People v Shaver: Betts’ Ex Post Facto Rule Is a New Substantive Rule Retroactive on Collateral Review

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
Date: May 29, 2026
Case: People of Michigan v. Gary J. Shaver, Jr. (Docket No. 167736)

1) Introduction

People v Shaver addresses whether People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021)—which held that Michigan’s 2011 Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) regime “in its entirety” operated as unconstitutional ex post facto punishment when applied to people whose registrable offenses predated the 2011 amendments—must be applied retroactively to defendants seeking postconviction relief on collateral review under MCR Subchapter 6.500.

The defendant, Gary J. Shaver, Jr., committed (as a juvenile) CSC-III offenses in 2004 and therefore was subject to registration under pre-2011 SORA. After the 2011 amendments shortened address-change reporting to “immediately” (defined as “within 3 business days”) and imposed other enhanced burdens, Shaver was convicted in 2015 (second offense) for failure to comply when his registered address remained incorrect for 19 days. After Betts (2021), Shaver sought to vacate that 2015 conviction through collateral proceedings.

The key issue before the Michigan Supreme Court was narrow but consequential: whether Betts announced a rule that applies retroactively to final convictions challenged collaterally. The Court of Appeals had held Betts was “new” but not retroactive; the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that Betts applies retroactively to defendants on collateral review under both federal and state constitutional law because Betts announced a new substantive rule: it prohibits a category of punishment—conviction for violations of the 2011 SORA requirements—for a class of defendants defined by status/offense timing (those whose registrable offenses occurred before the 2011 amendments).

Applying the federal retroactivity framework associated with Teague v Lane, the Court concluded:

  • New rule: Yes, because pre-Betts Michigan precedent treated SORA as civil/regulatory and rejected ex post facto challenges.
  • Substantive (therefore retroactive): Yes, because Betts removes governmental authority to impose a particular punishment scheme on a defined class.

Because Michigan cannot provide fewer protections than federal constitutional law, the Court held Betts is retroactive under state law as well. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

1. The core predicate: People v Betts

People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021) is the substantive constitutional anchor. Betts held that the 2011 SORA “in its entirety” functioned as punishment (despite legislative intent to regulate) when applied retroactively to pre-2011 offenders, violating the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and U.S. Constitutions.

Shaver treats Betts not as a narrow defect in discrete reporting provisions, but as a categorical prohibition on using the 2011 SORA scheme to criminally punish pre-2011 registrants—an understanding driven by Betts’ remedial analysis rejecting severance and revival.

2. Determining “newness” and retroactivity: People v Maxson, Teague v Lane, People v Barnes, People v Robinson

The Court uses Michigan’s established pathway for federal retroactivity analysis:

  • People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008) supplies Michigan’s articulation of the Teague v Lane “new rule” inquiry—whether prior precedent would have “compelled” the result at the time the conviction became final.
  • Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989) provides the federal retroactivity framework for collateral review (as later narrowed).
  • People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265 (2018) is cited for the general rule that new rules are normally not retroactive and for the practice of considering both federal and state retroactivity tests when both constitutions are implicated.
  • People v Robinson (February 4, 2026) is cited for the modern statement of nonretroactivity as a general matter for new rules, reinforcing that retroactivity is an exception requiring justification.

These cases structure the Court’s two-step method: (1) identify a “new” rule; (2) classify it as substantive or procedural to decide retroactivity.

3. Why procedural retroactivity is essentially foreclosed: Edwards v Vannoy

Edwards v Vannoy, 593 US 255 (2021) is pivotal because it eliminates (in practice and doctrine) the “watershed” procedural-rule exception under Teague. Shaver uses Edwards to clarify the stakes: if Betts is procedural, it is not retroactive; therefore, the substantive/procedural classification is decisive.

4. Defining substantive vs procedural: Schriro v Summerlin and Montgomery v Louisiana

  • Schriro v Summerlin, 542 US 348 (2004) is used for the concept that procedural rules regulate only the manner of determining culpability.
  • Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016) supplies the definition of substantive rules as those that forbid certain punishment for a class because of status or offense, i.e., categorical limits on state power to punish.

Shaver adopts Montgomery’s “category of punishment/class of defendants” language and maps it directly onto Betts.

5. Demonstrating Betts was not dictated by earlier Michigan SORA precedent: People v Golba and People v Pennington

To show that Betts was “new,” the Court highlights that Michigan courts had previously rejected ex post facto challenges by characterizing SORA as nonpunitive:

  • People v Golba, 273 Mich App 603 (2007)
  • People v Pennington, 240 Mich App 188 (2000)

Because those decisions treated SORA as “a remedial regulatory scheme” rather than punishment, a reasonable jurist at the time Shaver’s conviction became final would not have felt constitutionally compelled to apply Betts’ conclusion. That is the Court’s “new rule” finding.

6. The ex post facto “punishment” framework underlying Betts: Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez and Smith v Doe

While Shaver is principally about retroactivity, its reasoning depends on what Betts actually held. Betts relied on:

  • Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144 (1963) for the multi-factor test to determine whether a scheme labeled civil is punitive in purpose/effect.
  • Smith v Doe, 538 US 84 (2003) for the caution that the factors are neither exhaustive nor individually dispositive.

