People v Morrison: Psychiatric-Examination Statements Cannot Supply the Basis for a Justification Defense

2026 NY Slip Op 06593 — Appellate Division, Third Department — November 12, 2026

This commentary addresses the supplied opinion, which is designated uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

1. Introduction

In People v Morrison, the Appellate Division, Third Department, unanimously affirmed Jaquan Morrison’s convictions for second-degree murder, tampering with physical evidence, fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child. The appeal followed a jury’s rejection of Morrison’s affirmative defense that he lacked criminal responsibility because of mental disease or defect.

The prosecution arose from an April 2022 killing in a Schenectady residence. Morrison, who was temporarily staying with the victim, stabbed him repeatedly while the victim’s three-year-old sister was present. Police subsequently found a kitchen knife that appeared to have been rinsed in the apartment’s bathroom. The victim sustained 65 stab wounds.

The central appellate questions concerned the weight of the evidence, the competing psychiatric opinions, and Morrison’s entitlement to a justification instruction. The appeal also raised prosecutorial misconduct, delayed disclosure of potentially favorable evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing claims.

The opinion principally applies established law rather than announcing an entirely new doctrinal test. Its most significant evidentiary holding is that statements made to mental-health examiners, restricted by CPL 60.55 (2) to the issue of criminal responsibility, cannot supply the factual foundation for a separate justification defense. That limitation matters because Morrison’s account that the victim attacked first appeared in his statements to the examining experts, while the remaining evidence did not independently support a justification charge.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Disposition: The judgment of conviction and sentences were affirmed in full.
  • Legal sufficiency: Morrison failed to preserve this challenge because he did not renew his dismissal motion after the prosecution’s rebuttal proof.
  • Weight of the evidence: Reviewing the evidence neutrally, the court sustained all four convictions and the jury’s rejection of the mental-disease-or-defect defense.
  • Intent: The number of stab wounds and evidence that many were inflicted after the victim became incapacitated supported an inference of intent to kill.
  • Evidence tampering: Leaving the rinsed knife visible and initially cooperating with police did not defeat the conviction.
  • Justification: Statements to psychiatric examiners were unavailable to establish this separate defense, and the other evidence did not warrant a justification instruction.
  • Disclosure: The alleged failure to disclose the housemate’s possession of a pickaxe did not require reversal because the information was not sufficiently material and the defense later had a meaningful opportunity to use it.
  • Representation: Claims requiring facts outside the appellate record belonged in a CPL 440.10 proceeding. The record-based claims did not establish ineffective assistance.
  • Sentence: The court declined to reduce the maximum sentences as unduly harsh or severe.

The principal sentences were 25 years to life for murder and a consecutive term of 1⅓ to 4 years for evidence tampering. Lesser concurrent terms were imposed for the remaining offenses.

3. Analysis

A. Legal Reasoning

1. Preservation and weight review perform different functions

The court first separated two appellate inquiries that are frequently confused: legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence. A legal-sufficiency challenge asks whether the prosecution’s evidence adequately establishes the charged offenses as a matter of law. Morrison did not preserve that challenge because he failed to renew his motion for a trial order of dismissal after the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence.

That procedural default did not eliminate weight review. In evaluating whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court necessarily considered whether the prosecution proved every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court expressly recognized that a contrary result would not have been unreasonable. It therefore weighed the relative strength of conflicting testimony and competing inferences, while giving appropriate deference to the jury’s credibility determinations. This was not a conclusion that the evidence admitted only one possible interpretation; it was a determination that, after the required appellate assessment, the jury’s verdict should stand.

Two additional claims were unpreserved: the direct challenge to seating a prospective juror and the objection to the pathologist’s testimony concerning an intent to harm or kill. The court declined discretionary interest-of-justice review. That procedural disposition should not be mistaken for a substantive holding approving every aspect of the challenged testimony.

