People v. Morris (Cal. 2026): § 189(e)(2) Requires the Nonkiller to Aid the Lethal Act, Not Merely the Underlying Felony

Supreme Court of California (May 4, 2026) — Justice Groban (maj.); Chief Justice Guerrero (conc.); Justice Yegan (dis.)

1. Introduction

People v. Morris addresses a recurring and high-stakes interpretive question created by Senate Bill 1437’s overhaul of felony murder: when a defendant is not the actual killer but acted with an intent to kill, what must the defendant have done to remain liable for first degree felony murder under Penal Code § 189, subd. (e)(2)—is it enough to have aided the underlying felony, or must the defendant have aided the actual killer in the killing itself?

The case comes to the Supreme Court in the procedural posture that now dominates post–Senate Bill 1437 litigation: a petition for resentencing under § 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95), where courts must decide at the prima facie stage whether the record of conviction conclusively forecloses relief.

The parties are the People (plaintiff/respondent) and Richard Curtis Morris, Jr. (defendant/appellant). The record of conviction did not establish whether Morris or his codefendant fired the fatal shot. The key statutory issue therefore became whether—accepting that Morris had the intent to kill—he was nonetheless categorically ineligible for resentencing because he aided and abetted the underlying robbery and rape.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of California holds that § 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires proof that the nonkiller defendant aided or abetted the actual killer in the lethal act itself—not merely that the defendant aided the commission of the underlying felony during which the death occurred.

Accordingly, the Court reverses the Court of Appeal and remands for reconsideration in light of this interpretation. The Court also expressly disapproves appellate decisions that had held the opposite (including People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, People v. Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 616, review granted, and People v. Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694, review granted).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Decision)

A. Senate Bill 1437 framework and resentencing procedure

• People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong): The Court uses Strong for two foundational propositions: (1) the pre–SB 1437 felony-murder rule permitted murder liability without proof of intent to kill or implied malice, and (2) SB 1437 “significantly narrowed the scope” of felony murder, while also creating the retroactive § 1172.6 mechanism.
  Strong supplies the doctrinal “before/after” contrast that makes the statutory question urgent: SB 1437 is not a minor tweak but a recalibration of who should be punishable as a murderer.
• People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis): Cited for the statutory-interpretation methodology and the § 1172.6 prima facie screening standard, including the rule that a petition may be denied if the petition and record conclusively show ineligibility. The Court draws on Lewis to emphasize that interpretation must start with text, read in context.
• People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel): Used in two ways: (1) to reiterate the limited nature of prima facie review—no weighing evidence; and (2) to reject the Court of Appeal’s reliance on broad language in Curiel as if it had already resolved the actus reus question under § 189(e)(2). The Supreme Court stresses Curiel was not a felony-murder case and did not decide the actus reus point.

B. Murder elements (mens rea/actus reus) and malice

• People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968 and People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172: Cited to define implied malice as conscious disregard for life—important background because SB 1437 bars “imput[ing]” malice based solely on participation (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)).
• People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653: Cited for the basic proposition that murder requires an actus reus (a criminal act), underscoring why the § 189(e)(2) dispute is not merely about intent but about what conduct qualifies.

C. The interpretive fight: “commission of murder in the first degree”

• People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884 (Dickey): The Attorney General’s principal precedent. In Dickey, construing similar language in the felony-murder special circumstance, the Court held aiding the underlying felony could satisfy the “commission of murder in the first degree” phrasing. Here, the Supreme Court explains why Dickey does not control: Dickey rested on a background rule—“all persons aiding…burglary or robbery are guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills”—that SB 1437 has now displaced. In short, Dickey is tied to an earlier felony-murder regime and cannot be used circularly to define the new one.
• People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 and People v. Freeman (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337: The Court uses the financial-gain special circumstance’s parallel language (§ 190.2, subd. (c)) to show that “in the commission of murder in the first degree” naturally connotes aiding the killing (“deliberate killing”), reinforcing the majority’s “means what it says” reading.
• People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015: Cited for the anti-surplusage principle—courts avoid constructions that render statutory language “nugatory or redundant.” The majority uses this canon to argue the Attorney General’s view collapses subdivision (e)(2)’s “actual killer” clause into the preamble’s “participant” requirement, draining meaning from the 21-word phrase specifying assistance to the actual killer “in the commission of murder.”
• People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237: Used to support the inference that materially different words used in related provisions ordinarily signal a different meaning. The majority emphasizes that subdivision (e)(3) expressly says “underlying felony,” while (e)(2) does not.
• People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961: Cited for the interpretive sequence: plain meaning governs unless absurdity; if ambiguity, consider purpose/history. The majority finds the text clear enough to decide without relying on legislative history (though it still addresses history).

