Pleading Particularized Falsehoods and “But-For” Probable Cause in Eleventh Circuit § 1983 Malicious-Prosecution Claims at PLRA Screening

Introduction

Supreme Born v. Randall Woodfin (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision affirming the dismissal of a prisoner’s pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim at the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) screening stage.

The plaintiff, Supreme Born, was arrested in connection with a 2017 shooting and convicted in 2018 of four felonies, including attempted murder and multiple counts of discharging a firearm into a vehicle. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed one conviction (discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle) for insufficiency of evidence that the vehicle was occupied. Born later sued various municipal and police officials—most notably a detective who allegedly procured the arrest warrant—contending the warrant was obtained through false statements and fabricated evidence.

The key issue on appeal was not whether Born could ever state a malicious-prosecution claim, but whether his complaint as pleaded contained enough concrete facts to survive mandatory PLRA screening—particularly as to (i) what false statements were made, (ii) how they were false, and (iii) whether probable cause would still exist absent the alleged falsehoods.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal because Born’s complaint did not plead sufficient factual content to make the malicious-prosecution claim plausible. Although the court accepted that Born plausibly alleged some elements—initiation of prosecution, damages, and favorable termination on one charge—the complaint failed on the elements tied to malice/probable cause and constitutional infirmity of the legal process.

The panel emphasized two pleading gaps:

  1. Born alleged “false statements” and “reckless disregard for the truth,” but did not identify the statements or explain their falsity with nonconclusory facts.
  2. Without specifying the falsehoods, the complaint did not allow a reasonable inference that the warrant affidavit would lack probable cause if the falsehoods were removed (the Eleventh Circuit’s “corrected affidavit”/“but-for probable cause” inquiry).

The court also rejected Born’s attempt to cure deficiencies through appellate briefing, reiterating that new factual allegations cannot be added on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001)
    Cited for the standard of review: PLRA sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim are reviewed de novo. This frames the appeal as a legal sufficiency question about the pleadings rather than factfinding.
  • Worthy v. City of Phenix City, 930 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))
    These authorities supply the governing plausibility standard. The panel relies on them to distinguish permissible notice pleading from impermissible “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitations.” The decision treats Born’s allegations as conclusory because he asserted falsity and recklessness without the “who/what/how” factual content necessary to permit a reasonable inference of misconduct.
  • In re Ellingsworth Residential Cmty. Ass'n, 125 F.4th 1365 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Invoked to limit liberal construction of pro se pleadings: courts will not “rewrite” a deficient complaint or act as de facto counsel. This is pivotal at PLRA screening, where the temptation to infer missing factual detail is high; the court refuses to supply the omitted specifics.
  • Prospero v. Sullivan, 153 F.4th 1171 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2023))
    These cases provide the Eleventh Circuit’s modern framework for Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims: a plaintiff must plead the common-law elements plus a Fourth Amendment seizure via constitutionally infirm legal process. Critically, Prospero/Butler articulate the two-part inquiry the panel applies here: (1) intentional or reckless misstatements/omissions in the affidavit, and (2) whether probable cause would still exist absent those defects. The court uses that structure to explain why Born’s missing details are fatal.
  • Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022)
    These authorities support the court’s conclusion that Born plausibly satisfied favorable termination as to the reversed count. Laskar is quoted for the proposition that favorable termination can be met when at least one confinement-authorizing charge ends in a manner not inconsistent with innocence. Thompson reinforces a plaintiff-friendly favorable-termination concept in Fourth Amendment contexts. Notably, the panel treats this element as satisfied—showing the dismissal turned on pleading falsity/probable cause, not on termination doctrine.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
    Applied to the ultimate plausibility determination: Born did not “nudge” his claim from conceivable to plausible because the complaint lacked the concrete content needed to assess “corrected affidavit” probable cause.
  • Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Sterling Fin. Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2004))
    These cases foreclose Born’s effort to add facts in his appellate briefing (e.g., that the detective claimed she “witnessed” the shooting). The panel uses them to confine review to the complaint the district court screened, preserving the integrity of Rule 12/PLRA pleading practice.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1) PLRA screening applies ordinary plausibility pleading

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, district courts must promptly screen prisoner complaints against governmental actors and dismiss claims that fail to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that PLRA screening is not a relaxed standard; it incorporates the same plausibility framework associated with Iqbal/Twombly.

