People v. Kopp: Equal Protection Requires Ability-to-Pay Review (on Request) for Court Operations/Facilities Assessments; Punitive Fine Amount Challenges Proceed Under the Excessive Fines Clauses

I. Introduction

In People v. Kopp (Cal. Dec. 29, 2025, S257844), the Supreme Court of California resolved a long-running split in the Courts of Appeal over whether trial courts must consider a criminal defendant’s “ability to pay” before imposing various court-ordered monetary obligations at sentencing. The case arose from the sentencing of Jason Samuel Hernandez—convicted of gang-related violent and conspiratorial offenses—who objected to monetary orders on inability-to-pay grounds. The Court used the case to impose a structured constitutional framework that turns on the nature of the monetary obligation: (1) punitive fines, versus (2) nonpunitive “ancillary costs” designed to fund government functions.

The Court’s key issues were: (a) what constitutional doctrine governs challenges to punitive fines at the time of imposition; and (b) whether equal protection requires ability-to-pay consideration for certain mandatory court assessments in criminal cases, especially in light of the civil fee-waiver regime.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court announced two core rules:

  1. Punitive fines: A challenge to the amount of a criminal fine “should initially be reviewed” under the excessive fines provisions of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), rather than as a due process or equal protection requirement for a pre-imposition ability-to-pay hearing.
  2. Ancillary costs (court operations and facilities assessments): Upon the defendant’s request, equal protection requires the trial court to consider inability to pay before imposing (i) the court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and (ii) the court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).

Applying intervening legislation, the Court also ordered that any unpaid “booking fee” balance be vacated under Government Code section 6111, subdivision (a), and it vacated the unpaid portion of the restitution fine under Penal Code section 1465.9, subdivision (d). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s guidance, including recalculation of the parole revocation fine tied to the restitution fine amount.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Distinguishing “access-to-courts” and “imprisonment-for-nonpayment” lines of authority

Hernandez relied on U.S. Supreme Court cases often associated with wealth-based discrimination in criminal process. The Court carefully separated those cases from the question presented—whether ability to pay must be considered before imposing a punitive fine.

  • Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12 and related cases—Long v. District Court of Iowa (1966) 385 U.S. 192, Gardner v. California (1969) 393 U.S. 367, Williams v. Oklahoma City (1969) 395 U.S. 458, Mayer v. Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189, Burns v. Ohio (1959) 360 U.S. 252, Lane v. Brown (1963) 372 U.S. 477, and Smith v. Bennett (1961) 365 U.S. 708—were treated as “access to appellate/trial remedies” decisions: the state cannot condition meaningful review on prepayment.
  • The “nonpayment incarceration” cases—Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, Tate v. Short (1971) 401 U.S. 395, and Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660—were treated as limits on punishing nonwillful nonpayment (e.g., jailing a person solely because they cannot pay), not as limits on imposing fines in the first instance.

The Court emphasized that Bearden v. Georgia expressly recognizes the legitimacy of punishing “rich and poor” alike and focuses on the reasons for nonpayment (willful refusal versus inability), not on a categorical bar to imposing fines without an ability-to-pay finding.

2. Excessive fines as the primary vehicle for punitive fine amount challenges

The Court anchored punitive fine review in the excessive fines doctrine:

  • United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321 supplied the “touchstone” proportionality principle and its “gross disproportionality” standard.
  • People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707 was used to link due process concerns about excessive monetary sanctions to the excessive fines framework, supporting the Court’s instruction that excessive fines analysis is the “proper vehicle” for punitive fines.
  • The Court reiterated that criminal fines are sovereign “penalties” (citing Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343) and treated legislative judgments about punishment as primary (citing People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62 and People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821).

3. Clarifying “fines” versus “ancillary costs” by function, not label

The Court relied on California authority distinguishing punitive and nonpunitive monetary obligations:

  • People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100 and People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749 supported the proposition that certain statutorily labeled “fees” are actually punitive fines and that labels are not dispositive.
  • The drug-related “fees” (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11372.5, 11372.7) were treated as punitive in purpose (citing Ruiz), and the associated penalty assessments were likewise treated as punitive (citing People v. Batman (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 587 and People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192).
  • For nonpunitive costs, the booking fee was “not ‘punishment’” (citing People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589), and the court operations/facilities assessments were not punishment (citing Alford and People v. Knightbent (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1105).

