People v. Grant — Good-Cause Standard for Cold-Case Preindictment Delay After Leads Are Exhausted and DNA Evidence Is Later Activated

Introduction

People v Grant (2026 NY Slip Op 00910 [App Div, 2d Dept Feb. 18, 2026]) addresses whether an extraordinary preindictment delay—nearly 27 years between a 1992 rooftop murder and a 2019 arrest/indictment— violated the defendant’s due process right to prompt prosecution. The People appealed from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, that dismissed the indictment for “unreasonable delay in prosecution” after a hearing pursuant to People v Singer (44 NY2d 241).

The central issues were: (1) whether the People established “good cause” for a decades-long delay in commencing the prosecution, and (2) how courts should evaluate delays where an investigation went cold, DNA evidence was untested for years, and a later technological and database ecosystem (STR testing/CODIS) ultimately generated a match.

Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the dismissal, reinstated the indictment, and remitted for further proceedings. Applying the People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442) factors in a holistic manner (as emphasized in People v Johnson (39 NY3d 92)), the Court held that:

  • The 27-year delay was extraordinary and favored the defendant on the “extent of delay” factor.
  • Nevertheless, the People established good cause for the preindictment delay because investigators acted in good faith, exhausted leads by the mid-1990s, lacked sufficient evidence to charge, and later pursued DNA testing promptly once the OCME identified the availability of untested swabs that could be tested and uploaded to CODIS.
  • The case differed materially from People v Regan (39 NY3d 459), where the People conceded an unjustified period of inaction after deciding they needed the defendant’s DNA.
  • Given the seriousness and investigative challenges of a murder case with no eyewitnesses, no weapon, and limited linkage evidence, plus the absence of pretrial incarceration, the balance favored the People.
  • The defendant did not show “special prejudice” beyond presumptive prejudice from delay (discussed through People v Wiggins (31 NY3d 1) and Doggett v United States (505 US 647)).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

A. The governing framework: prompt prosecution as due process

  • People v Singer (44 NY2d 241) and People v Staley (41 NY2d 789): establish that unreasonable prosecutorial delay, including preaccusatory delay, can violate due process and warrant dismissal even before formal accusation or restraint. Grant uses Singer both procedurally (the “Singer hearing”) and substantively (as the due process anchor).
  • People v Regan (39 NY3d 459): reiterates the due process prompt-prosecution doctrine, stresses heightened constitutional vigilance where no statute of limitations applies, and clarifies that when delay is protracted the People must show good cause. Grant relies on Regan’s framework but distinguishes its outcome.
  • People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442) and the “Taranovich factors”: the five-factor balancing test. People v Johnson (39 NY3d 92) is cited to reinforce that the test is holistic, with no dispositive factor set.

B. How “good cause” is evaluated in long, cold-case delays

  • People v Innab (182 AD3d 142): particularly influential. Grant echoes Innab’s caution against imposing an affirmative duty on the People to pursue investigative steps that might not be successful and might jeopardize an investigation; it also adopts Innab’s practical point that earlier DNA testing may not yield “meaningful information” without a comparative profile in CODIS.
  • People v Mattison (162 AD3d 905): treated as the closest analogue. In Mattison, a cold case stalled for decades until a “random” fingerprint match reinvigorated investigation; the delay was upheld because the People lacked sufficient evidence earlier and acted expeditiously after the new linkage evidence emerged. Grant frames its DNA reactivation similarly.
  • People v Decker (13 NY3d 12) and People v Vernace (96 NY2d 886): demonstrate that lengthy delays (15 and 17 years) do not automatically violate due process and that a later charging decision is permissible if made in good faith and within the discretion necessary for prosecution decisions.
  • The Second Department also cites multiple examples declining to dismiss despite long delays—e.g., People v Jolivert (223 AD3d 573), People v Wald (215 AD3d 497), People v Gardner (204 AD3d 1039), People v Hayes (39 AD3d 1173), People v Pacheco (38 AD3d 686)—and trial-level examples such as People v Atkinson (85 Misc 3d 578), People v Krauseneck (73 Misc 3d 1227[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51137[U]), and People v Parrilla (56 Misc 3d 766), underscoring that duration alone is not dispositive, especially in cold-case contexts.