D. Major participant / reckless indifference comparison

• People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788: Cited to explain that “major participant” requires involvement “substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor,” rebutting the Attorney General’s argument that the Court’s reading makes (e)(3) redundant.
• People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187: Mentioned in the majority’s response to the concurrence’s surplusage theory (and its suggestion of “transactional” relatedness).

E. Capital narrowing arguments

• Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, People v. Wilkins (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 153, and People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52: Cited to reject the claim that it would be illogical (or constitutionally problematic) if guilt-phase felony-murder liability is narrowed more than special-circumstance eligibility; the Eighth Amendment “narrowing function” may be performed at guilt phase.

F. The inter-district conflict the Court resolves

• People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162, review granted November 26, 2024, S287341 (Kelly) and People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, review granted June 11, 2025, S290457 (Jackson): These decisions align with the Supreme Court’s holding: (e)(2) requires aiding the lethal act.
• People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 (Lopez), People v. Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 616, review granted November 13, 2024, S287162, and People v. Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694, review granted January 28, 2026, S294105: These cases held the opposite (aiding the underlying felony suffices). The Supreme Court disapproves them to the extent they conflict with its construction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Text and context: “actual killer” + “commission of murder” = aiding the killing

The majority’s reasoning begins with the statutory syntax: § 189(e)(2) targets a person “not the actual killer” who, “with the intent to kill,” “aided…or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.” The Court treats “actual killer” as a key narrowing phrase: once the statute speaks in terms of aiding the “actual killer,” the most natural referent is the act that makes that person the “actual killer”—the lethal act.

The Court reinforces this reading by comparing subdivision (e)(2) with subdivision (e)(3): the latter explicitly ties liability to being a “major participant in the underlying felony,” while (e)(2) does not. That differential drafting is treated as purposeful.

B. Anti-surplusage: the Attorney General’s reading collapses (e)(2) into the preamble

Subdivision (e)’s preamble already requires that the defendant be a “participant” in an enumerated felony “in which a death occurs.” If (e)(2) merely required aiding the underlying felony plus intent to kill, the remaining clause specifying assistance to the “actual killer in the commission of murder” would add little or nothing beyond what “participant” already covers. The Court therefore rejects the People’s construction as making the statute’s wording largely redundant.

C. Rejecting People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884 as a template for the amended statute

The People’s argument attempted to “carry over” the special-circumstance construction in Dickey. The Court’s response is methodological: Dickey was decided within the old felony-murder rule, and its logic depended on a now-abrogated premise. Because SB 1437’s project is to define anew which accomplices remain murderers, pre-SB 1437 rules cannot be used to define the new categories without risking circularity.

D. Legislative purpose: not just mens rea, but actions and proportionality

Even though the majority finds the text sufficient, it still addresses legislative history to rebut the claim that SB 1437 cared only about malice imputation (mens rea). The Court points to statutory findings emphasizing punishment aligned with a person’s “involvement,” “actions,” and “individual culpability,” reading SB 1437 as concerned with conduct as well as mental state.

E. Responding to “illogic” arguments (e)(2) vs (e)(3), direct aiding-and-abetting, and special circumstances

The Attorney General offered a structural theory: as mens rea drops from intent-to-kill to reckless indifference, actus reus should increase. The Court declines to assume the Legislature was designing an inverse “sliding scale.” Instead, it reads the statute as defining different “paths” to liability aimed at proportional responsibility.

