People v. Guerrero (2026): “Extraordinary Circumstances” Under Raise the Age Is a Totality-of-the-Circumstances, Discretionary Determination

1. Introduction

In People v Guerrero (2026 NY Slip Op 00826), the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of a Youth Part judge’s discretion under the Raise the Age (RTA) removal framework. The defendant, Errick Guerrero—four months shy of 18—was indicted for two counts of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2], [3]) and one count of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]) arising from a preplanned, armed home invasion with physical injury to the victim.

Because the case involved an “adolescent offender” prosecution, it was presumptively removable from the Youth Part to Family Court under CPL 722.23, unless a statutory retention ground applied or the People demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances” warranting retention (CPL 722.23 [1] [d]).

The central issue on appeal was narrow but consequential: whether the Youth Part abused its discretion as a matter of law in granting the People’s motion to prevent removal based on “extraordinary circumstances.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority held that the statute’s failure to define “extraordinary circumstances” reflects legislative intent to entrust that determination to the Youth Part’s broad discretion, to be made through an individualized assessment of the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. On the record before the Youth Part—particularly the defendant’s chronic and escalating reoffending despite years of Family Court services, combined with the serious, preplanned home-invasion conduct—the court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the case in the Youth Part.

The Court also resolved important procedural points: the defendant failed to preserve (1) his argument for a rigid, two-part “heinous facts + non-amenability” test and (2) an evidentiary claim under Family Court Act § 381.2 (1). The Court further declined to consider evidence from the later trial that was not before the Youth Part at the removal hearing.

In dissent, Judge Halligan would have found an abuse of discretion, emphasizing legislative history suggesting the “extraordinary circumstances” standard should be met only in rare cases and typically requires highly unusual and heinous facts plus strong proof of non-amenability to Family Court services.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Statutory “extraordinary circumstances” in other contexts

  • Matter of Suarez v Williams, 26 NY3d 440 (2015)
    The majority cited Matter of Suarez v Williams alongside Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2) to illustrate that, in some statutory schemes, the Legislature supplies explicit guidance about “extraordinary circumstances.” By contrast, CPL 722.23 (1) (d) provides no definition, supporting the majority’s conclusion that RTA leaves the determination to judicial discretion.
  • People v Cintron, 75 NY2d 249 (1990)
    Cited with CPL former 65.20 (9), People v Cintron similarly served as a comparator: where the Legislature defined or constrained “extraordinary circumstances,” courts follow that guidance; where it did not (as in CPL 722.23), courts exercise broader discretion.

2) Preservation and evidentiary treatment of Family Court history

  • People v Dukes, 186 AD3d 1073 (4th Dept 2020), affd 37 NY3d 1085 (2021)
    Referenced in the majority’s preservation discussion. The Court used People v Dukes as a “cf.” citation while holding the defendant did not preserve his Family Court Act § 381.2 (1) challenge because he did not object to the probation officer’s testimony about Family Court involvement.

3) Raise the Age lower-court approaches and legislative-history disputes

  • People v T.P., 73 Misc 3d 1215 [A] (Nassau County Ct 2021)
    The defendant invoked (on appeal) language from People v T.P. describing a stringent test: “highly unusual and heinous facts” plus “strong proof” of non-amenability. The majority rejected this argument as unpreserved because defendant did not seek that test in the Youth Part and instead argued for totality-of-the-circumstances review.
  • People v Lloyd F., — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583 (2d Dept 2025) and People v M.M., 64 Misc 3d 259 (Nassau County Ct 2019)
    These cases appear in the dissent to show that lower courts “widely” treat the sponsor’s debate remarks as endorsing a two-factor focus (heinous/unusual facts and non-amenability) when deciding “extraordinary circumstances.” The dissent used them to argue that the majority’s approach risks diluting the statutory presumption favoring removal.

4) Illustrative burglary doctrine (not Raise the Age-specific)

  • People v Lewis, 5 NY3d 546 (2005)
    The majority cited People v Lewis as part of an explanation of how relatively less serious conduct could still qualify as “burglary” and even as a violent felony under the Penal Law—reinforcing the point that violent felony labeling is broad, and therefore “extraordinary circumstances” cannot be reduced to offense category alone.

5) Juvenile culpability and punishment (constitutional backdrop in dissent)

  • Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005)
  • Graham v Florida, 560 US 48 (2010)
  • Miller v Alabama, 567 US 450 (2012)

The dissent drew on these decisions to situate RTA within a modern understanding of adolescent development and diminished culpability. While not controlling interpretations of CPL 722.23, they supply persuasive context for why the Legislature favored services and rehabilitation over adult punishment.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s framing: a discretionary, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry

The majority treated CPL 722.23 (1) (d) as intentionally open-textured. Because “extraordinary circumstances” is undefined in the RTA statute, the Court inferred legislative intent to leave the determination “within the broad discretion of the court,” rather than to impose a rigid checklist. The majority then reinforced that reading with sponsor remarks emphasizing that the judge has “ultimate discretion” and “must look at all the circumstances” of both the case and the youth, including aggravating and mitigating factors.

