Plain-View Passenger-Floorboard Firearm Supports Constructive Possession; Obvious Juror Unfitness Permits Pre-Deliberation Removal Without Further Inquiry

Case: United States v. Myking Green (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Myking Green, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case arose from a traffic stop in which Myking Dayquan Green was the front-seat passenger. When police opened the unlocked passenger door after Green exited, they found a loaded firearm lying in plain sight on top of a white t-shirt on the passenger-side floorboard where Green’s feet would have been.

Green’s appeal presented two issues:

• Sufficiency: whether the evidence proved Green’s knowing possession—specifically, constructive possession—of the firearm.
• Juror removal: whether the district court abused its discretion by removing “juror 10” before deliberations due to disruptive conduct and stated refusal to carry out core juror duties.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed on both grounds.

• Constructive possession: A reasonable jury could find Green knew about the gun and had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control, given the gun’s plain-view placement at his feet on the passenger floorboard and the body-camera video showing he exited from that seat.
• Juror dismissal: The district court had reasonable cause under Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1) to replace juror 10 before deliberations where the juror distracted proceedings, appeared not to attend to evidence, and allegedly stated “Guilty or innocent, I don’t care,” including in the presence of other jurors. The court could act without further inquiry where unfitness was “clear” or “obvious.”

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and procedural posture

• United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015): supplied the de novo standard for Rule 29 sufficiency review, requiring the appellate court to view evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.
• United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2014): supplied abuse-of-discretion review for excusing a juror and framed the “bias or prejudice” lens (e.g., removal without factual support or for a legally irrelevant reason).

2) Constructive possession doctrine (firearm in a vehicle)

• United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846 (11th Cir. 2017): reaffirmed that § 922(g) requires, among other things, knowing possession.
• United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011): provided the controlling Eleventh Circuit definition of constructive possession: awareness/knowledge of the firearm plus ability and intent to later exercise dominion and control.
• United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1998): distinguished actual possession (physical possession or personal dominion).
• Cnty. Ct. of Ulster Cnty., N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979): supported the permissibility of inferring awareness and control where guns lie in plain view on a vehicle’s floor or seat.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009): used as an Eleventh Circuit example that ready access within a vehicle can support constructive possession even where the vehicle is not registered to the defendant. (Gant is acknowledged solely to clarify that Gonzalez remains relevant here on possession/inference points.)
• United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1992): the court’s closest comparator—passenger in a truck with loaded guns near him—held sufficient to establish possession. The panel treated Gates as essentially controlling and emphasized that Green’s case was stronger because the gun was in plain sight at his feet.

3) Distinguishing “hidden contraband” and weaker inference cases

The opinion rejected Green’s reliance on cases where the location/visibility of contraband did not support knowledge or control.

• Guevara v. United States, 242 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1957): marijuana in the “middle of the car,” making attribution to a particular occupant less reliable.
• United States v. Pedro, 999 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1993): gun concealed in a suitcase; insufficient evidence the defendant knew the suitcase contained a firearm.
• United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1974): drugs hidden in a narrow gap in the car, undermining proof of knowledge.
• United States v. Louis, 861 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2017): cocaine in sealed boxes; concealment cut against knowledge and control.
• United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1996): defendant not in the car with marijuana; missing the crucial proximity/access link.
• Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1 373 (1 1 th Cir. 1 982): noted as “even further off the mark,” addressing sufficiency for a burglary conviction from later possession/sale of stolen property, not vehicle proximity constructive possession.

4) Juror replacement before deliberations; inquiry discretion

• United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986): foundational authority that removal pre-deliberations is within the trial judge’s discretion upon facts showing the juror’s ability is impaired; also endorsed removal without further inquiry when the problem is “clear” or “obvious,” and emphasized deference to the trial judge’s first-hand assessment of disruption.
• United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2018): reaffirmed that “reasonable cause” suffices to replace a juror pre-deliberations, including disruption.
• United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1990): upheld removal where juror distraction would disrupt the jury’s ability to evaluate evidence and reach a verdict.
• United States v. Smith, 550 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1977): upheld replacement of jurors who did not pay attention.
• United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999): confirmed the district court’s broad discretion to choose the investigative procedure for alleged juror misconduct.
• United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001): cited (via Godwin) on the post-deliberations “good cause” standard, including refusal to follow law/instructions.
• United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448 (11th Cir. 1996): supported removing jurors unwilling/unable to focus or follow instructions.
• United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 657 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1981)): supported the conclusion that replacing a juror with an alternate generally does not prejudice the defendant where alternates and regular jurors were selected similarly and treated the same.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why the constructive-possession evidence was sufficient

