Permanent Neglect Under Social Services Law § 384-b: No “Imminent Danger” or “Nexus to Initial Removal” Showing Required to Prove Failure to Plan

Decision: Matter of Gianna H. (Naliesha H.), 2026 NY Slip Op 01787 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t Mar. 25, 2026).
Lower Court: Family Court, Queens County (Joan Piccirillo, J.), order dated Jan. 24, 2025 (fact-finding and disposition).
Parties: Little Flower Children and Family Services of New York (petitioner-respondent) vs. Naliesha H. (mother/appellant); attorney for the child appeared.

Introduction

This appeal arose from a proceeding under Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate a mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect. After fact-finding and a dispositional hearing, the Family Court found permanent neglect, terminated parental rights, and transferred guardianship and custody to the agency and the Commissioner of Social Services for adoption planning.

On appeal, the central issues were (1) whether the agency met its threshold obligation to make “diligent efforts” to strengthen the parent-child relationship, (2) whether the mother “permanently neglected” the child—particularly by failing to “plan for the future of the child,” and (3) whether termination (as opposed to a suspended judgment) was in the child’s best interests.

Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed. It held that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts and that, despite services completed, the mother failed to plan for the child’s return due to lack of insight into the issues preventing reunification and inconsistent parental access (including missed virtual sessions). The Court also rejected the mother’s argument that the agency had to prove either (a) that her actions placed the child in imminent danger of impairment or (b) that her failure-to-plan had a nexus to the reason for the child’s initial removal—concluding Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a) imposes no such requirement.

At disposition, the Court held that termination was in the child’s best interests; a suspended judgment was not appropriate given the mother’s lack of insight and continued failures to attend access sessions, and because additional delay would prolong instability. The record supported freeing the child for adoption by the foster mother with whom the child had bonded and lived for a prolonged period.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

A. “Diligent efforts” as a threshold requirement

The Court framed the agency’s burden using a line of Second Department cases emphasizing that diligent efforts are a precondition to a permanent neglect finding:

  • Matter of Benz G. [Nadia B.] — Quoted for the rule that the agency must first prove diligent efforts by clear and convincing evidence, and that the agency need not guarantee parental success; an uncooperative parent does not defeat diligent efforts.
  • Matter of Christopher C. [Sonia C.] — Cited for the diligent-efforts framework and the content of those efforts.
  • Matter of Naijah- S.G.B. [Thomas X.B.] — Cited consistently with the threshold diligent-efforts requirement.
  • Matter of Asia M.A. [Nia H.] and Matter of Chiamaka B.O. [Stanley N.O.] — Cited for what diligent efforts “must include”: counseling, suitable arrangements for parental access, assistance to resolve barriers to discharge, and advising parents of the child’s progress and development.
  • Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.] — Cited alongside the description of required diligent-efforts services.
  • Matter of William S.L. [Julio A.L.] — Cited for the principle that agencies are not required to ensure parents overcome their circumstances.
  • Matter of Zechariah J. [Valrick J.] — Cited for the proposition that diligent efforts are satisfied where the agency faces an uncooperative parent.

Applying these precedents, the Court concluded the petitioner met the threshold requirement and thus the inquiry proceeded to whether the mother maintained contact or planned for the child.

B. Failure to plan and the parent’s affirmative duty

  • Matter of Kalebh-Xavier X.O. [Jessica-Maria M.] — Cited for the post-diligent-efforts burden: clear and convincing evidence that, for one year following placement, the parent failed to maintain contact or failed to plan for the child’s future while physically and financially able.
  • Matter of Ryder S.R. [Shaquana R.] — Cited with the same statutory burden statement.
  • Matter of Chiamaka B.O. [Stanley N.O.] and Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.] — Quoted for the principle that parents must “assume a measure of initiative and responsibility” and have a duty to plan for the child’s future.
  • Matter of Ahking-Tyheem C.J. [Letitia M.E.] and Matter of Mark M.L. [Shantia B.] — Used to distinguish “participation” in programs from meaningful planning: attendance is insufficient where the parent fails to benefit and apply lessons/tools toward reunification.