C. Distinguishing unjustified delay: the role of “incompetence” and unjustified inaction

  • People v Regan is the foil: there, the People had early evidence, decided they needed defendant’s DNA by April 2010, and then waited until November 2012 “for no asserted or apparent reason,” conceding incompetence. Grant treats Regan’s key principle as: once the People know they need a specific investigative step and can obtain it “with speed and ease,” unexplained inaction is fatal.
  • People v Lesiuk (81 NY2d 485): supports the proposition that good-faith deferral for further investigation or sufficient reasons does not deny due process, even if some prejudice results.

D. Probable cause constraints on compelling a DNA/blood sample

  • Matter of Abe A. (56 NY2d 288): provides the three-part standard for a court order compelling a blood sample, including probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime. Grant uses Abe A. to explain why it was not clear—given the 1992 evidentiary posture—that the People could have obtained a compelled sample from Grant in 1992 without speculation.

E. Resource constraints and institutional workload

  • People v Johnson (38 NY2d 271) (distinct from the later Johnson case): cited for the proposition that personnel shortages are “not exactly” in the State’s favor but may “weigh less heavily than would most other causes.” Grant applies this logic to NYPD cold-case resource constraints.
  • People v Jones (236 AD3d 1058): applies Johnson (38 NY2d 271) to workload and staffing shortages (COVID-era context), reinforcing the “weigh less heavily” approach.

F. CODIS-era reluctance to impose a duty of constant retesting

  • People v Bradberry (68 AD3d 1688): supports the view that delay can be justified where crimes predate CODIS and no DNA sample exists for comparison until later entry into CODIS.
  • People v Parrilla (56 Misc 3d 766): supports rejecting an “unrealistic requirement” that police keep investigations open indefinitely and constantly pursue DNA testing absent a meaningful comparison path.

G. Prejudice principles

  • People v Wiggins (31 NY3d 1) and Doggett v United States (505 US 647): support the concept of “presumptive prejudice” from excessive delay and the difficulty of proving defense impairment.
  • People v Deacon (96 AD3d 965) and People v Gibian (76 AD3d 583): cited to suggest that certain potentially exculpatory evidence (here, prior reports about a confession by someone else) may still be admissible, reducing prejudice.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s balancing of the Taranovich factors

  1. Extent of delay: The Court labels the 27-year preindictment delay “extraordinary,” and acknowledges that the absence of a statute of limitations for murder “heightens the need for constitutional vigilance” (language drawn from People v Regan and People v Singer). This factor favored the defendant.
  2. Reason for delay (good cause): This is the decisive battleground. The Court accepts that by the mid-1990s police had exhausted leads, had no eyewitness or physical linkage, no weapon, no fingerprints, and conflicting/confounding information (three women reported a confession by a person whose description did not match the defendant). Under that evidentiary posture, it was a good-faith and legitimate decision to defer prosecution until additional evidence emerged.

    Critically, the Court rejects the notion that the People were constitutionally obligated to (a) compel a DNA sample in 1992 or (b) continually re-test/press forward when the case had gone cold. It emphasizes uncertainty under Matter of Abe A. about whether probable cause existed to compel a blood draw at that time, and it refuses to “saddle” the People with a duty to pursue a course that might fail and jeopardize an investigation (language aligned with People v Innab).

    As to institutional constraints (thousands of cold cases and limited detectives), the Court treats resource limitations as providing “some explanation” but “not exactly” in the People’s favor—still, they do not negate good cause where the core reason for delay is evidentiary insufficiency and good-faith deferral after leads were exhausted.
  3. Nature of the charge: Murder in the second degree is exceptionally serious; the Court also treats “nature” as including investigative complexity and challenges (per People v Johnson (39 NY3d 92)). With no eyewitnesses, no weapon, and limited contemporaneous linkage, this factor weighed in the People’s favor.
  4. Pretrial incarceration: Defendant was not incarcerated on this charge until arrest in 2019; that weighs in the People’s favor (consistent with People v Decker and related cases).
  5. Prejudice: Because only the first factor favored defendant, prejudice was not presumed to the extent that it would alone drive dismissal. The Court acknowledges “presumptive prejudice” but finds no “special prejudice” shown—especially where the defense could potentially present the third-party-confession information at trial, and where the record did not establish that certain physical evidence was unavailable.

