Pet Fees for Service Animals Are an Unlawful Refusal of Reasonable Accommodation Under Executive Law § 296(18)(2)

1. Introduction

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Winnie (2026 NY Slip Op 03041 [249 AD3d 1377] [3d Dept May 14, 2026]) is an Executive Law § 298 enforcement-and-review proceeding in which the New York State Division of Human Rights (the “Division”) sought to enforce the Commissioner’s final order awarding relief to tenants Heidy Trees and Craig Ostrander.

The dispute arose from a housing rental in Saugerties, Ulster County. The tenants alleged that their landlord—Saugerties Self Storage Inc. and its officer/manager Derek Winnie—engaged in unlawful discriminatory housing practices by refusing to reasonably accommodate Ostrander’s disability, including by requiring a pet deposit and monthly pet fee for a service animal and then undertaking actions aimed at forcing the tenants to move out.

Key issues included: (i) whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination of housing discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (18) (2); (ii) whether it was procedurally proper for the Commissioner to adopt an alternative proposed order under 9 NYCRR 465.17 (c) (2) after the ALJ recommended dismissal; (iii) whether a prior small claims action barred the Division’s proceeding; and (iv) whether the compensatory damages, punitive damages, and civil fine/penalty were authorized and not an abuse of discretion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department confirmed the Commissioner’s determination and granted the petition to enforce the order. The court held that:

  • Adoption of the alternative proposed order was not error under 9 NYCRR 465.17 (c) (2).
  • A prior small claims case did not bar the Division’s Human Rights Law proceeding, particularly because the small claims court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Human Rights Law claims.
  • Substantial evidence supported the finding that respondents violated Executive Law § 296 (18) (2) by refusing a reasonable accommodation for a disabled tenant’s service animal—specifically by charging pet-related fees and then intentionally making the tenants’ living conditions intolerable to induce them to vacate.
  • The compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the $15,000 civil fine/penalty were within statutory authority and not an abuse of discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision is anchored in a consistent line of New York appellate authority addressing (a) the reasonable-accommodation framework for disabled tenants (including accommodations involving animals) and (b) the deferential standard of judicial review applied to Division determinations.

A. Reasonable accommodation for disability-related animals

  • Matter of 1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 176 AD3d 930 (2d Dept 2019): cited for the elements a complainant must show—disability, disability-related necessity for the animal to use and enjoy the dwelling, and the feasibility of a reasonable accommodation. The Third Department relied on this framework and found it satisfied by medical documentation and the landlord’s conduct.
  • Matter of Kennedy St. Quad, Ltd. v Nathanson, 62 AD3d 879 (2d Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 714 (2009), and Matter of One Overlook Ave. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 8 AD3d 286 (2d Dept 2004), lv denied 5 NY3d 714 (2005): cited for the same reasonable-accommodation requirements and used as comparators. The court “compare[d]” them in explaining why the present record supported liability.
  • Mozaffari v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 63 AD3d 643 (1st Dept 2009): cited as additional authority supporting the conclusion that the landlord’s refusal to allow a disability-related animal as a reasonable accommodation can constitute unlawful discrimination.

B. Standard of review and deference to the Division

  • Matter of Janitronics, Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 239 AD3d 1190 (3d Dept 2025): cited repeatedly for (i) the propriety of the Commissioner’s adoption of an alternative proposed order under 9 NYCRR 465.17 (c) (2), (ii) the “substantial evidence” review standard in discrimination cases, and (iii) deference to the agency’s determinations and damages assessment.
  • Matter of R & B Autobody & Radiator, Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 31 AD3d 989 (3d Dept 2006): cited alongside Janitronics to confirm the agency’s procedural authority to proceed via an alternative proposed order rather than the ALJ’s recommended dismissal.
  • Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Miranda, 136 AD3d 1240 (3d Dept 2016): cited for the limited nature of judicial review under Executive Law § 298.
  • Matter of Gifford v McCarthy, 137 AD3d 30 (3d Dept 2016): cited for the principle that the reviewing court may not reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute its judgment for the Division’s.
  • Matter of ABD Engrs. LLP v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 225 AD3d 982 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Arcuri v Kirkland, 113 AD3d 912 (3d Dept 2014): cited to emphasize deference owed to the Division given its expertise in discrimination matters.

C. Jurisdiction / preclusion argument based on prior small claims action

  • Mentiply v Foster, 239 AD3d 1070 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 911 (2026): cited to reject the contention that the tenants’ prior small claims case barred the Division’s proceeding; the Third Department characterized the argument as “patently without merit,” highlighting that the small claims court would have lacked jurisdiction over Human Rights Law claims even if raised.

D. Remedies: compensatory damages, punitive damages, and civil penalties

  • Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Hilpl, 125 AD3d 1318 (4th Dept 2015), and Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Muia, 176 AD2d 1142 (3d Dept 1991): cited for the proposition that compensatory damages are proper when reasonably related to wrongdoing and comparable to awards in similar cases.
  • Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Weichert, 229 AD3d 1236 (4th Dept 2024), and Matter of Matteo v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 306 AD2d 484 (2d Dept 2003): cited to uphold punitive damages as a deterrent against housing discrimination, and to confirm the Commissioner’s statutory authority.
  • Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v C&A Cent. Realty, Inc., 240 AD3d 439 (1st Dept 2025), and Matter of Jacobs v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 131 AD3d 883 (1st Dept 2015): cited to confirm authority and discretion to impose a civil fine/penalty—in this case, $15,000.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The governing statutory rule: Executive Law § 296 (18) (2)

The court applied the statutory command that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a housing provider “[t]o refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a] person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]).

