Plain-Error Limits on Plea-Agreement Breach Claims and Guilty-Plea Waiver of Geofence Suppression Issues

Case: United States v. Scott Carpenter, Jr. (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication)
Charges of conviction: Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision addresses two recurring appellate issues in federal criminal practice: (1) when a defendant—who failed to object at sentencing—can obtain relief on a claim that the government breached a plea agreement’s sentencing-recommendation promise; and (2) whether an unconditional guilty plea preserves a Fourth Amendment challenge to evidence obtained via a “Google geofence” warrant.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Scott Carpenter, Jr. (appellant), charged in connection with a series of armed robberies. After the district court denied Carpenter’s motion to suppress Google geolocation data, Carpenter entered a written plea agreement to two counts arising from a Dollar Tree robbery, and the government dismissed the remaining ten counts. The plea agreement included a key promise: the government would “recommend to the Court that the defendant be sentenced within the defendant's applicable guidelines range as determined by the Court.”

On appeal, Carpenter argued (a) the government effectively undercut that promise by suggesting an upward variance, and (b) the district court erred in denying suppression of geofence-derived evidence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Malone

Role in the opinion: This is the central template for the court’s disposition of the alleged plea-breach claim under plain-error review. The panel quoted Malone for:

• the governing standard when no breach objection is raised below (plain error),
• the “reasonable understanding” framework for interpreting plea promises, and
• the key “substantial rights” requirement—i.e., whether the alleged error affected the sentencing outcome.

Influence: The court effectively applied Malone’s outcome-based approach: when the district court imposes a sentence within the guideline range as calculated at the hearing, the defendant may fail to establish that an alleged breach changed the result—especially absent a contemporaneous objection.

2. United States v. Sosa

Role: Sosa is cited for the proposition that an error is “plain” only if it is clear or obvious, not reasonably debatable.

Influence: Although the panel ultimately assumed a breach without deciding it, Sosa underscores that breach questions can be fact-intensive and not always “plain,” reinforcing why unpreserved breach claims face steep hurdles on appeal.

3. United States v. Hunter

Role: Hunter provides two key principles:

• The government breaches when it fails to perform plea promises that induced the plea.
• The breach inquiry is objective and avoids hyper-technical readings; it asks what the defendant reasonably understood.

Influence: Hunter frames the interpretive lens for whether the government’s remarks (top-of-range recommendation, plus comments about upward variance) conflicted with Carpenter’s reasonable expectations under the agreement.

4. United States v. Taylor

Role: Taylor supplies the cautionary rule that the government cannot pay “lip service” to a promised recommendation while effectively advocating for a longer sentence, and that a “begrudging recommendation” may be “too little, too late.”

Influence: Taylor is the doctrinal basis for Carpenter’s theory: that suggesting an upward variance can be inconsistent with a promise to recommend a within-guidelines sentence. The panel did not reject Taylor; instead, it bypassed the breach question by resolving the appeal on the “substantial rights” prong of plain-error review.

5. United States v. Edwards

Role: Edwards is cited for the broad waiver principle: a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional defects, including challenges to the denial of suppression motions.

Influence: Edwards directly controls the disposition of Carpenter’s geofence-suppression argument because his plea was unconditional and undisputedly knowing and voluntary.

6. United States v. Pierre

Role: Pierre is cited for the requirement that a conditional plea requires the government’s express approval.

Influence: This precedent closes the door on any suggestion that Carpenter implicitly reserved suppression issues; without an express conditional-plea arrangement, the suppression challenge is waived.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Alleged breach of the plea agreement

The plea agreement obligated the government to recommend a within-guidelines sentence “as determined by the Court.” After guideline disputes (notably the PSR’s use of “pseudo-counts”), the parties agreed to a lower offense level, and the court adopted a guideline range of 30–37 months on the Hobbs Act count, plus a consecutive mandatory 25 years for the § 924(c) count.

At sentencing, the government recommended “the very top of the Guidelines” but also stated that an upward variance would “not necessarily be inappropriate.” The district judge pressed the government about the dismissed counts and the theoretical exposure (the prosecutor referenced potential § 924(c) stacking leading to at least 175 years if tried and proven).