4. Equal protection framework and the civil fee-waiver comparator

For the operations and facilities assessments, the Court’s equal protection reasoning relied on:

  • People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 and People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277 for rational basis methodology, including Hardin’s clarification that when a classification is facial, courts need not conduct a threshold “similarly situated” inquiry.
  • James v. Strange (1972) 407 U.S. 128 as the central analogy: the state may pursue legitimate recoupment interests, but cannot impose discriminatory repayment conditions on indigent criminal defendants compared to ordinary civil judgment debtors.
  • Fuller v. Oregon (1974) 417 U.S. 40 as a contrast: Oregon’s statute was sustained because it retained exemptions available to other debtors—highlighting that equal protection concern arises when criminal debtors are singled out for harsher treatment.

The Court also distinguished settings where treating criminal and civil litigants differently is rational because of distinct systemic purposes, citing People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, and People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823. But unlike evidentiary exclusions or discovery tools, the Court found no “overarching justification” to deny indigent criminal defendants fee-waiver-type relief for the same court-funding costs that can be waived for indigent civil litigants.

5. Treatment of People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157

The Court rejected Dueñas’s broad approach that constitutional due process requires ability-to-pay consideration before imposing every monetary obligation. It expressly disapproved People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 and also disapproved People v. Cowan (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32, People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647, and People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485 “to the extent they are inconsistent.”

At the same time, the Court did not deny the reality of “cascading consequences” described in Dueñas; it simply held that those precedents do not constitutionally require a pre-imposition ability-to-pay hearing for punitive fines, and that ancillary costs raise a different equal protection problem.

6. Concurring and dissenting opinions as interpretive signals

  • Justice Liu’s concurrence agreed with the majority’s holdings but flagged unresolved statewide issues: the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (c) (minimum $300 restitution fine without considering inability to pay), the potential for due process/equal protection violations from “cascading consequences,” and administrable standards for ability-to-pay determinations (including skepticism about relying on speculative future prison wages and the burdens of proof).
  • Justice Rothschild’s concurrence and dissent argued the equal protection holding fails rational basis review’s extreme deference and offered conceivable bases for differential treatment, emphasizing court-access concerns for civil litigants and greater criminal-system costs. The dissent cited FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, and referenced out-of-state authority and federal analogs (including United States v. Smith (9th Cir. 1987) 818 F.2d 687) as supportive of mandatory criminal assessments without waivers.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The opinion’s organizing principle: “what kind of payment is it?”

The decision turns on a categorical division:

  • Punitive fines are punishments for crime. Their constitutional limit is the Excessive Fines Clause proportionality inquiry (gross disproportionality), which can incorporate ability to pay as part of evaluating excessiveness.
  • Ancillary costs (even if labeled “fees” or “assessments”) are funding measures rather than punishments. Their constitutional vulnerability arises not from punishment proportionality, but from equal protection—especially when civil law offers waivers for analogous court-funding charges.

2. Why fines are routed to excessive fines doctrine rather than a Dueñas-style ability-to-pay prerequisite

The Court’s reasoning has three steps:

  1. High court precedent (Griffin/Williams/Tate/Bearden) prevents wealth from blocking access to review or turning inability to pay into additional incarceration, but does not constitutionally forbid imposing nonexcessive punitive fines on indigent defendants.
  2. Because legislatures set punishment ranges, courts should not constitutionalize a universal pre-imposition ability-to-pay hearing for fines; instead, courts should evaluate whether a fine is constitutionally “excessive” in context.
  3. Excessive fines doctrine is the doctrinal “home” for considering proportionality (including the defendant’s circumstances), without converting every fine into an individualized means test as a threshold requirement.

Practically, this reorients trial and appellate litigation: defendants challenging fine amounts must plead and prove excessiveness (with ability to pay folded into that proportionality analysis), rather than framing the claim as a due process right to an ability-to-pay hearing at sentencing.

3. Why ancillary court assessments trigger equal protection once civil fee waivers exist

For Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) and Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1), the Court found a structural asymmetry:

  • These assessments are explicitly court-funding mechanisms imposed mandatorily on criminal convictions.
  • The Legislature simultaneously created an extensive civil fee-waiver scheme (Gov. Code, §§ 68630-68637) premised on ensuring fees are not a barrier for those unable to pay.
  • Because civil litigants can obtain waivers for analogous court costs, denying any similar relief to indigent criminal defendants—who are charged for the same court operations/facility purposes—lacked a rational basis in the Court’s view, making the scheme akin to the discriminatory debt treatment condemned in James.

