Date: Feb 8, 2026

Pleading Specific Falsity to Disregard an Attached Arrest Affidavit at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage

Introduction

In Melissa Antoinette Betterson v. Town of Cutler Bay, the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-precedential) affirmed dismissal of a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida-law complaint arising from Betterson’s arrest after police responded to a report of shots fired. Betterson sued the Town of Cutler Bay, Miami-Dade County, and multiple officials and officers, alleging (i) arrest without probable cause (Fourth Amendment and Florida false arrest/false imprisonment theories) and (ii) denial of medical care (pleaded under the Eighth Amendment), along with theories of supervisory, official-capacity, and municipal liability.

The appeal centered on whether the district court could consider an arrest affidavit attached to the complaint, whether probable cause existed (including under the “any crime” rule), whether non-arresting supervisors could be liable, whether Florida’s sovereign-immunity waiver permitted an individual-capacity tort claim against an officer, whether official-capacity counts were duplicative, whether municipal liability was adequately pleaded under Monell, and whether qualified immunity barred individual-capacity constitutional claims.

Summary of the Opinion

Arrest affidavit considered: Because Betterson’s complaint did not specifically allege falsity as to the affidavit’s factual statements (as opposed to disputing legal conclusions like probable cause), the court held the district court properly considered the affidavit attached to the complaint.
Probable cause existed (any-crime rule): Even if probable cause were lacking for the charged offenses, officers had probable cause to arrest for discharging a firearm near a dwelling under Fla. Stat. § 790.15(1), based on the shots-fired call and officers’ observations of Betterson holding and dropping a gun.
Supervisors not present: Claims against officials not alleged to have participated in or procured the arrest were properly dismissed.
Florida sovereign immunity: The individual officer defendant (Romero) was protected by Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) because the complaint did not plausibly allege bad faith/malicious purpose/wanton and willful disregard.
Official-capacity duplicativeness: Official-capacity claims against individual municipal/county employees duplicated claims against the Town and County and were properly dismissed.
Municipal liability not pleaded: The complaint did not plausibly allege an official policy, widespread custom, or action by a final policymaker causing a constitutional violation, and the “single incident” theory did not fit the narrow exception.
Qualified immunity: Individual-capacity Fourth Amendment claims failed because at minimum officers had arguable probable cause, and the medical-care allegations did not plausibly allege a sufficiently serious medical need or subjective recklessness.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

A. Using exhibits attached to a complaint at Rule 12(b)(6)

Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd: Provided the governing framework: attached exhibits may be considered, and when an exhibit contradicts conclusory allegations, the exhibit controls. Critically, when a plaintiff claims an arrest affidavit is misleading/incorrect, courts compare the complaint’s allegations to the affidavit statement-by-statement to see whether the allegations are specific enough to prevent treating the affidavit’s statement as true.
Saunders v. Duke: Established that when a plaintiff attaches a police report and plausibly alleges it is false, the court should not treat the report’s contents as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The panel distinguished Saunders because Betterson did not plead specific factual falsity in the affidavit; she largely argued that the affidavit’s facts did not add up to probable cause.
Hoefling v. City of Miami: Reinforced the “classic example” of exhibit control—where a plaintiff’s characterization of a document conflicts with the document itself, the document governs. The panel relied on this principle when rejecting Betterson’s assertion that the affidavit claimed she had a “concealed firearm,” noting the affidavit did not say that.
United States v. Dudley: Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. The panel used it to explain why the district court’s approach was consistent with circuit law and why Gill did not undermine Saunders.
Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd (standard of review) and Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.: Together anchored the pleading lens: accept well-pleaded facts as true, but not legal conclusions unsupported by facts.
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.: Used to emphasize that liberal construction for pro se pleadings does not permit courts to rewrite deficient pleadings.

B. Probable cause and the “any crime” rule

Garcia v. Casey: Supplied two key principles: (i) probable cause exists where a reasonable officer could conclude there was a substantial chance of criminal activity, and (ii) the “any crime” rule—false arrest claims fail if there was probable cause to arrest for some offense, even if not the offense articulated at the time. The panel’s core disposition on the false arrest theories is an application of Garcia.
Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala.: Provided the general definition of probable cause based on reasonably trustworthy information and collective knowledge.
Davis v. City of Apopka: Reinforced that probable cause is a complete bar to Florida false arrest claims; also that officers need not resolve every inconsistency or accept a suspect’s innocent explanation when circumstances suggest criminal activity.
Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ.: Cited for the appellate principle that the court may affirm on any legal basis supported by the record.

C. Florida concealed-carry authorities (contextual but not outcome-determinative)

State v. Yarn, State v. Hankerson, and Jean-Marie v. State: Cited to explain Florida’s flexible, circumstance-dependent approach to concealment—absolute invisibility is not required.
Dorelus v. State: Cited for the countervailing point that if an officer immediately recognizes an object as a weapon, that may demonstrate non-concealment as a matter of law. These cases framed Betterson’s argument about concealed carry, but the panel ultimately relied on probable cause for a different offense under the “any crime” rule.

