Pinegar: Voir Dire Judicial-Misconduct Claims Require Actual Prejudice; Targeted Threats Can Satisfy § 6-2-505 “Reckless Disregard of Evacuation”

1. Introduction

In Byron W. Pinegar, Jr., v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 55, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed convictions for making a terroristic threat (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-505 (2021)) and stalking. The case arose from a years-later fixation on Pinegar’s former probation officer, escalating from repeated texts to a 911 call, a personal appearance at the probation office with a gun-shaped hand gesture, and a barrage of explicit threats to kill the officer and harm his family—events that culminated in the probation office being locked down, closed, and its staff sent home.

On appeal, Pinegar raised two principal issues: (1) whether the trial judge committed judicial misconduct during voir dire by questioning (and allegedly ridiculing) a prospective juror who stated she could not “judge” anyone for religious reasons; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the § 6-2-505 element that Pinegar acted “in reckless disregard of the risk” of causing “evacuation of a building.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Voir dire/judicial misconduct: The Court held the judge did not commit misconduct. The judge’s comments, though arguably capable of being phrased more carefully, were aimed at clarifying whether the juror would follow the court’s instructions and perform the basic duty to deliberate and decide—an inquiry within the judge’s supervisory role under W.R.Cr.P. 24(c). The record also showed no “chilling effect”: other jurors continued candidly disclosing potential biases.
  • Sufficiency of evidence (§ 6-2-505): The Court held sufficient evidence supported the “reckless disregard” element. Applying McCone v. State, the Court concluded threats aimed at an individual employee can still create a substantial risk of evacuation or serious disruption, and Pinegar’s conduct—spanning a 911 call, an in-person gesture, and dozens of explicit threats—supported the jury’s inference that he consciously disregarded the risk of evacuation that in fact occurred.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Framework for judicial-misconduct review

The Court anchored its voir dire analysis in Wyoming’s established approach to judicial-misconduct claims:

  • Fernandez v. State and Belden v. State: The question is not whether the judge’s comments “left something to be desired,” but whether the behavior was “so prejudicial that it denied a defendant a fair trial.” This sets a high bar: appellate review focuses on prejudicial effect, not mere impropriety.
  • Langley v. State (quoting Belden): Misconduct claims are decided on the “particular facts and circumstances,” and reversal requires an affirmative showing the conduct prejudiced “substantial rights.”

B. Out-of-state “chilling effect” cases distinguished

  • U.S. v. Rowe: The Court treated Rowe as a cautionary example of a judge creating an intimidation dynamic—by issuing an arrest warrant before the panel and punishing jurors who admitted bias—thereby “cut[ting] off the vital flow of information” needed for voir dire. Wyoming distinguished Rowe because the judge here did not threaten punishment, accuse the juror of lying, or impose sanctions.
  • Azucena v. State: In Azucena, the judge threw a book, yelled, and accused a juror of “thinking up s***,” conduct the Nevada Supreme Court held could suppress honest disclosures. The Wyoming Court found no comparable intimidation here; the questioning remained tethered to the juror’s stated refusal to deliberate and decide.

C. Wyoming voir dire authority and discretion

  • W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(1) and W.R.Cr.P. 24(c): Voir dire’s “only purpose” is to select a fair and impartial jury; the examination is under “supervision and control of the judge,” who may conduct further examination as deemed proper.
  • Gresham v. State: Voir dire is designed to explore prejudices and biases that would interfere with juror duty and to uncover grounds for challenges for cause. The Court also drew from Gresham (via Summers) the principle that it is not error for a judge to help a juror understand that a “supposed bias” is not automatically disqualifying if the juror can follow the law and decide on the evidence.
  • Summers v. State: The central in-state comparator. In Summers, the judge made unnecessary comments (including suggesting a juror wanted “to get off” jury duty), yet the Court upheld the conviction because the judge’s intervention reflected an effort to clarify impartiality and the record showed jurors continued to disclose biases candidly. The Court used Summers to validate a pragmatic approach: intemperate phrasing alone does not equal reversible misconduct absent demonstrated impairment of voir dire’s truth-seeking function.
  • Redwine v. Fitzhugh (cited within Summers): Supports the trial court’s “affirmative duty” to ensure a competent, fair, and impartial jury.
  • Hopkinson v. State: Cited for deference to the trial court’s supervision of voir dire.
  • Martinez v. State: Supplies the abuse-of-discretion definition: exceeding “the bounds of reason under the circumstances.”