The Court relied on this authority to affirm a failure-to-plan finding based on lack of insight into reunification barriers, despite completion of some services.

C. Deference to Family Court credibility findings

  • Matter of Benz G. [Nadia B.] and Matter of Geddiah S.R. [Seljeana P.] — Cited for the rule that Family Court credibility findings receive great deference because the court directly observes testimony and demeanor.
  • Matter of Derrick D.A. [Shavonna L.L.D.] — Cited similarly for deference to credibility determinations.

This deference matters in permanent neglect appeals where the fact-finder’s assessment of insight, sincerity, and engagement often drives whether efforts “benefited” the parent.

D. Parental access deficiencies as evidence of permanent neglect

  • Matter of Mathew B.C. [Sue-Ann L.C.] — Cited along with other cases supporting the relevance of missed parental access sessions to the neglect analysis.
  • Matter of Messiah S.E. [Micquella E.] and Matter of Ahking-Tyheem C.J. [Letitia M.E.] — Cited both in connection with planning deficiencies and parental access failures.

Here, the Court explicitly noted the mother’s inconsistent in-person visits and missing “nearly all” virtual sessions as part of the permanent neglect showing.

E. Disposition: best interests, no presumption of return, and suspended judgment standards

  • Matter of Asia M.A. [Nia H.] and Matter of Jeremiah W.T. [Shaunta K.J.—William T.] — Quoted for the rule that at disposition the court considers only the child’s best interests; also cited for the characterization of suspended judgment as a brief “grace period.”
  • Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.] — Cited for best-interests focus at disposition.
  • Matter of Christopher C. [Sonia C.] and Matter of Jaheem M. [Cymon M.] — Cited for factors including the caretaker’s capacity to supervise, current information, and potential threat of future neglect.
  • Matter of Camila G.C. [Matthew C.] and Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.] — Cited for the principle that there is no presumption that a child’s best interests are served by returning to the biological parent.
  • Matter of Keylin D.C.D. [Maria S.] and Matter of Ruth C. [Jaslene C.] — Cited for the conclusion that a suspended judgment is inappropriate where a parent continues to miss parental access.
  • Matter of Ella Elizabeth V. [Reginald P.] — Cited for the policy concern that a suspended judgment may “prolong the delay of stability and permanence” in the child’s life.
  • Matter of Christian M.L. [Christopher M.L.] — Cited alongside permanence and adoption/bonding considerations.

These cases collectively anchored the Second Department’s conclusion that the dispositional outcome (termination and adoption planning) best served the child’s need for permanence.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. The two-stage permanent neglect framework

The Court followed the familiar two-stage structure of Social Services Law § 384-b litigation:

  • Stage 1 (threshold): The agency must prove “diligent efforts” to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship.
  • Stage 2 (parental failure): After diligent efforts are shown, the agency must prove that for the relevant one-year period the parent failed to maintain contact or failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able.

B. “Failure to plan” is about insight and actionable change, not box-checking

The Court’s analysis emphasized that completion of services does not equate to planning. Planning requires progress that addresses the barriers preventing reunification. The Court affirmed a finding that the mother “failed to gain insight into the issues that were preventing the child's return,” which, in permanent neglect jurisprudence, functions as a key indicator that services did not translate into safer parenting or an achievable reunification plan.

C. The decision’s clearest doctrinal statement: no “imminent danger” or “nexus to initial removal” requirement for failure-to-plan

The Court expressly rejected the mother’s contention that the petitioner had to prove either:

  • that her actions placed the child in “imminent danger of becoming impaired,” or
  • that her “actions in failing to plan for the child's future had a nexus to the basis for the child's initial removal.”

