People v. Hespinobarros: A Certificate of Compliance Remains Valid When Grand Jury Minutes Are Disclosed Upon Creation and Police Impeachment Material Is Reasonably Provided by Summary Where Unrelated to the Case

1. Introduction

In People v Hespinobarros (2026 NY Slip Op 00260), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reviewed a Queens County felony prosecution that ended in a guilty plea to attempted assault in the second degree. The appeal primarily tested two recurring post–CPL article 245 issues: (1) whether the defendant validly waived the right to appeal; and (2) whether the People’s Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR) were valid for CPL 30.30 speedy-trial purposes, where certain discovery—most notably grand jury minutes and certain police disciplinary materials—was allegedly missing or deficient when readiness was declared.

The defendant (Samuel Hespinobarros) sought dismissal under CPL 30.30(1)(a), arguing that the COC was invalid and the SOR was illusory. The Supreme Court denied dismissal both initially and upon reargument. The Second Department affirmed, while also holding that the appeal waiver was invalid—thereby allowing review of the speedy-trial/discovery issues.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Appeal waiver: The court held the waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent due to a deficient oral colloquy and an untranslated written waiver.
  • CPL 30.30 readiness / CPL 245 compliance: The court held the People exercised due diligence and acted in good faith when filing the COC and SOR. Subsequent disclosures did not render readiness illusory.
  • Grand jury minutes: Their later disclosure did not invalidate the COC/SOR where the minutes were provided on the same day they were created, and the transcript had not been completed at the time of the COC.
  • Police impeachment material: Providing “Law Enforcement Officer as Witness” reports summarizing relevant disciplinary and credibility-related information was sufficient on these facts; failure to turn over certain underlying disciplinary records did not defeat due diligence where the infractions did not bear on the subject matter and there was no indication of prior credibility findings against the officers.
  • Result: The judgment of conviction was affirmed; the CPL 30.30 dismissal motion was properly denied.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appeal-waiver doctrine

The Second Department’s appeal-waiver discussion is anchored in the Court of Appeals’ insistence that waivers must be meaningfully explained and understood:

  • People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545: The modern baseline—courts must ensure the defendant understands the nature of appellate rights and that the waiver is distinct from rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea.
  • People v Vilmont, 216 AD3d 1113: A Second Department application emphasizing careful colloquy and record clarity.
  • People v Burris, 231 AD3d 1063, and People v Lawrence, 227 AD3d 829: The court relied on these for two practical points: (i) mischaracterizing the waiver’s scope undermines validity, and (ii) addressing waiver only after the defendant allocutes to guilt is a procedural red flag.
  • People v Pelige, 172 AD3d 1407, and People v Hong Mo Lin, 163 AD3d 849: These cases support the proposition that a written waiver does not “cure” a flawed oral colloquy when the record does not show the waiver was translated or understood by a non-English-speaking defendant.

By applying these authorities, the court reinforced that an appeal waiver is not a check-the-box formality; it must be explained accurately, timely (before guilt is admitted), and in a language the defendant understands.

2) Speedy-trial readiness and illusory SOR

On the CPL 30.30 component, the court cited a line of cases defining readiness and the “illusory” readiness doctrine:

  • People v Moore, 233 AD3d 802, and People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541: These frame the six-month readiness obligation for felony prosecutions under CPL 30.30(1)(a).
  • People v King, 42 NY3d 424: The court emphasized that the People must declare ready and “actually be ready” to stop the CPL 30.30 clock.
  • People v Lisene, 201 AD3d 738: Cited for the principle that a readiness statement made when the People are not ready is “illusory.”
  • People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158: Critical to the outcome—“subsequent diligent disclosures made in good faith” do not automatically retroactively invalidate a previously valid COC and readiness declaration.

Together, these cases supply the doctrinal bridge the court used: readiness is presumed accurate absent proof to the contrary, and later discovery activity does not necessarily mean readiness was illusory at the time it was stated.

