Perez-Mejilla: Land-Dispute Threats and Verbal Harassment Rarely Establish “Persecution,” and Unraised BIA Issues Are Forfeited

1. Introduction

In Hector Perez-Mejilla v. Pamela Bondi (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision rejecting a Guatemalan applicant’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and (procedurally) Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. The petitioner, Hector Perez-Mejilla, entered the United States at age 11 and sought humanitarian relief based on threats and harassment from extended family members in Guatemala stemming from a long-running intra-family land dispute.

The core issues were whether the record compelled a finding of (1) past persecution or (2) a well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground, and—if past persecution was not established—whether the petitioner demonstrated that he could not reasonably relocate internally within Guatemala. The opinion also addressed (3) forfeiture of CAT relief for failure to raise it to the BIA, (4) forfeiture of a defective Notice to Appear (NTA) argument based on Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, and (5) forfeiture of a voluntary departure claim not shown in the administrative record.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Perez-Mejilla did not establish past persecution because the incidents described were primarily threats and verbal harassment unaccompanied by physical harm, and the most serious threat (a 2007 incident involving machetes and threats to kill and burn the house) lacked the immediacy and menacing character required under circuit precedent—especially given that the petitioner remained on the land for years thereafter and his grandmother continues to live there.

The court also upheld the BIA’s rejection of a future persecution claim because the petitioner relied on the same evidence deemed insufficient for past persecution and failed to carry his burden to show why internal relocation would not avoid harm (his testimony suggested the dispute was tied to presence on the disputed parcel, and his stated reason for not relocating was a personal refusal to leave ancestral land).

The Sixth Circuit further ruled that several additional arguments were forfeited, including CAT protection (not briefed to the BIA), an NTA-defect theory (not exhausted and not excused by an intervening change in law), and voluntary departure (no record support that it was requested).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review and scope of review

  • Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2009)): The court reiterated that when the BIA issues a written decision, the Sixth Circuit reviews the BIA decision and the IJ decision only to the extent the BIA adopted it. This framing mattered because Perez-Mejilla attacked some IJ findings the BIA did not reach; the court treated those attacks as beside the point once persecution failed.
  • Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, --- S. Ct. ---, 2026 WL 598435 (2026): The court emphasized the “substantial evidence” standard and, importantly, treated the “persecution” determination as a reviewable application of law to facts under that deferential standard (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). This supported affirmance unless the record compelled the opposite conclusion.

2) Asylum/withholding framework and burdens

  • Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401 (6th Cir. 2025): Used for the core elements: asylum requires “past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution,” and withholding requires a higher “clear probability” standard. The case also supplied the modern articulation that when past persecution is not shown, the applicant must prove future persecution and address internal relocation.
  • Mbonga v. Garland, 18 F.4th 889 (6th Cir. 2021) and West v. Barr, 830 F. App’x 757 (6th Cir. 2020): Cited for the regulatory presumption of future persecution arising from a showing of past persecution (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) and § 1208.16(b)(1)). Because Perez-Mejilla failed to show past persecution, he could not obtain that presumption.
  • Kukalo v. Holder, 744 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2006)): The court relied on Kukalo to reject a future-fear claim supported by the “same evidence” found insufficient for past persecution, reinforcing that applicants must provide something more (or at least meet the future-fear standard independently) when past persecution is not established.

3) Defining “persecution” and evaluating threats/harassment

  • Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2004)): The court repeated that persecution is more than “treatment our society regards as offensive.” It also supplied the key limiting principle: “Only threats of a most immediate and menacing nature can possibly qualify as past persecution.”
  • Perez v. Garland, No. 23-3852, 2024 WL 1804635 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1998)): Used for the proposition that “isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation,” without physical harm or significant liberty deprivation, do not constitute persecution.
  • Galicia v. Garland, No. 22-3650, 2023 WL 3318393 (6th Cir. May 9, 2023) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1998)): Reinforced the general rule that verbal harassment “rarely amounts to persecution.”
  • Japarkulova v. Holder again: The court analogized Perez-Mejilla’s delayed departure from Guatemala (years after the most serious incident) to Japarkulova, where delay undermined the immediacy/menace of threats. Here, the petitioner stayed on the property for years and his grandmother remains, which the court treated as powerful circumstantial evidence against “most immediate and menacing” threats.

