People v. Marsh: Miranda Waiver Invalid Where Police Do Not Administer or Ensure Reading of Warnings

Court: Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 03874 (239 AD3d 1382)
Date: June 27, 2025

1. Introduction

People v Marsh addresses a recurring Miranda problem in modern custodial interrogations: law enforcement’s reliance on a written Miranda form without an oral recitation and without meaningful confirmation that the suspect actually read and understood the warnings before signing a waiver.

The defendant, Derrick C. Marsh, was convicted after trial of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]) based in part on incriminating statements made during a videotaped stationhouse interview following arrest. On appeal, he challenged (among other things) the denial of suppression of those statements, arguing the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

The Fourth Department ultimately reversed, granted suppression of the videotaped statements made at the police station on January 13, 2020, and ordered a new trial on count 2 of the indictment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that, although Miranda warnings need not always be read aloud as a categorical rule, the People must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was adequately advised of Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them before custodial questioning.

On the videotape, the detective did not orally advise the defendant of Miranda rights. The detective instructed the defendant only to read the “first one,” walked away briefly, and the defendant read aloud only the first two warnings (“remain silent” and “anything you say can be used against you”) before quickly signing the waiver. The court found there was no reliable indication that the defendant read or comprehended the remaining warnings—especially the right-to-counsel advisements—before signing. The People therefore failed to meet their burden, requiring suppression and a new trial.

The court also rejected (or found unpreserved) other appellate claims relating to legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence, but those issues did not affect the disposition once suppression was granted.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • People v Gray (86 NY2d 10 [1995]) and related preservation cases: People v Elmore (175 AD3d 1003 [4th Dept 2019]) and People v Lankford (162 AD3d 1583 [4th Dept 2018]).
    These cases governed preservation of a sufficiency challenge: a “perfunctory” dismissal motion that is not “specifically directed” at the claimed error does not preserve the issue. The Fourth Department applied that rule to deem the sufficiency claim unpreserved.
  • People v Contes (60 NY2d 620 [1983]), People v La Belle (18 NY2d 405 [1966]), and People v Bleakley (69 NY2d 490 [1987]).
    These are the standard frameworks for reviewing legal sufficiency (viewing evidence most favorably to the People) and weight of the evidence. They supported the court’s conclusion that the assault proof, apart from the confession issue, was sufficient and not against the weight.
  • People v Ford (148 AD3d 1656 [4th Dept 2017]) and People v McDonald (172 AD3d 1900 [4th Dept 2019]).
    These cases illustrate joint liability principles (Penal Law § 20.00) and how continued participation can support intent and concerted action in an assault involving a dangerous instrument. They bolstered the merits analysis of the assault count.
  • People v Danielson (9 NY3d 342 [2007]).
    Cited for the weight-of-the-evidence methodology: review is conducted in light of the elements as charged to the jury.
  • Preservation despite different framing at the hearing: CPL 470.05 (2) and People v Prado (4 NY3d 725 [2004]).
    Even though the defendant did not articulate the Miranda deficiency in the same way below, the issue was reviewable because County Court “expressly decided” that Miranda was satisfied. People v Prado is the key mechanism: an issue is preserved where the trial court’s ruling squarely resolves it.
  • Core Miranda-waiver burden and standards: People v Jin Cheng Lin (26 NY3d 701 [2016]), People v Lee (224 AD3d 1372 [4th Dept 2024]), People v Dunbar (104 AD3d 198 [2d Dept 2013], affd 24 NY3d 304 [2014]), and Moran v Burbine (475 US 412 [1986]).
    These authorities supply the controlling rule: the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver made with “full awareness” of the right and the consequences of abandoning it. Moran v Burbine provides the canonical formulation; People v Jin Cheng Lin emphasizes the practical comprehension the defendant must “grasp.”
  • Consequence of inadequate warnings: People v Santos (112 AD3d 757 [2d Dept 2013]).
    The court relied on this principle that inadequate advising of Miranda rights requires suppression “even [of] voluntary statements.” In other words, voluntariness alone does not cure a Miranda-deficient warning/waiver.
  • Written warnings without oral reading: People v Peraza (288 AD2d 689 [3d Dept 2001]), People v Jeremiah (147 AD3d 1199 [3d Dept 2017]), United States v Sledge (546 F2d 1120 [4th Cir 1977]), and People v Warren (2 AD3d 1317 [4th Dept 2003]).
    The court acknowledged these cases for the proposition that there is no absolute rule requiring Miranda warnings be read aloud. But it distinguished them on proof: in United States v Sledge and People v Warren, officers “observed” the defendant read the form. In Marsh, the detective did not observe meaningful reading, and the video suggested the defendant could not have read the full form before signing.
  • Lack of “rational” basis to find a valid waiver on the record: People v Teixeira-Ingram (199 AD3d 1240 [3d Dept 2021]).
    This case supported the court’s bottom-line conclusion that there were “no facts” from which the trial court could rationally find a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of counsel—or any other Miranda right—where the advisement/understanding is inadequately demonstrated.
  • Dissent’s coercion/trickery reference: People v Smalls (191 AD3d 1258 [4th Dept 2021]).
    The dissent invoked People v Smalls to emphasize the absence of coercion or trickery, arguing that the waiver should stand. The majority, however, treated the case as fundamentally about the People’s failure to prove adequate administration/understanding—not about coercion.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s key move is evidentiary and practical: it treats the videotape not as neutral background but as affirmative proof that the People did not establish an adequate Miranda advisement and waiver beyond a reasonable doubt.

