Pereira Alves v. Blanche: “Avoiding the Locus” Is Not Internal Relocation; Indirect Family Harm and Non-Menacing Threats Do Not Compel Asylum

1. Introduction

Pereira Alves v. Blanche (1st Cir. Aug. 24, 2026) concerns a Brazilian family’s petitions for review after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed their appeal from an Immigration Judge (IJ) and later denied reopening and reconsideration. Petitioners Aldenir Pereira Alves and Cristiana Barros Alves, along with their two minor children, sought asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), alleging persecution by two Brazilian military police officers.

The core claim was that corrupt police repeatedly entered and terrorized Cristiana’s mother’s home—where Cristiana’s brothers lived and where one brother (Jaider) was a gang leader—threatening family members and physically abusing Cristiana’s siblings. Petitioners themselves were not physically harmed; Cristiana experienced threats during visits to her mother’s home; Aldenir was not threatened or harmed. Petitioners also relied heavily on the fact that Cristiana’s sister, Poliana, later received asylum from the same IJ on a form order.

The First Circuit denied review, emphasizing (i) the high threshold for “persecution,” (ii) the limited weight of indirect harm to relatives, (iii) the speculative nature of future-persecution claims when harm was localized and time-limited, and (iv) that merely avoiding a particular house is not an “internal relocation” determination under the asylum regulations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Past persecution: Substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that Petitioners did not establish past persecution. Petitioners were not arrested or physically harmed; the threats they experienced at the mother’s house were not shown to be so menacing as to cause “significant actual suffering or harm.”
  • Future persecution: Substantial evidence supported the finding that Petitioners lacked an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. The alleged misconduct occurred exclusively at the deceased mother’s home, did not extend to Petitioners’ own home, and had ceased for an extended period before departure.
  • “Similarly situated”/Poliana’s asylum grant: The BIA did not abuse discretion in denying remand based on a bare form order granting Poliana asylum. Without reasoning or facts from Poliana’s case, the order did not establish Petitioners’ prima facie eligibility, and Poliana appeared not similarly situated (she lived in the targeted home and was arrested).
  • Withholding: Because Petitioners failed to meet the lower asylum standard, they necessarily failed to meet the higher withholding standard.
  • Motions to reopen/reconsider: Petitioners waived meaningful review by not developing arguments challenging the BIA’s denial, particularly regarding new affidavits.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is a synthesis of First Circuit asylum doctrine, framed through standards of review and the “persecution” threshold. Key cited authorities shaped both the analytic structure and the outcome:

A. How the court reviewed the agency record (standard of review)

  • Mayancela v. Bondi (136 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025)) and Lee v. Barr (975 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2020)): When the BIA adopts the IJ and adds analysis, the court reviews “both decisions as a unit.” This framing allowed the panel to credit the IJ’s fact-findings while evaluating the BIA’s added reasoning on indirect harm, speculation, and the “avoid the house” point.
  • Esteban-Garcia v. Garland (94 F.4th 186 (1st Cir. 2024)) and López-Pérez v. Garland (26 F.4th 104 (1st Cir. 2022)): The court reviews the adopted IJ portions and the BIA’s additional grounds. This legitimized reliance on both the IJ’s “no persecution” finding and the BIA’s “limited and indirect harm” characterization.
  • Maldonado-Ruiz v. Bondi (169 F.4th 315 (1st Cir. 2026)) and Urias-Orellana v. Bondi (607 U.S. 537 (2026)): These cases supplied the “substantial evidence” formulation and emphasized that agency findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to disagree. This deference was outcome-determinative given the largely inferential nature of Petitioners’ fear.
  • Vasili v. Holder (732 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2013)): Cited for de novo review of legal questions, reinforcing that Petitioners’ challenge mostly failed because it was factual/discretionary under substantial evidence, not a pure legal error.