The Court also rejects the claim that its construction makes (e)(2) redundant of direct aiding-and-abetting murder. It notes that direct aiding and abetting requires “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent” (citing Curiel), whereas (e)(2) is triggered by the defendant’s own “intent to kill” plus assistance in the lethal act; the knowledge element is not the same.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical consequences for § 1172.6 litigation

People v. Morris meaningfully expands the set of nonkiller petitioners who can at least reach an evidentiary hearing (or survive prima facie denial) when the prior record shows only that they aided the underlying felony—even if the jury also found intent to kill under pre-SB 1437 instructions.

• Prima facie stage: Trial courts and reviewing courts must now ask whether the record of conviction conclusively shows the petitioner aided the lethal act—not merely the felony.
• Burden and proof at the evidentiary hearing: Prosecutors seeking to preserve a felony-murder conviction under (e)(2) must be prepared to prove conduct tying the defendant’s assistance to the killing itself (e.g., providing the weapon at the moment of the shooting, restraining the victim to facilitate the killing, acting as lookout specifically for the shooting, directing or encouraging the killing during its commission, etc.), rather than relying solely on felony participation.
• Interaction with (e)(3): The decision does not preclude the People from proving liability under the “major participant + reckless indifference” route; it simply prevents (e)(2) from becoming a back door for imposing murder liability based on felony participation plus a mental state finding divorced from aiding the killing.

B. Clarifying an appellate split and stabilizing statewide doctrine

By endorsing the approach in People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162, review granted and People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, review granted, and disapproving contrary lines of authority, the Court provides a uniform interpretive rule governing (e)(2).

C. Likely ripple effects: special circumstances and “financial gain” findings

The majority leaves open (expressly, via footnote 10) whether Morris’s financial-gain special circumstance finding independently demonstrates aiding the killing or direct aiding-and-abetting. On remand, courts may increasingly examine how special circumstance findings—particularly under § 190.2, subd. (c)—map onto SB 1437’s narrowed guilt-phase standards. Expect further litigation on which prior true findings “carry over” as conclusive bars to resentencing and which do not.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felony murder (old rule): If a death occurred during certain dangerous felonies, participants could be guilty of murder without proof of intent to kill or implied malice.
• Senate Bill 1437 (SB 1437): A reform narrowing felony-murder liability and creating retroactive relief for certain convictions. It also added the principle that malice cannot be imputed “based solely” on crime participation.
• Mens rea vs actus reus: Mens rea is the defendant’s mental state (here, “intent to kill”); actus reus is the conduct required (here, whether the defendant aided the killing itself or only the underlying felony).
• § 189(e)(2): The “intent-to-kill accomplice” pathway. After Morris, it applies only when the nonkiller intended to kill and aided the actual killer in the lethal act.
• § 189(e)(3): The “major participant + reckless indifference” pathway. It covers highly involved felony participants who did not necessarily intend to kill but whose conduct showed extreme disregard for human life.
• § 1172.6 prima facie stage: An early screening step. The court asks whether the record conclusively shows the petitioner is ineligible; it does not weigh evidence or decide disputed facts.
• Rule of lenity (from the concurrence): If a criminal statute remains genuinely ambiguous after applying interpretive tools, courts adopt the reasonable interpretation more favorable to the defendant. Chief Justice Guerrero concurs on this basis.

5. Conclusion

People v. Morris establishes a significant interpretive limitation on post–SB 1437 felony-murder liability: under § 189(e)(2), a nonkiller with intent to kill is liable for first degree felony murder only if the nonkiller aided or assisted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not merely in committing the underlying felony.

The decision resolves an entrenched Court of Appeal split, curbs the risk that (e)(2) becomes functionally redundant of mere felony participation plus intent, and strengthens SB 1437’s proportionality project by tethering the “intent-to-kill accomplice” category to conduct that actually facilitates the killing. The concurrence underscores that, even if the text is not “plain,” lenity independently supports the narrower reading; the dissent warns against judicial “interpretation” that, in its view, dilutes a longstanding felony-murder tradition. In practice, Morris will most immediately shape the adjudication of § 1172.6 petitions by requiring a focused inquiry into whether the record shows assistance in the killing itself.