PIA § 2102 “Relates To” Requires Substantive Identity of Bid Information, and Rule 11(b)(3) Demands an Element-by-Element Factual Basis

1. Introduction

United States v. Nicole Schuster addresses a recurring but under-litigated problem in federal guilty pleas: parties can agree on a theory of criminality that the statute does not support, and a plea may be accepted without facts establishing each element. Nicole K. Schuster, a Navy mechanical engineer and procurement project lead, disclosed confidential bid information from a 2017 procurement (SU22) to a favored vendor (Company 1) during a later 2019 procurement (SU25). The Government charged her under the Procurement Integrity Act (PIA) for disclosing “contractor bid or proposal information” before award and, criminally, for doing so to confer competitive advantage.

The central issue was not whether Schuster disclosed confidential material, or whether she intended to help Company 1, but whether the pleaded facts established the PIA’s procurement-specific timing/relationship requirement: a defendant violates 41 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) only by disclosing information “before the award of a Federal agency procurement contract to which the information relates.” The parties assumed that disclosure of SU22 bid information during SU25 sufficed because the machines were “virtually identical.” The Third Circuit held that assumption was legally and factually inadequate.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit vacated Schuster’s conviction and sentence and remanded “for repleading.” It held:

• Statutory construction: When bid/proposal information comes from a prior procurement, it “relates” to a pending procurement only if it is the same in substance as information submitted as part of the pending procurement (not merely “related to” a similar product, and not necessarily word-for-word identical).
• Rule 11(b)(3): The district court has an independent obligation to interpret the statute and ensure the record contains a sufficient factual basis for each element; it may not rely on the parties’ shared (but mistaken) assumptions.
• Plain error: Accepting the plea without facts establishing the required “relates to” nexus was plain error; it affected substantial rights; and it seriously affected the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.
• Remedy: The appropriate remedy is vacatur and remand for repleading, not an acquittal, because the Rule 11(b)(3) failure is “trial error” and does not trigger Double Jeopardy as a reversal for insufficient trial evidence would.

Judge Matey dissented, agreeing with the majority’s statutory reading but concluding the district court’s error was not “plain” and did not affect substantial rights.

3. Analysis

3.1. The New Precedent: What “to which the information relates” means under 41 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1)

The opinion’s core doctrinal contribution is its construction of the PIA’s limiting clause. The Government argued for a broad view: if earlier bid information is “related to” a pending procurement because the products are similar, disclosure violates § 2102(a)(1). Schuster argued for a very narrow view: the disclosed information must be “exactly the same.”

The Third Circuit rejected both extremes and adopted a middle rule keyed to substance: disclosure of information from a past procurement violates § 2102(a)(1) only if that information is the same in substance as information submitted in the pending procurement—i.e., it has the potential to convey, in substance, what disclosure of current bid/proposal information would reveal. Similarity of the procured items (“virtually identical” machines) does not itself establish similarity of the bid information, because competitive bids can differ markedly in technical approaches, processes, and pricing even for identical end products.

3.2. Precedents Cited

A. Rule 11(b)(3) and factual-basis review

• United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2000): Anchors the methodology—courts may consider “all the evidence in the record at the time of judgment” when assessing factual basis, but the question is legal sufficiency of the admitted facts, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir.1995): Quoted through Cefaratti for the proposition that a court need only find “sufficient evidence to justify” a conclusion of guilt, underscoring that the problem here was not weighing evidence but the absence of element-satisfying facts.
• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): The Government invoked Jackson-style sufficiency review; the Third Circuit refused to import the full trial standard, reinforcing that plea factual-basis review focuses on whether admitted facts, taken as true, satisfy the statute.
• United States v. Avalos-Sanchez, 975 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2020): Used for the notion that the Government may benefit from reasonable inferences, but only those supported by record facts—important to the court’s rejection of “speculation” in place of pleaded details.
• Allen v. Ollie's Bargain Outlet, Inc., 37 F.4th 890 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2002): These cases support the inference/speculation line: inferences must be grounded in facts; conjecture cannot supply missing elements.

B. Plain-error framework and appellate-waiver limits

• United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190 (3d Cir. 2021): Provides the Third Circuit’s plain-error posture when a Rule 11(b)(3) objection is raised for the first time on appeal, and confirms “out-of-circuit decisions” can render an error “plain.”
• Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936): Supply the canonical four-part plain-error test and the discretionary “fairness, integrity or public reputation” prong the court ultimately invoked.
• Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009): Defines “plain” as “clear or obvious.”
• United States v. Irvin, 369 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2004): Cited via Scott to clarify that perfect factual analogues are unnecessary for “plainness.”
• United States v. Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2004): Used to show statutory text can itself make an error plain when sufficiently clear; the majority analogized this case to Dickerson rather than Jabateh.
• United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2020): The dissent’s central authority for the claim that where a “close interpretative inquiry” is required, error cannot be plain. The majority distinguished Jabateh as involving novel questions, extensive briefing, and reliance beyond text/structure/precedent.
• United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 2005): Explain why appellate waivers are not enforced to bar claims that a defendant pleaded guilty to non-criminal conduct or where enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice.