D. Liability of non-arresting officials under Florida false arrest law

Mathis v. Coats: Stated Florida elements for false arrest/false imprisonment.
Harris v. Kearney: Critical to the dismissal: liability requires personal and active participation (directly or indirectly by procurement) in the unlawful restraint. The panel applied this to reject claims against officials not alleged to be present or to have caused the arrest.

E. Florida sovereign immunity for individual officers

Coleman v. Hillsborough Cty.: Interpreted Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) exceptions, explaining “bad faith” and “malicious purpose” and the high threshold for “wanton and willful disregard.” The panel relied on Coleman to conclude Betterson’s allegations did not plausibly reach the exception thresholds.

F. Official-capacity duplication

Stephens v. Geoghegan: Provided the Florida rule that official-capacity suits are equivalent to suits against the municipal entity, supporting dismissal as duplicative.

G. Municipal liability under § 1983

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services: Anchored the core limitation—no respondeat superior; liability only for an official policy/custom or actions by a final policymaker causing the constitutional violation.
Salvato v. Milev: Reinforced the equivalence of official-capacity suits to suits against the government entity.
Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty, Fla.: Supplied the three recognized routes to establish municipal liability (official policy; widespread custom; final policymaker decision). The panel used this as the yardstick for why Betterson’s allegations were insufficient.
Cooper v. Dillon: Cited for the proposition that, under Florida law, police chiefs can have final policymaking authority in their municipalities for law enforcement matters—used to assess (and reject) Betterson’s attempt to treat a supervising officer as a final policymaker.
City of Canton v. Harris, Ziegler v. Martin Cnty. Sch. Dist., Connick v. Thompson, and Gold v. City of Miami: Together delineated failure-to-train liability: deliberate indifference typically requires a pattern of similar constitutional violations; the “single incident” possibility is narrow and usually hypothetical.
Bd. of Cnty. Comr's of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown: Tightened the “single incident” theory, describing it as available only in a narrow range of circumstances.
Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala.: Also served the § 1983 false arrest principle: probable cause defeats a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.

H. Medical care claims and deliberate indifference

Farmer v. Brennan and Estelle v. Gamble: Established the Eighth Amendment framework and the concept that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs can be unconstitutional.
Wade v. McDade (en banc): Provided the two-part structure emphasized by the panel: an objectively serious deprivation plus subjective recklessness (actual, subjective awareness that the defendant’s conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm).
Harris v. Coweta Cnty. and Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc.: Used to distinguish between actionable serious medical needs (including some delayed-treatment situations) and non-actionable generalized allegations of pain or “mere discomfort.”

I. Waiver/abandonment principles

United States v. Campbell: Applied to find waiver where Betterson disclaimed a conditions-of-confinement theory in district court briefing.
Timson v. Sampson: Applied to deem issues not briefed on appeal abandoned, even for pro se litigants.

J. Qualified immunity doctrine

Cottone v. Jenne: Provided the review standard and pleading-stage principle that dismissal is appropriate when the complaint’s face shows an affirmative defense (qualified immunity) bars relief.
Thornton v. City of Macon, Fish v. Brown, and Wilkerson v. Seymour: Supplied the “arguable probable cause” standard for qualified immunity in arrest cases—lower than actual probable cause, and satisfied if a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed for some offense.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. A practical pleading rule for attached arrest affidavits

The opinion’s most practice-facing move is its application of the Eleventh Circuit’s exhibit/pleading doctrine: attaching an arrest affidavit does not automatically make its contents “true,” but a plaintiff must do more than label the affidavit “false.” The plaintiff must plausibly and specifically allege that particular factual assertions are wrong or misleading. Where the complaint instead disputes the legal significance of the stated facts (e.g., “that doesn’t add up to probable cause”), the affidavit remains usable at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and any contradiction between the affidavit and the complaint’s generalized characterizations is resolved in favor of the exhibit.

B. Probable cause: the “any crime” rule resolves the false arrest theories

The panel bypassed protracted debate over the original arrest charges (concealed carry and battery) by applying the “any crime” rule: the shots-fired dispatch and the officers’ observation of Betterson holding and dropping a gun supported a reasonable belief that she discharged a firearm near a dwelling (Fla. Stat. § 790.15(1)). That was sufficient to establish probable cause for “some crime,” which defeats Florida false arrest claims and the Fourth Amendment false arrest theory.

The opinion also illustrates the limited role of on-scene self-defense explanations at the probable-cause stage: officers need not conclusively resolve competing accounts before making an arrest if the totality of circumstances suggests criminal activity.

