Permanent Protection Orders May Bar Parent-Child Contact Until Age 18 When Necessary to Prevent Harm
I. Introduction
Darrah v. Haggag (Mont. 2026 MT 43N) concerns whether the Seventeenth Judicial District Court,
Phillips County, abused its discretion by entering a permanent order of protection restraining
Adam Kadry Haggag from contacting his minor children, A.H. and J.H., until each child reaches eighteen.
The petitioner, Shanay Lee Darrah, sought protection on behalf of the children after alleging that Haggag
sexually assaulted A.H. by digitally penetrating her anus.
The central issue on appeal was not whether the Supreme Court would re-try the facts, but whether the District Court’s
decision to impose a long-duration protective order—effectively eliminating contact for the remainder of childhood—
fell within the “abuse of discretion” standard governing protection-order review.
A procedural feature is also significant: the Supreme Court designated this as a memorandum opinion under its internal rules,
expressly stating it is noncitable and does not serve as precedent.
II. Summary of the Opinion
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the June 5, 2025 permanent order of protection restraining Haggag from
A.H. and J.H. until each child’s eighteenth birthday. Applying a deferential standard of review, the Court held the District Court
did not act arbitrarily, did not fail to employ conscientious judgment, and did not exceed the bounds of reason.
The Court emphasized (1) the District Court’s role in assessing witness credibility, (2) the District Court’s familiarity with the parties’
history, and (3) the evidentiary basis supporting the protective order, including multiple credible witnesses recounting A.H.’s disclosures and
trauma-related behaviors.
Notably, while affirming, the Supreme Court added a cautionary note: it encouraged the District Court to consider any future request
by Haggag to terminate the order and reestablish a parental relationship if he presents sufficient evidence that renewed contact would be in the
children’s best interests—acknowledging that a permanent protection order can function like a long-term termination of the parent-child relationship.
III. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153
The Supreme Court grounded its appellate review in Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153, citing it for two linked propositions:
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Standard of review: A district court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.
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Definition of abuse of discretion: Abuse occurs when a court acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds
the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.
That framework strongly shaped the outcome. Rather than asking whether the Supreme Court would have issued the same order,
the Court asked whether the District Court’s decision fell within a permissible range given the record.
Once the District Court made explicit credibility findings and tied the remedy to safety concerns and the severity of allegations,
Boushie effectively required affirmance absent a clear showing of irrationality or injustice.
B. Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds in four steps:
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Deference to fact-finding and credibility: The Supreme Court reiterated that it will not disturb the District Court’s credibility
determinations. Here, the District Court found credible multiple witnesses (including the grandmother, a family nurse practitioner, a treating psychologist,
the sheriff who observed forensic interviews, and a Head Start coordinator).
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Safety-driven purpose of protection orders: The District Court (and Supreme Court in affirming) framed the order as necessary to “avoid further
injury or harm” given the history between the parties and the nature of the allegations involving a very young child.
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Context matters—history and judicial familiarity: The Supreme Court relied on the District Court’s prior involvement with the parties,
including earlier protection-order litigation in DR-2021-013, where the District Court had already evaluated Haggag’s behavior, compliance, and risk factors.
The Court treated this familiarity as supporting conscientious judgment rather than arbitrariness.
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Reconciling protective orders with parenting rights: The District Court had previously stated “this is not a parenting plan proceeding,” while also
recognizing children’s constitutional interests in a parent-child relationship if it can be developed positively. The Supreme Court affirmed the protection-based
remedy while acknowledging the tension: a long-duration protective order can effectively eliminate parental contact and thus resembles a parenting determination in effect,
even if not in form.
The Supreme Court’s added “caveat” is legally important: it signals that even when an order is labeled “permanent,” a district court should remain open to later modification
if circumstances materially change and the children’s best interests can be served safely. The Court did not require modification, but it encouraged careful review of any
future request supported by credible evidence of rehabilitation and safety.
C. Impact
Although the Court explicitly stated this memorandum opinion is noncitable and “does not serve as precedent,” the decision still provides practical guidance
on how Montana appellate review is likely to operate in similar disputes:
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High deference on appeal: Where a district court makes detailed credibility findings and ties relief to child safety, reversal is unlikely under the
abuse-of-discretion framework.
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Long-duration child-protective restraints can be affirmed: The Court accepted an order lasting until each child turns eighteen as within the district court’s
discretion on this record, especially where the allegations involve sexual abuse and the court finds credible disclosures and trauma symptoms.
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Growing recognition of “functional termination” concerns: The Court’s cautionary language highlights that protection-order proceedings may sometimes produce outcomes
similar to parenting-plan or parental-rights determinations, and thus courts should remain attentive to best-interests considerations when evaluating later termination requests.
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Parallel proceedings and unresolved criminal allegations: The District Court noted pending North Dakota charges (felony stalking and misdemeanor violations of an order of protection).
While not treated as dispositive, such context may reinforce perceived risk and justify protective measures.
IV. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Order of protection (temporary vs. permanent)
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A court order restricting contact to prevent harm. A temporary order can issue quickly and is typically followed by a hearing.
A “permanent” order can last much longer (here, until the children reach eighteen), though courts may retain authority to modify or terminate it upon a proper showing.
- Abuse of discretion
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A highly deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether the appellate court agrees with the outcome, but whether the district court’s decision was irrational,
careless, or beyond the range of reasonable choices given the evidence.
- Credibility determinations
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Decisions about who to believe. Trial courts see and hear witnesses; appellate courts generally do not re-weigh credibility.
- Parenting plan proceeding vs. protection-order proceeding
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A parenting plan case primarily decides custody/visitation based on children’s best interests. A protection-order case focuses on preventing harm from abuse, threats, stalking,
or violence. This case illustrates that the two can overlap in effect when a protection order blocks parental contact.
- Forensic interview / SANE examination
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A forensic interview is a structured interview designed to elicit information from a child in a developmentally appropriate, non-leading way. A pediatric SANE exam is a specialized medical
evaluation for suspected sexual abuse; it can be invasive and may or may not yield physical evidence, especially if time has passed.
V. Conclusion
Darrah v. Haggag affirms that, under Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153 and the abuse-of-discretion standard, a Montana district court may
impose a “permanent” protection order barring a parent’s contact with minor children until they reach adulthood when the record supports a safety-based necessity and the district court
makes credibility findings supporting the risk of harm.
The opinion’s most consequential takeaway is its dual message: appellate courts will defer heavily to carefully reasoned protection orders grounded in credible testimony, yet courts should also
remain mindful that such orders can function as de facto long-term severance of the parent-child relationship—warranting careful consideration if a future, evidence-supported request for termination arises.