Avoiding a Targeted Household Is Not “Internal Relocation,” and a Relative’s Asylum Grant (Without Findings) Does Not Establish Prima Facie Eligibility

I. Introduction

Pereira Alves v. Blanche (1st Cir. Aug. 24, 2026) addresses a recurring asylum pattern: applicants allege persecution by police connected to a relative’s suspected criminal activity, supported largely by threats and mistreatment inflicted on other family members at a particular family home.

The petitioners—Aldenir Pereira Alves and Cristiana Barros Alves and their two minor children—are Brazilian nationals who entered the United States without authorization and sought asylum and withholding of removal under the INA. They alleged that two Brazilian military police officers repeatedly threatened and terrorized their extended family at Cristiana’s mother’s house between roughly 2012 and 2020, motivated by Cristiana’s brother’s gang leadership and subsequent imprisonment.

The key issues were whether: (1) the petitioners established past persecution based on threats directed at them and violence against relatives; (2) they established a well-founded fear of future persecution; and (3) the BIA had to remand or reopen because Cristiana’s sister, Poliana, later received an asylum grant by the same IJ on what petitioners argued were “virtually the same facts.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit denied the consolidated petitions for review, upholding the BIA’s:

  • affirmance of the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal;
  • rejection of petitioners’ “similarly situated to Poliana” argument (treated as a motion to remand); and
  • denial of petitioners’ motions to reopen and reconsider (largely on waiver grounds in the court of appeals).

On the merits, substantial evidence supported findings that the petitioners themselves were not physically harmed, arrested, or subjected to threats severe enough to constitute persecution; that harm to siblings was indirect and not shown to have been inflicted to persecute the petitioners; and that the claimed future risk was speculative, particularly given the locus of events at the mother’s house and the lack of encounters at petitioners’ own home.

Critically, the court agreed with the BIA majority that the IJ’s observation that petitioners could avoid the mother’s house was not an “internal relocation” finding. Because petitioners already lived elsewhere (fifteen minutes away) and reported no police misconduct at their own residence, simple avoidance did not require relocation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Scope and standard of review

  • Mayancela v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025), and Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2020): When the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning but adds its own analysis, reviewing courts consider both decisions “as a unit.”
  • Esteban-Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186 (1st Cir. 2024), quoting López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104 (1st Cir. 2022): The court reviews the IJ portions adopted by the BIA and the BIA’s additional grounds.
  • Maldonado-Ruiz v. Bondi, 169 F.4th 315 (1st Cir. 2026), quoting Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537 (2026): “Past persecution / well-founded fear” determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence; the agency’s decision is conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.
  • Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2013): Legal questions are reviewed de novo (as reiterated via Mayancela).

2. Elements and thresholds for “persecution”

  • Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2025), quoted in Maldonado-Ruiz v. Bondi: Persecution analysis involves (i) serious harm, (ii) nexus to government action/inaction, and (iii) causation linked to a protected ground.
  • Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland, 86 F.4th 482 (1st Cir. 2023): Applicants must show past persecution (creating a presumption) or independently show a well-founded fear.
  • Ang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2013), quoted in Esteban-Garcia v. Garland: Future fear must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.
  • Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2007), quoted in Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland: “Well-founded fear” requires a reasonable possibility of harm.
  • Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2018), quoting Vasili v. Holder: Past persecution is a heavy burden.
  • Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland, 121 F.4th 316 (1st Cir. 2024), quoting Vasili v. Holder: Past persecution requires “discriminatory experiences” reaching a high seriousness threshold with some regularity/frequency.
  • Urias-Orellana v. Garland, 121 F.4th 327 (1st Cir. 2024), quoting Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455 (1st Cir. 2023), aff’d sub nom. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537: Persecution exceeds mere harassment and “basic suffering.”
  • Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023), quoting Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510 (1st Cir. 2023): Credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if sufficiently severe (especially death threats).
  • Vargas-Salazar v. Garland, 119 F.4th 167 (1st Cir. 2024), quoting Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2009): Unfulfilled threats rarely constitute persecution unless so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering/harm.
  • Hernandez-Mendez v. Garland (discussing Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2014)): Even serious threats plus robbery may still fall short absent significant actual suffering/harm.
  • Moreno v. Holder, 749 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2014): To treat harm to relatives as persecution of the applicant, one must provide more than speculation/surmise.
  • Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2011): A benchmark case where extreme violence against family members was “specifically designed to send a message” to the applicant—used here to distinguish petitioners’ weaker showing.

3. Future-fear evaluation and time-without-harm evidence

  • Villafranca v. Lynch, 797 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2015): A meaningful period living in the home country without harm can undercut objective reasonableness of fear.
  • Bopaka v. Garland, 123 F.4th 552 (1st Cir. 2024): The court defers to IJ credibility determinations under substantial evidence (invoked to justify crediting testimony over inconsistent affidavit assertions).

