Pleading a Prison-Job Retaliation Claim: Alleged Termination Must Be Credited as “Adverse Action” at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage

1. Introduction

In Brian Thompson v. Mohamed Safa, Sergeant (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (not precedential), Pennsylvania state prisoner Brian Thompson sued Sergeant Mohamed Safa, a corrections officer at SCI-Phoenix, alleging constitutional violations and state-law torts arising from Safa’s conduct toward him in prison. The case reached federal court after removal from state court, then proceeded through in forma pauperis screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissal practice.

The central appellate issues were whether Thompson plausibly pleaded: (i) state-law claims not barred by sovereign immunity; (ii) Eighth Amendment “failure to protect” theories based on being called a “rat”; (iii) Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection theories tied to prison employment; and (iv) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on a negative work report and the alleged termination of his prison job after he pursued (or threatened) a grievance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. It upheld dismissal of:

  • Thompson’s state-law claims as barred by Pennsylvania sovereign immunity for acts within the scope of employment;
  • requests for declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at past conduct;
  • Eighth Amendment “failure to warn/failure to protect/state-created danger” theories based on being called a “rat”;
  • Fourteenth Amendment due process (no protected interest in prison employment) and “class of one” equal protection theories;
  • the First Amendment retaliation claim insofar as it relied only on a negative work report (treated as de minimis).

However, it vacated dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim based on the alleged termination from prison employment, holding that—at the motion-to-dismiss stage—the district court was required to credit Thompson’s repeated allegations of termination and could not resolve factual disputes by relying on competing inferences or an official’s contrary statement embedded in the complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that retaliation theory.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review and pleading posture

  • Dooley v. Wetzel and Allah v. Seiverling: The court reaffirmed that dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) and under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) receive plenary review on appeal, emphasizing that IFP screening does not dilute ordinary plausibility review.
  • Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co.: Anchored the core procedural correction—at the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them favorably to the plaintiff, rather than choose among competing narratives.

2) Pennsylvania sovereign immunity and “scope of employment”

  • Maute v. Frank and Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon: Supported the conclusion that, under Pennsylvania law, a Commonwealth employee remains within the scope of employment even when animus is alleged; “scope” turns on the nature, time/place, and purpose of the conduct.
  • Brumfield v. Sanders and La Frankie v. Miklich: Reinforced that sovereign immunity may bar claims arising from intentional torts when the employee acted within the scope of employment.
  • Gray v. Huntzinger: Used to show that a one-time insult (“rat”) is not “outrageous” enough to constitute IIED under Pennsylvania law, echoing the Restatement’s “mere insults” limitation.

3) Limits on declaratory and injunctive relief

  • CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia: Cited for the principle that declaratory relief is generally prospective and not designed solely to adjudicate past conduct.
  • Brown v. Fauver: Applied to require a “real and immediate threat” of future injury for standing to obtain prospective injunctive relief.
  • Williams v. Walsh: Clarified that punitive damages are a remedy, not a standalone cause of action.

4) Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect framework

  • Farmer v. Brennan: Supplied the governing two-part test: (i) objectively substantial risk of serious harm and (ii) subjective deliberate indifference (actual awareness of the risk).
  • Bistrian v. Levi: Recognized that labeling someone a “snitch” can support deliberate indifference; the panel distinguished it on the pleaded facts because Thompson alleged being called a “rat” for grieving staff, not for informing on inmates.
  • Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel: Used to emphasize the subjective element—plaintiff must plausibly allege the official actually knew of an excessive risk, not merely that the plaintiff believed a risk existed.

5) “State-created zone of danger” (state-created danger) and injury requirement

  • Mark v. Borough of Hatboro: Invoked to reject the state-created danger theory where Thompson did not allege he suffered harm as a result of Safa’s conduct.

6) Prison employment and the Fourteenth Amendment

  • Bryan v. Werner: Controlled the due process analysis—there is no protected property or liberty interest in prison employment.
  • Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr.: Supported dismissal of Thompson’s “class of one” equal protection claim by treating prison work assignment decisions as akin to discretionary public-employment decisions for which “class of one” is a poor fit.

7) First Amendment retaliation doctrine

  • Watson v. Rozum: Provided the Third Circuit’s three-element test for prisoner retaliation and confirmed that filing (or expressing intent to file) grievances is protected conduct.
  • Wisniewski v. Fisher: Established that termination from prison employment qualifies as an “adverse action” for retaliation purposes—critical to the vacatur and remand.
  • McKee v. Hart (and Watson v. Rozum): Used to categorize certain minor actions as de minimis; here, the negative work report alone was treated as insufficiently adverse.
  • In re Wettach and Erikson v. Pardus: Addressed the forfeiture argument; the court applied liberal construction to pro se filings and found the retaliation issue adequately preserved.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) State-law claims: sovereign immunity applied through “scope of employment”

The panel agreed that Thompson’s tort and related state-law claims (e.g., IIED, conspiracy, breach of contract, defamation) targeted Safa for conduct undertaken as a corrections officer and thus fell within Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity protection for Commonwealth employees acting within the scope of employment. The opinion stresses that alleged hostility does not necessarily remove conduct from the scope, and it separately indicated that the pleaded insult (“rat”) was insufficient for IIED even aside from immunity.

