Evidentiary Exclusion Is Not “Suppression” Under Crim. P. 37.1(a): An Unauthorized Prosecution Appeal Does Not Toll Colorado’s Statutory Speedy Trial Deadline

Introduction

In Phillips v. People, 2026 CO 21, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether the prosecution can toll Colorado’s statutory speedy trial deadline by filing a pretrial “interlocutory appeal” from county court to district court when the underlying ruling is not a true suppression order, but instead a routine evidentiary exclusion under CRE 401–403.

The petitioner, Khristina Phillips, was convicted in county court of child abuse and operating a childcare facility without a license. She argued her statutory speedy trial right was violated because the People filed a second pretrial appeal that was jurisdictionally improper, and therefore could not toll the speedy trial clock under § 18-1-405(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025). The respondent was The People of the State of Colorado.

The central issue was narrow but consequential: under Colorado law, tolling occurs for “the period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal,” but only if the appeal is truly interlocutory—i.e., it satisfies the good-faith/arguable-merit framework of People v. Gallegos.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the People’s second pretrial appeal—taken after the county court excluded an unedited interview video as cumulative, irrelevant in parts, and unfairly prejudicial—did not qualify as an interlocutory appeal for speedy-trial tolling purposes. The county court had repeatedly emphasized it was not “suppressing” evidence, but making an evidentiary ruling under CRE 401, 402, and 403.

Because the prosecution’s assertion that the appeal was authorized by Crim. P. 37.1(a) lacked arguable merit, the appeal was not in good faith under People v. Gallegos. Accordingly, the appeal did not toll the statutory deadline, the deadline expired, and Phillips’s convictions had to be vacated with dismissal with prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Speedy-trial principles and the statute’s role

  • Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016) and United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) were used to frame the systemic purposes of speedy-trial rights—preventing undue pretrial incarceration, limiting anxiety, and avoiding defense impairment. While these are constitutional-touchstone cases, the Court’s holding turned on the Colorado statutory mechanism that implements the right.
  • People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22) supplied the interpretive lens: § 18-1-405 is reviewed de novo, the burden of compliance lies with the court and prosecution, and the statute functions as a “bulwark” effectuating the constitutional right.
  • Marquez v. Dist. Ct., 613 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1980) reinforced the record-making obligation: the trial court must create a record sufficient to determine statutory compliance.

2) What counts as an “interlocutory appeal” for tolling

  • People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997) controlled. It defines an interlocutory appeal for § 18-1-405(6)(b) tolling as one taken in good faith, and deems an appeal taken in good faith only when: (i) the assertion of legal authorization has arguable merit; (ii) the appeal is not for delay; and (iii) the issues substantially affect the prosecution’s case. The Court resolved Phillips solely on the first prong: no arguable merit.

3) “Suppression” as a term of art (and limits on interlocutory review)

  • People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986) was pivotal: rulings about evidentiary admissibility “not constitutional in character” fall outside the interlocutory appeal scope (there, under Crim. P. 41.2, the predecessor to Crim. P. 37.1).
  • The Court emphasized its broader suppression jurisprudence distinguishing constitutional suppression from non-constitutional exclusion: People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380 (Colo. 1997); Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197 (Colo. 2001); People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831 (Colo. 2009). These cases reinforced that “suppression” is generally reserved to remedy constitutional violations and does not ordinarily apply to mere statutory noncompliance—still less to discretionary evidence-rule exclusions.
  • People v. Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1983) (quoting People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1978)) supplied an important guardrail: prosecutors may not “piggyback” issues to obtain interlocutory review of pretrial evidentiary decisions. The Phillips Court extended that logic to the Crim. P. 37.1(a) context.
  • People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001) was used to describe the traditional, limited universe of interlocutory criminal appeals: suppression tied to unlawful search/seizure, involuntary confession/admission, or certain identification issues—again underscoring that mere evidentiary disputes are not the target.
  • The Court cited multiple Crim. P. 37.1(a) cases as consistent practice: interlocutory appeals arise from true suppression (e.g., Miranda/unlawful seizure), not CRE 401–403 exclusion—People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1997); Tate v. People, 2012 CO 75; People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437 (Colo. 2010).

4) Interpretation discipline: avoiding absurd expansions of interlocutory appeals

  • McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44 and People v. Angel, 2012 CO 34 supported the Court’s insistence that Crim. P. 37.1(a) cannot be read to authorize interlocutory appeals from any adverse evidentiary ruling, because that would generate illogical/absurd results and destabilize trial management and speedy-trial compliance.
  • The People’s attempt to analogize to civil usage via Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M was rejected as contextually irrelevant: the criminal term “suppress” is a term of art, not a loose synonym for “exclude.”

