People v. Manganiello: Compelled Biometric Phone Unlocking Is Testimonial Under the Fifth Amendment (and Its Fruits Must Be Suppressed)

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York, Fourth Department
Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 03873; 242 AD3d 41 (June 27, 2025)
Author: Ogden, J.

1) Introduction

People v Manganiello sits at the modern intersection of digital searches and the privilege against self-incrimination. After investigators traced suspected child sexual abuse material uploads to an internet service account at a particular Oswego address, they obtained a search warrant for the defendant, his apartment, and electronic devices. Notably, the warrant contemplated that officers might need to use biometric unlocking (finger/face) to access devices.

During execution, defendant was directed to surrender his phone, was restrained, and—after being told the warrant required it—unlocked the phone by placing a fingertip on the device’s biometric sensor. Investigators discovered over 100 sexually explicit videos involving children and additional AI-generated images. Defendant was charged, moved to suppress on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, lost, pleaded guilty to possessing a sexual performance by a child (Penal Law § 263.16), and appealed.

The key legal issue on appeal was narrow but consequential: whether compelling a suspect to unlock a phone using biometric authentication is a “testimonial” communication protected by the Fifth Amendment, such that both the act and resulting evidence must be suppressed.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Department reversed the judgment, vacated the plea, granted defendant’s motion in part, and remitted for further proceedings. The court held that, on the facts presented, compelling the defendant to unlock his cell phone by placing his finger on it was testimonial and therefore violated the Fifth Amendment.

Because the compelled unlocking was testimonial, the court adopted the remedial principle that both the message communicated by the act and evidence obtained from that communication must be suppressed, and remitted for County Court to determine the extent of suppression required.

The court rejected the Fourth Amendment particularity challenge, holding the warrant did not lack particularity.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

• United States v Hubbell (530 US 27 [2000]) and People v Havrish (8 NY3d 389 [2007]): The court relied on these for the familiar three-part Fifth Amendment framework: the communication must be compelled, incriminating, and testimonial. Here, the People did not dispute compulsion or incrimination on appeal, leaving “testimonial” as the decisive element.
• Doe v United States (487 US 201 [1988]): Quoted for the definition of “testimonial communications” as those that “explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” This supported the court’s focus on what biometric unlocking communicates beyond mere physical characteristics.
• United States v Wade (388 US 218 [1967]) and Schmerber v California (384 US 757 [1966]): These anchor the “physical trait” line: compelling a person to provide certain physical evidence (e.g., a blood sample or lineup participation) is often non-testimonial when the person functions merely as a “donor” and their mental processes are irrelevant. The Fourth Department used these cases largely as a contrast: biometric unlocking is not merely donating a fingerprint for later analysis; it is an act that itself conveys knowledge and control.
• Fisher v United States (425 US 391 [1976]): Introduced the core “act of production” concept: even a “purely physical act” can be testimonial because of what it communicates “wholly aside from the contents” of what is produced.
• United States v Doe (465 US 605 [1984]): Cited in the opinion’s act-of-production discussion, reinforcing that compelled acts can implicitly communicate facts (e.g., possession/control/authentication).
• People v Porter (192 AD3d 222 [2d Dept 2020]): Provided New York appellate support for the proposition that compelled acts may implicitly communicate possession or control—an important in-state bridge to the federal act-of-production analysis.
• United States v Brown (125 F4th 1186 [DC Cir 2025]): This was the opinion’s most direct analogue. The Fourth Department adopted Brown’s reasoning that compelled biometric unlocking is testimonial because it communicates: “I know how to open the phone,” “I have control over and access to this phone,” and “the print of this specific finger is the password.” The court also drew from Brown’s remedy: suppress both the communication and the fruits.
• United States v Payne (99 F4th 495 [9th Cir 2024]): Treated as a key counterpoint. The Ninth Circuit found biometric unlocking non-testimonial on its facts because ownership/control were not in dispute (Payne had already acknowledged ownership and location). The Fourth Department distinguished Payne because, here, the compelled unlocking itself functioned to establish ownership/control/knowledge rather than merely facilitate access to already-attributed evidence.
• In re Application for a Search Warrant (236 F Supp 3d 1066 [ND Ill 2017]): Cited to support the conclusion that compelled unlocking can be testimonial by revealing control/knowledge.
• People v Socciarelli (203 AD3d 1556 [4th Dept 2022]): Used to dispose of the Fourth Amendment particularity challenge; the warrant’s description of what was to be searched/seized was sufficiently particular.

