Pepper Spray for Repeated Noncompliance Is Not “Malicious,” and Short-Term Suicide-Watch Deprivations Require Proof of a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

1. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit decision addresses two recurring Eighth Amendment questions in prison litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) when a correctional officer’s use of chemical spray to obtain compliance constitutes “excessive force,” and (2) when harsh, unsanitary, and restrictive conditions—imposed during a short period of heightened security and suicide watch—cross the constitutional line into “cruel and unusual punishment.”

After a prison “Security Threat Group” allegedly assaulted an officer on Christmas Day 2022, prison officials designated Jacob Julick as an “active participant” and transferred him to restricted housing. Julick then reported suicidal ideation, was placed under close observation, and—after failing to comply with repeated commands to face the wall—was pepper-sprayed by Officer Dylan Bond. Julick was later housed for ten days (December 26 to January 4) in conditions he described as filthy, cold, and demeaning, including alleged feces in the cell and denial of showering and hygiene.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Julick failed to generate a triable issue under the controlling objective/subjective Eighth Amendment frameworks.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Excessive force (pepper spray): The court held Julick could not satisfy either prong of the Eighth Amendment test. Subjectively, the evidence showed Officer Bond used pepper spray in a good-faith effort to restore discipline after repeated noncompliance; objectively, Julick’s reaction and the record showed only de minimis injury/temporary discomfort.
• Conditions of confinement (10-day restrictive housing/suicide watch): The court addressed only the objective prong and held the conditions described—alone or in combination—did not demonstrate an “extreme deprivation” posing a “sufficiently serious” risk of harm on this record, especially where key details (extent/freshness/origin of feces; concrete health effects) were missing and new appellate embellishments were disregarded.
• Scope of appeal: The court refused to consider a taser-related theory because it was not addressed below and was not properly preserved on appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Procedural posture and appellate constraints

• Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2017): Supplied the de novo standard for summary judgment and the obligation to draw reasonable inferences for the nonmovant—while still requiring a genuine dispute of material fact.
• Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam): Reinforced that pro se pleadings receive less stringent construction; the court read Julick’s filings broadly, but that leniency did not replace evidentiary burdens at summary judgment.
• In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2001) and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976): Used to decline review of issues not considered below—here, the taser theory.
• Bowles v. Sabree, 121 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the court’s admonition that appellate courts are “the wrong place to try out new facts,” which mattered when counsel on appeal characterized the cell as “covered” in feces and claimed Julick was required to lie in it—details not supported by the complaint/record.
• England v. DENSO Int'l Am. Inc., 136 F.4th 632 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited to distinguish pleading-stage scrutiny from summary-judgment scrutiny, undermining comparisons to cases decided on a motion to dismiss.

B. Excessive force doctrine

• Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986): Framed “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and supplied the multi-factor inquiry (need for force, proportionality, injury, perceived threat, tempering efforts) for deciding whether force was applied “maliciously and sadistically.”
• Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992): Stated the core subjective distinction: force used “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” versus a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”
• Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991): Anchored the two-prong structure (objective seriousness and subjective culpability) and the requirement of a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
• Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited by Julick but distinguished as far more severe (ramming a compliant, handcuffed prisoner into a wall causing serious injury).
• Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2023): Emphasized that failure on either prong defeats the claim and acknowledged the “murky border” between actionable and de minimis force.
• Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979): Supported “wide-ranging deference” to correctional officials’ judgments in maintaining institutional order.
• Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008): Warned against “unreasonable post hoc judicial second-guessing” and underscored the prison-setting context.
• Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App'x 723 (6th Cir. 2004) (order); Siggers v. Renner, 37 F. App'x 138 (6th Cir. 2002) (order); Thomas v. Greene, 1999 WL 1253102 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999) (table); Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002): These formed the opinion’s main analogical chain: using pepper spray/mace to obtain compliance from disobedient inmates is typically viewed as a disciplinary, good-faith measure rather than malicious force—especially where the prisoner’s injuries are minimal.
• Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2008): Provided the objective threshold: an excessive-force claimant must show more than de minimis force.
• Hernandez v. Simmons, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29233 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020) (order): Bolstered the de minimis analysis for pepper-spray exposure where video did not show distress or pain.

