People v. SanMiguel: Section 231.7(g) Requires a Functional Case-Relevance Explanation for Demeanor Strikes, and (In)Validity Is Not Dispositive of the Ultimate Discrimination Inquiry

I. Introduction

People v. SanMiguel (Cal. Supreme Court, July 30, 2026) is the California Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, the Legislature’s 2020 reform of peremptory-challenge doctrine enacted via Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). The case arises from a criminal jury selection in Ventura County in which the prosecutor peremptorily struck prospective juror S.M., described by the defense as the only remaining Latino man in the venire at that point.

The defense objected under section 231.7. The prosecutor gave several reasons, including a classic “behavior-based” rationale: S.M. was allegedly less engaged/attentive and made less eye contact. The trial court confirmed aspects of demeanor (flat affect, looking down, no eye contact), overruled the objection, and the jury ultimately convicted defendant Joel SanMiguel.

The key issue on review was how courts must apply section 231.7’s special treatment of “behavior-based” justifications—especially the statute’s mandate that, even if demeanor is confirmed, counsel “shall explain” why that demeanor “matters to the case to be tried.” The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded, clarifying both (1) what is required to overcome the presumption of invalidity for demeanor reasons, and (2) what legal consequences flow from a demeanor reason being deemed “valid” or “invalid.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Explanation requirement is necessary and functional: Under section 231.7(g)(2), behavior-based reasons (e.g., inattentiveness, lack of eye contact, problematic demeanor) are “presumptively invalid” unless (a) the trial court can confirm the behavior and (b) counsel explains why it “matters to the case to be tried.” The court held the explanation requirement is not a formal “magic words” rule, but it must provide enough information to let the court evaluate what counsel infers about juror performance and whether bias may be at play.
  • (In)validity of a demeanor reason is not dispositive of the ultimate section 231.7(d)(1) inquiry: If the demeanor reason remains invalid, it generally may not be relied on as a justification; however, the court must still evaluate other proffered reasons and the totality of the circumstances under section 231.7(d)(1). Conversely, even if the presumption is overcome, the strike may still be unlawful if the totality shows a substantial likelihood an objectively reasonable person would view race or other protected status as a factor.
  • Reversal and remand: The Court of Appeal erred by (a) treating confirmation of demeanor as effectively sufficient without grappling with the statutory need for a case-relevance explanation, and (b) treating comparative “less attentive” demeanor as independently dispositive without conducting the required totality-of-circumstances analysis.
  • Disapproval of conflicting appellate approaches: The Court disapproved People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874 and People v. Barnes (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 560 to the extent they articulated a different rule about the effect of an unrebutted presumption under section 231.7(g).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Constitutional baseline: prohibiting discrimination in jury selection

  • People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 supply the foundational principle: peremptory strikes cannot be exercised on the basis of race (and, by doctrinal extension, other protected characteristics), because such discrimination harms litigants, excluded jurors, and public confidence in the courts. The opinion uses these cases to frame section 231.7 as a legislative attempt to strengthen enforcement, not to weaken the underlying anti-discrimination rule.
  • Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 is cited to summarize the traditional Batson/Wheeler three-step framework and its “prima facie” inference requirement—an element section 231.7 intentionally removes.
  • People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363 provides the court’s prior description of peremptories as usable “for any reason, or no reason at all,” while underscoring that constitutional constraints still apply—setting the stage for the Legislature’s choice to more tightly regulate how reasons are evaluated.

2. Prior California “demeanor reasons” doctrine and why the Legislature intervened

  • People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150 and People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986 illustrate the pre-section 231.7 environment: reasons were generally presumed neutral unless discriminatory intent was “inherent,” and demeanor observations could be accepted even if not explicitly confirmed by the record, particularly if undisputed. The SanMiguel court contrasts this with section 231.7’s reversal of the presumption (certain reasons start “presumptively invalid”) and its insistence on confirmation/explanation for demeanor.