C. Statutory-interpretation authorities supporting the “substance” reading

• Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)): Supports the interpretive principle that words are construed “in context, not in a vacuum.”
• Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69 (2023): Cited for how voice/grammar choices (active vs passive) can affect meaning; the majority used this to justify treating “to which the information relates” as directing attention to the procurement that the information itself concerns.
• Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022): Used for consulting ordinary usage and how similar phrasing appears in statutes and decisions.
• Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards Enf't v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring): Quoted for the caution that “everything is related to everything else,” reinforcing why Congress’s phrasing cannot be read to permit boundless “related to” theories that erase statutory limits.
• Twp. of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 582 F.3d 482 (3d Cir. 2009); King v. Newbold, 845 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2017); Abtew v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 808 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth of P.R. v. Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); United States v. Neary (In re Armstrong), 206 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000); Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1993): These citations function as linguistic comparators—examples of “to which it relates” used to refer to a specific, direct object, not a generalized resemblance.

D. PIA-specific and procurement-related decisions

• Am. Small Bus. League v. Dep't of Def., 372 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2019): Supports the majority’s concern that the Government’s reading would “eviscerate” the statute’s pre-/post-award distinction, rendering “before the award” meaningless.
• Abacus Tech. Corp. v. United States, 164 Fed. Cl. 199 (2023): Central to both sides. The Third Circuit used Abacus to confirm that information “related only to” a prior procurement would not violate § 2102(a), while rejecting Schuster’s argument that Abacus required “exactly the same” information; it instead read Abacus as a pleading failure on similarity.
• SAGAM Securite Senegal v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 653 (2021): Cited for the proposition that the PIA targets disclosure of a bidder’s competition-sensitive proposal features to a competitor “in an ongoing procurement.”
• Insight Pub. Sector, Inc. v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 416 (2021): Invoked to support that disclosing information “directly related to” and occurring prior to award falls within § 2102(a).
• United States v. Kuciapinski, 434 F. Supp. 3d 939 (D. Colo. 2020): Used to reinforce that one cannot violate § 2102 when the matter concerns only an already-awarded contract.
• Mitchco Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022): Cited as an example of recurring procurements, illustrating why “relatedness” based on similar services/products is too capacious.

E. Substantial rights under Rule 11 error and the circuit split

• United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004): The majority applied this stricter standard (reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for the error) and found it satisfied because the record contained no facts establishing criminality under the correct statutory interpretation.
• United States v. Carillo, 860 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 2017): Recognized as taking a different approach (factual basis fails, substantial rights affected), but the Third Circuit did not choose sides because Schuster prevailed under Dominguez Benitez.
• United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Castro-Trevino, 464 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2005): Cited as circuits applying Dominguez Benitez in comparable Rule 11 contexts.
• United States v. Garcia-Paulin, 627 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2009): Used to support that convictions entered without a sufficient factual basis seriously affect the fairness/integrity of proceedings.

F. Remedy and Double Jeopardy

• United States v. Smith, 997 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Maye, 582 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2009): Represent the “weight of authority” that the remedy is vacatur and remand for repleading rather than acquittal.
• Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978): Establishes that reversal for insufficient evidence after trial bars retrial.
• Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988): Distinguishes “trial error” (retrial permissible) from insufficiency (retrial barred).
• United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Green, 139 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1998): Support treating a Rule 11(b)(3) acceptance error as “trial error,” permitting repleading/reprosecution without Double Jeopardy concerns.

3.3. Legal Reasoning

A. Text and grammar: why “relates” is not “related to”

The majority’s interpretive move is grammatical as much as semantic. It emphasized that § 2102(a)(1) does not ask whether information is “related to” some procurement in a generalized way; it requires identifying the specific procurement “to which the information relates.” This frames “relates” as an active linkage: the information must meaningfully concern the pending procurement. The court then used ordinary statutory usage (multiple examples across the U.S. Code and case law) to show that “relates” commonly functions to pick out a particular referent, not merely a thematic similarity.

B. Structural constraint: preserving the “before the award” boundary

The PIA draws a sharp temporal line: the prohibition is tied to the period “before the award” of the procurement “to which the information relates.” The court reasoned that if any past procurement information could qualify whenever a similar product is being sought, the “before the award” limitation becomes unstable in systems where agencies repeatedly procure similar goods and services—effectively turning a procurement-specific anti-leak statute into a broad confidentiality crime untethered from procurement timing. The court refused to interpret the PIA in a way that makes Congress’s temporal limit “meaningless.”

C. The “same in substance” test and why product similarity is not enough

Having rejected “everything is related” breadth, the court also declined to require verbatim identity. It instead adopted a functional test: prior-procurement bid information violates § 2102(a)(1) only if it is “the same in substance” as the type of bid/proposal information submitted in the pending procurement. This recognizes how bid information can be reused (e.g., stable labor categories, recurring technical approaches) while avoiding an unrealistic “word-for-word” standard.