2. The evidence supported the elements of all four offenses

Offense Statutory requirement discussed Evidentiary significance
Second-degree murder
Penal Law § 125.25 (1)
Causing another person’s death with the intent to cause death. The victim suffered 65 stab wounds, and a substantial number were inflicted after incapacitation. The court held that these circumstances permitted an inference that causing death was Morrison’s conscious objective.
Tampering with physical evidence
Penal Law § 215.40 (2)
Suppressing evidence through concealment, alteration, or destruction, intending to prevent its use in an official or prospective official proceeding. Bloody footprints led between the bedroom and bathroom, where police found blood droplets and an apparently rinsed kitchen knife bearing the victim’s DNA. The knife’s visibility did not negate evidence of alteration.
Fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon
Penal Law § 265.01 (2)
Knowingly possessing a knife with intent to use it unlawfully against another. The circumstances of the stabbing supported the verdict. The opinion sustained this conviction without giving it the same separate discussion devoted to murder and tampering.
Endangering the welfare of a child
Penal Law § 260.10 (1)
Knowingly acting in a manner likely to injure the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child under 17. The victim’s three-year-old sister was present during the violence and was observed screaming and later crying. The court sustained the conviction as part of its overall weight determination.

The murder analysis illustrates how intent may be inferred from conduct rather than established by an express admission. The pathologist’s evidence about the number, distribution, and timing of wounds was especially important. Defensive wounds on the victim’s hands and evidence of limited movement during the stabbing reinforced the prosecution’s account.

The court nevertheless acknowledged evidence that could support competing inferences. Morrison had scratches, cuts, and a bite mark; a closed utility knife was found in the bedroom; and the pathologist conceded that he could not exclude every innocent explanation for Morrison’s injuries. Those facts did not require the appellate court to reject the verdict.

For tampering, the important distinction was between concealing an object and altering evidence associated with it. Penal Law § 215.40 (2) encompasses alteration as well as concealment. Accordingly, the fact that police could readily see the knife did not answer whether rinsing it was intended to prevent its evidentiary use. Nor did initial cooperation necessarily negate the inference arising from the knife’s condition and location.

3. Mental illness and legal nonresponsibility are not interchangeable

Under Penal Law § 40.15, Morrison had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, because of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either the nature and consequences of his conduct or that the conduct was wrong.

This defense has both a condition requirement and a functional requirement. Evidence of a psychiatric disorder does not alone establish the defense. The disorder must have caused the legally specified impairment at the time of the conduct.

The defense psychologist, Jacqueline Bashkoff, diagnosed a persecutory-type delusional disorder. Her testimony described disorganized thinking, perceived insults, and Morrison’s belief that others were arranging circumstances to portray him as a rapist or facilitate an attack. She concluded that he did not understand his conduct’s consequences or wrongfulness because he believed he was defending himself.

The prosecution’s psychiatrist, Stephan Price, disagreed. He found no mental disease or defect at the relevant time and concluded that Morrison understood his conduct and its wrongfulness. Price relied on the absence of persistent delusional beliefs during his examination, the psychiatric history available to him, and conduct suggesting awareness and reasoning. That conduct included misleading the emergency dispatcher and rinsing the knife. Price also considered Morrison’s account of removing the knife because he did not want to “overkill” the victim.

The appellate court did not simply declare one diagnosis medically correct. It held that the jury could credit Price’s account and that Bashkoff’s testimony did not clearly establish the necessary causal connection between the asserted disorder and the statutory incapacity. Under the governing appellate approach, conflicting expert testimony ordinarily presents a jury question unless a serious flaw undermines the prosecution expert’s testimony.

The allocation of burdens remained essential. Morrison bore the burden on his affirmative defense, but the prosecution retained its “primary and constant” obligation to prove every element of every offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Rejection of the defense did not itself establish murderous intent; the court separately identified the evidence supporting that element.

4. Restricted psychiatric statements could not establish justification

The justification issue provides the opinion’s clearest evidentiary lesson. Morrison told both examiners that the victim attacked him first. However, CPL 60.55 (2) rendered those statements inadmissible on any issue other than the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect.

The statements could therefore inform the experts’ assessment of Morrison’s mental condition without becoming general proof that the victim initiated a deadly attack. Their permissible use depended on the issue for which they were offered.