B. The Court’s key doctrinal move: distinguishing “good-faith evidentiary insufficiency” from “unexplained inaction”

The opinion’s most practically important reasoning is its distinction between:

  • Regan-type delay: the People know they need a specific item of evidence, can obtain it with relative ease, and yet do nothing for an extended time without justification (unreasonable, due-process-violative).
  • Grant/Mattison-type delay: the case goes cold because evidence is insufficient to responsibly prosecute; years later, new linkage evidence emerges (here, STR/CODIS DNA match after OCME alerts police to untested swabs), and the People proceed expeditiously (good cause).

On this view, the constitutional problem is not that earlier testing was theoretically possible, but that earlier prosecution lacked a good-faith basis because the evidentiary threshold for charging/compelling intrusive evidence (e.g., a blood draw) was uncertain or unmet.

3. Impact

A. Cold-case practice: no categorical duty of continuous reinvestigation

People v Grant strengthens a line of authority—seen in People v Innab, People v Mattison, People v Bradberry, and trial-level cases like People v Parrilla—that courts are reluctant to impose a constitutional requirement that law enforcement continually re-test or re-open dormant investigations as technologies or databases improve. The “good cause” showing can be satisfied where:

  • investigators exhausted leads in good faith;
  • the evidentiary picture was insufficient to prosecute or to compel a suspect’s DNA under standards like Matter of Abe A.;
  • and the People acted promptly once new, case-advancing evidence became available.

B. CODIS-era arguments: “DNA was available earlier” is not automatically dispositive

The decision narrows a common defense argument in cold cases: that because biological material existed, the People were constitutionally obligated to test it much earlier. Grant indicates that courts will look to whether earlier testing would likely have been meaningful in the investigative posture at the time (including whether a comparative profile existed, or whether the People could lawfully compel one).

C. Resource constraints remain a weak—but not irrelevant—explanation

The Court does not treat limited staffing as an affirmative “excuse” that alone justifies delay; it follows People v Johnson (38 NY2d 271) by stating that such causes weigh “less heavily” than others and are “not exactly” in the People’s favor. But in a cold-case setting, resource constraints can contextualize why cases are not continuously revisited and may reinforce a finding that inaction was not bad faith.

D. Litigation consequences: more focus on Abe A. and the feasibility of compelled sampling

The opinion invites future prompt-prosecution litigation to grapple with whether, at earlier points in time, the People had probable cause sufficient to compel DNA/blood sampling. Defense claims that “they should have compelled DNA earlier” may increasingly be answered with an Abe A. analysis: would a court order have issued then, on those facts?

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Prompt prosecution (due process) vs. speedy trial: New York protects both. “Speedy trial” often concerns delay after charges are filed; “prompt prosecution” can address long delays before indictment where due process is implicated (as in People v Singer and People v Regan).
  • Singer hearing: A fact-finding hearing ordered to assess reasons for preindictment delay and whether dismissal is warranted for lack of prompt prosecution.
  • Taranovich factors: A five-part balancing test (delay length, reason, nature of charge, incarceration, prejudice). It is holistic; no single factor is automatically decisive.
  • Good cause: A legally sufficient, good-faith reason for delay—commonly, continued investigation, lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute, or waiting for meaningful new evidence— as distinct from negligence or unexplained inaction (contrast People v Regan).
  • CODIS: A DNA database that allows comparison of DNA profiles. A profile must be in a compatible format (modern STR profiles) to be searchable.
  • HLA-DQ Alpha vs. STR: Earlier DNA typing (HLA-DQ Alpha) had limitations and was not CODIS-compatible; STR is the modern method used for CODIS entries.
  • NIBIN/IBIS: Systems for imaging and comparing cartridge casings to link shootings to the same firearm; relevant here to illustrate investigative avenues and technological timelines.
  • Presumptive vs. special prejudice: Long delay presumptively harms trial reliability (memories fade), but “special prejudice” involves concrete, case-specific harm.

Conclusion

People v Grant reaffirms that even an extraordinary cold-case preindictment delay does not compel dismissal where the People show good cause grounded in good-faith evidentiary insufficiency after leads were exhausted and where they act promptly once new linkage evidence emerges (here, DNA testing and a CODIS match). The decision distinguishes People v Regan by centering the constitutional defect on unjustified inaction after a known, feasible investigative need—not on the mere possibility that earlier testing could have been attempted. In practical terms, Grant strengthens prosecutorial viability of cold-case DNA prosecutions while preserving the principle that negligence, indolence, or conceded incompetence in delaying key steps can still warrant dismissal.