Critically, the court separated two different similarities:

• Similarity of solicited products (SU22 and SU25 were “virtually identical” machines), and
• Similarity of bid information (pricing, processes, technical content actually submitted by Company 2 for SU25).

Only the second similarity matters for the statutory “relates to” element. Because the plea record did not describe the SU25 bid information or connect it to the disclosed SU22 information, the element was missing.

D. Rule 11(b)(3) as a non-delegable judicial obligation

The majority underscored that Rule 11(b)(3) requires the court to ensure that the admitted facts constitute a crime. Even where the defendant does not object and both parties proceed on a shared theory, the district court must independently interpret the statute and confirm an adequate factual basis. That point is particularly consequential in specialized statutes like the PIA, where parties may assume “procurement-related” misconduct is automatically criminal.

E. Plain error, substantial rights, and why “maybe the Government could prove it” is insufficient

On plain error, the majority found the correct interpretation clear from text/structure/usage and consistent with all available precedent interpreting § 2102(a). It also found the factual-basis deficiency outcome-determinative: with no record facts tying SU22 information to SU25 bid information, Schuster could not reliably assess the Government’s case, and the court could not lawfully enter judgment of conviction.

The Government argued it could have produced additional evidence demonstrating substantial similarity. The majority treated that assertion as beside the point: Rule 11(b)(3) requires the factual basis to be in the record at the time the plea is accepted. A conviction cannot rest on post hoc assurances that evidence exists somewhere.

F. Remedy: vacatur and remand for repleading, not acquittal

The court’s remedial holding matters beyond procurement cases. It drew the doctrinal line between:

• Insufficient evidence after trial (triggering Burks v. United States and barring retrial), and
• Rule 11(b)(3) trial error (permitting remand because the Government did not have to present its full case at a plea).

The PIA charge can therefore be repleaded, potentially with a corrected factual proffer or different charging decision.

3.4. Impact

A. Procurement Integrity Act enforcement: a procurement-specific nexus requirement

This decision operationalizes a limiting principle in PIA prosecutions: when the Government relies on disclosure from a prior procurement to establish a § 2102(a)(1) violation in a later procurement, it must plead and be prepared to prove that the prior information is substantively the same as information submitted (or to be submitted) in the pending procurement. Evidence that the products are similar, or that the defendant intended to confer advantage, will not substitute for the statutory nexus.

B. Plea practice: heightened attention to element-specific proffers

The opinion is also a cautionary precedent for plea drafting and plea colloquies: conclusory statements (“competitive advantage”) and background facts (“virtually identical” products) may fail Rule 11(b)(3) when an element turns on the relationship between two specific datasets (here, SU22 bid information and SU25 bid information). Prosecutors should expect courts—especially within the Third Circuit—to demand explicit proffers tying the admitted facts to each element.

C. Appellate waivers: limits where conduct may not be criminal

Though not the merits holding, the opinion reinforces Third Circuit skepticism about enforcing waivers to bar claims that the defendant pleaded guilty to non-criminal conduct, relying on United States v. Yung, United States v. Castro, and United States v. Wilson.

D. Institutional consequence: Rule 11(b)(3) as a structural safeguard

The case reaffirms Rule 11(b)(3) as a structural check against “assumption-based criminality,” especially in complex regulatory crimes where statutory limits are easy to overlook. The court’s insistence that the judiciary—not the parties—must verify that admitted facts constitute a crime strengthens the legitimacy of plea-based adjudication.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Contractor bid or proposal information” (41 U.S.C. § 2101(2)): Confidential data submitted in a federal procurement, including pricing, labor rates, and proprietary processes, not publicly available.
• Procurement Integrity Act (PIA): A statute designed to protect the fairness of federal contracting by preventing leaks of competitor-sensitive information during an ongoing procurement.
• “Before the award … to which the information relates”: The leak must happen before the relevant contract is awarded, and the information must concern that particular procurement—not just a similar product line or a prior contract generally.
• Rule 11(b)(3) factual basis: Before accepting a guilty plea, the judge must ensure the record contains facts that satisfy every element of the crime. Agreement by the parties is not enough.
• Plain error: A demanding appellate standard used when the defendant did not object in the district court; the error must be clear/obvious and must have affected the outcome.
• Vacatur and remand for repleading: The conviction is undone and the case returns to the district court; the Government may seek a new plea or proceed further, because this is treated as a procedural (trial) error rather than an acquittal-worthy failure of proof at trial.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Nicole Schuster establishes a concrete limitation on PIA liability where the Government relies on information from a prior procurement: § 2102(a)(1) requires that the disclosed information be the same in substance as information submitted in the pending procurement, not merely connected to a similar product. Equally important, the case is a Rule 11(b)(3) warning: district courts must independently interpret the statute and ensure that the record’s admitted facts satisfy each element, even when both parties proceed on a shared assumption. The decision is likely to influence both procurement-integrity prosecutions and plea practice more broadly by demanding element-specific factual proffers and resisting conviction-by-conclusion.