After excluding those statements from the justification inquiry, the court considered the remaining evidence in the light most favorable to Morrison. It found no reasonable view under which his use of deadly physical force was justified. The County Court therefore properly refused the requested instruction under Penal Law § 35.15 (2).

The holding is limited but important: asserting a mental-disease-or-defect defense does not automatically bar justification. Rather, a defendant seeking both defenses must have evidence legally available for the justification issue. Statements admitted for the restricted purpose specified in CPL 60.55 (2) cannot bridge an otherwise insufficient evidentiary foundation.

5. The summation ruling was contextual and alternatively based

The prosecutor commented on the exclusion of justification after defense counsel had alluded to its elements during summation without objection. The appellate court found the prosecutor’s comments appropriate in that context.

It also supplied an alternative reason for affirmance: even assuming impropriety, the comments were not misconduct so pervasive that they deprived Morrison of a fair trial. This does not create unrestricted permission to discuss excluded defenses. The ruling turns on the defense summation, the responsive context, and the absence of the level of prejudice necessary for reversal.

6. The disclosure claim failed on materiality and meaningful opportunity to use the evidence

The housemate who discovered the victim had brought a small pickaxe downstairs but left it in the hallway before entering the apartment. Morrison argued that the prosecution’s failure to disclose this information constituted a Brady violation.

The court assumed, without deciding, that the prosecution had an obligation to disclose the unrequested information. It nevertheless found no reasonable probability that earlier disclosure would have changed the result. The housemate’s possession of the pickaxe did not establish that Morrison’s use of deadly force against the victim was justified.

There was also a separate practical answer. Once the defense learned about the pickaxe, the housemate was recalled, allowing the defense to question her and use the information at trial. The court regarded that opportunity as meaningful.

The decision does not hold that delayed disclosure is always harmless whenever a witness can be recalled. Its reasoning depends on both the information’s limited materiality and the actual opportunity afforded to the defense in this trial.

7. Ineffective-assistance review depended on the record and the possibility of legitimate strategy

The court divided Morrison’s representation complaints into two categories.

Claims requiring additional facts. Whether counsel inadequately prepared the psychiatric defense, including by failing to provide Bashkoff with grand jury minutes before her evaluation, involved matters both within and outside the appellate record. Those claims were more appropriately pursued through CPL 440.10. The same was true of the allegation that counsel should have requested a competency hearing: the record did not establish Morrison’s ability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense.

The court did not find that these allegations were factually disproved. It identified the procedural setting in which the missing facts should be developed.

Claims assessable on the existing record. Applying New York’s meaningful-representation standard, the court rejected the remaining complaints:

  • Jury selection: The prospective juror agreed not to draw a negative inference if Morrison did not testify and assured the court of impartiality despite knowing someone who had been stabbed. Her use of “I think” did not make the assurance equivocal in context. Counsel’s decision to retain her could also have been strategic.
  • Extreme emotional disturbance: The record supplied possible strategic reasons not to pursue this affirmative defense, including Morrison’s calm presentation and the experts’ accounts of his emotional state. The court did not establish a categorical rule that calmness after a killing excludes the defense.
  • Intoxication: Evidence of marijuana use did not show impairment sufficient to prevent formation of the required intent. Counsel could reasonably forgo an intoxication instruction.
  • Forensic evidence: Counsel effectively elicited concessions from the pathologist concerning the possibility that Morrison’s injuries were not self-inflicted. The failure to retain another expert therefore did not establish the absence of a legitimate strategy.
  • Sentencing advocacy: Counsel submitted a supportive letter from Morrison’s mother and urged consideration of mental illness in mitigation.

The unifying principle was that an unsuccessful defense is not necessarily an inadequately presented defense. The court assessed counsel’s performance as a whole, in the circumstances existing at the time, rather than treating every omitted tactic as constitutionally deficient.