2) Application to the record: escalation + prior services + serious conduct

The Youth Part acknowledged that offense violence alone is not enough. The decisive aggravating feature, as the majority described it, was the combination of:

  • a sustained pattern of arrests/Family Court involvement since age 13,
  • multiple named Family Court services over approximately five years, and
  • continued escalation culminating in a preplanned home invasion with weapons and injury.

The majority emphasized it was not affirming based on “mere reoffense,” but rather “chronic, repeated reoffense and escalating criminal behavior.” It also treated the defendant’s mental health diagnoses as “a substantial mitigating factor,” acknowledging that removal would not have been unreasonable; the point, however, was that the Youth Part’s balancing did not cross the line into legal abuse of discretion.

3) Preservation and record-limitation holdings

  • Two-part test unpreserved: The Court held defendant could not demand on appeal a specific “two-part inquiry” (as articulated in People v T.P.) after urging the Youth Part to apply a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.
  • Family Court Act § 381.2 (1) argument unpreserved: Defendant did not object to testimony about prior Family Court proceedings/services; therefore, appellate review was foreclosed.
  • Record limitation: The Court rejected reliance on subsequent-trial evidence when reviewing the Youth Part’s removal decision, confining review to what was before the Youth Part at the time of its ruling.

C. Impact

1) Practical rule clarified

The decision cements that, in RTA cases where no automatic retention ground under CPL 722.23 (2) (c) is established, “extraordinary circumstances” under CPL 722.23 (1) (d) is:

  • not statutorily defined,
  • committed to broad Youth Part discretion, and
  • reviewed as a totality-of-the-circumstances determination for abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

2) Likely influence on future “extraordinary circumstances” motions

  • Broader room for individualized balancing: Prosecutors and courts may treat escalating conduct and a demonstrated history of unsuccessful interventions as meaningful aggravators even absent “significant physical injury” or “display” by the adolescent offender.
  • Legislative-history arguments reoriented: The majority used the Assembly debate to underscore discretion; the dissent used it to underscore rarity and a “high standard.” Future litigation will likely focus less on extracting rigid tests from the debate and more on presenting (or contesting) individualized records demonstrating why the case is—or is not—“extraordinary.”
  • Evidence-development at the hearing becomes critical: The dissent’s critique spotlights a vulnerability: when the People rely on “services” history, courts and litigants may need fuller proof about what services were provided, their adequacy, and the youth’s engagement and response. Defense counsel, after Guerrero, will have strong incentive to build a detailed record and to preserve evidentiary objections (including under Family Court Act § 381.2 [1]).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Raise the Age (RTA): New York’s statutory framework moving most 16- and 17-year-olds away from adult criminal processing and toward Family Court-style services, with a “Youth Part” acting as the initial forum for felony charges.
  • Youth Part: A part of superior court designated to handle adolescent offender felony cases initially; it decides whether cases should remain or be removed to Family Court under CPL 722.23.
  • Removal (transfer) to Family Court: Moving a case from Youth Part to Family Court, generally favored by statute unless specific retention criteria are proven or “extraordinary circumstances” justify keeping it.
  • Extraordinary circumstances (CPL 722.23 [1] [d]): An undefined standard permitting the Youth Part to keep a presumptively removable case. After Guerrero, it is confirmed as a discretionary, individualized, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.
  • Abuse of discretion as a matter of law: A deferential appellate standard. The reviewing court does not ask whether it would have made the same decision; it asks whether the decision fell outside the range of legally permissible outcomes given the record.
  • Preservation: To raise an issue on appeal, a party typically must have timely raised it in the trial court (e.g., by making a specific argument or objection). Unpreserved claims are usually not reviewed.
  • Family Court Act § 381.2 (1): A confidentiality/evidentiary protection limiting use of Family Court involvement and related admissions in other courts. In Guerrero, the Court did not reach the merits because the defendant did not object, leaving the substantive question for another day.

5. Conclusion

People v Guerrero is a major interpretive decision on CPL 722.23 (1) (d). The Court of Appeals confirmed that “extraordinary circumstances” is an intentionally flexible standard entrusted to the Youth Part’s broad discretion and to be assessed on the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court upheld retention where the record showed chronic, escalating criminal conduct despite years of Family Court services, even while recognizing substantial mental-health mitigation and the plausibility of the opposite outcome.

Going forward, Guerrero will likely shape both litigation strategy (record-building and preservation) and the doctrinal center of gravity of RTA removal disputes: away from rigid formulations and toward fact-intensive, individualized discretionary judgments—reviewed deferentially on appeal.