C. Conditions of confinement doctrine

• Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): Supplied the baseline duty to provide “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care” and to take reasonable measures to guarantee inmate safety.
• Pearson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 170 F.4th 1027 (6th Cir. 2026): Framed the objective inquiry as whether the condition posed a “sufficiently serious” risk of harm and described the prohibition as “deliberate indifference” to dangerous conditions.
• Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the “substantial risk of serious harm” formulation used to test the objective severity alleged.
• Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981): Provided the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” benchmark and cautioned against a rigid test for cruel-and-unusual conditions.
• Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980): Cited to emphasize that Eighth Amendment judgments should not devolve into purely subjective judicial preferences.
• Dykes v. Benson, 2022 WL 19076614 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2022) (order): Supported the proposition that “temporary exposure to unsanitary conditions” usually is not enough; the deprivation must be “extreme.”
• Turner v. Long, 2024 WL 3029249 (6th Cir. June 17, 2024): Distinguished as not reaching the merits (remanded without deciding the Eighth Amendment issue).
• Taylor v. Larson, 505 F. App'x 475 (6th Cir. 2012): Recognized that placing a prisoner in a cell “covered” with “fresh fecal matter” may violate the Eighth Amendment, but the Julick panel found the factual specifics in Larson (coverage, freshness, urine-soaked mattress, pleading posture) materially stronger than Julick’s record.
• Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) (per curiam): Distinguished as “miles away” factually—massive feces coverage, inability to eat/drink, sleeping naked in sewage—illustrating that only exceptionally vile short-term conditions clearly cross the constitutional threshold.
• Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App'x 204 (6th Cir. 2017) and Keel v. Davidson Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2015 WL 799724 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2015): Cited as persuasive examples where temporary exposure to sewage leaks did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
• Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1985) (and, via Walker, Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978) and Dorrough v. Hogan, 563 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) (order)): Used to reject a claimed bright-line rule that “at least one shower per week” is a constitutional minimum. The panel read Walker as a deferential approval of a district court’s remedial/administrative judgment in a specific post-riot setting, not a generally applicable constitutional command.
• Franklin v. Franklin, 2000 WL 687434 (6th Cir. May 16, 2000) (table) and Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006): Cited by Julick regarding cold conditions, but distinguished because Julick was on suicide watch and officials had a safety rationale for limiting bedding/materials.
• Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001): Supported the defendants’ justification for restricting items that can facilitate self-harm (e.g., bed sheets), reinforcing that suicide risk changes the constitutional balance.
• Watison v. Perry, 2024 WL 3461194 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024): Functioned as the most factually analogous comparator: eight days without hygiene supplies, showers, recreation, clothing, and bedding (with asserted physical harms) still did not meet the objective severity threshold—making Julick’s less-developed showing insufficient.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Excessive force: why the pepper spray did not violate the Eighth Amendment

The court applied the familiar two-prong Eighth Amendment structure for excessive force (objective seriousness and subjective maliciousness), emphasizing that Julick’s claim failed on both.

1. Subjective prong (Hudson / Whitley):
   • The critical evidence was the video: Julick repeatedly turned toward the officer and continued talking after being ordered to face the wall.
   • Applying the Whitley v. Albers factors, the panel treated the need for force as arising from persistent disobedience in a high-security context (immediately after a gang stabbing and while Julick was on maximum assault status).
   • The amount of force was limited (brief bursts) and paired with efforts to restore control (commands, escalating only after noncompliance).
   • Consistent with Jennings v. Mitchell, Siggers v. Renner, Thomas v. Greene, and Combs v. Wilkinson, the court held that using pepper spray to gain compliance from a disobedient inmate is typically a good-faith disciplinary measure, not “malicious and sadistic” force.
   • The court rejected the legal premise that “noncompliance alone” can never justify force, citing its own pepper-spray/mace line of cases.
2. Objective prong (Wilson / Leary):
   • The panel held Julick showed only de minimis injury/temporary discomfort. It relied on the video (laughing/smiling during spraying), the nurse’s decontamination with “copious amounts of water,” and the lack of recorded distress.
   • The opinion treated pepper-spray exposure as commonly falling on the de minimis side of the line, consistent with Jennings v. Mitchell, Thomas v. Greene, and Hernandez v. Simmons.

Notably, the court did not reach qualified immunity; it disposed of the claim on the merits.

B. Conditions of confinement: why the 10-day restrictions did not meet the objective threshold

On conditions, the court confined itself to the objective prong (whether the conditions posed a sufficiently serious risk of harm), reflecting a common judicial practice: if the plaintiff cannot show an objectively serious deprivation, the claim fails without probing officials’ subjective intent.