B. Defining “persecution” and the “high threshold” for past persecution

  • Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions (897 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2018)) and Vasili v. Holder: Past persecution is a “heavy burden”/“daunting task.” The court used this to anchor the analysis: threats and fear must be severe and well-supported.
  • Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland (121 F.4th 316 (1st Cir. 2024)): Past persecution requires discriminatory experiences reaching a “fairly high threshold of seriousness” and occurring with “regularity and frequency.” Here, the court treated Petitioners’ exposures—mostly as visitors to a third-party home—as insufficiently serious as applied to them.
  • Urias-Orellana v. Garland (121 F.4th 327 (1st Cir. 2024)), quoting Santos Garcia v. Garland (67 F.4th 455 (1st Cir. 2023)): Persecution is more than “unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering.” This supported rejecting a persecution finding where Petitioners lacked physical harm, detention, or sustained direct targeting.
  • Montoya-Lopez v. Garland (80 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023)) and Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland (59 F.4th 510 (1st Cir. 2023)): Credible threats can qualify—especially death threats—if severe enough. The absence of death threats or comparably severe threats was central to affirmance.
  • Vargas-Salazar v. Garland (119 F.4th 167 (1st Cir. 2024)), quoting Touch v. Holder (568 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2009)): Unfulfilled threats “rarely” establish past persecution unless “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” The court applied this directly: threats of arrest and insults at the mother’s home did not compel a finding of “significant actual suffering.”
  • Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland (86 F.4th 482 (1st Cir. 2023)) and Ordonez-Quino v. Holder (760 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2014)): Even serious criminal threats or robbery can fail the persecution threshold absent evidence of severe, targeted mistreatment causing significant harm. This case was used as a comparator to show that Petitioners’ record was weaker.
  • Avelar Gonzalez v. Whitaker (908 F.3d 820 (1st Cir. 2018)): Any minor factual misstatement by the IJ about “direct threats” was treated as harmless, because the IJ repeatedly analyzed whether the threats were sufficiently menacing.

C. Harm to relatives as “indirect harm” and the need for a targeted message

  • Moreno v. Holder (749 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2014)): Where an applicant relies on harm to a relative as evidence of the applicant’s persecution, speculation is insufficient. This supported the BIA’s “limited and indirect harm” approach to beatings/arrests of siblings not shown to be aimed at Petitioners.
  • Precetaj v. Holder (649 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2011)): The court distinguished this case to clarify what “message-sending” family harm looks like: repeated threats and extensive violence against the applicant and children “specifically designed to send a message” to the applicant. Here, the record supported the inference that police conduct was focused on the household associated with suspected criminal activity, not on punishing Petitioners through their relatives.

D. Future fear, speculation, lapse of time without harm, and localization

  • Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland (and Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2007)): A well-founded fear requires a “reasonable possibility” of harm (objective reasonableness), not merely subjective fear.
  • Ang v. Holder (723 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2013)) and Esteban-Garcia v. Garland: Future fear must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Petitioners’ subjective fear did not compel objective reasonableness.
  • Villafranca v. Lynch (797 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2015)): Remaining in the country for months without further harm can support a finding that fear is not objectively reasonable. Petitioners’ lengthy period without threats after the last alleged incidents and before departure helped defeat future fear.
  • Bopaka v. Garland (123 F.4th 552 (1st Cir. 2024)): Credibility/fact-evaluation deference supported the agency’s choice to credit testimony about last police entry being around February 2020, despite affidavit inconsistencies.

E. Internal relocation doctrine—when it applies and what counts as “relocation”

  • The court referenced the regulatory framework: 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2026). Petitioners invoked the presumption against the reasonableness of internal relocation when persecution is by the government or its sponsors.
  • Caz v. Garland (84 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2023)) and Khattak v. Holder (704 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2013)): The panel clarified that internal relocation analysis becomes relevant where there is a predicate showing of persecution (or a well-founded fear). Here, the agency found no persecution; additionally, “avoiding the mother’s house” was not “relocation” at all because Petitioners already lived elsewhere and had not been harmed at their own home.

F. Motions to remand / prima facie eligibility and “similarly situated” asylum grants

  • Moreno v. Garland (51 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022)), Adeyanju v. Garland (27 F.4th 25 (1st Cir. 2022)), and Rivera-Medrano v. Garland (47 F.4th 29 (1st Cir. 2022)): Denial of remand is reviewed for abuse of discretion; the movant must show prima facie eligibility for relief. The bare form order granting Poliana asylum, without reasoning or record facts, was insufficient to establish Petitioners’ prima facie eligibility.

G. Withholding of removal’s higher burden

  • Cortez-Mejia v. Garland (121 F.4th 938 (1st Cir. 2024)), De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi (161 F.4th 17 (1st Cir. 2025)), Mendoza v. Bondi (133 F.4th 139 (1st Cir. 2025)), Paiz-Morales v. Lynch (795 F.3d 238 (1st Cir. 2015)), and Vargas-Salazar v. Garland: Collectively stand for the familiar rule: failure to meet asylum’s lower standard usually defeats withholding, which requires a “clear probability” of persecution.