2) Malicious-prosecution pleading requires more than asserting “false statements”

Relying on Prospero v. Sullivan and Butler v. Smith, the court identifies six elements, then focuses on the cluster that turns on affidavit integrity and probable cause. Those elements “collectively” require:

  • facts supporting that the defendant intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions in the warrant materials; and
  • facts supporting that, with the misstatements removed (or omissions supplied), the affidavit would not establish probable cause.

Born’s complaint failed at the first prong because it did not identify the specific false statements or explain why they were false—i.e., no concrete content about what the detective said, what she knew, what she lacked personal knowledge of, or how the magistrate was misled. The panel characterizes the pleading as a “formulaic recitation” of elements.

3) The court insists on “but-for probable cause” plausibility

The second prong is where the Eleventh Circuit’s affidavit-centered approach is most consequential. Even if a plaintiff alleges some falsity, the claim must plausibly show that the warrant would have lacked probable cause absent the defect. Because Born never specified the purported false statements, the court could not perform—nor could it plausibly infer the outcome of—the “corrected affidavit” analysis. That missing link justified dismissal.

4) No pleading-by-briefing on appeal

Born attempted to argue more specific facts on appeal (e.g., the detective claimed she “witnessed” the shooting; the warrant rested solely on fabricated evidence). The panel, citing Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc. and Sterling Fin. Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, rejects this as improper supplementation. The appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the complaint that was actually screened and dismissed.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces several practical rules in Eleventh Circuit malicious-prosecution litigation, particularly for prisoner plaintiffs:

  • Specificity is essential at the affidavit stage. Alleging that an officer “lied” or acted with “reckless disregard” is insufficient without identifying the statements/omissions and explaining their falsity. The case underscores that Iqbal/Twombly plausibility applies with full force at PLRA screening.
  • Probable cause must be addressed through a “corrected affidavit” lens. Plaintiffs should plead facts showing that, once the alleged falsehoods are excised (and omissions added), probable cause would not exist. Mere disagreement with a conviction or pointing to a later reversal on sufficiency does not, by itself, plead absence of probable cause for arrest.
  • Partial favorable termination can be enough, but it is not everything. The panel accepts favorable termination based on reversal of one charge, consistent with Laskar and Thompson, yet still affirms dismissal—highlighting that favorable termination does not substitute for pleading constitutional infirmity.
  • Appellate briefing cannot cure a deficient complaint. The decision serves as a caution that plaintiffs must place key factual allegations in the complaint (or properly amend), not in objections, briefs, or argument on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA screening (28 U.S.C. § 1915A)
A mandatory early review of prisoner suits against government actors. If the complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim, the court must dismiss it before the case proceeds to discovery.
“Plausibility” pleading (Iqbal/Twombly)
The complaint must include enough concrete facts—not just conclusions—to allow a court to reasonably infer liability. Assertions like “the officer lied” need supporting detail describing what was said and why it was false.
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution (§ 1983)
In the Eleventh Circuit framework cited here, it combines (i) traditional malicious prosecution elements (including malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination) with (ii) a Fourth Amendment seizure caused by constitutionally defective legal process (often a warrant).
“Corrected affidavit” / “but-for probable cause” analysis
The court asks: if you remove the alleged lies (and add any omitted material facts), would the remaining affidavit still establish probable cause? If yes, malicious prosecution typically fails because the seizure would still be justified.
Favorable termination
The criminal case (or at least one confinement-authorizing charge) must end in a way not inconsistent with innocence. Here, reversal of one conviction for insufficient evidence satisfied that element for that charge.

Conclusion

Supreme Born v. Randall Woodfin solidifies a pleading-centered lesson: to survive PLRA screening on a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution theory in the Eleventh Circuit, a plaintiff must do more than allege that officers “fabricated” evidence or made “false statements.” The complaint must identify the misstatements or omissions with enough factual detail to support an inference of recklessness/intentionality and must plausibly show that, without those defects, the warrant would not have established probable cause. The case also reiterates two procedural guardrails—courts will not rewrite pro se complaints, and plaintiffs cannot amend by appellate briefing— making the complaint itself the decisive battleground at the screening stage.