Citing Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), the Court held the statute does not impose those additional showings. In practical terms, this confirms that a permanent neglect case grounded in nonplanning is evaluated based on the parent’s post-placement conduct and progress toward reunification (after diligent efforts), rather than being constrained by the original removal theory or an added endangerment requirement.

D. Disposition: stability and permanence over a speculative “grace period”

At disposition, the Court focused on best interests and treated a suspended judgment as an exceptional option, permitted only if affirmatively in the child’s best interests. Two facts drove the Court’s conclusion that it was not:

  • Lack of insight into the problems preventing reunification.
  • Ongoing inconsistency in parental access, undermining the prospect of timely reunification.

The Court also adopted a child-centered time perspective: further delay would “prolong the delay of stability and permanence,” especially where the child had a bond with the foster mother and had resided there for a prolonged period—facts supporting adoption as the permanency plan.

3) Impact

A. Litigation impact: narrowing defensive theories in nonplanning cases

The opinion’s most consequential point is its explicit rejection of two arguments sometimes raised to resist termination based on failure to plan: (1) that the agency must prove imminent risk of impairment and (2) that the failure-to-plan must be tethered to the initial removal grounds. By stating these are not required under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), the Second Department strengthens agencies’ ability to litigate permanent neglect as a forward-looking inquiry focused on reunification readiness during the one-year statutory period—assuming diligent efforts are proven.

B. Practice impact: documenting “insight” and visitation consistency

For agencies, the decision reinforces that records should demonstrate both: (i) the services offered as diligent efforts and (ii) the parent’s functional engagement—especially whether the parent internalized lessons and could articulate and implement a reunification plan. For parents and counsel, it highlights that consistent access and demonstrable insight are not ancillary; they are central indicators of planning and reunification viability.

C. Dispositional impact: suspended judgments remain tightly cabined

The Court’s disposition analysis reiterates that suspended judgment is not a default “extra chance” after a permanent neglect finding; it is appropriate only when the child’s best interests support it. Ongoing missed visits and lack of insight weigh heavily against it, particularly where adoption by a bonded foster parent offers a stable, timely permanency outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Permanent neglect (Social Services Law § 384-b): A statutory ground to terminate parental rights when, after the child has been placed with an agency, the parent fails for the required period to maintain contact and/or to plan for the child’s future—despite being able to do so—and after the agency has made “diligent efforts.”
  • Diligent efforts: The agency’s legally required, affirmative steps to help repair/strengthen the parent-child relationship (e.g., counseling referrals, arranging visitation, helping resolve barriers to reunification, and keeping the parent updated). The agency must try; it need not guarantee success.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened proof standard—more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt”—often described as evidence that makes the fact-finder firmly believe the allegation is true.
  • Failure to plan: Not simply enrolling in programs. It means not making meaningful, workable progress toward reunification—often assessed through insight, behavior change, and practical readiness to safely parent.
  • Parental access: Visitation (in-person or virtual). Consistent visitation can show commitment and help maintain the relationship; repeated missed visits can support findings of nonplanning or lack of meaningful contact.
  • Suspended judgment: After permanent neglect is found, the court may delay termination for a short period to allow the parent another opportunity—only if that delay is in the child’s best interests.
  • Best interests at disposition: Once grounds are established, the case shifts from assessing parental fault to determining what outcome best serves the child’s welfare, stability, and permanency—without any presumption favoring return to the biological parent.

Conclusion

Matter of Gianna H. (Naliesha H.) reaffirms the Second Department’s structured approach to permanent neglect: agencies must prove diligent efforts, and parents must demonstrate genuine planning—shown through insight, actionable change, and consistent engagement such as visitation. The opinion’s most notable doctrinal contribution is its explicit statement that, in proving failure to plan under Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), the petitioner need not establish “imminent danger” of impairment or a nexus between the failure-to-plan and the basis for the child’s initial removal. At disposition, the decision underscores that suspended judgments are exceptional and may be rejected where they would merely extend instability, particularly when the child is bonded with a foster parent who can provide a timely permanent home through adoption.