H. Waiver through undeveloped briefing

  • Varela-Chavarria v. Garland (86 F.4th 443 (1st Cir. 2023)), Xirum v. Bondi (141 F.4th 345 (1st Cir. 2025)), and United States v. Zannino (895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)): Issues mentioned perfunctorily without developed argumentation are waived. This foreclosed meaningful review of the motions to reopen/reconsider.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Start with deference: Applying substantial evidence, the court asked not whether it would have decided differently, but whether the record compelled a contrary conclusion.
  2. Past persecution failed on severity and directness: Petitioners’ own lack of physical harm, detention, or severe threats was decisive. The court treated threats of arrest and being called a criminal, occurring only during visits to a third-party home, as insufficiently “menacing” without evidence of significant actual suffering (e.g., documented lasting effects). The court also accepted the BIA’s view that siblings’ beatings and arrests were not shown to be inflicted to harm Petitioners.
  3. Future fear failed on objective reasonableness: The alleged misconduct was localized to the mother’s home and linked by the record to suspicion of criminal activity associated with that home. The cessation of incidents, the time Petitioners remained in Brazil without harm, and the absence of any targeting at Petitioners’ own home supported the inference that future persecution was speculative rather than reasonably possible.
  4. “Avoiding the house” is not “internal relocation”: The court adopted the BIA majority’s key conceptual distinction: advising avoidance of a specific locus of harm (the mother’s home) is not the same as requiring internal relocation, especially where Petitioners already resided elsewhere without incident.
  5. Poliana’s asylum grant did not prove Petitioners’ eligibility: With only a form order and no factual findings, the BIA could not assume Poliana’s case matched Petitioners’. Moreover, the record suggested meaningful differences (Poliana lived in the targeted home, resisted entry, and was arrested). Therefore, no prima facie eligibility was shown.
  6. Withholding fell with asylum: Under established circuit law, inability to satisfy asylum’s standard ordinarily defeats withholding’s higher “clear probability” standard.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies the boundary between “avoidance” and “relocation”: The opinion signals that not every reference to living elsewhere triggers the internal-relocation presumptions—particularly where the agency’s core holding is “no persecution” and the record shows harm confined to a specific location the applicant need not frequent.
  • Raises the evidentiary bar for “indirect family harm” theories: Applicants relying on harm to relatives must develop record evidence that the harm was inflicted to target the applicant (as in Precetaj), not simply that the applicant feared it or inferred message-sending.
  • Limits “similarly situated” arguments based on bare outcomes: A relative’s asylum grant—especially via a form order lacking reasoning—will not, by itself, establish prima facie eligibility or require remand. Practitioners will need transcripts, decisions with findings, or other admissible evidence showing true comparability.
  • Emphasizes appellate waiver risk: The court’s waiver holding underscores that petitions challenging reopening/reconsideration must directly and specifically contest each BIA ground, including availability/materiality of new evidence and prima facie eligibility.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Asylum vs. withholding of removal
Asylum requires showing a “well-founded fear” (a reasonable possibility) of persecution on a protected ground. Withholding requires more: a “clear probability” of persecution. If asylum fails on the merits, withholding usually fails too.
Persecution
Not every bad experience qualifies. Courts look for severe mistreatment (e.g., serious violence, detention, severe threats). Harassment, intimidation, and non-menacing, unfulfilled threats often fall short.
Indirect harm (harm to relatives)
Harm to family members can matter, but the applicant generally must show it was done to target the applicant—such as to punish or coerce the applicant—rather than as part of a separate conflict or investigation focused on others.
Substantial evidence review
The court does not reweigh facts. It upholds the agency unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.
Internal relocation
This doctrine asks whether an applicant could reasonably avoid persecution by living elsewhere in the country. Here, the court treated “do not go to that specific house” as simple avoidance, not an adjudicative finding that the applicant must relocate within the country.
Motion to remand / prima facie eligibility
If an applicant asks the BIA to send the case back to the IJ based on new evidence, the applicant must show the evidence would likely make them eligible for relief. A form order granting someone else asylum, without factual findings, typically won’t meet that standard.

5. Conclusion

Pereira Alves v. Blanche reinforces three practical rules for asylum litigation in the First Circuit: (1) threats and intimidation—especially when unfulfilled and not shown to cause significant actual suffering—often do not compel a finding of persecution; (2) harm to relatives supports an applicant’s claim only when the record shows it was inflicted to target the applicant, not merely because the applicant is related; and (3) “avoidance” of a localized setting of misconduct is not necessarily an internal-relocation determination.

The decision also cautions that “similarly situated” arguments require a developed record (not just a relative’s unexplained grant) and that reopening/reconsideration challenges can be lost through waiver if not fully briefed.