Date: Feb 22, 2026

Permanent Neglect in New York: “Diligent Efforts” Satisfied by Evolving Services, and “Planning” Requires Demonstrable Benefit—Termination Favored Over Suspended Judgment Absent Meaningful Progress

1. Introduction

Matter of Alisha SS. (Zuhra SS.) (Appellate Division, Third Department; Feb. 19, 2026) concerns the termination of parental rights following an adjudication of permanent neglect under Social Services Law § 384-b. The Schenectady County Department of Social Services (the agency/petitioner) sought to terminate the parental rights of Zuhra SS. (the mother/appellant) to Alisha SS. (born 2018), after the child spent essentially her entire life in foster care following removal in October 2018.

The removal stemmed from domestic violence involving the mother and the child’s biological father, along with parenting and safety concerns that led to a neglect finding in 2019. The agency filed a permanent neglect petition in August 2022. After fact-finding, Family Court adjudicated permanent neglect and, after disposition, terminated the mother’s parental rights and freed the child for adoption. The mother appealed, arguing primarily that (1) the agency did not satisfy “diligent efforts,” (2) she did not fail to plan, and (3) even if permanent neglect was established, the best interests analysis warranted a suspended judgment rather than termination.

The Third Department affirmed in full, emphasizing that completion of some services does not equal “planning” where the parent fails to benefit, and that a suspended judgment is inappropriate absent significant progress within a timeframe consistent with the child’s best interests.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Diligent efforts: Affirmed. The agency’s efforts were “practical and reasonable,” evolving over time and targeting the barriers to reunification (parenting deficits, safety concerns, domestic violence, and mental health), including increased visitation supports and interdisciplinary coordination regarding the child’s needs.
Failure to plan: Affirmed. Despite being able to do so, the mother failed to “substantially plan” because she did not meaningfully correct the conditions leading to removal, did not benefit from services, missed visits and key meetings, and continued to minimize serious domestic violence and the child’s needs.
Disposition/best interests: Affirmed. Termination (not a suspended judgment) served the child’s best interests given the child’s long-term stability and bond in the foster home, waning/negative visitation dynamics, the mother’s lack of meaningful progress over years, and her cessation of programming and counseling.
Appellate posture: The father did not appeal; therefore, he could not obtain affirmative relief, and his brief could only support the mother.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision is heavily grounded in Third Department permanent neglect doctrine, using prior cases to define (a) “permanent neglect,” (b) “diligent efforts,” (c) “substantial planning,” and (d) the standard for a suspended judgment after permanent neglect.

A. Defining permanent neglect and the agency’s threshold burden (diligent efforts)

Matter of Gabriel J. [Christina I.]: Cited for the governing definition of a “permanently neglected child” and the overarching framework: the agency must prove diligent efforts, and the parent must have failed for the statutory period to substantially and continuously or repeatedly plan. The Court also relied on this case for the dispositional rule that, after permanent neglect, there is no presumption in favor of reunification and a suspended judgment requires significant progress.
Matter of Colby R. [David Q.]: Used to articulate what “diligent efforts” entail—“practical and reasonable efforts” to address barriers to reunification, including assistance with visitation, sharing information about the child’s progress, and offering counseling/educational/therapeutic services.
Matter of Macayla N. [Sheena N.] and Matter of Makayla I. [Sheena K.]: Cited as confirmatory authorities supporting the conclusion that similar service arrays (visitation assistance, parenting supports, tailored referrals, and ongoing reviews) meet the diligent-efforts requirement.

B. What it means to “plan” for the child’s future (and why “good faith” is not enough)

Matter of Jase M. [Holly N.]: Provides the core planning standard applied here: the parent must take “meaningful steps” to correct the conditions that caused removal; the plan must be realistic and feasible; “good faith effort, alone, is not enough.” This directly supports the Third Department’s focus on whether the mother actually benefitted from services.
Matter of Zaiden P. [Ashley Q.]: Supports considering a parent’s failure to utilize medical, psychiatric, psychological, and rehabilitative services and resources made available. The court analogized the mother’s missed meetings and inadequate engagement with mental-health treatment and the child’s care infrastructure to a failure to plan.
Matter of Drey L. [Katrina M.]: Cited for the principle that the agency satisfies its obligation where appropriate services are offered but the parent refuses to engage or “does not progress.” This was pivotal because the mother completed some programs, but the record supported a finding of lack of progress/benefit.
Matter of Nikole V. [Norman V.] and Matter of Konner N. [Justin O.]: Invoked as additional authorities supporting affirmance where the evidence demonstrates ongoing failure to remedy the removal conditions despite services and opportunity.

