Pro Hac Vice Rule 3(A)(2) Noncompliance Constitutes Unauthorized Practice Under N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a)

I. Introduction

Petition of Dansdill, 2026 ND 109, is a North Dakota Supreme Court attorney-discipline decision affirming a private admonition for unauthorized practice of law under N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5. The petitioner, Lindsay E. Dansdill, was licensed in Illinois, Nevada, and California but not North Dakota. She was listed as counsel on a Cass County civil complaint filed in March 2022, and later obtained a district court order (October 2022) granting her pro hac vice permission. She nonetheless failed to comply with key requirements of North Dakota Admission to Practice Rule 3, including the 45-day deadline to move for pro hac vice admission after “appearance,” and other filing/fee obligations.

The core issues were:

  • Whether violating Admission to Practice Rule 3 can amount to professional misconduct under N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a).
  • Whether being designated as counsel on a pleading (even without signing) constitutes an “appearance” triggering Rule 3 obligations.
  • Whether N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(b)(3) permits an out-of-state lawyer to “appear” before pro hac vice admission if the lawyer reasonably expects authorization.
  • Whether shortcomings in the Inquiry Committee’s written explanation affected the outcome or due process.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Disciplinary Board’s approval of the Inquiry Committee West’s private admonition. On de novo review, the Court held that clear and convincing evidence established Dansdill violated N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a) by engaging in North Dakota practice that violated “the regulation of the legal profession” in North Dakota—specifically, by failing to file her motion for pro hac vice admission within 45 days of appearing as counsel as required by Admission to Practice Rule 3(A)(2).

The Court also addressed (but found non-dispositive) deficiencies in the Inquiry Committee’s notice of disposition under N.D.R. Lawyer Discipl. 3.1(D)(8), concluding that despite the committee’s conclusory explanation, Dansdill had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the charge, and the Court could resolve the merits on a de novo record.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and burden of proof

  • Kuntz v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of N.D., 2015 ND 220: The Court relied on Kuntz for the governing approach: informal disciplinary dispositions are reviewed de novo on the record, and rule violations must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  • In re Disciplinary Action Against McGuire, 2004 ND 171 (quoting Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1979)): These authorities supplied the Court’s definition of “clear and convincing”—evidence producing a firm belief or conviction in the factfinder.
  • In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 2012 ND 174: Cited for the proposition that interpreting the Rules of Professional Conduct is a question of law, and for the Court’s textualist method of rule interpretation (plain meaning; unambiguous language controls).
  • State v. Kopperud, 2015 ND 124: Reinforced that interpretation of court rules is a legal question, supporting the Court’s independent construction of Rule 5.5 and Admission to Practice Rule 3.

2. Due process and adequacy of disciplinary notice

  • In re Gerber, 2015 ND 217: Provided the due-process framework in attorney discipline—fair notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard—and supported affirmance despite imperfect reasoning statements where the attorney had meaningful notice and participation.
  • Matter of Bolinske, 2018 ND 72: Used as a comparator for assessing procedural fairness; the Court contrasted the committee’s inadequate explanation here with Bolinske’s written notice, but still found no due process violation on this record because Dansdill did not argue due process and the investigative report/participation supplied notice.
  • In re Disciplinary Action Against McKechnie, 2003 ND 37: Cited to illustrate when remand may be necessary for lack of proper notice; the Court distinguished that scenario and declined remand here because of de novo review, undisputed material facts, and existing notice.

3. Textual interpretation and “or” as disjunctive

  • State v. Martin, 2011 ND 6 and D.A.H. v. D.A.D., 2025 ND 208: These cases grounded the Court’s interpretation that “or” is disjunctive. The Court used them to read N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(b)(3) as providing two distinct alternatives—(i) authorized representation, or (ii) preparing for a matter with a reasonable expectation of authorization—thereby limiting the pre-admission safe harbor to “preparing,” not “appearing.”