(a) The People’s burden is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Relying on People v Lee and People v Dunbar, the court framed the suppression question with the highest burden used in suppression litigation: the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. That framing matters because gaps in the record and “maybe he read it” inferences cut against the People, not the defendant.

(b) No per se requirement of oral Miranda—but proof must show actual administration/understanding.
The court accepted that People v Peraza rejects a categorical rule requiring oral recitation. But it emphasized the corollary: if the People choose a “written-form” route, they still must prove the suspect was actually “administered” the rights or had them “verbally outline[d]” or otherwise shown to have read and understood them. The majority distinguished cases like United States v Sledge and People v Warren because, there, officers observed defendants read the warnings.

(c) The video undercut the waiver’s reliability.
The court relied on concrete details captured on tape: the detective told defendant to read only the first warning; defendant read aloud only the first two sentences; the detective stepped away; defendant looked at the form for less than five seconds before signing; neither party read all warnings aloud; and the discussion largely centered on counsel waiver (including the defendant’s question “I don’t need a lawyer, do I?”).

The opinion treats these circumstances as incompatible with the “full awareness” requirement drawn from Moran v Burbine and with the “grasped” understanding described in People v Jin Cheng Lin—particularly as to the right to counsel “upon request, at any time, and before questioning is continued.”

(d) Suppression is required even if the statements seem “voluntary.”
By citing People v Santos, the court made clear that the absence of coercion does not resolve a Miranda administration/waiver defect. The defect is structural to the admissibility of custodial statements.

(e) The dissent’s core disagreement: deference to trial fact-finding and the defendant’s assurances.
Justice Keane stressed that defendant said he could read, read the first two rights aloud, said “Ok, I get it,” signed the waiver, then twice confirmed he read the rights. The dissent viewed the majority’s focus on how long the defendant looked at the form as an “unreliable benchmark,” warning against a rule that effectively requires a minimum reading time or officer “observation time.”

The majority, however, treated the tape as demonstrating not merely a short reading time but a process that affirmatively failed to support a finding—beyond a reasonable doubt—of adequate advisement and comprehension.

3.3 Impact

Operational impact on interrogations in New York (especially within the Fourth Department): People v Marsh incentivizes (and effectively pressures) law enforcement to adopt documentation practices that can withstand “beyond a reasonable doubt” scrutiny when using written Miranda forms—particularly in videotaped settings where the court can independently assess how the waiver occurred.

  • Written form alone is not enough without proof of actual reading/understanding. The decision does not create a formal per se oral-reading rule, but it raises the evidentiary bar for “silent hand-the-form-over” practices where the record suggests the suspect did not (and likely could not) read the full warning before signing.
  • Video can be a double-edged sword. Recording protects against coercion claims, but it also enables appellate courts to reject trial-level conclusions where the video contradicts a claim that Miranda was adequately administered.
  • Suppression litigation will focus on process details. Expect future hearings and appellate records to emphasize: whether the officer told the suspect to read all warnings, whether the officer observed reading, whether the suspect paraphrased understanding, whether any warning was read aloud, and whether the suspect had the form long enough to read it.
  • Prosecutorial risk management. Even absent coercion, statements may be lost if the Miranda administration is not clearly demonstrated. The remedy here—reversal and a new trial—shows the high stakes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” waiver: This means the suspect (1) understood the rights, (2) chose to give them up without improper pressure, and (3) appreciated what it meant to talk without a lawyer—i.e., that statements can be used against them.
  • “People’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt” (in suppression): At a suppression hearing, the prosecution must prove—at a very high level of certainty—that the waiver was valid. If the evidence leaves serious doubt (e.g., the video suggests the suspect did not read the rights), the People lose.
  • “Miranda administered” vs. “Miranda form signed”: A signature is evidence of waiver, but it is not the same as proof that the warnings were actually communicated and understood. Marsh underscores that courts look at what was actually conveyed and comprehended, not just paperwork.
  • Preservation and “expressly decided” (CPL 470.05 [2]): Even if a party did not phrase an argument exactly at trial, the appellate court can review it when the trial court explicitly ruled on that precise point—here, that “Miranda’s safeguards were satisfied.”

5. Conclusion

People v Marsh establishes a practical evidentiary rule for Miranda administration in custodial interrogations: while officers are not categorically required to read Miranda warnings aloud, the People must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect was adequately advised and truly understood the rights before waiving them. Where a written form is used, the record must support that the suspect actually read (or had the rights otherwise communicated) and comprehended the full warnings—especially the right to counsel. In Marsh, the videotape did the decisive work: it undermined the waiver’s reliability and compelled suppression, reversal, and a new trial.