4. Internal relocation doctrine in asylum law

  • Regulations: 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2026) (relocation and reasonableness framework, including presumptions when the persecutor is the government).
  • Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2023), and Khattak v. Holder, 704 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2013): Internal relocation analysis becomes relevant within the persecution framework; the court here emphasized there was no need to analyze relocation where there was no persecution finding, and in any event avoiding a single location is not “relocation.”

5. Motions to remand/reopen/reconsider and “similarly situated” claims

  • Moreno v. Garland, 51 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022), quoting Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th 25 (1st Cir. 2022): Denial of a motion to remand is reviewed for abuse of discretion; the standard is highly deferential.
  • Rivera-Medrano v. Garland, 47 F.4th 29 (1st Cir. 2022): A motion to remand fails without a showing of prima facie eligibility for relief.
  • Avelar Gonzalez v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 820 (1st Cir. 2018): Harmless error doctrine for minor IJ misstatements that do not affect the outcome.
  • Varela-Chavarria v. Garland, 86 F.4th 443 (1st Cir. 2023), and Xirum v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 345 (1st Cir. 2025), quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990): Perfuctory or undeveloped arguments are deemed waived.

6. Withholding-of-removal linkage to asylum failure

  • Cortez-Mejia v. Garland, 121 F.4th 938 (1st Cir. 2024): Withholding requires a higher proof standard than asylum.
  • De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 17 (1st Cir. 2025), quoting Mendoza v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 139 (1st Cir. 2025): Withholding requires a “clear probability” of persecution on a protected ground.
  • Vargas-Salazar v. Garland, quoting Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238 (1st Cir. 2015): Failure to meet asylum’s lower burden typically defeats withholding.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Past persecution: threats and indirect harm did not cross the “high threshold”

The court accepted that petitioners testified credibly, but emphasized that credibility is not enough: the harm must reach the persecution threshold. The record showed:

  • no physical harm, arrest, or detention of the petitioners;
  • threats were limited largely to threats of arrest if the family did not open the door at the mother’s house;
  • violence and arrests occurred to other family members (Poliana, Robson), not the petitioners.

Applying Vargas-Salazar v. Garland and Touch v. Holder, the panel treated unfulfilled threats as typically insufficient unless “so menacing” as to cause significant actual suffering/harm—and found substantial evidence for the agency’s conclusion that this showing was not made.

The petitioners’ attempt to bootstrap violence against relatives into their own persecution failed under Moreno v. Holder: the record did not compel a finding that the siblings were harmed “for the purpose of harming the petitioners themselves.” The court distinguished Precetaj v. Holder, where the abuse of family members was extreme and explicitly intended to punish/coerce the petitioner.

2. Future persecution: fear was not objectively reasonable and was undercut by time, place, and the limited identity of alleged persecutors

The court highlighted multiple evidentiary features that supported the agency’s “speculative fear” conclusion:

  • Temporal gap: according to Cristiana’s testimony, the last police incursion at the mother’s house was around February 2020; petitioners remained in Brazil until October 2021 without experiencing harm. Under Villafranca v. Lynch, time without harm can undercut objective fear.
  • Geographic/locus constraint: events occurred at the mother’s house; police never visited petitioners’ home fifteen minutes away.
  • Motivation inference: substantial evidence permitted the agency to infer the police focus was tied to suspected criminal activity associated with the household where the brother lived.
  • Persecutor specificity: petitioners attributed the harm to “two specific police officers,” weakening any claim of nationwide risk from police generally.
  • Country conditions nuance: the Country Report reflected corruption and impunity concerns but also governmental efforts to address corruption, which the agency treated as cutting against an inevitable future-harm prediction.

3. Internal relocation: avoiding a specific “locus” is not relocation, and relocation presumptions do not do the work absent persecution

One BIA member dissented, concerned the IJ implicitly required internal relocation without applying the regulatory presumption that relocation is unreasonable when persecution is by the government. The First Circuit sided with the BIA majority on two distinct grounds:

  1. No relocation finding was actually made: “avoiding the mother’s house” was framed as avoiding a specific place, not relocating within Brazil.
  2. Relocation rules do not rescue a claim lacking persecution: the court noted (citing the regulation and cases including Caz v. Garland and Khattak v. Holder) that internal relocation analysis is relevant within the persecution framework; if there is no past persecution and no objectively reasonable future fear, presumptions about relocation do not create eligibility.

This is the opinion’s most practically important clarification: asylum applicants cannot transform evidence that harm is confined to a single property or gathering place into an “internal relocation” dispute when the record supports that they can avoid the site without moving and without facing persecution elsewhere.

