Date: Apr 5, 2026

Plain-Error Challenges to Sentencing Factors Require Clear Reliance; § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment Attacks Remain Foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit

I. Introduction

United States v. Tyreic Brewer (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026) is a non-published decision affirming (1) two convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (2) an above-Guidelines sentence of 60 months. The defendant, Tyreic T. Brewer, pleaded guilty to possessing firearms on two separate occasions (December 9, 2023 and April 11, 2024).

The appeal raised two core issues:

Second Amendment: Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Brewer.
Sentencing: Whether the upward variance (Guidelines 37–46 months; sentence 60 months) was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The panel held that binding Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed the Second Amendment challenge, and that Brewer failed to show reversible error in the variance—particularly given the two discrete felon-in-possession episodes occurring within roughly four months and the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Convictions affirmed: The court held that United States v. Dubois controls and confirms that neither New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi abrogated United States v. Rozier; therefore, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the circuit.
Sentence affirmed:
- Procedural reasonableness: Under plain-error review, Brewer did not show it was “clear” or “obvious” that the district court relied on an impermissible factor.
- Substantive reasonableness: The 60-month sentence was within the district court’s discretion given the totality of circumstances and was well below the statutory maximum.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Binding precedent and the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1)

United States v. Leahy and United States v. White: The panel reiterated that constitutional questions are reviewed de novo (Leahy), but a panel remains bound by prior circuit precedent unless overruled by the Supreme Court or en banc review (White). This framing makes the Second Amendment issue primarily a precedent-following exercise, not a fresh constitutional balancing.
United States v. Dubois: The decisive case. The panel invoked Dubois for the proposition that Bruen and Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier, and that “clearer instruction” from the Supreme Court is required before reconsidering § 922(g)(1).
United States v. Rozier: The foundational Eleventh Circuit authority holding that felon-in-possession restrictions are a “constitutional avenue” to restrict firearm possession for “certain classes of people,” including felons. Brewer’s as-applied challenge could not succeed without Rozier being abrogated.
United States v. Hicks: Cited as additional confirmation that similar challenges continue to be rejected in this circuit post-Bruen and post-Rahimi.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi: The panel treated these Supreme Court cases as insufficient to dislodge circuit precedent under the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-panel-precedent rule. In other words, even if defendants view Bruen/Rahimi as doctrinally transformative, the circuit will not treat them as overruling Rozier absent unmistakable direction.

2. Sentencing review framework: procedural vs. substantive

United States v. Trailer: Supplies the “two-step process” for sentencing review—procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness.
United States v. Steiger and United States v. Vandergrift: The panel used these cases to apply plain-error review to a procedural reasonableness claim raised for the first time on appeal.
United States v. Utsick: Provides the elements of plain error (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and discretionary correction only if fairness/integrity/public reputation is seriously affected).
United States v. Butler, United States v. Rosales-Bruno, United States v. Gonzalez, and United States v. Irey: These cases collectively define the abuse-of-discretion approach to substantive reasonableness, the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” language, the appellant’s burden, and the recognized ways a court may abuse its discretion (misweighting relevant factors, relying on irrelevant factors, or clear errors of judgment).

3. Plain error and “impermissible factor” claims at sentencing

United States v. Williams (abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States): The panel acknowledged the general proposition that reliance on an improper factor can make a sentence unreasonable.
United States v. Humphrey, United States v. Olano, and United States v. Lejarde-Rada: Used to define “plain” error and to reinforce that, in the Eleventh Circuit, absent explicit statutory/rule language or controlling precedent resolving the issue, plain error is hard to show.
Esteras v. United States: Central to the procedural holding. The panel relied on Esteras for the requirement that, on plain-error review, the court of appeals must affirm unless it is “clear” or “obvious” the district court “actually relied on” an impermissible factor, “either expressly or by unmistakable implication.” That threshold defeated Brewer’s argument because the record did not clearly show reliance on the assertedly impermissible “adultification”/juvenile-history framing.