4) Internal relocation and adequacy of the BIA’s explanation

  • Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401: The court used it to underscore that the applicant bears the burden to show why internal relocation is unreasonable or infeasible (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b)(2)(ii) (2025)). Perez-Mejilla’s argument that the BIA should have considered “safety conditions” and “resources” failed because he did not develop that record or articulate those points.
  • Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2005): Invoked for the principle that the BIA is not required to provide a detailed explanation when affirming the IJ, blunting a procedural attack on the BIA’s analysis of relocation.

5) BIA need not address every IJ ground; one sufficient ground sustains denial

  • Rongfu Huang v. Holder, 360 F. App’x 632 (6th Cir. 2010): Cited for the notion that the BIA need not grapple with every part of the IJ’s reasoning.
  • Kaba v. Holder, 516 F. App’x 479 (6th Cir. 2013): The court emphasized that denial can stand on any one dispositive ground articulated by the IJ/BIA; here, failure to establish persecution was independently fatal.

6) Forfeiture/exhaustion principles (CAT, NTA defects, and beyond)

  • Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2020) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1): Applied to treat issues not pursued during immigration proceedings as forfeited/unexhausted.
  • Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838 (6th Cir. 2023): Used to hold that failure to present a claim to the BIA bars judicial review; this was the direct basis for rejecting CAT review because it was not raised in the BIA brief.

7) CAT “torture” is more stringent; asylum failure often signals CAT difficulty

  • Singh v. Sessions, 683 F. App’x 463 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Yates, 677 F. App’x 985 (6th Cir. 2017)) and Bah v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006): The panel added that even if CAT were reached, inability to show persecution undermined meeting the “more stringent” CAT burden to show “torture.” (Doctrinally, CAT and asylum are distinct; the court’s point was comparative burden severity given this record.)

8) NTA timing defects and the “intervening-change-in-law” excuse

  • Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018) and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021): Perez-Mejilla relied on these to argue his NTA lacked date/time and proceedings should be terminated.
  • Espinoza-Anguiano v. McHenry, No. 24-3219, 2025 WL 405108 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2025) (citing Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2021)): The court reiterated that Pereira and Niz-Chavez did not create an intervening change excusing forfeiture in this context.
  • Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 987 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941)): Provided the governing test: intervening-change doctrine excuses forfeiture only if the issue was not available during the administrative process. The panel found the issue was available at least at the BIA stage because Pereira and Niz-Chavez existed then, yet the petitioner did not raise it.

9) Record limitation on petition for review

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) and Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971 (6th Cir. 2009): Used to reject the voluntary departure argument because the court’s review is constrained to the administrative record and petitioner did not point to record evidence of requesting such relief.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The court applied a deferential evidentiary posture. Under Urias-Orellana v. Bondi and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), the question was not whether the panel might have viewed the facts differently, but whether the record compelled a contrary conclusion to the BIA’s.
  2. Past persecution: threats and harassment did not cross the Sixth Circuit’s threshold. The court treated the petitioner’s evidence as falling into the category of verbal harassment and intimidation addressed by Mikhailevitch v. INS (as quoted in Perez v. Garland and Galicia v. Garland). The 2007 machete incident was the strongest fact, but the panel emphasized two features that undermined “immediacy” and “menace”: (i) the incident was defused without injury, and (ii) the petitioner stayed on the land for about seven years afterwards (and his grandmother still lives there), making the threats look less like imminent execution and more like episodic coercion in a property feud—insufficient under Japarkulova v. Holder.
  3. Future persecution: “same evidence” plus failure to negate internal relocation. Without past persecution, no presumption applied (Mbonga v. Garland; West v. Barr). The petitioner essentially recycled the same incidents, triggering Kukalo v. Holder’s rejection of a future-fear case built on evidence already found insufficient. Separately, the panel credited the BIA’s relocation rationale: petitioner tied the threat to the disputed parcel and offered only a preference not to leave ancestral land, which does not satisfy the regulatory burden to show relocation is unreasonable (as framed in Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi).
  4. The court declined to entertain issues not decided by the BIA or not properly presented. Attacks on IJ reasoning not reached by the BIA did not matter once persecution failed (Rongfu Huang v. Holder; Kaba v. Holder). CAT, NTA defects, and voluntary departure were rejected on forfeiture/record grounds (Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr; Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland; Lin v. Holder), with an additional explanation that “intervening change” did not apply (Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs; Hormel v. Helvering).