The remedy was measured: there is no automatic waiver rule announced in the majority opinion. Instead, “upon request” the court must consider inability to pay before imposing the assessments, allowing adversarial presentation of evidence and argument.

4. Statutory overlays and the remand design

The Court narrowed the practical dispute by applying legislative reforms:

  • Booking fee: any unpaid portion vacated under Government Code section 6111, subdivision (a).
  • Restitution fine: any unpaid balance vacated under Penal Code section 1465.9, subdivision (d) (as amended).

Even with vacatur, remand mattered because the parole revocation fine must match the restitution fine amount (Pen. Code, § 1202.45), and because some payments (like the drug program “fee”) statutorily require an ability-to-pay finding (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (b)).

C. Impact

1. Doctrinal re-centering away from Dueñas

The Court substantially recalibrates post-Dueñas litigation. By disapproving Dueñas and its progeny to the extent inconsistent, the Court removes the broad constitutional premise that all monetary obligations require a pre-imposition ability-to-pay determination. Instead:

  • Punitive fine disputes will increasingly be litigated as excessive-fines proportionality challenges.
  • Assessment disputes will proceed as equal protection waiver/ability-to-pay issues—at least for the operations and facilities assessments.

2. Immediate procedural consequences in trial courts

Sentencing courts must now be prepared to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry when requested before imposing:

  • Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) court operations assessment; and
  • Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1) court facilities assessment.

This will generate new trial-court records (evidence and findings) and reduce the need for appellate speculation about indigence, while also creating implementation questions the majority leaves to courts and (as urged) the Legislature.

3. Legislative pressure point

The opinion explicitly “urge[s] the Legislature” to revisit criminal ancillary payments comprehensively—echoing the history of attempted but incomplete reforms (veto of Assembly Bill No. 927; enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1869; later amendments to Penal Code section 1465.9). The concurrence highlights likely future disputes (burdens of proof, presumptions, prison wages), suggesting substantial room for statutory standardization.

4. Likely future litigation themes

  • Excessive fines standards in California: How trial courts apply Bajakajian-style proportionality to different statutory fines, including the treatment of inability to pay within that inquiry.
  • Scope of equal protection logic: Whether similar civil/criminal asymmetries exist for other nonpunitive charges, and whether Kopp’s reasoning extends beyond the two specified assessments.
  • Operational details: What constitutes a “request,” what evidence is required, and how “ability to pay” should be measured (including the relevance of future prison earnings), topics foreshadowed by Justice Liu.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Punitive “fine” vs. nonpunitive “ancillary cost”

A fine is imposed to punish the crime. An ancillary cost is imposed mainly to fund government operations (like court operations or facilities) rather than to punish. The label “fee” or “assessment” is not decisive; the Court looks to function and legislative purpose.

2. Restitution fine vs. victim restitution

A restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) is a punitive payment to the state. Victim restitution (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)) compensates victims for economic loss and is not treated as punishment in California law; inability to pay is not considered in setting victim restitution amounts.

3. “Excessive fines” review

The Excessive Fines Clauses prohibit fines that are grossly disproportionate to the offense. Courts assess proportionality, and ability to pay can be relevant to whether a fine is “excessive” in context.

4. “Equal protection” rational basis review (in this case)

When no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, the government generally needs only a rational reason for treating groups differently. Here, the Court found no rational basis to allow civil fee waivers for court-funding charges while denying any comparable consideration to indigent criminal defendants facing the same types of court-funding assessments.

V. Conclusion

People v. Kopp establishes a clarified constitutional map for criminal monetary obligations in California:

  • Punitive fines: challenges to fine amounts proceed first through the excessive fines framework, not through a categorical due process/equal protection right to a pre-imposition ability-to-pay hearing.
  • Court operations and facilities assessments: equal protection requires an ability-to-pay consideration upon request, given the Legislature’s civil fee-waiver regime for similar court-funding charges.

The decision simultaneously contracts the broad constitutional reach attributed to People v. Dueñas while expanding equal-protection-based relief for indigent criminal defendants with respect to specific mandatory court assessments. It also signals that the next phase—definitions, burdens, presumptions, and administrability—may be shaped as much by legislative action as by future litigation.