Applying Perez, the panel focused on two linked facts: (i) knowledge and (ii) ability and intent to control. The gun’s plain-view placement on the front passenger floorboard—directly in the area Green occupied—supported a rational inference that he was aware of it, consistent with Cnty. Ct. of Ulster Cnty., N.Y. v. Allen. “Ready access” to a firearm in a vehicle has long supported constructive possession in the circuit, and the panel treated Gates as a close factual match (and, if anything, weaker than Green’s case because the guns in Gates were under the seat rather than in plain sight).

The court also rejected common defense sufficiency themes:

• No ownership/driver control required: the court emphasized that passenger status does not immunize a defendant from constructive possession when proximity and access support the inference (as in Gates).
• No forensic evidence required: the panel noted that cases like Allen, Gonzalez, and Gates did not turn on DNA/fingerprints; sufficiency may rest on circumstantial evidence.
• Other occupants present is not dispositive: the firearm’s location (front passenger floorboard) and timing (found almost immediately after Green exited) supported the inference that Green—not a rear passenger—had ready access and thus the ability and intent to control.

2) Why juror 10’s dismissal was within discretion

The court treated the removal as a straightforward application of Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1) and the “reasonable cause” standard from Fajardo and Crabtree. The district court relied on: repeated interruptions (hand-raising during testimony), visible non-attentiveness (eyes closed, head down, staring away), argumentative resistance to instructions about the issues in the case, and—most importantly—reported statements to a security officer that he did not care whether Green was guilty or innocent.

Two features drove the affirmance:

• First-hand assessment and deference: following Fajardo, the panel stressed that disruption is better judged by the trial court’s live observations than by a cold record.
• No further inquiry required where unfitness is obvious: drawing on Fajardo and Register, the panel accepted that the district court could remove juror 10 without questioning him because the impairment was “clear” or “obvious,” particularly given the reported profane statement made in the presence of other jurors and the court’s finding of likely “taint.”

The panel also rejected prejudice arguments. Even if juror 10 earlier suggested he wanted “video” evidence, the government had body-camera video showing Green exiting near where the gun was found, and, under United States v. De La Vega, substitution of an alternate generally does not establish bias or prejudice when selection and treatment were equivalent.

C. Impact

Although the decision is “not for publication,” it consolidates two recurring themes in Eleventh Circuit practice: (1) constructive possession may be proved through proximity/visibility/ready access in a shared vehicle; and (2) trial judges retain broad authority to protect the integrity of proceedings by replacing jurors whose conduct threatens attention, impartiality, or adherence to instructions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Constructive possession: You do not need to be holding the gun. The government can prove possession if the evidence shows you knew the gun was there and you could (and intended to) control it—often inferred from where it is located and how accessible it is.
• Sufficiency of the evidence (Rule 29): On appeal, the question is not whether judges believe the defendant is guilty, but whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the government’s favor.
• Alternate juror replacement (Rule 24(c)(1)): Before deliberations, a judge may replace a juror who cannot perform the job (e.g., not paying attention, disrupting, refusing to follow instructions), so long as there is “reasonable cause.”
• “Obvious impairment” and limited inquiry: Judges often investigate juror problems, but they are not required to do more fact-finding when the problem is clear from direct observation or reliable reports—especially to prevent disruption or contamination of the remaining jurors.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Myking Green affirms two core propositions. First, when a loaded firearm is found in plain view on the floorboard at a passenger’s feet, the jury may rationally infer knowledge and the ability and intent to control the weapon—supporting constructive possession under § 922(g). Second, a district court acts within its discretion in replacing a juror before deliberations when the juror’s conduct and statements plainly show unwillingness or inability to perform, and the court may do so without further questioning where the impairment is obvious and threatens the fairness and functionality of the trial.