Plain-Error Review Governs Unpreserved § 3553(c) Explanation Claims After Steiger; No Requirement to Address Recidivism Explicitly

Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely an application of established Eleventh Circuit sentencing-review doctrine, with particular emphasis on the en banc clarification of § 3553(c) error review.

Framework for Sentencing Review

• United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): Supplies the “two-step process”—(1) procedural reasonableness and (2) substantive reasonableness—in reviewing federal sentences. Hemley’s appeal is organized around this framework.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness and articulates three ways a district court can impose a substantively unreasonable sentence (failure to consider an important factor, reliance on an improper factor, or unreasonable weighing). The panel uses Butler to reject Hemley’s claim that the court inadequately accounted for recidivism risk.
• United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994)): Reinforces that abuse-of-discretion review allows a “range of choice,” reversed only for a “clear error of judgment.” This “range of choice” framing supports deference to the district court’s balancing of sentencing factors.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (Opinion of E. Carnes, J.): Provides the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” phrasing cited via Butler, emphasizing appellate restraint.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): Places the burden on the challenger to show unreasonableness and notes that within-guidelines sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable. Although Hemley’s sentence was below-guidelines, the burden principle still matters: Hemley had to affirmatively demonstrate unreasonableness.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Cited alongside Butler for the contours of substantive-reasonableness abuse-of-discretion review.

Plain Error and Unpreserved § 3553(c) Claims

• United States v. Defilippis, __F.4th__, 2026 WL 1067115 (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026): Cited for the proposition that issues not raised in the district court are reviewed only for plain error, reinforcing the threshold preservation problem.
• United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2022): Supplies the four-part plain-error structure (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and discretionary correction only if fairness/integrity/public reputation is seriously affected).
• United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc): The controlling authority for unpreserved § 3553(c) explanation challenges. The panel relies on Steiger for two key points: (1) the relevant prejudice inquiry focuses on whether the error impaired the defendant’s right to meaningful appellate review; and (2) it rejects the government’s contention (in Hemley) that a defendant must show he would have received a different sentence to establish plain error in this § 3553(c) context.
• United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2016): Noted because Hemley invoked it for “per se reversible” treatment of inadequate explanation. The panel expressly explains that Steiger overruled that portion of Parks. This is a central doctrinal clarification featured in the opinion’s reasoning.

What the District Court Must Address (and Need Not Address) at Sentencing

• Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Cited for the overarching “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” directive in § 3553(a). The panel uses it as a statement of the governing sentencing principle rather than as a dispute-specific holding.
• United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Supports the point that the failure to discuss particular mitigating evidence does not mean the court ignored it. This precedent directly undercuts Hemley’s argument about the lack of explicit discussion of his low recidivism risk.
• United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Provides that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness. The panel uses this as an additional reason the sentence falls within permissible bounds.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural Reasonableness: § 3553(c) Explanation and Plain Error

The panel’s procedural analysis turns almost entirely on preservation. Because Hemley did not object at sentencing to the adequacy of the court’s statement of reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), the appellate court applied plain-error review under United States v. Steiger.

The critical move is the panel’s conclusion that, even if one assumes a § 3553(c) deficiency, Hemley failed to show that any deficiency impaired meaningful appellate review. The opinion emphasizes that the district court:

• gave a “detailed explanation”;
• referenced multiple § 3553(a) factors;
• explained why those factors supported a below-guidelines sentence; and
• made the reasoning “clear on the face of the record.”

This is quintessential Steiger logic: an appellant cannot show plain-error prejudice where the record itself makes the court’s rationale sufficiently reviewable.

2) Substantive Reasonableness: No Requirement to Explicitly Discuss Recidivism

On the merits, the panel rejected the claim that the district court’s failure to expressly mention Hemley’s asserted low likelihood of recidivism rendered the sentence unreasonable. Invoking United States v. Amedeo and United States v. Butler, the panel reiterated that:

• a sentencing judge is not required to explicitly discuss each piece of mitigating evidence; and
• acknowledgment of considering the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is generally sufficient.

The panel also grounded its conclusion in record details: the district court reviewed the presentence report, character letters, and a sentencing memorandum, and it listened to and noted mitigation arguments. Finally, the panel bolstered the reasonableness conclusion by noting the sentence was both: (a) below the guideline range, and (b) well below the statutory maximum—an “indicator of a reasonable sentence” under United States v. Dougherty.

Impact

• Reinforcement of Steiger’s anti-per-se-reversal approach: Hemley underscores—again—that unpreserved § 3553(c) explanation complaints are not automatically reversible. The key inquiry is whether the record permits meaningful appellate review, not whether the district court used any particular verbal formula.
• Practical litigation consequence (preservation): Defense counsel who believe the sentencing court’s explanation is inadequate must object contemporaneously to avoid the steep hurdles of plain-error review.
• Mitigation arguments and “explicit mention”: The opinion provides defendants limited traction for appeals based solely on the judge’s failure to verbalize a specific mitigating factor (such as recidivism risk), so long as the record reflects consideration of the parties’ submissions and § 3553(a).
• Below-guidelines sentences are hard to upset: While not dispositive, Hemley illustrates how a below-guidelines, far-below-maximum sentence can be a powerful indicator against substantive unreasonableness on appeal.