Permanent Disbarment Under Amended Rule XIX: Egregious Bank-Fraud Misconduct Plus No Reasonable Expectation of Rehabilitation

1. Introduction

This attorney disciplinary proceeding arose from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s (“ODC”) formal charges against Gregory Joseph St. Angelo, a Louisiana lawyer who had been placed on interim suspension following his conviction of a “serious crime” (In re: St. Angelo, 19-1102 (La. 7/22/19), 276 So. 3d 1017). Respondent served from 2006 to 2016 as general counsel to First NBC Bank (“First NBC”), while also borrowing heavily from the bank through personal and controlled-entity loans.

The central issues were narrow and sanction-focused: because respondent was criminally convicted (guilty plea to conspiracy to commit bank fraud), the conviction was conclusive proof of guilt, leaving only (i) whether discipline was warranted and (ii) the appropriate level of discipline—specifically, whether Louisiana’s post-2022 permanent-disbarment rule should be applied.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court permanently disbarred respondent based on a decade-long fraud scheme against his client-bank. Applying the May 4, 2022 amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, the court made the required express findings that:

• Respondent’s conduct was so egregious as to demonstrate a convincing lack of ethical and moral fitness to practice law; and
• There was no reasonable expectation of significant rehabilitation of respondent’s character in the future.

The court emphasized respondent’s role as general counsel, the length and calculated nature of the fraud, the substantial financial harm tied to the bank’s collapse, and respondent’s continued minimization of culpability and lack of genuine remorse in both criminal and disciplinary contexts.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re: St. Angelo, 19-1102 (La. 7/22/19), 276 So. 3d 1017

This earlier matter is referenced for procedural posture: respondent was already on interim suspension due to a serious-crime conviction. While not a merits precedent on sanction, it situates the case within Louisiana’s discipline framework for criminally convicted lawyers and underscores that the present proceeding concerns final discipline (up to and including permanent disbarment).

In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So. 2d 76

The court cited In re: Boudreau for the foundational rule that, in discipline matters stemming from a criminal conviction, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the hearing’s scope is limited to whether the crime warrants discipline and the extent of discipline. This authority supports the court’s refusal to entertain respondent’s attempts to relitigate or reframe the factual basis of his guilty plea as “not every line” being “evidence of a crime.”

Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Wilkinson, 562 So. 2d 902 (La. 1990)

Like Boudreau, Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Wilkinson reinforces the principle that criminal guilt is settled by the conviction, cabining the disciplinary inquiry to sanction. The case thus functions as a doctrinal “gatekeeper,” preventing disciplinary hearings from becoming collateral attacks on criminal judgments.

Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez, 550 So. 2d 188 (La. 1989)

The court cited Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Perez for sanction calibration: discipline depends on (i) the seriousness of the offense, (ii) the circumstances, and (iii) aggravating and mitigating factors. This authority anchors the opinion’s structured approach: baseline sanction (disbarment), then adjustment in light of aggravation/mitigation, and finally the additional, heightened findings required for permanent disbarment under the amended rules.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The “criminal conviction” procedural rule controls the factual posture

A critical (and often misunderstood) feature of lawyer discipline appears explicitly in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E): the conviction certificate is “conclusive evidence” of guilt; the “sole issue” is discipline and its extent; and respondent may offer mitigating evidence only if it is “not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime.”

That framework decisively shaped the outcome. Respondent’s hearing testimony attempted to minimize the admitted conspiracy—reducing the “crime” to backdating a document and asserting he “didn't steal a dime” or benefit. The hearing committee found this minimization inconsistent with contrition, and the court accepted that assessment when evaluating rehabilitation. In short, the rules did not merely streamline proof; they also made respondent’s minimization strategically perilous because it undermined mitigation and fed directly into the permanent-disbarment analysis.

(b) Baseline disbarment plus heightened findings for “permanent disbarment”

The court followed the familiar structure used in Louisiana discipline:

• Rule violations: Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) were established by the bank-fraud conspiracy conviction and admitted dishonest conduct.
• Baseline sanction: Using the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee and court identified disbarment as the baseline.
• Aggravation/Mitigation: Aggravators included dishonest/selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience, and illegal conduct. Mitigators included no prior discipline, other penalties, and some efforts characterized as cooperation (and, in the court’s list, a “timely good faith effort to rectify consequences”).
• Permanent disbarment test (post-2022): The decisive step was the court’s application of the May 4, 2022 amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, requiring express findings of two factors.