4. “Similarly situated” to a relative granted asylum: form orders are not enough, and prima facie eligibility remains required

Petitioners argued that their case should be reconciled with Poliana’s later asylum grant by the same IJ. The BIA treated this as a motion to remand; the First Circuit applied the “highly deferential” abuse-of-discretion standard from Moreno v. Garland.

The court upheld denial because petitioners failed to make a prima facie showing of their own eligibility as required by Rivera-Medrano v. Garland. The only “new” material submitted on appeal was an IJ form order granting Poliana asylum, which contained no findings or reasoning. The court endorsed the BIA’s refusal to assume facts not in the petitioners’ administrative record and accepted that Poliana appeared differently situated (including evidence she had been arrested and lived in the mother’s home).

The decision therefore limits a common litigation strategy: pointing to a relative’s grant as “proof” of one’s own eligibility. Unless the grant contains usable findings (or the record includes the underlying evidence), it will not establish prima facie eligibility or require a remand.

5. Withholding of removal: asylum failure was dispositive

Relying on Cortez-Mejia v. Garland and De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi, the court reiterated that withholding requires a higher showing (“clear probability”) than asylum. Under Vargas-Salazar v. Garland and Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, failure to meet asylum’s burden ordinarily defeats withholding, which occurred here.

6. Reopening/reconsideration: waiver on petition for review

Although the consolidated appeal included review of the BIA’s denial of motions to reopen/reconsider, the court held the petitioners did not develop arguments challenging key aspects of that denial, and thus waived them under Varela-Chavarria v. Garland and Xirum v. Bondi (quoting United States v. Zannino).

C. Impact

  • Constrains “government-persecutor relocation” arguments where harm is site-specific: By endorsing the distinction between (a) internal relocation within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 and (b) simply avoiding a single household “locus,” the opinion gives IJs and the BIA a doctrinal path to reject relocation-presumption arguments when the record shows no persecution outside a discrete place.
  • Reinforces stringent treatment of unfulfilled threats: The court’s application of Touch v. Holder and Vargas-Salazar v. Garland confirms that threats of arrest—without severe escalation, detention, physical harm, or documented enduring effects—will often be deemed insufficient for past persecution.
  • Limits reliance on relatives’ asylum grants: A bare grant (especially a form order) is not “material evidence” establishing another applicant’s prima facie eligibility. Practitioners may need to obtain the relative’s full decision, transcript, or evidentiary submissions to make a meaningful remand/reopen showing.
  • Clarifies evidentiary logic for “speculation” findings: The decision illustrates how time-without-harm, confinement of incidents to a single property, and the identity of only two alleged persecutors can combine to support an agency’s conclusion that future fear is not objectively reasonable.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Past persecution: Not every serious or frightening experience qualifies. Courts require harm that is sufficiently severe and sustained—typically involving serious violence, detention, or threats so extreme they cause significant actual suffering.
  • Unfulfilled threats: Threats alone can qualify, but usually only if they are exceptionally severe (often death threats) or have consequences showing real, significant suffering.
  • Indirect harm to relatives: Harm to a family member can support an applicant’s claim if it is inflicted to persecute the applicant (e.g., to punish or coerce the applicant). Otherwise, it is usually treated as indirect and insufficient by itself.
  • Well-founded fear (objective reasonableness): The applicant must show more than a sincere fear; the fear must be reasonable given the facts—such as patterns of targeting, recent threats, and inability to avoid harm.
  • Internal relocation: This is the legal idea that someone can avoid persecution by moving elsewhere in the country. The court’s key clarification is that avoiding one particular house is not necessarily “relocation,” especially when the applicant already lives elsewhere safely.
  • Prima facie eligibility on remand/reopen: To get a case sent back based on new information (like a relative’s asylum grant), the applicant must show the new material would likely make them eligible—not merely raise questions or suggest inconsistency.

V. Conclusion

Pereira Alves v. Blanche consolidates several practical asylum principles into a fact pattern common in claims involving alleged police corruption and familial association with criminal suspects:

  • threats of arrest and exposure to relatives’ mistreatment, without more, may not meet the high threshold for past persecution;
  • future fear may be deemed speculative where incidents are confined to a particular location, time has passed without harm, and the alleged persecutors are limited and not shown to be pursuing the applicant elsewhere;
  • avoiding a targeted household is not necessarily “internal relocation,” and relocation presumptions do not substitute for proof of persecution;
  • a relative’s asylum grant—especially via form order without findings—does not establish prima facie eligibility or require remand.

The opinion’s most notable doctrinal contribution is its clear separation of site avoidance from internal relocation, shaping how future First Circuit cases may handle government-persecutor arguments when the alleged harm is tied to a single household or “locus” rather than to the applicant’s broader ability to live safely in the country.