4. Variances, mitigation evidence, and indicia of reasonableness

United States v. Olson: Reinforces that district courts need not weigh § 3553(a) factors equally.
United States v. Oudomsine: Confirms courts may consider factors already accounted for by the Guidelines when varying, so long as the § 3553(a) reasoning supports it.
United States v. Amedeo and United States v. Sarras: Support the idea that sentencing judges need not expressly discuss each piece of mitigating evidence; acknowledging the parties’ arguments and § 3553(a) is often enough.
United States v. Castaneda, United States v. Dougherty, and United States v. Gonzalez: Used to describe expectations for within-Guidelines sentences, and that being well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness—even for an above-Guidelines sentence.
United States v. Beaufils and Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury): Reinforce the breadth of discretion—there is a “range of choice” unless the district court commits a “clear error of judgment.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Second Amendment issue: precedent lock

The panel’s reasoning is straightforward: under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, United States v. Rozier remains binding unless abrogated. United States v. Dubois had already held that New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi do not abrogate Rozier. Because Brewer conceded the point, the panel affirmed without revisiting historical-tradition analysis, instead emphasizing institutional constraints: the court requires “clearer instruction from the Supreme Court” before reconsidering § 922(g)(1).

2. Procedural reasonableness: “adultification” framing fails under plain error

Brewer argued the district court procedurally erred by treating his criminal history—much of which began in childhood—as aggravating when it should have been mitigating, describing this as the criminal system “adultifying” him. The panel did not decide whether that sociological framing could ever matter; it decided the case through the lens of plain-error review and record clarity.

Applying Esteras v. United States, the panel asked whether it was clear or obvious that the district court actually relied on an impermissible factor. The panel held the record did not show such reliance because:

The court identified “the biggest driver” as the two distinct felon-in-possession episodes in quick succession—a plainly permissible § 3553(a)(1) factor.
The court’s discussion of prior offenses emphasized dangerous conduct and supervision failures in ways the panel read as referring to adult convictions and adult supervision issues, not juvenile adjudications.
Even if Brewer believed the court implicitly relied on juvenile conduct, the implication was not “unmistakable,” which is fatal under Esteras on plain-error review.

3. Substantive reasonableness: a justified upward variance tied to § 3553(a)

The district court varied upward from 37–46 months to 60 months, explaining that the Guidelines did not “pick up” the seriousness of two back-to-back felon-in-possession episodes, and that Brewer’s history suggested heightened risk and deterrence needs. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because:

The variance was anchored in legitimate § 3553(a) considerations (nature/circumstances, history/characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public).
The court considered mitigation (age, remorse, immaturity, acceptance of responsibility) and expressly stated the sentence would have been higher without it.
Under deferential abuse-of-discretion review, the appellate court will not reweigh factors; Brewer’s complaint was largely about weight, not legal error.
The sentence was well below the statutory maximum (the panel described the maximum as 30 years), a conventional indicator of reasonableness.

C. Impact

Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision further solidifies that, in this circuit, § 922(g)(1) challenges—especially as-applied challenges—remain blocked by United States v. Rozier as reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois, notwithstanding Bruen and Rahimi. Defendants must look to Supreme Court intervention or en banc reconsideration to change the result.
Procedural sentencing appeals under plain error: The opinion underscores a practical appellate rule after Esteras v. United States: when a defendant fails to object at sentencing, it will be difficult to win a procedural challenge alleging reliance on an improper factor unless the transcript makes that reliance unmistakably clear. This incentivizes contemporaneous objections and explicit record development.
Upward variances for repeated similar conduct close in time: The case approves treating near-term repetition of the same serious conduct (here, two gun possessions) as an aggravating circumstance supporting a variance, even if the Guidelines calculation does not substantially change between one versus two episodes (as the district court observed).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“As applied” constitutional challenge: A claim that a statute might be valid generally but is unconstitutional when applied to a particular person’s circumstances (here, Brewer’s specific status and history).
Plain-error review: A stricter appellate standard used when the defendant did not object in the trial court. The error must be clear/obvious under current law and usually must have affected the outcome. After Esteras v. United States, for “impermissible factor” claims, the record must clearly show the sentencing judge actually relied on that factor.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed the correct steps (proper Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), no clearly erroneous facts, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the final sentence is within a permissible range given all circumstances and the § 3553(a) goals.
Guidelines range vs. upward variance: The Guidelines range is advisory. A variance is when the judge selects a sentence outside that range based on § 3553(a) factors (not a mechanical Guidelines adjustment).
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory considerations that guide federal sentencing, including seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Tyreic Brewer is chiefly significant for what it confirms rather than what it changes: (1) Eleventh Circuit panels remain bound to uphold 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under United States v. Rozier as reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois, and (2) when procedural sentencing objections are not preserved, Esteras v. United States makes reversal unlikely absent a clear record that the judge actually relied on an impermissible factor. On the merits, the decision also illustrates that repeated, close-in-time firearms possession can justify a meaningful upward variance when the district court ties that repetition to deterrence, public protection, and the seriousness of the offense under § 3553(a).