3) Due diligence under CPL article 245 and People v Bay

The decision’s core is the application of the Court of Appeals’ due-diligence framework:

  • People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200: The controlling authority. The People bear the burden to show they “exercise[d] due diligence and made reasonable inquiries” before filing the initial COC despite belated/missing items. The opinion also lifted Bay’s factor-based test for assessing diligence.
  • People v McMahon, 237 AD3d 746: Used to reiterate that “due diligence” is flexible and to restate Bay’s multi-factor considerations.
  • People v Henderson, 237 AD3d 853: Cited to support the conclusion that the People satisfied their CPL article 245 efforts regarding disclosure and diligence in this context.

4) Grand jury transcript timing and statutory “transcription resources” allowance

  • People v Drayton, 231 AD3d 1057: The key analogue. As in Drayton, the grand jury minutes were not completed at the time the COC was filed; disclosure upon availability supported the COC’s validity.
  • People ex rel. Barta v Maginley-Liddie, 227 AD3d 754: Supports the statutory mechanism acknowledging delays due to “limited availability of transcription resources” under CPL 245.20(1)(b).

These authorities helped the court distinguish between (i) a failure to seek/obtain readily available transcripts and (ii) unavoidable timing where the transcript does not yet exist.

5) Police disciplinary/credibility disclosures and the limits of what must be turned over

  • People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122: Cited as a “cf.” contrast. The court invoked it to highlight that other cases may demand more robust disclosure—particularly where disciplinary material bears on credibility in a way that matters to the case or where credibility determinations exist—while concluding those features were not present here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The appeal waiver failed on multiple, independent grounds

The court identified three distinct defects that, cumulatively, prevented enforcement:

  • Misdescription of the waiver’s scope: The court’s colloquy suggested the defendant was waiving “attendant rights” such as assignment of counsel and waiver of fees—an inaccurate description that obscures what is actually being surrendered: appellate review.
  • Timing problem: The waiver was discussed after the defendant had already admitted guilt as part of the plea, undermining the notion of an informed, bargained-for waiver.
  • Language/translation problem: The written waiver could not salvage the colloquy because the record did not show it was translated before the defendant signed.

This portion of the opinion matters beyond this case because it signals that appellate courts will scrutinize both process and comprehension, not merely the existence of a signed form.

2) Readiness and COC validity were evaluated through Bay’s due-diligence lens

The defendant’s central CPL 30.30 theory was that discovery issues made the COC invalid, thereby making the SOR illusory and keeping the speedy-trial clock running. The Second Department applied a structured approach:

  • Presumption of readiness: Under People v Lisene, readiness is presumed accurate absent proof otherwise.
  • Bay’s burden allocation: Once challenged on due diligence, the People had to show they made reasonable inquiries and efforts before certifying compliance.
  • Totality of circumstances: The court expressly evaluated the “totality,” consistent with Bay’s flexible factors: volume of discovery (about 70 files disclosed), the nature of what was outstanding, explanations for the lapse, and the People’s response when notified.

3) Grand jury minutes: no COC defect where the transcript did not yet exist

CPL 245.20(1)(b) mandates disclosure of grand jury testimony transcripts relating to the subject matter of the charges. The court acknowledged that this obligation is tempered by a statutory reality: transcripts may be unavailable due to limited transcription resources, and the statute allows additional time (CPL 245.20(1)(b)).

The factual hinge was decisive: the People disclosed the grand jury minutes on the same day they were created. Therefore, at the time of the COC, the People could not disclose what did not yet exist, and their prompt disclosure upon availability supported a finding of due diligence and good faith. Under People v Drayton, that timing pattern does not render the COC invalid or readiness illusory.

4) Police impeachment material: summary disclosure was sufficient on these facts

CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) requires disclosure of information tending to impeach a testifying prosecution witness. Here, the People provided “Law Enforcement Officer as Witness” reports for six officers, summarizing disciplinary history, civil suits, CCRB matters, and internal investigation documents regarding one officer. The defense sought underlying disciplinary records not provided.