The retroactivity conclusion in Shaver flows from the breadth of Betts’ punishment determination and its rejection of severing “bad” parts while leaving a workable “good” remainder.

7. Other cited Michigan authorities

  • People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541 (2018) and People v Franklin, 500 Mich 92 (2017) for standards of review (abuse of discretion; “range of reasonable and principled outcomes”).
  • People v Fredell, 516 Mich ___ (2024) for de novo review of constitutional/statutory interpretation.
  • People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15 (1992) for the Michigan Supreme Court’s ultimate authority on the meaning/application of the Michigan Constitution.
  • People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993) as context for the plea/sentencing process in Shaver’s underlying conviction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Step one: Betts is a “new rule”

The Court applies the Maxson/Teague inquiry: whether existing precedent at the time finality attached would have compelled the result. It answers “no” because Michigan appellate courts had treated SORA as civil, defeating ex post facto punishment claims. Therefore, Betts “breaks new ground” for retroactivity purposes.

2. Step two: the new rule is substantive (thus retroactive)

The Court rejects the Court of Appeals’ characterization that Betts is neither substantive nor procedural. Under Montgomery v Louisiana, a rule is substantive if it prohibits a category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.

The Court’s key move is to define the “punishment” prohibited by Betts as: criminal conviction for violating the 2011 SORA requirements, when imposed on people whose registrable offenses occurred before 2011. That is a categorical constraint on the state’s authority to punish—not a regulation of trial procedure or proof.

3. Why “he would have had to register anyway” is legally irrelevant

The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Shaver would have had registration duties under any SORA version, Betts did not create a substantive bar. The Supreme Court calls that erroneous because Betts assessed the 2011 SORA “in its entirety,” and its remedy analysis refused severance/revival. Thus, whether some earlier version might have required some form of reporting does not salvage convictions under the specific, constitutionally forbidden 2011 punishment scheme applied retroactively.

4. State constitutional retroactivity follows the federal floor

Although People v Maxson recognizes Michigan may provide broader retroactive effect than federal doctrine, Shaver emphasizes the supremacy-floor principle: Michigan cannot provide fewer protections than federal constitutional law (citing US Const, art VI, cl 2). Once the Court finds retroactivity compelled under the federal substantive-rule doctrine, state-law retroactivity necessarily aligns (at least to that extent).

C. Impact

  • Collateral relief is available: Defendants whose underlying registrable offenses predate 2011 may seek to vacate final convictions for violating the 2011 SORA requirements via MCR Subchapter 6.500, because Betts is retroactive.
  • Prosecutorial and judicial administration: The decision strengthens statewide efforts (including coordinated litigation/settlement projects) to unwind 2011-SORA-based failure-to-register convictions imposed on pre-2011 offenders.
  • Doctrinal clarity on “substantive” rules: Shaver confirms that rules invalidating an entire punitive statutory regime as applied to a defined class are paradigmatically substantive—especially where the earlier decision rejects severance and treats the statutory scheme holistically.
  • Future ex post facto litigation: When a court’s ex post facto analysis results in a categorical prohibition on punishment for a class, Shaver provides a template for retroactivity arguments on collateral review.
  • Limits: Shaver does not itself redesign SORA or identify which later legislative amendments (post-2011) are valid; it answers the retroactivity question for Betts and directs lower courts to apply that substantive bar in postconviction cases.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Ex post facto punishment: The Constitution forbids the government from increasing punishment retroactively—i.e., applying a harsher punitive law to conduct that occurred before the law existed.
  • Collateral review: A postconviction challenge after the direct appeal window has closed (here, via Michigan’s MCR 6.500 procedures), typically harder to win unless the law clearly requires relief.
  • Retroactivity (under the federal framework): New constitutional rules generally do not apply to already-final convictions—unless the rule is substantive.
  • Substantive vs procedural rules:
    • Procedural rules change how guilt or punishment is determined (e.g., jury instructions, factfinding allocation). After Edwards v Vannoy, new procedural rules do not apply retroactively on collateral review.
    • Substantive rules change what the government may punish or whom it may punish in a particular way. These apply retroactively because the state lacks authority to keep punishing under an unconstitutional substantive regime.
  • Mendoza-Martinez factors: A set of guideposts to determine whether a law labeled “civil” is actually punitive in effect—important because ex post facto limits apply to punishment, not genuine civil regulation.
  • Severability/revival: “Severability” means cutting out unconstitutional parts while leaving the rest; “revival” means reverting to an older version. Betts rejected both for the 2011 SORA as applied to pre-2011 offenders, supporting Shaver’s view that the prohibition is categorical for that regime.
  • Cobbs evaluation: Under People v Cobbs, a trial judge may provide a preliminary sentence evaluation during plea negotiations; if the judge later cannot follow it, the defendant may withdraw the plea.

5) Conclusion

People v Shaver establishes a clear retroactivity rule for Michigan postconviction practice: People v Betts is retroactive on collateral review because it announced a new substantive constitutional limitation—Michigan may not impose the 2011 SORA punishment scheme (including failure-to-register convictions under that regime) on individuals whose registrable offenses predate the 2011 amendments.

The decision is significant beyond SORA litigation. It reinforces that when a constitutional ruling removes state authority to impose a category of punishment on a defined class, finality yields to legality, and collateral relief must be available.