B. Legal Reasoning: Why Biometric Unlocking Was “Testimonial” Here

The court framed the dispute as a “contextual” inquiry into testimonial character, addressing two doctrinal lines: (1) “physical trait” cases and (2) the “act of production” doctrine.

1. Physical trait cases—why this was not “just” a fingerprint

The Fourth Department reasoned that unlocking a phone is not akin to providing an “immutable physical characteristic” for later testing. Instead, the act of selecting a finger and successfully unlocking the device conveyed mental knowledge and access: that defendant knew how to open the phone, had access/control, and that this finger was the “password.” In that sense, it was closer to compelled disclosure of a password than to a passive physical donation.

2. Act of production doctrine—implicit statements of control, access, and authentication

Separately and cumulatively, the act-of-production cases supported finding testimonial content. By unlocking in response to a command, defendant implicitly communicated facts “wholly aside from” the phone’s contents—most centrally, his control over the phone and his knowledge of how to access it. At a minimum, the act implicitly authenticated that the phone’s contents were within his possession or control.

3. The role of “ownership/control not yet conceded”

The opinion’s distinction between United States v Brown and United States v Payne is pivotal: where ownership/control is already conceded, biometric unlocking may add little communicative value (as Payne reasoned); where ownership/control has not been conceded, the compelled unlock itself can serve as the government’s proof of those facts (as in Brown and here).

4. Remedy—suppression of the communication and its fruits

Accepting Brown’s approach, the court held that because the compelled unlocking was testimonial, suppression extends not only to the act (the “message” it communicated) but also to evidence obtained from that communication. The matter was remitted to determine the scope of suppression in the first instance.

C. Impact

• Search-warrant execution limits in New York’s Fourth Department: Even with a valid warrant to search a phone, compelling a suspect to unlock it via biometrics can violate the Fifth Amendment when the act communicates control/knowledge/authentication.
• Litigation focus will shift to “what the act communicated” and “what was already known”: The opinion signals that testimonial character may turn on whether ownership/control/access facts were already established independent of the compelled act (the Payne distinction) and on how the warrant was executed (commands, restraint, and compelled compliance).
• Suppression exposure is potentially broad: By endorsing suppression of both the testimonial communication and its fruits, the decision invites substantial “fruit” litigation on remand and in future cases about what evidence is derivative of the compelled unlock.
• Limits of the holding: The court expressly confined its decision to the facts before it and did not decide whether warrant language authorizing officers to physically press a person’s finger to a sensor would independently violate the Fifth Amendment. It also declined to address whether the New York Constitution would provide greater protection, or whether it would follow Payne on similar facts.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Testimonial” (Fifth Amendment): A person is “a witness” against themselves when they are compelled to communicate information from their mind—directly or implicitly. Here, the court said unlocking the phone implicitly communicated “I can access this phone and know how to open it.”
• Physical evidence vs. testimonial evidence: Providing a blood sample (physical evidence) is usually not testimonial because the person’s thoughts do not matter to the result. Unlocking a phone, by contrast, was treated as a communicative act because success itself conveys information about knowledge and control.
• Act of production doctrine: Even if the government is not forcing you to speak, forcing you to produce or enable access to evidence can “say” something—e.g., that the evidence exists, that you control it, or that it is authentic.
• “Fruits” suppression: If the government obtains evidence by using a compelled testimonial act, the resulting evidence may be suppressed as a product of that unconstitutional compulsion. The court remitted to decide how far that suppression extends here.

5) Conclusion

People v Manganiello establishes (at least on its facts) a clear rule in the Fourth Department: compelling a suspect to unlock a cell phone with biometric authentication is a testimonial communication when it implicitly conveys knowledge, access, and control. Because that compulsion violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, both the communicative act and evidence derived from it are subject to suppression.

The decision’s broader significance is its doctrinal synthesis: it aligns biometric unlocking with the act-of-production framework (and with United States v Brown) rather than treating it as a mere collection of physical characteristics. Going forward, the most consequential questions will be contextual—what was already conceded or independently known, what exactly the compelled act communicated, and how far “fruits” suppression reaches in digital-evidence prosecutions.