The opinion also notes a significant legislative clarification (by amendment) that this obligation “includ[es] the use of an animal as a reasonable accommodation to alleviate symptoms or effects of a disability” (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2], as amended by L 2020, ch 137). While the case concerned events beginning in 2017, the court treated the animal-accommodation concept as well-grounded in the statutory framework and precedent.

B. Proof and “substantial evidence”

The Third Department framed its review in classic Executive Law § 298 terms: whether “substantial evidence” supports the Division’s determination, without reweighing conflicting proof and with deference to the agency’s credibility findings.

On the merits, the court emphasized:

  • Disability was uncontested.
  • Necessity of the dog was supported by medical letters describing the dog’s training and its role in assisting daily tasks and maintaining independence/quality of life.
  • Despite receiving this documentation, Winnie required a pet deposit and monthly pet fee, which functioned as a denial of the accommodation.
  • When the tenants did not pay, Winnie engaged in targeted conduct to make the apartment unlivable and induce them to leave—blocking the ramp used for access and playing excessively loud music for 28 days, among other conduct.
  • Although Winnie denied or reframed conduct at the hearing, contemporaneous statements to law enforcement supported intentional harassment linked to the service dog and the nonpayment of pet fees.

This evidentiary combination—documentation of need, insistence on pet charges, and retaliatory/inducing conduct—supported the conclusion that respondents refused a reasonable accommodation and discriminated in housing.

C. Procedural authority: adoption of an alternative proposed order

The case is notable for its procedural path: the ALJ recommended dismissal twice; the Division objected; the record was reopened with an explicit directive to consider certain evidence; and ultimately adjudication counsel issued an alternative proposed order sustained by the Commissioner.

The Third Department confirmed this mechanism as permissible under 9 NYCRR 465.17 (c) (2), relying on Matter of Janitronics, Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights and Matter of R & B Autobody & Radiator, Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights. In practical terms, the decision underscores that an ALJ recommendation does not bind the Commissioner; the Commissioner may sustain a complaint where the record supports doing so.

D. No bar from a prior small claims action

The court rejected the claim-preclusion/jurisdiction argument as meritless, stressing that the small claims court could not adjudicate Human Rights Law claims in the first place. This reinforces that a tenant’s separate small claims dispute does not, without more, displace the Division’s statutory enforcement role.

E. Remedies within statutory authority

The court upheld three categories of relief:

  • Compensatory damages: sustained as reasonably related to the wrongdoing and comparable to similar awards, citing Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Hilpl and Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Muia.
  • Punitive damages: upheld as within authority and not an abuse of discretion, emphasizing deterrence in housing discrimination; grounded in Executive Law § 297 (4) (c) (iv) and supported by Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Weichert and Matter of Matteo v New York State Div. of Human Rights.
  • Civil fine and penalty ($15,000): upheld under Executive Law § 297 (4) (c) (vi), with the court citing Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v C&A Cent. Realty, Inc. and Matter of Jacobs v New York State Div. of Human Rights.

3.3. Impact

  • Service-animal “pet fees” are high-risk under NYHRL: This decision reinforces that treating a disability-related service animal as an ordinary “pet”—by imposing deposits/fees—can constitute a refusal of reasonable accommodation, especially when the tenant provides medical documentation.
  • Harassment/constructive pressure amplifies liability and remedies: The court’s approval of punitive damages and a substantial civil penalty reflects that intentional conduct to force a disabled tenant out (e.g., blocking accessible routes, sustained noise campaigns) may be viewed as particularly blameworthy and deterrence-worthy.
  • Agency deference remains decisive: The opinion is a reminder that appellate review under Executive Law § 298 is narrow; litigants should focus on building (or attacking) the administrative record rather than expecting a re-trial on review.
  • Parallel civil proceedings do not necessarily displace Division enforcement: Attempts to use unrelated small claims litigation as a shield against Human Rights Law enforcement are unlikely to succeed where jurisdiction and claim identity are lacking.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable accommodation: A change to a housing provider’s rules or practices that is needed to give a disabled person an equal chance to use and enjoy a home. Here, the accommodation was allowing a trained assistance dog without pet charges.
  • Service animal vs. “pet”: The decision treats a disability-assistance animal as part of an accommodation analysis, not a discretionary pet privilege—meaning pet deposits/fees may operate as an unlawful barrier when the animal is disability-related and necessary.
  • Substantial evidence: Not “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” or even “more likely than not” as re-decided by a court. It means enough relevant proof exists in the administrative record that a reasonable factfinder could reach the agency’s conclusion; appellate courts do not reweigh credibility.
  • Punitive damages: Monetary relief aimed at punishment and deterrence, not just compensation. The court approved them as a tool to deter housing discrimination.
  • Civil fine and penalty: A statutory monetary sanction payable as a penalty (distinct from compensating the victim), authorized by the Human Rights Law to reinforce compliance.

5. Conclusion

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Winnie consolidates an important practical rule in New York housing discrimination law: charging pet-related deposits and monthly fees for a disabled tenant’s service animal—especially after receiving documentation—and then engaging in conduct intended to drive the tenant out can support a finding of unlawful refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation under Executive Law § 296 (18) (2). The Third Department also reaffirmed strong deference to the Division’s factfinding under Executive Law § 298 and endorsed robust remedies—including punitive damages and a significant civil penalty—as appropriate deterrents in serious housing-discrimination scenarios.