C. No participation, no Florida false arrest liability

For claims against the Town Manager and other officials, the court applied Florida law’s participation requirement: liability requires that the defendant personally participated in the restraint or procured it. Absent allegations connecting these officials to the arrest decision or execution, the claims fail as a matter of pleading, regardless of generalized assertions about training duties.

D. Florida’s sovereign-immunity waiver is limited for individual employees

Betterson argued sovereign immunity was “waived,” but the panel emphasized the statutory structure: Florida waives immunity for governmental entities in specified circumstances, while simultaneously shielding individual employees unless the complaint plausibly alleges conduct meeting the high-threshold exceptions in Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (bad faith/malicious purpose/wanton and willful disregard). Because the complaint did not plausibly plead that level of culpability—especially given the presence of probable cause-like circumstances—individual tort liability against the officer was barred.

E. Official-capacity claims: entity suit by another name

The panel treated official-capacity counts as redundant of the claims against the Town and County. This is a recurring housekeeping doctrine: where the municipality is already named, duplicative official-capacity claims are typically dismissed to streamline the litigation and avoid confusion about who would pay a judgment.

F. Monell: why a “single incident” rarely becomes a municipal “custom”

The court rejected municipal liability because Betterson pleaded no official policy, no widespread practice, and no plausible final-policymaker decision attributable to the County or Town. The opinion is also a reminder that the “single incident” route to liability is exceedingly narrow: it is not enough to allege one arrest/detention episode and label it a “custom.” Without facts showing an obvious need for training that was deliberately ignored, or a pattern of similar violations, deliberate indifference is not plausibly alleged.

G. Qualified immunity: arguable probable cause and non-serious medical allegations

On the individual-capacity constitutional claims, the court held that (i) arguable probable cause existed for at least one offense linked to the gunshots call and gun observation, and (ii) the medical-care allegations did not meet the objective seriousness threshold or the subjective-awareness requirement. The complaint’s description of a head injury lacked factual detail showing severity or obviousness, and it did not plausibly allege that the relevant officials were actually aware their conduct created a substantial risk of serious harm.

3. Impact

Pleading strategy with exhibits: Plaintiffs who attach arrest reports/affidavits must plead specific factual falsity (who said what, what is incorrect, and why) to prevent courts from crediting those factual assertions at Rule 12(b)(6). Conclusory “the affidavit is false” allegations—especially those contradicted by the exhibit—will not suffice.
“Any crime” rule remains decisive: Litigants challenging arrests should anticipate that courts may identify alternative offenses supported by the alleged facts, defeating false arrest claims even if the stated arrest charge is contested.
High hurdles for supervisory and municipal liability: General allegations about failures to train or supervise will not substitute for facts showing deliberate indifference (pattern or narrow obviousness) and an identified policy/custom/final-policymaker action.
Individual-capacity Florida tort claims: Claims against individual officers face a demanding pleading burden to fit within Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) exceptions.
Non-precedential but instructive: As “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is not binding precedent, but it reflects how the Eleventh Circuit is likely to apply established doctrines to similar pleadings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6): A motion asking the court to dismiss because the complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim, even if its well-pleaded facts are assumed true.
Probable cause: Whether the known facts would lead a reasonable officer to believe there is a substantial chance a crime occurred.
“Any crime” rule: Even if officers cited the “wrong” offense, an arrest is still lawful (for false-arrest purposes) if probable cause existed for some offense.
Arguable probable cause: A lower threshold used in qualified immunity: whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.
Qualified immunity: A defense protecting officials from personal liability unless they violated clearly established federal law; it often ends cases at the pleading stage.
Sovereign immunity (Florida) and § 768.28(9)(a): Florida generally channels tort liability to the government entity, shielding individual employees unless the plaintiff plausibly alleges bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard.
Official capacity: Suing an officer “in official capacity” is effectively suing the government entity; if the entity is already a defendant, the official-capacity claim is usually redundant.
Monell liability: A municipality is liable under § 1983 only for its own policies/customs (or final-policymaker decisions), not simply because it employs a wrongdoer.
Deliberate indifference to medical needs: A constitutional standard requiring (1) a serious medical need and (2) subjective recklessness—actual awareness that one’s conduct creates a substantial risk of serious harm.

Conclusion

Betterson is a doctrinally conventional but practically important application of pleading and immunity principles. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal by: (1) allowing consideration of an attached arrest affidavit absent specific pleaded falsity; (2) applying the “any crime” rule to find probable cause for an alternative firearm offense; (3) enforcing participation requirements for Florida false arrest claims; (4) applying Florida’s individual-employee sovereign immunity limits; (5) treating official-capacity claims as duplicative; (6) rejecting municipal liability absent a pleaded policy/custom/final-policymaker act (and refusing to expand the narrow “single incident” theory); and (7) applying qualified immunity where arguable probable cause existed and the medical-care allegations lacked factual heft.