C. Impact

Although “not recommended for publication,” the decision consolidates several practical lessons that will predictably shape litigation behavior in the Sixth Circuit:

  • Land-dispute violence and threats remain difficult to translate into “persecution” without immediacy, repetition, escalation, or physical harm. The panel’s emphasis on the long delay between the worst incident and the applicant’s departure, and the grandmother’s continued residence, signals that continued safe(ish) residence by similarly situated family members can be potent evidence against the claimed severity and imminence of threats.
  • Internal relocation is not optional to brief; it is a burden to carry. Where harm is geographically tethered (here, to a particular parcel), applicants must build a record explaining why relocation elsewhere is not reasonable—safety, resources, family ties, language, employment, and feasibility—rather than relying on preference-based assertions.
  • Issue preservation is dispositive. The opinion is a reminder that CAT and NTA-defect theories must be explicitly raised to the BIA; otherwise, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) will bar judicial review. Likewise, the “intervening-change-in-law” doctrine will not rescue a forfeited argument where the relevant authority was available at the BIA stage.
  • Record discipline matters for discretionary relief claims. Voluntary departure arguments must be grounded in the administrative record; absent a cited request and ruling, they will fail on petition for review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Asylum vs. withholding of removal: Asylum requires showing (among other things) “past persecution” or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution; withholding requires a higher likelihood (“clear probability”). If you cannot meet asylum’s persecution showing on these facts, withholding is usually even harder.
  • “Persecution”: Not every threat or insult counts. Sixth Circuit law generally requires serious harm (or threats so immediate and menacing that they resemble imminent harm), not merely recurring intimidation or offensive treatment.
  • Past persecution presumption: If past persecution is proven, regulations can create a presumption of future persecution, shifting part of the burden to the government. No past persecution means no presumption.
  • Internal relocation: Even if danger exists in one place, asylum may be denied if the person can avoid harm by moving to another part of the home country—provided relocation is reasonable. When no past persecution is shown, the applicant must explain why relocation would not work.
  • Exhaustion/forfeiture: Federal courts typically cannot review arguments not first presented to the BIA. A petitioner must “raise” the issue—not merely allude to it—so the agency has a chance to decide it.
  • Notice to Appear defects (Pereira/Niz-Chavez): These cases concern statutory notice requirements in certain contexts. But even potentially strong legal arguments can be lost if not timely raised in immigration proceedings, and the Sixth Circuit will not treat those decisions as an automatic “get out of forfeiture free” card when the argument was available to present to the BIA.

5. Conclusion

Hector Perez-Mejilla v. Pamela Bondi reaffirms a strict Sixth Circuit line on what counts as “persecution”: verbal harassment and episodic threats arising from a family land dispute—without physical harm and without credible immediacy—do not compel a finding of past persecution. It also underscores that, absent past persecution, an applicant must develop and articulate a future-fear case that squarely addresses internal relocation. Finally, the decision is a procedural cautionary tale: claims not briefed to the BIA (CAT, NTA defects, voluntary departure) are generally lost, and intervening-case law will not excuse forfeiture where the argument was available during the administrative appeal.