2) Prospective relief: declaratory and injunctive claims were backward-looking

The court treated Thompson’s requested declaratory relief as an improper attempt to obtain a judicial pronouncement about past conduct rather than prospective clarification. For injunctive relief, it found no “real and immediate” threat of repetition adequate to support standing, even though Thompson argued ongoing effects from a negative work report.

3) Eighth Amendment: no plausible deliberate indifference on the pleaded facts

Even assuming that being called a “rat” could, in some contexts, create danger, the complaint did not plausibly allege the subjective component required by Farmer v. Brennan. The panel also drew a factual distinction from Bistrian v. Levi, framing “snitch” labeling (informing on inmates) as a different risk profile than being derided for filing grievances against staff. Absent plausible allegations of Safa’s actual awareness of an excessive risk, the claim failed.

4) Fourteenth Amendment: prison job interests are not constitutionally protected

The due process claim failed under Bryan v. Werner because prison employment does not create a protected property or liberty interest. The equal protection “class of one” theory failed under Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., reflecting a view that discretionary employment-type decisions do not readily lend themselves to “class of one” comparisons.

5) First Amendment retaliation: the pleading-stage error concerned “adverse action”

The panel’s principal correction was procedural and factual-inference based. The district court concluded Thompson had not alleged termination, but the complaint repeatedly alleged he was terminated. The district court also credited an embedded statement from a prison official suggesting only reduced hours and drew an inference from the timing of a later work report. The Third Circuit held those moves were improper under Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co.: at this stage, the court must credit Thompson’s pleaded termination allegation, particularly where he alleged the contrary explanation was untrue.

With termination credited, Wisniewski v. Fisher supplied the legal rule that job termination is an adverse action, satisfying element two of Watson v. Rozum. On causation, Thompson’s allegations—temporal linkage to grievance activity and asserted differential treatment—were enough to plausibly plead that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor. By contrast, the negative work report alone was treated as de minimis under McKee v. Hart and Watson v. Rozum.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is practically significant in three ways:

  • Pleading-stage discipline: It reinforces that courts may not resolve contested factual inferences against a pro se plaintiff when the complaint plainly alleges an adverse action (here, termination), even if the complaint also quotes an official’s competing account.
  • Retaliation screening under § 1915(e)(2): It signals that IFP screening cannot be used to truncate plausible retaliation claims where the complaint satisfies Watson v. Rozum and alleges a recognized adverse action under Wisniewski v. Fisher.
  • Doctrinal boundary-drawing: It narrows reliance on “labeling” cases like Bistrian v. Levi by emphasizing that not every derogatory label is equivalent to “snitch” labeling for Eighth Amendment purposes—particularly absent allegations of subjective awareness and resultant harm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2): A screening rule requiring courts to dismiss IFP complaints that fail to state a claim, even before full litigation.
  • Sovereign immunity (Pennsylvania): A state-law shield that can protect Commonwealth employees from tort liability for actions taken within the scope of their job duties.
  • “Scope of employment”: Whether conduct is the kind the employee was hired to do, occurs during work-related time/place, and is at least partly intended to serve the employer—even if done badly or with hostility.
  • Declaratory vs. injunctive relief: Declaratory relief typically clarifies future legal relations; injunctive relief orders future conduct. Courts generally will not grant either solely to address completed past events.
  • Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”: More than negligence; the official must actually know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.
  • State-created danger: A doctrine imposing liability when government actions create or increase danger that results in harm; without alleged harm, the theory generally fails.
  • First Amendment retaliation (prison context): Protected activity (like grievances) + adverse action (like job termination) + a plausible causal link.
  • De minimis adverse action: Minor actions that would not deter an ordinary person from exercising First Amendment rights may not qualify as “adverse.”

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit largely affirmed dismissal of Thompson’s wide-ranging claims—sovereign immunity barred state tort theories; prospective relief was unavailable for past wrongs; Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment theories were not plausibly pleaded; and a negative work report alone was de minimis for retaliation. The key holding prompting remand was that, under ordinary pleading rules, Thompson’s repeated allegations that he was terminated from prison employment had to be credited at the motion-to-dismiss stage, making termination a sufficiently “adverse action” under Wisniewski v. Fisher and allowing the retaliation claim to proceed under Watson v. Rozum. In practical terms, the opinion underscores that plausibly pleaded prison-job retaliation claims should not be dismissed based on judicial fact-weighing or unfavorable inferences during early screening.