(c) How the court satisfied the two-factor permanent disbarment standard

Factor 1 — Egregiousness demonstrating lack of ethical and moral fitness.
The court stressed respondent’s status as the bank’s general counsel and the decade-long nature of the scheme. The betrayal was not peripheral: respondent used his relationship with the client-bank while concealing financial condition, using false financial statements, cycling loans to mask non-performance, and participating in a fake tax-credit investment mechanism that funneled funds to cover loans/overdrafts. The court treated the bank’s collapse “under the weight of the fraud” as part of the gravity assessment, reinforcing the notion that client-harm magnitude matters sharply when the lawyer is an insider fiduciary.

Factor 2 — No reasonable expectation of significant rehabilitation.
The court’s analysis focused less on the sentence length and more on character evidence revealed by respondent’s own statements:

• Repeated minimization of culpability in criminal pleadings and disciplinary testimony;
• Lack of “genuine remorse” at the hearing;
• A particularly damaging admission that he did not stop/report the scheme because he did not want to jeopardize a lucrative salary (over $2 million/year in legal fees, per his sentencing memorandum).

This constellation was used to infer a forward-looking risk: that, presented with similar incentives, respondent would again prioritize self-interest over professional duty—supporting the conclusion that meaningful rehabilitation was not reasonably expected.

3.3. Impact

The opinion’s most significant contribution is its concrete application of Louisiana’s amended permanent-disbarment framework. Several likely impacts follow:

• Post-2022 clarity on “express findings”: The decision illustrates the evidentiary markers that satisfy each factor—especially how minimization and lack of remorse can independently drive the “no rehabilitation” finding.
• Heightened scrutiny for lawyer-insiders harming clients: Where the client is the entity the lawyer serves as counsel (here, general counsel to a bank), the betrayal and systemic harm can quickly cross into “egregiousness” warranting permanent removal from the bar.
• Collateral-attack resistance: By reiterating Rule XIX § 19(E) and the Boudreau/Wilkinson line, the case signals that attempts to relitigate a guilty plea (even indirectly) are not only barred but may be sanction-aggravating if they reflect lack of candor or remorse.
• Mitigation limits where cooperation is “qualified”: Even where the respondent cooperates with authorities, the persuasiveness of mitigation can be blunted if the tribunal finds the respondent’s remorse “measured, guarded,” or strategically framed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Interim suspension: A temporary removal from practice while a discipline case proceeds, often triggered by serious criminal convictions.
• Conclusive evidence of guilt (Rule XIX § 19(E)): In discipline based on a conviction, the tribunal does not re-try the criminal case; guilt is taken as established, and the only question becomes the sanction.
• Permanent disbarment vs. disbarment: Disbarment ordinarily may allow future readmission under conditions. Permanent disbarment, as applied here, permanently prohibits readmission (Rule XIX § 24(A)).
• Aggravating/mitigating factors: Case-specific considerations that increase (aggravate) or decrease (mitigate) the sanction from the baseline.
• ABA Standards (baseline sanction): A national framework often used to identify an initial sanction level (e.g., disbarment) before adjusting for aggravation/mitigation.
• Restitution: A criminal-court order to repay victims for losses; here, substantial restitution reinforced the seriousness of the underlying misconduct, though the discipline decision rested primarily on the criminal conduct and character findings.

5. Conclusion

In re: Gregory Joseph St. Angelo stands as a forceful application of Louisiana’s amended permanent-disbarment regime: when a lawyer’s misconduct is profoundly disloyal to a client, sustained over years, and results in major harm, the “egregiousness” prong is readily met; when the lawyer continues to minimize culpability and shows no genuine remorse—particularly while admitting self-interested reasons for staying silent—the court may find “no reasonable expectation” of rehabilitation and impose the profession’s ultimate sanction. The decision underscores that, after the 2022 amendments, permanent disbarment is not merely about the crime’s label, but about demonstrated character, accountability, and the likelihood of future ethical fitness.