C. Disposition: termination vs. suspended judgment

Nevaeh N. [Heidi O.] and Matter of Jase M. [Holly N.]: Used to support that termination is appropriate where a parent has not made meaningful progress and the child’s best interests favor permanency, and that a suspended judgment is reserved for cases involving significant progress such that a short “grace period” is justified.
Matter of Macayla N. [Sheena N.] and Matter of Makayla I. [Sheena K.]: Cited again for analogous best-interests/dispositional outcomes—reinforcing that extended foster placement and lack of parental progress typically weigh against delay.
Matter of Drey L. [Katrina M.]: Cited in the footnote for appellate procedure: a non-appealing party cannot be granted affirmative relief; thus, the father’s role was limited to supporting the mother’s position.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Diligent efforts: “practical and reasonable” does not mean “successful”

The court methodically matched the agency’s conduct to the statutory and precedential criteria for “diligent efforts.” Key to the court’s analysis was that the agency did not simply make referrals; it adapted interventions as problems persisted: increasing supervised visitation to weekly, adding pre-visit parenting instruction and in-visit coaching, providing domestic-violence-related housing assistance and further counseling, and coordinating interdisciplinary meetings around the child’s educational and medical needs.

The implicit doctrinal point is that “diligent efforts” is evaluated by the reasonableness and responsiveness of the agency’s efforts to known barriers, not by whether reunification is ultimately achieved.

B. Failure to plan: engagement and completion are insufficient without demonstrated change

The Third Department affirmed the planning failure on a record showing (1) weak engagement quality, (2) minimal skill implementation, and (3) continuing safety threats. The court emphasized testimony that the mother was distracted (e.g., on her phone), adversarial with staff, unprepared for visits, and inconsistent or non-progressing in parenting skills.

The decision is notable for treating “lack of benefit” as the central practical indicator of failure to plan. Even where a parent participates in services, the court looked for behavioral change tied to the original removal conditions—safe housing, consistent caregiving, meaningful cooperation with providers, and protective capacity in domestic violence contexts.

Domestic violence risk was especially salient: the mother’s willingness to drop an order of protection after a firearm threat to kill her and the child, and her subsequent relationship dynamics, supported the finding that she did not appreciate or adequately respond to ongoing safety threats.

The court also relied on the mother’s missed supervised visits and missed interdisciplinary meetings, and her lack of meaningful participation in mental health treatment, as evidence that she did not build the consistent, functional parental role required for reunification.

C. Best interests at disposition: permanency and time matter; a suspended judgment is not a default “last chance”

Once permanent neglect is found, the court underscored that Family Court’s focus becomes the child’s best interests “without any presumption in favor of reunification,” and that a suspended judgment requires significant parental progress such that a short delay is justified and consistent with the child’s needs.

Here, best interests turned on (i) the child’s near-lifelong placement with the same foster family, (ii) the strength and stability of that bond, (iii) the child’s educational and care needs being met by foster parents, (iv) the child’s waning interest and later opposition to visits, and (v) the mother’s continued lack of progress years after removal—despite stable employment.

The court treated the mother’s refusal to acknowledge the child’s medical conditions and needs as a significant barrier to reunification, because it undermined the capacity to meet the child where the child is, not where the parent wishes the child to be.

3.3. Impact

Reinforces a “benefit-based” view of planning: Participation in, or completion of, programming will not defeat permanent neglect if the record shows the parent did not internalize skills or improve protective capacity. Future litigants should expect courts to focus on demonstrated behavioral change and consistency, not checklists.
Validates tailored, evolving service plans as diligent efforts: Agencies that can document iterative adjustments—e.g., adding in-visit coaching, increasing visitation, coordinating interdisciplinary care—are well positioned to meet the diligent-efforts burden.
Domestic violence dynamics remain central to parental fitness: Minimization of threats, unsafe relationship choices, and attempts to relax protective orders can be treated as ongoing failure to remedy the core removal condition, even with some service participation.
Suspended judgment remains exceptional: Where a child has spent years in stable foster placement and parental progress is marginal, courts will likely view additional delay as inconsistent with permanency and best interests.
Appellate practice reminder: A parent who does not appeal cannot obtain affirmative relief; their appellate submissions may only support the appealing party (as highlighted by the citation to Matter of Drey L. [Katrina M.]).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Permanent neglect: A legal finding that, for the required statutory period, a parent failed to make real, sustained plans to safely care for the child in the future, even though the agency tried diligently to help reunification and the parent was able to take steps to do so.
Diligent efforts: The agency must do reasonable, practical things to help fix what caused removal—such as arranging visitation, providing parenting or counseling services, and helping the parent connect with resources. It does not mean the agency must “guarantee” reunification.
Failure to substantially plan: Not making meaningful, realistic changes that address the problems that led to removal. “Trying” or “attending” services may not be enough if the parent does not improve (for example, continuing unsafe conditions, failing to protect the child, missing visits, or not learning parenting skills).
Clear and convincing evidence: A higher level of proof than “more likely than not.” The evidence must be strong and persuasive, though not as demanding as “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Suspended judgment: Instead of immediately terminating rights after permanent neglect, the court can give a short, closely monitored period for the parent to prove fitness. It is reserved for cases with significant progress and where delay still serves the child’s best interests.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Alisha SS. (Zuhra SS.) affirms a familiar but consequential rule set in New York permanent neglect practice: the agency satisfies “diligent efforts” by providing reasonable, responsive, and evolving services aimed at reunification, while a parent “plans” only by making demonstrable, meaningful progress in correcting the removal conditions—mere attendance or partial completion of services is insufficient without benefit. At disposition, the decision underscores that permanency and the child’s best interests control, and a suspended judgment is inappropriate absent significant progress within a child-centered timeframe.