On appeal, the panel:

• Applied plain-error review because Carpenter did not object at sentencing to a breach (per United States v. Malone).
• Assumed without deciding that the government’s comments amounted to a breach.
• Held Carpenter failed the third prong—substantial rights—because the court imposed a sentence within the calculated range anyway.

The practical reasoning is outcome-centered: even if the prosecutor’s rhetoric flirted with an upward variance, the district court did not impose one; it sentenced Carpenter to 36 months (within 30–37) plus the mandatory consecutive 25 years. Without a showing that the alleged breach moved the judge to a higher sentence than would otherwise have been imposed, plain-error relief is unavailable.

2. Waiver of the suppression issue by unconditional plea

Carpenter’s motion to suppress challenged Google geofence data as overbroad, insufficiently particularized, and lacking probable cause. But the panel held the argument was waived under United States v. Edwards because:

• Carpenter entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, and
• the plea was unconditional, with no Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) conditional reservation of appellate rights, and no express government approval (per United States v. Pierre).

Accordingly, the appellate court did not reach the merits of the geofence warrant’s constitutionality.

C. Impact

1. On plea-agreement breach litigation

The opinion reinforces a consequential procedural point: failing to object at sentencing can be fatal to breach claims, even where the government’s argument arguably undermines its promised recommendation. Under the panel’s approach (tracked to Malone), a defendant must connect the alleged breach to a different sentencing outcome to satisfy the “substantial rights” prong.

Practically, this encourages defense counsel to:

• object contemporaneously to any government argument that could be construed as advocating above the promised position,
• seek a clear record that the government is not indirectly urging an upward variance, and
• request a remedy promptly (e.g., asking the court to disregard the argument, or moving for specific performance).

2. On suppression issues involving geofence warrants

The decision does not develop Fourth Amendment doctrine on geofence warrants; instead, it highlights the procedural reality that defendants who wish to litigate such issues on appeal must enter a conditional plea under Rule 11(a)(2), requiring the government’s express approval (per Pierre). Absent that, even potentially significant digital-privacy questions are forfeited by a guilty plea.

3. On sentencing dynamics in multi-count robbery/§ 924(c) cases

The case illustrates how § 924(c) mandatory consecutive terms can dominate sentencing outcomes, and how guideline disputes (like “pseudo-counts”) may meaningfully affect only the non-mandatory portion. It also reflects a common negotiating posture: dismissal of additional counts (including potentially multiple § 924(c) counts) can massively reduce exposure, while leaving the court discretion within the remaining guideline range on the predicate offense.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Plain-error review: A stricter appellate standard used when the defendant did not object in the trial court. The defendant must show not only an error, but that it was clear, affected the outcome, and seriously harmed the fairness of proceedings.
• Plea-agreement breach: The government violates a plea deal if it fails to do what it promised in exchange for the guilty plea—especially at sentencing. Courts assess breach by what the defendant reasonably understood the promise to mean.
• “Lip service” to a recommendation: Even if the prosecutor formally states the promised recommendation, the government may breach if it effectively argues for a harsher sentence.
• Guidelines range “as determined by the Court”: The promise is pegged to the judge’s final guideline calculation at sentencing, not the PSR’s initial range or the parties’ estimates.
• Conditional vs. unconditional guilty plea: An unconditional plea waives most pretrial issues (like suppression). A conditional plea preserves specified issues for appeal, but must be explicit and approved.
• Geofence warrant: A warrant seeking location data for all devices in a defined geographic area during a set time window, often to identify unknown suspects.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Scott Carpenter, Jr. delivers two practical rules for federal criminal litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) when a plea-breach claim is unpreserved, a defendant may lose on plain-error review absent a concrete showing that the alleged breach changed the sentence imposed—particularly where the court still sentences within the guideline range; and (2) an unconditional guilty plea forecloses appellate review of suppression issues, including challenges to geofence warrants, unless preserved via an explicit, government-approved conditional plea.