D. Sufficiency-of-evidence standards and the terroristic-threat statute

  • Aune v. State (quoting Munoz v. State): The Court restated Wyoming’s familiar sufficiency test—viewing evidence favorably to the State, deferring to the jury on credibility, and asking only whether a reasonable jury could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • McCone v. State: The key precedent interpreting § 6-2-505’s “reckless disregard” of evacuation/serious public inconvenience. McCone held that a threat directed at an individual (not a facility) can still create a substantial risk of evacuation or similar disruption, and that disruption-related outcomes (lockdown, police response, reduced care) support the inference of recklessness.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Voir dire: clarifying bias versus intimidating disclosure

The Court treated the complained-of exchange as a functional inquiry into whether the juror would perform the minimum requirements of jury service: deliberating and rendering a verdict under the court’s instructions. The prospective juror did not merely express discomfort; she stated she would “refuse to make a decision” because it was “God’s place.”

Against that posture, the judge’s role under W.R.Cr.P. 24(c) and the duty described in Summers v. State required probing follow-up. The Court acknowledged phrasing could have been more careful, but it found the exchange aimed at removing ambiguity before excusing the juror for cause—rather than punishing or shaming disclosure. The Court then confirmed the absence of actual prejudice by looking to the record: after the exchange, jurors continued to disclose biases (including possible pro-law-enforcement leanings), undermining the claim of a “chilling effect.”

In short, the Court located the constitutional line not at “sharp” questioning, but at judicial conduct that effectively suppresses truthful answers or signals retaliation for bias disclosures—conduct present in U.S. v. Rowe and Azucena v. State, but absent here.

B. Terroristic threat: “reckless disregard” tied to foreseeable disruption

For § 6-2-505, the element in dispute was whether Pinegar threatened a violent felony “in reckless disregard of the risk” of causing evacuation. The Court incorporated the statutory definition of recklessness from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (2021): conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from reasonable conduct.

Applying McCone v. State, the Court reasoned that threats to a specific employee can reasonably trigger building security measures—including closing/evacuation—because workplaces must respond to credible violence risks. The Court emphasized this case was stronger than McCone: Pinegar’s conduct was not a single call but an escalating pattern culminating in explicit killing threats, mention of pistols, statements about investigating the officer’s family, and a recent in-person appearance at the office with a gun-shaped gesture. Those circumstances supported a jury finding that Pinegar consciously disregarded the substantial risk that the office would be shut down and evacuated, which is exactly what occurred.

3.3 Impact

A. Voir dire practice in Wyoming: record-based “chilling effect” inquiries

The decision reinforces that Wyoming appellate courts will demand a concrete showing—grounded in the transcript and surrounding circumstances—that judicial remarks actually impaired voir dire’s truth-seeking purpose. Litigants alleging a “chilling effect” should expect courts to look for post-incident indicators: whether jurors continued to disclose biases, whether cause challenges remained meaningful, and whether the judge’s intervention resembled clarification rather than intimidation.

B. § 6-2-505 prosecutions: threats to individuals can satisfy evacuation-risk element

The opinion strengthens the practical reach of § 6-2-505 in workplace-targeted threats: evacuation/closure need not be the threat’s explicit object. If a defendant’s threats and surrounding conduct make evacuation or serious disruption a foreseeable response, the “reckless disregard” element can be met, particularly where the defendant’s behavior is escalating and context-rich (prior appearance, repeated contacts, reference to weapons, threats to family).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Voir dire: The jury-selection questioning process used to uncover biases so that jurors who cannot be fair can be removed (for cause or by peremptory strikes).
  • Judicial misconduct (in this context): Not every ill-advised comment is reversible. The key question is whether the judge’s behavior likely deprived the defendant of a fair trial—e.g., by intimidating jurors into hiding bias.
  • “Chilling effect” during voir dire: A claim that the judge’s actions discouraged jurors from answering honestly. Courts often test this by looking at what happened next in the transcript: did jurors still disclose concerns?
  • Abuse of discretion: A deferential review standard; reversal occurs only when the trial court’s decision falls outside the “bounds of reason.”
  • Sufficiency of the evidence: The appellate court does not reweigh evidence. It asks whether, viewing evidence favorably to the State, a reasonable jury could find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Reckless disregard (criminal recklessness): Consciously ignoring a substantial, unjustifiable risk—more blameworthy than carelessness; it is a “gross deviation” from what a reasonable person would do.
  • § 6-2-505 “evacuation” risk: The State need not prove the defendant intended evacuation—only that he threatened a violent felony while recklessly disregarding the risk his conduct would cause evacuation (or similar serious disruption).

5. Conclusion

2026 WY 55 affirms two core propositions. First, a trial judge may directly question a prospective juror about stated bias—even in pointed terms—when the purpose is to determine whether the juror can follow the law and perform the duty to decide; reversal requires a showing of actual prejudice, not simply imperfect phrasing. Second, under § 6-2-505 and McCone v. State, threats directed at an individual employee can still satisfy the “reckless disregard of evacuation risk” element when the context makes workplace closure or evacuation a foreseeable, substantial risk—and the record shows that risk materialized.