525-NO, 25-528-NZ, and 25-529-CZ, and Henderson v. Lofton, No. 25-20133-NO.

These cases were examples supporting the concurrence’s concern about repetitive filings, not precedents establishing a new counting rule. Failure to prosecute and failure to serve are not themselves listed in § 1915(g). Moreover, the statute’s reference to actions in courts of the United States presents a separate limitation for the state-court examples; the opinion did not hold those cases countable.

C. Frivolousness findings and legislative amendment

Drawing on both the majority and concurring opinions in Crump v. Blue, Judge Bush warned that litigants might avoid strikes by including claims dismissed on nonenumerated grounds. He urged courts to use available frivolousness determinations where appropriate and suggested that Congress add sovereign immunity, failure to prosecute, and failure to serve to the statutory list.

The majority likewise cited Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1986), to emphasize that self-representation does not authorize abuse of judicial resources. That warning did not change the statutory analysis: litigation volume and unpaid fees cannot substitute for three qualifying dismissals.

Nor does the concurrence make every procedural or immunity dismissal frivolous. A frivolousness finding remains a distinct legal determination, not an automatic consequence of a litigant’s history.

6. Potential Impact

More exacting review of prior dismissal orders

Courts applying § 1915(g) must examine the grounds disposing of individual claims, rather than relying solely on a case’s unsuccessful outcome or a prior court’s strike label. Mixed-ground dismissals require particular care.

Greater importance of jurisdictional sequencing

The decision makes clear that alternative merits language cannot rescue a strike classification after an operative Eleventh Amendment ruling. At the same time, the concurrence highlights that courts may sometimes screen on an independently available merits ground without first raising immunity themselves.

Protection against retroactive strike accumulation

Defendants must identify dismissals qualifying at the relevant filing point. A later dismissal cannot be added simply because it exists by the time an appeal is decided.

Closer attention to the record of prior litigation

Parties invoking issue preclusion must establish that the earlier strike question was genuinely litigated. A motion, response, and decision may support that showing; an uncontested court-generated classification does not necessarily do so.

A limited access-to-court ruling, not immunity from litigation controls

The decision preserves the statutory boundary between unsuccessful litigation and qualifying strikes. It does not validate Henderson’s constitutional allegations, erase filing-fee obligations, or prevent appropriately supported dismissals. Its broader significance lies in enforcing Congress’s chosen criteria despite concerns about abusive filings.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

In forma pauperis
A procedure allowing a financially eligible litigant to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee. Prisoners ordinarily remain responsible for payment through the statutory installment system.
PLRA strike
A prior federal action or appeal dismissed on grounds specified in § 1915(g). Losing a lawsuit does not automatically produce a strike.
Eleventh Amendment immunity
A protection that generally prevents certain suits against states in federal court. Relevant here, it barred damages claims against prosecutors sued in their official capacities as state agents.
Failure to state a claim
A determination that the allegations do not establish a legally sufficient claim for relief. It differs from a determination that the court lacks authority to hear the claim.
Issue preclusion
A doctrine that can prevent parties from relitigating an issue already actually litigated and decided, provided its other requirements are met.
Sua sponte
Action taken by a court on its own initiative, without a party requesting it.
Ultra vires
Beyond lawful authority. Here, it described a purported merits ruling made after the court had determined that immunity barred its jurisdiction.
Vacate and remand
Set aside the lower court’s decision and return the case for further proceedings under the appellate court’s instructions.

8. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit required fidelity to the PLRA’s actual terms: qualifying dismissal grounds, qualifying timing, and genuine prior litigation before issue preclusion can apply. Eleventh Amendment dismissals could not be transformed into strikes through retrospective merits reasoning, an ineffective alternative holding, or an uncontested earlier classification.

The court vacated and remanded without deciding Henderson’s constitutional claims. It also expressly left unresolved his separate argument concerning prosecutorial-immunity dismissals. The decision’s central lesson is that concerns about repetitive litigation cannot replace the specific statutory and procedural requirements governing the three-strikes bar.