3. Appellate interpretations of section 231.7(g) the Supreme Court harmonizes and corrects

  • People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768 is cited as recognizing confirmation and explanation as requirements and as emphasizing the court’s ability to consider the substance of the explanation as part of the totality analysis.
  • People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874 and People v. Barnes (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 560 are central foils. The Supreme Court disapproved them to the extent they suggested an unrebutted presumption under section 231.7(g) is effectively dispositive of unlawfulness (i.e., that the strike must fail without considering other reasons and circumstances).

4. Why demeanor is risky: authorities on subjectivity, implicit bias, and the cold record

  • People v. Hicks (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1229 and Harris v. Hardy (7th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3d 942 are used for the proposition that demeanor-based explanations are uniquely susceptible to pretext.
  • People v. Silas (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1057 supports the point that what looks like “hostility” can be an understandable reaction to biased or inappropriate questioning, reinforcing the need to probe inferences rather than accept labels.
  • People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 and People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266 are cited for the limits of appellate review of demeanor and the value of trial-level observation—yet section 231.7 simultaneously demands an on-the-record account so appellate courts can conduct the statute’s mandated de novo review.
  • Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388 and People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398 are cited to show that attentiveness is indeed important and can justify removing a juror in appropriate circumstances; the point is not that attentiveness is irrelevant, but that section 231.7 requires courts to assess what “inattentiveness” actually means and what is being inferred from it.

5. Statutory interpretation tools (how the court reads section 231.7)

  • People v. Castillolopez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 322 and National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488 supply the general interpretive approach: read text in context; if ambiguous, consult legislative history.
  • In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 supports reading “shall” as mandatory, while acknowledging that the consequence of noncompliance may require contextual analysis.
  • Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hosp. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330 and Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406 are used to illustrate that statutes sometimes impose requirements without specifying consequences (“directory” vs. “mandatory” in effect), prompting the court to infer consequences by function and scheme.
  • People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786 reinforces the context-first approach to resolving ambiguity.
  • People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254 is cited to note the court is not bound by parties’ concessions on legal meaning.
  • People v. Cisneros (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 111 is invoked to critique the prosecutor’s “I prefer other jurors” type explanation as effectively “no reason at all,” underscoring the statute’s insistence on concrete, reviewable rationales.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Section 231.7’s redesigned framework

The opinion explains section 231.7 as a deliberate break from Batson/Wheeler in three structural ways: (1) no prima facie requirement—once an objection is made, reasons must be stated; (2) the court may not speculate about unstated justifications; (3) the ultimate standard is objective and bias-aware: whether there is a “substantial likelihood” that an objectively reasonable person would view race or other protected status as “a factor,” with that observer presumed aware of unconscious bias.

2. The core clarification: what “explain why it matters” requires

The Supreme Court holds the section 231.7(g)(2) explanation requirement is essential because confirmation alone does not reveal the inference that counsel is drawing. A court can confirm “no eye contact,” but cannot evaluate whether the strike reflects legitimate juror-performance concerns or culturally inflected stereotypes unless counsel articulates what the behavior is believed to signify (e.g., hostility, timidity, disengagement, inability to deliberate).

Critically, the court rejects a rigid, procedural “script”: the statute does not impose a fixed step order, nor “magic words.” The requirement is satisfied when the record contains a case-relevance explanation sufficient to permit the trial court (and later the appellate court) to evaluate the strike under section 231.7(d)(1).

3. The second clarification: validity of a demeanor reason vs. legality of the strike

The court separates two questions that some Courts of Appeal had tended to collapse:

  1. Validity of a section 231.7(g)(1) demeanor reason: If confirmation and an adequate explanation are not provided, the demeanor reason remains “presumptively invalid” and generally may not be relied upon to justify the strike.
  2. Ultimate legality under section 231.7(d)(1): The court must still decide, considering all reasons actually given and the totality of the circumstances, whether an objective observer would view protected status as a factor. A single invalid demeanor rationale may weigh heavily and may sometimes be dispositive, but it is not automatically dispositive in every case. Likewise, overcoming the presumption does not automatically insulate the strike.