The Second Department’s reasoning was fact-sensitive:

  • Relevance to the “subject matter”: The court stressed that the disciplinary infractions “did not have any bearing on the subject matter of the case at hand.”
  • No known credibility findings: There was “no indication” that any prior testimony by these officers had been found incredible—reducing the likelihood that withheld underlying materials were materially impeaching in a meaningful way.
  • Reasonable efforts at the certification moment: The court framed the question as what the People reasonably did by the time they filed the COC, not whether discovery disputes later arose. Under People v Macaluso, subsequent good-faith supplementation does not retroactively destroy an otherwise valid COC.

The court’s “cf.” citation to People v Coley implicitly warns that this is not a blanket rule: where officer misconduct bears more directly on credibility or the case issues, or where concrete credibility determinations exist, courts may require more than summaries.

5) Speedy-trial consequence

Because the court found the COC valid and the SOR not illusory, the People stopped the CPL 30.30 clock when they filed them. The court concluded that, at most, 180 days of chargeable time accrued from commencement to filing—placing the People within the six-month window.

C. Impact

1) Practical guidance on grand jury minutes under CPL 245.20(1)(b)

The decision strengthens the proposition that a COC is not invalid merely because grand jury transcripts are disclosed later, provided the People show the transcript was not yet available and disclose it promptly upon creation. This reduces the incentive for defendants to treat ordinary transcription timing as per se noncompliance, while preserving challenges where delay reflects lack of diligence rather than lack of existence.

2) Police impeachment disclosures: a fact-bound “sufficiency by summary” holding

The court effectively approved the use of “Law Enforcement Officer as Witness” summary reports as a diligence-satisfying method in a case where the disciplinary issues were not tied to the case’s subject matter and there were no known credibility rulings. Future litigation will likely focus on distinguishing facts: the type of misconduct, its logical connection to truthfulness, and whether any adjudicative body has found the officer unreliable.

3) Reinforced scrutiny of appeal waivers

The appeal-waiver portion, while not new, has strong day-to-day courtroom implications: courts must accurately describe the waiver, address it before the plea allocution is complete, and ensure translation/interpretation is reflected on the record. Otherwise, appellate courts will reach the merits notwithstanding a signed waiver.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CPL 30.30 (statutory speedy trial): A time-limit statute requiring the People to be “ready for trial” within a set period (six months for felonies). It is not the same as the constitutional speedy-trial right; it operates largely by counting “chargeable” time.
  • COC (Certificate of Compliance): The prosecutor’s formal certification that they have exercised due diligence and disclosed discoverable materials required by CPL article 245 (subject to protective orders and statutory exceptions).
  • SOR (Statement of Readiness): The People’s declaration that they are ready for trial. A valid SOR typically stops the CPL 30.30 clock—unless it is “illusory.”
  • Illusory readiness: A readiness statement that does not reflect real readiness (for example, because essential prerequisites have not been met). If illusory, the clock keeps running despite the statement.
  • Due diligence (under People v Bay): A flexible reasonableness standard: the People must make reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate and disclose discoverable material before filing the COC. Courts assess diligence using multiple practical factors (efforts made, volume, complexity, obviousness of missing items, explanation, and response when notified).
  • Impeachment material: Information that can be used to challenge a witness’s credibility (e.g., prior findings of untruthfulness, certain misconduct, or bias). Under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), prosecutors must disclose impeachment information known to law enforcement acting on the government’s behalf.
  • Grand jury minutes/transcripts: Transcripts of testimony given before the grand jury. They must be disclosed under CPL 245.20(1)(b), but the statute recognizes they may not be immediately available due to transcription constraints.

5. Conclusion

People v Hespinobarros delivers two key takeaways. First, appeal waivers remain highly vulnerable on appellate review when trial courts misdescribe the right being waived, address the waiver only after an admission of guilt, or fail to make a record that a written waiver was translated and understood. Second, on discovery-driven CPL 30.30 challenges, the decision exemplifies a pragmatic application of People v Bay: a COC may remain valid despite later disclosures where the People show due diligence, promptly provide items when they become available (as with newly created grand jury minutes), and reasonably supply police impeachment information—here, by detailed summary—where underlying materials are not shown to be meaningfully connected to the case’s subject matter or to established credibility findings.