Permissive Deliberate-Ignorance Language That Mismentions “Intent” Does Not Create an Unconstitutional Presumption When the Charge as a Whole Preserves the State’s Burden

Case: Victor Grullon v. Warden, Bulloch County Correctional Institute (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2026) (per curiam) (Not for Publication).

1. Introduction

Victor Grullon, a Georgia prisoner serving a 30-year sentence for heroin trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(b)(3), sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He contended that the state trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by giving an erroneous “deliberate ignorance” jury instruction that briefly conflated “knowledge” and “intent.”

The core federal issue was not whether the instruction was flawed as a matter of Georgia law (the Georgia Court of Appeals had already said it was), but whether the instruction—viewed as a reasonable juror would—created an unconstitutional presumption that relieved the State of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that the challenged language described a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, and that the charge as a whole preserved the State’s burden of proof.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Grullon’s due process claim failed because the deliberate-ignorance instruction told the jury it may draw an inference, leaving jurors free to accept or reject it. That feature made it permissive, not mandatory, and therefore not the sort of instruction that typically violates due process by shifting the burden of proof.

The court further explained that even if the single phrase referencing “knowledge, intent” could be read in isolation as problematic, the jury charge as a whole repeatedly emphasized that the State bore the burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, gave detailed intent instructions, stated the defendant would not be presumed to have criminal intent, and the remainder of the deliberate-ignorance instruction properly focused on knowledge.

The court also declined to resolve whether AEDPA deference applied, reasoning that the claim failed even under de novo review.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Morrow v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 886 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018) — Cited for the standard of review: denials of habeas relief are reviewed de novo in the Eleventh Circuit, while still applying AEDPA’s constraints where applicable.
  • Sears v. Warden GDCP, 73 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) — Used to emphasize AEDPA’s “highly deferential framework” when federal courts evaluate claims decided on the merits in state court.
  • Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) — Supplies AEDPA’s “contrary to” framework (rule contradiction or materially indistinguishable facts with a different outcome).
  • Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111 (2020) and Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) — Reinforce that “unreasonable application” is more than error; it must be beyond “fairminded disagreement.”
  • Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2019) and Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) — Support the proposition that federal courts must give state decisions the “benefit of the doubt.”
  • Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015) and Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) — Address AEDPA deference to state factual determinations and the presumption of correctness absent clear and convincing evidence.
  • In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) — Anchors the due process requirement that guilt must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element.
  • Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) — The opinion’s central due process authority. It provides (i) the framework distinguishing mandatory presumptions from permissive inferences, and (ii) the interpretive method requiring review of the challenged phrase in the context of the charge as a whole.
  • Ulster Cnty. Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) — Clarifies that mandatory presumptions (must find elemental fact upon proof of basic fact) are constitutionally suspect, while permissive inferences generally are not.
  • United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992) — Reinforces that permissive inferences do not place a burden on the defendant and do not shift the burden of proof.
  • Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir. 1995) — Applied to classify “may infer” instructions as permissive rather than mandatory, undercutting Grullon’s presumption argument.
  • Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) and Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) — Provide the procedural move the panel used: affirming without deciding AEDPA deference because the claim fails even under de novo review.
  • Yates v. Everett, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) — Cited for the narrower proposition that even permissive inferences can violate due process if the inference is “irrational.” The panel disposed of this by noting Grullon did not argue irrationality and the record did not support it.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning followed the Supreme Court’s due process architecture for jury-instruction presumptions:

  1. Step 1: Classify the instruction as mandatory or permissive.

    The challenged sentence stated: “The element of knowledge, intent, may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes….” The panel focused on the operative structure—“may be satisfied” and “inferences”—and held it did not direct jurors that they must find intent (or knowledge) upon certain predicate facts. This placed the instruction on the permissive side of the line under Francis v. Franklin and Ulster Cnty. Ct. v. Allen.

    In other words, the constitutional concern in presumption cases is coercion: whether jurors are told they have no real choice. The panel found the instruction preserved choice.

  2. Step 2: Even if ambiguous in isolation, read the instruction in the context of the entire charge.

    Assuming arguendo that the “knowledge, intent” phrasing could confuse, Francis v. Franklin requires evaluating whether the rest of the charge cured the risk that a reasonable juror would treat the inference as a burden-shifting presumption.

    The panel relied on several curative features:

    • Repeated beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden instructions for “every essential element.”
    • Detailed intent instructions emphasizing permissive inference and expressly stating a “defendant will not be presumed to have acted with criminal intent.”
    • The remainder of the deliberate-ignorance instruction focusing on knowledge, not intent.
    • A final reminder that drawing inferences was “solely within [the jury’s] discretion.”

    Taken together, the panel concluded a reasonable juror would not interpret the charge as creating an unconstitutional presumption.

  3. Step 3: Address the “irrational permissive inference” theory only as needed.

    The panel noted that permissive inferences can still violate due process if irrational (Yates v. Everett; Francis v. Franklin), but found the argument forfeited/not raised and in any event not satisfied on these facts.

  4. Step 4: Resolve without deciding AEDPA deference.

    The panel invoked Knowles v. Mirzayance to avoid the deference question: because Grullon loses under the less-deferential de novo approach, he necessarily cannot win under AEDPA’s stricter standards.

C. Impact

Although designated “Not for Publication” (limiting precedential force), the decision is practically significant in three ways:

  • Habeas petition framing: It signals that not every acknowledged state-law error in a deliberate-ignorance charge translates into a federal due process violation. Petitioners must show a burden-shifting effect (mandatory presumption) or an irrational inference, and must overcome “charge as a whole” analysis.
  • Permissive-inference safe harbor: The court’s emphasis on “may infer” language and repeated discretion reminders provides a blueprint for why many inference-based instructions will survive federal constitutional attack.
  • Litigation efficiency under AEDPA: The court’s use of the “fails even de novo” route may encourage future panels to dispose of weak habeas claims without resolving complicated AEDPA-merits/deference questions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • AEDPA (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)): A federal court usually cannot overturn a state conviction just because it thinks the state court was wrong; the state decision must be unreasonably wrong under U.S. Supreme Court law, or based on unreasonable fact-finding.
  • Mandatory presumption vs. permissive inference:
    • Mandatory presumption: “If you find X, you must find Y.” This can unconstitutionally reduce the State’s burden.
    • Permissive inference: “If you find X, you may find Y.” This usually is constitutional because jurors keep the choice.
  • Deliberate ignorance (willful blindness): A doctrine allowing jurors to infer knowledge when a defendant intentionally avoided learning an obvious fact (e.g., “I didn’t know” because “I didn’t want to know”).
  • “Charge as a whole” review: Courts do not evaluate one sentence in a vacuum; they ask how a reasonable juror would understand the instructions after hearing them all.
  • Certificate of appealability: A screening device in federal habeas appeals; the district court allowed appeal only on the due process jury-instruction question.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief because the deliberate-ignorance instruction, though imperfectly worded to include “knowledge, intent,” communicated a permissive inference and—when read with the full set of instructions—did not create a burden-shifting presumption. The decision underscores a recurring habeas boundary: state-law instructional error does not become a federal due process violation unless it meaningfully undermines the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement as a reasonable juror would understand it.