1. Record discipline at summary judgment:
   • The panel refused to credit new appellate characterizations (e.g., that the cell was “covered” in feces or that Julick was required to lie in it), invoking Bowles v. Sabree.
   • This mattered because the complaint’s feces allegations were nonspecific (amount, origin, freshness, duration of contact), and those missing specifics bear directly on whether conditions posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” under Finley v. Huss.
2. Feces/unsanitary conditions:
   • The panel distinguished Taylor v. Riojas as involving extraordinarily extreme, life-necessities-depriving conditions (massive feces coverage, inability to eat/drink, naked sleeping in sewage).
   • It distinguished Taylor v. Larson because Larson involved a cell “covered” in “fresh fecal matter” and additional facts (urine-soaked mattress) in a more plaintiff-friendly procedural posture (motion to dismiss), while Julick’s record lacked comparable detail and proof of serious risk.
   • It treated “temporary exposure to unsanitary conditions” as ordinarily insufficient without evidence of an extreme deprivation, citing Dykes v. Benson.
3. Denial of showers and toothbrushing:
   • The panel rejected the asserted bright-line “one shower per week” constitutional minimum, narrowing Walker v. Mintzes to its remedial and institution-specific context and reading Walker’s supporting citations (Preston v. Thompson, Dorrough v. Hogan) as deferential review of district court judgments rather than circuit-wide constitutional rules.
   • The absence of alleged concrete health consequences further undermined objective seriousness.
4. Cold, lack of bedding/clothing, and suicide-watch context:
   • The court acknowledged Julick’s allegations of cold and deprivation but found the suicide-risk justification significant: restricting bedding/materials may reduce the risk of self-harm, a concern highlighted by Comstock v. McCrary.
   • It distinguished cold-condition cases cited by Julick (Franklin v. Franklin; Spencer v. Bouchard) as not involving the same suicide-watch rationale.
5. “Totality” assessment and the comparator case:
   • Assessing the conditions “alone or in combination” under Rhodes v. Chapman, the panel found Julick’s showing insufficient—especially when compared to Watison v. Perry, where even more detailed allegations and asserted physical harms over eight days still failed the objective test.

3.3. Impact

• Reinforcement of a Sixth Circuit “compliance spray” pattern: The opinion consolidates the practical rule emerging from Jennings v. Mitchell, Siggers v. Renner, Thomas v. Greene, and Combs v. Wilkinson: limited pepper spray deployed after repeated disobedience, with minimal injury, will usually be viewed as a good-faith disciplinary measure rather than malicious excessive force.
• Conditions claims require specificity and evidence of risk: The decision underscores that alleging “filthy” or “inhumane” conditions is not enough at summary judgment without evidence showing how conditions posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” (Finley v. Huss) or deprived “life’s necessities” (Rhodes v. Chapman).
• Suicide-watch rationales can be constitutionally weighty: By citing Comstock v. McCrary, the court signals that restrictions on bedding/clothing—normally suspect—may be constitutionally defensible when tethered to self-harm prevention, though the reasonableness of duration and implementation will remain litigable in future cases.
• Appellate record discipline: The panel’s reliance on Bowles v. Sabree is a caution to counsel: reframing conditions more dramatically on appeal cannot substitute for developing the record below.
• Limited precedential force but practical influence: Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding precedent in the same way as published decisions; nonetheless, it may be cited for its reasoning and will likely influence district-court outcomes in factually similar summary-judgment disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Objective vs. subjective prongs (Eighth Amendment):
  • Objective asks “how serious was the harm or risk?” (e.g., significant injury; or conditions creating a substantial risk of serious harm).
  • Subjective asks “what was the official’s mindset?” For force, the question is whether the officer acted “maliciously and sadistically” (Hudson v. McMillian) or in good-faith discipline. For conditions, the subjective concept is often “deliberate indifference” (knowing of and disregarding a serious risk), though the court did not reach it here.
• De minimis force/injury: Minor, fleeting discomfort—without meaningful injury—often does not satisfy the objective component of an excessive-force claim (Leary v. Livingston County). The court treated typical pepper-spray effects as falling into this category on this record.
• Summary judgment: A case ends before trial if the plaintiff cannot point to evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact. Courts accept reasonable inferences for the nonmovant (Smith v. City of Troy), but they do not accept new facts introduced for the first time on appeal (Bowles v. Sabree).
• “Totality of conditions”: Courts consider whether conditions, viewed together, deprive the inmate of basic human needs (food, warmth, sanitation, safety), rather than isolating each hardship (Rhodes v. Chapman).
• Qualified immunity (not reached): A defense shielding officials unless they violated “clearly established” law. The district court and defendants raised it, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ground that no constitutional violation was shown.

5. Conclusion

Jacob Julick v. Scott Jordan affirms summary judgment against two Eighth Amendment theories and illustrates two demanding thresholds in prison civil-rights litigation. First, where an inmate repeatedly disobeys direct commands, brief pepper-spray bursts causing only temporary discomfort will generally be treated—especially when supported by video evidence—as a good-faith effort to restore discipline rather than malicious excessive force, consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s existing spray/mace line of authority. Second, short-term but harsh restrictive-housing conditions (including alleged unsanitary elements and hygiene limitations) will not satisfy the objective Eighth Amendment standard without concrete, record-supported facts showing an extreme deprivation or a substantial risk of serious harm—particularly when security and suicide-prevention rationales plausibly explain restrictions on clothing and bedding.