4. Prior North Dakota unauthorized-practice/pro hac vice jurisprudence

  • Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87: A central precedent. The Court quoted Carlson for the proposition that Admission to Practice Rule 3, read with Rule 5.5, “plainly says” pro hac vice admission is required for nonresident attorneys who appear “either in person, by signing pleadings, or by being designated as counsel” in administrative actions. Carlson also supported the conclusion that certain filings and being listed as counsel are not mere preparatory work; they are “appearance” triggering the Rule 3(A)(2) deadline.
  • Blume Const., Inc. v. State ex rel. Job Serv. N.D., 2015 ND 285: Reinforced that signing a filing as an attorney and being designated as counsel constitute “practice” in North Dakota requiring timely pro hac vice motion within 45 days. The Court used Blume Const. to analogize Dansdill’s situation: listing/acting as counsel without timely compliance falls outside Rule 5.5(b) safe harbors.
  • In re Disciplinary Action Against Corwin, 2014 ND 50: Cited for the principle of judicial restraint in discipline appeals: the Court may decline to address additional alleged violations if the sanction would not change. Here, it avoided deciding whether the failure to file paperwork with the Board of Law Examiners simultaneously, and failure to pay annual fees, independently constituted Rule 5.5 violations.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 5.5(a) incorporates “regulation of the legal profession,” including Admission to Practice Rules

Dansdill’s central defense was jurisdictional in character: she argued the Disciplinary Board could not discipline her for violating “non-disciplinary” Admission to Practice Rules. The Court rejected this by construing the text of N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a):

“A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.”

The Court treated “regulation” as a broad category encompassing authoritative rules controlling legal practice in North Dakota. It held that the North Dakota Admission to Practice Rules, including Admission to Practice Rule 3, are part of that “regulation.” The doctrinal move is important: it converts certain admission-rule violations into professional misconduct because Rule 5.5(a) makes it unethical to practice in a manner that violates local practice regulation. The Court bolstered this reading by invoking N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5, Comment [1] (“The practice of law in violation of lawyer-licensing standards of another jurisdiction constitutes a violation of these Rules.”).

2. Being “designated as counsel” is an appearance, even without signing

Dansdill argued she did not “appear” merely because her name appeared in the complaint’s signature block, emphasizing she did not sign it. The Court relied on the text of Admission to Practice Rule 3(A) and its Explanatory Note, both of which define “appearance” to include not only in-person appearances and signing pleadings, but also “being designated as counsel” on filings. The Court also relied on Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87 to confirm that being designated as counsel constitutes engaging in practice requiring pro hac vice admission.

On undisputed facts, Dansdill was listed as counsel on the complaint filed March 28, 2022—more than six months before the October 11, 2022 pro hac vice order. That was enough to constitute an appearance triggering Rule 3 obligations.

3. Rule 5.5(b)(3) “reasonable expectation” language protects preparation, not appearance

Dansdill invoked the multijurisdictional “safe harbors” in N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(b), especially Rule 5.5(b)(3), arguing it allows practice before admission if the attorney “reasonably expects” to be admitted pro hac vice.

The Court parsed the clause—“authorized to represent a client or is preparing for a matter in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be so authorized”—and used State v. Martin, 2011 ND 6 and D.A.H. v. D.A.D., 2025 ND 208 to treat “or” as creating two independent alternatives. It then emphasized that the “reasonable expectation” language attaches to the preparing alternative, not “appearing.” The Court reinforced that limitation by quoting N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5, Comment [5], which describes the safe harbor as covering preparatory work such as factual investigation and discovery, not filing as counsel or otherwise making an appearance of record.

The upshot: Rule 5.5(b)(3) cannot be used to justify being listed as counsel on a complaint in North Dakota before pro hac vice admission.

4. The 45-day deadline in Rule 3(A)(2) is enforceable through Rule 5.5(a)

The Court held that, once Dansdill “appeared” by being designated as counsel on the complaint, Admission to Practice Rule 3(A)(2) required her to file her pro hac vice motion no later than 45 days after service of the relevant pleading/paper (as explained in Rule 3’s Explanatory Note). Her October 2022 motion came well after that deadline.

Applying Blume Const., Inc. v. State ex rel. Job Serv. N.D., 2015 ND 285 and Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, the Court concluded this was unauthorized practice of law under N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a) because it violated North Dakota’s licensing/admission regulation.