The court’s reasoning is pragmatic and scheme-based: if any unconfirmed or unexplained demeanor reference automatically compelled sustaining an objection, counsel might avoid candidly stating demeanor-related reasons even when true, undermining the statute’s insistence that courts consider “only the reasons actually given.”

4. Application error identified

The Supreme Court finds the Court of Appeal effectively treated demeanor confirmation (and an “inattentiveness” label) as sufficient and dispositive. It also faulted the Court of Appeal for overstating the record—S.M. was described as “less attentive” (looking down, less eye contact, returning to the room at a different time), not persistently asleep or unable to follow proceedings. Because section 231.7(g) was designed to force scrutiny of precisely these kinds of inferences (e.g., equating “looking down” with “not paying attention”), and because the Court of Appeal did not conduct the required totality analysis, reversal and remand were required.

C. Impact

1. Trial-court practice: building a reviewable record

  • Demeanor strikes now require articulated inferences: Counsel should expect to put on the record what they infer from demeanor and why that inference relates to juror performance in the particular case.
  • Confirmation is necessary but not sufficient: Even when a judge agrees a juror looked down or avoided eye contact, the court must still demand enough explanation to evaluate whether that inference is legitimate or potentially stereotype-driven.
  • Courts must resist “obviousness” shortcuts: “Inattentiveness” can be obvious in extreme cases (e.g., sleeping), but many “inattention” claims are ambiguous and require explication.

2. Appellate review: doctrinal calibration

  • De novo review is meaningful only with on-record reasoning: Section 231.7(j)’s de novo review (with express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence) makes it crucial that trial courts expressly state demeanor findings and explain their rulings.
  • Disapproval of Caparrotta/Barnes narrows automatic-dispositive approaches: Courts must not treat every failure to satisfy section 231.7(g)’s rebuttal requirements as automatically ending the section 231.7(d)(1) inquiry.

3. Broader effects: peremptories constrained toward transparency

SanMiguel reinforces section 231.7’s legislative purpose: shifting jury selection away from inscrutable intuition and toward stated, testable, bias-aware reasoning. It also signals that “demeanor” rationales—historically easy to assert and hard to refute—will be a focal point of enforcement.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory challenge vs. challenge for cause
A for-cause challenge removes a juror for a legally recognized reason (e.g., bias, disqualification). A peremptory challenge traditionally allowed removal without stating a reason, but constitutional and statutory law forbids using it based on protected traits.
Batson/Wheeler framework (old model)
A three-step test asking whether discrimination was intentional: (1) inference (prima facie case), (2) race-neutral reason, (3) determination of purposeful discrimination. Section 231.7 modifies this by removing the prima facie gatekeeping and shifting the focus away from proving intent.
Section 231.7(d)(1) “substantial likelihood” / “objectively reasonable person”
The court does not ask whether the attorney subjectively meant to discriminate; it asks whether a reasonable observer—aware of unconscious bias—would likely see protected status as a factor.
“Presumptively invalid” demeanor reasons under section 231.7(g)
If the reason is about demeanor (e.g., eye contact, rapport, “inattentive”), it starts out treated as suspect. It becomes usable only if the behavior is confirmed and counsel explains its case-related significance sufficiently to allow evaluation for bias.
Totality of the circumstances
The court must assess all stated reasons together with surrounding facts (questions asked, comparative jurors, case context, group identities, record support, patterns in strikes), and it may not invent unstated reasons.

V. Conclusion

People v. SanMiguel is a foundational interpretation of section 231.7’s treatment of demeanor-based peremptory strikes. It establishes two practical rules: (1) a demeanor rationale is not usable unless it is both confirmed and functionally explained in a way that reveals the case-related inference being drawn; and (2) the (in)validity of a demeanor reason does not itself end the analysis—courts must still decide, under section 231.7(d)(1), whether the totality of circumstances shows a substantial likelihood that an objective observer would view protected status as a factor. The decision’s broader significance lies in its insistence on transparency and inference-testing—exactly where unconscious bias is most likely to hide.