Legal Reasoning

  1. The tolling statute requires an “interlocutory appeal,” and Gallegos supplies the operative definition.
    Under § 18-1-405(6)(b), delay is excluded only if the appeal qualifies as interlocutory; under People v. Gallegos, interlocutory status depends on good faith, including whether the claimed authorization has arguable merit.
  2. Crim. P. 37.1(a) authorizes interlocutory appeals only from specified suppression-type rulings.
    The Court read Crim. P. 37.1(a) in its technical criminal-law sense: “suppression” refers to excluding evidence because it was illegally obtained, typically implicating constitutional protections. A CRE 401–403 decision is different in kind: it regulates what is admissible at trial, not whether the government may use illegally obtained evidence.
  3. The county court’s ruling was expressly evidentiary, not suppression.
    The trial judge repeatedly disclaimed suppression and grounded the decision in cumulative evidence concerns, relevance, unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of time—classic CRE 403 management.
  4. The People’s attempt to re-label exclusion as suppression lacked arguable merit.
    Because the appeal sought review of an evidentiary ruling outside Crim. P. 37.1(a), the People’s legal-authorization claim failed Gallegos’s arguable-merit threshold. The Court therefore did not need to decide whether the appeal was dilatory or whether the issue substantially affected the case.
  5. Consequently, there was no tolling, the statutory deadline elapsed, and dismissal with prejudice was mandatory.
    Once the second appeal was deemed non-interlocutory for § 18-1-405(6)(b), the conceded timing consequence followed: trial occurred outside the six-month window, requiring vacatur and dismissal with prejudice under § 18-1-405(1).

Impact

  • Limits prosecutorial tolling strategies. Prosecutors may not toll speedy trial by appealing ordinary evidentiary exclusions and characterizing them as “suppression.” The decision forecloses a path that would otherwise permit routine pretrial CRE disputes to halt proceedings.
  • Strengthens the “term of art” boundary between suppression and exclusion. Phillips cements that “suppress” in Crim. P. 37.1(a) is tied to illegal procurement/constitutional infirmity, not to discretionary evidentiary gatekeeping.
  • Reinforces Gallegos as a meaningful screening test. The “arguable merit” prong does real work: if the interlocutory-authorization theory is untenable, the appeal is not “interlocutory” for tolling even if filed sincerely or with certification language.
  • Trial-court administration and fairness. The Court’s reasoning protects the trial process from last-minute prosecution interruptions that would otherwise shift the burden of scheduling consequences onto defendants and the court system.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory speedy trial (§ 18-1-405)
Colorado’s statute generally requires trial within six months of a not-guilty plea. If the deadline is missed (and no valid extension/tolling applies), the remedy is dismissal with prejudice.
Tolling (§ 18-1-405(6)(b))
“Tolling” stops the clock for certain periods. One such period is the time consumed by a qualifying interlocutory appeal.
Interlocutory appeal
A pretrial appeal of a limited class of rulings. Under People v. Gallegos, it is “interlocutory” for speedy-trial tolling only if taken in good faith, including that the appeal’s authorization theory has arguable merit.
Suppression vs. exclusion
Suppression (in criminal practice) means barring evidence because it was obtained illegally—often implicating constitutional violations (e.g., Miranda, unlawful search). Exclusion under the rules of evidence means keeping evidence out because it is irrelevant, cumulative, or too unfairly prejudicial, even if it was lawfully obtained.
CRE 401 and CRE 403
CRE 401 defines relevance; CRE 403 allows relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers like unfair prejudice, confusion, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Miranda / custody
Miranda safeguards apply when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. Suppression may follow if statements are obtained in violation of Miranda. (Here, the first interlocutory appeal involved Miranda; the second did not.)

Conclusion

Phillips v. People draws a bright, practical line: a prosecution appeal does not become “interlocutory” for speedy-trial tolling merely because the People label a trial-management evidentiary exclusion as “suppression.” Under People v. Gallegos, tolling depends on a good-faith appeal, and good faith requires that the asserted authorization have arguable merit. When the underlying ruling rests on CRE 401–403 rather than the illegality of how evidence was obtained, Crim. P. 37.1(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal, the clock does not stop, and the statutory remedy—dismissal with prejudice—applies if the deadline is exceeded.