5. Committee’s inadequate written reasons: error noted, but not outcome-determinative

The Court criticized the Inquiry Committee for failing to comply with N.D.R. Lawyer Discipl. 3.1(D)(8), which requires written notice of disposition and reasons. The Committee did not identify the facts relied on or which subsections of Rule 5.5 were violated. The Court acknowledged that, depending on facts, such deficiencies could affect due process (citing In re Gerber, 2015 ND 217).

However, the Court found no basis to halt review or remand because Dansdill did not raise a due process argument and the record showed fair notice and an opportunity to be heard: Disciplinary Counsel’s investigative report laid out the factual theory and Rule 5.5 subsections; Dansdill responded in writing, submitted exhibits, appeared with counsel at the Committee meeting, and briefed the matter on appeal. The Court therefore proceeded to decide the merits de novo.

C. Impact

1. Practical compliance consequences for out-of-state lawyers

The decision materially heightens the risk profile for nonresident counsel who “touch” a North Dakota matter before pro hac vice admission. Two takeaways are likely to shape practice:

  • “Counsel of record” designation is enough: Even if local counsel signs, an out-of-state lawyer’s name on a complaint can constitute an “appearance” under Rule 3(A), triggering the Rule 3(A)(2) timing obligation and, if missed, a Rule 5.5(a) ethical exposure.
  • Safe harbor is narrower than some assume: Rule 5.5(b)(3) does not authorize appearing or filing as counsel before admission; it protects only preparatory activities when a lawyer reasonably expects pro hac vice authorization.

2. Doctrinal clarification: Admission-rule violations as professional misconduct

The Court’s reasoning cements a link between admission requirements and disciplinary enforcement: if an Admission to Practice rule “regulates the legal profession” within the meaning of Rule 5.5(a), its violation can be treated as unauthorized practice. This is likely to reduce the force of future arguments that admission-rule noncompliance is “administrative” rather than “ethical.”

3. Institutional discipline-process implications

Although the admonition was affirmed, the Court’s criticism of the Inquiry Committee’s conclusory notice signals that future cases could turn on the adequacy of written reasons—especially if a respondent timely asserts a due-process violation or if the factual/legal theory is less clearly laid out in the investigative report.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Pro hac vice: Permission for an out-of-state lawyer to appear in a specific case in a state where the lawyer is not licensed, typically requiring a motion and compliance with procedural prerequisites (including deadlines and fees).
  • Unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5): Practicing in a jurisdiction without meeting that jurisdiction’s licensing/admission requirements. In North Dakota, practicing in a way that violates Admission to Practice rules can trigger Rule 5.5(a).
  • “Safe harbor” (Rule 5.5(b)): Specific exceptions allowing limited multijurisdictional activities without violating Rule 5.5. In this case, the Court emphasized that the pro hac vice-related safe harbor protects only preparation before admission, not filing/appearing as counsel.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not,” requiring a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegation.
  • De novo review: The Supreme Court independently reviews the record rather than deferring to the disciplinary body’s conclusions.
  • Procedural due process in discipline: At minimum, fair notice of charges and a meaningful chance to respond; inadequate written reasoning can matter, but may be cured where the record shows full notice and opportunity to be heard.
  • Private admonition: A non-public discipline reserved for minor misconduct with little/no injury and low likelihood of repetition (as reflected in the Opinion’s reference to the North Dakota standards).

V. Conclusion

Petition of Dansdill establishes (and reinforces through prior precedent) a strict compliance principle for nonresident lawyers: if you are designated as counsel in a North Dakota matter, you have “appeared,” and you must meet Rule 3’s pro hac vice requirements—especially the 45-day filing deadline—or you risk discipline for unauthorized practice under Rule 5.5(a). The Court also clarified that Rule 5.5(b)(3) protects only preparatory work undertaken with a reasonable expectation of pro hac vice admission, not the act of appearing or being counsel of record. Finally, while the Court criticized the Inquiry Committee’s conclusory explanation, it affirmed where the overall process provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard and the record supported the violation by clear and convincing evidence.