8. Sentence review remained discretionary and individualized

Under CPL 470.15 (6) (b), the appellate court could consider whether the sentences were unduly harsh or severe. It acknowledged the mitigating factors Morrison advanced but concluded that the particulars and severity of the crime did not justify reduction.

The ruling affirms the exercise of sentencing discretion in this case. It does not establish that maximum sentences are required whenever an intentional killing involves numerous wounds or a rejected mental-health defense. Nor does the opinion develop a separate rule governing the legality of consecutive sentences.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion draws on a substantial body of New York authority. The following discussion identifies the role each cited decision plays in the court’s reasoning, without attributing additional factual holdings to those authorities.

1. Preservation and appellate review of the evidence

  • People v Odofin, 153 AD3d 972, 974 [3d Dept 2017], supplies the direct preservation rule: failure to renew a dismissal motion after the prosecution’s rebuttal proof leaves the legal-sufficiency claim unpreserved. The court quotes it to dispose of Morrison’s standalone sufficiency argument.
  • People v Lyons, 200 AD3d 1222, 1225 n [3d Dept 2021], reinforces that renewal requirement. Its role is procedural rather than an assessment of the strength of the homicide evidence.
  • People v Lerario, 246 AD3d 1281, 1282-1283 [3d Dept 2026], establishes that weight review necessarily includes examination of whether the elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court cites it again when concluding that the verdict survives neutral review.
  • People v Gomez, 244 AD3d 1382, 1382 [3d Dept 2025], supports the same relationship between an unpreserved sufficiency argument and an available weight challenge. It helps explain why the court still examined the substantive proof.
  • People v Rahaman, 189 AD3d 1709, 1710-1711 [3d Dept 2020], provides the operative formulation for weighing conflicting testimony and competing inferences when an acquittal would not have been unreasonable.
  • People v Oquendo, 248 AD3d 1325, 1326 [3d Dept 2026], confirms that weight-review framework. Together, these authorities support an independent appellate assessment that still respects the jury’s superior opportunity to evaluate witnesses.

2. Burdens of proof and competing psychiatric testimony

  • People v Kohl, 72 NY2d 191, 193 [1988], supplies the foundational rule that the prosecution’s burden to prove all offense elements beyond a reasonable doubt remains “primary and constant.” It prevents the defendant’s burden on the affirmative defense from displacing the prosecution’s obligations.
  • People v Gilbert, 199 AD3d 1048, 1049 [3d Dept 2021], supports the statutory requirements and preponderance burden governing the mental-disease-or-defect defense. Its repeated use connects the governing test, resolution of expert disagreement, and ultimate finding that Morrison failed to carry his burden.
  • People v Demagall, 114 AD3d 189, 192-193 [3d Dept 2014], provides the central appellate-restraint principle: conflicting expert opinions on criminal responsibility ordinarily present a jury question, with intervention warranted when the prosecution expert’s testimony contains a serious flaw.
  • People v Leppanen, 218 AD3d 995, 997 [3d Dept 2023], is cited in accord with that principle. It reinforces that expert disagreement alone is insufficient to overturn the jury’s determination.
  • People v Reese, 166 AD3d 1057, 1061 [3d Dept 2018], supports leaving intact the jury’s decision to credit Price over Bashkoff. The citation is directed to the legitimacy of the jury’s credibility choice, not to a rule favoring psychiatrists over psychologists.

3. Intent, evidence tampering, and the overall verdict

  • People v Chancey, 127 AD3d 1409, 1411 [3d Dept 2015], supports inferring homicidal intent from the circumstances of the attack. Here, the repeated wounds and evidence of incapacitation supplied the relevant factual foundation.
  • People v Moore, 118 AD3d 916, 917 [2d Dept 2014], provides additional support for that inference. Its use confirms that intent may be established circumstantially through the nature of the violence.
  • People v Mercer, 221 AD3d 1259, 1264 [3d Dept 2023], supports rejecting the argument that an openly left knife and initial cooperation necessarily defeat evidence tampering. The statutory inquiry encompasses alteration intended to prevent evidentiary use, not merely successful concealment.
  • People v Cilberg, 255 AD2d 698, 699 [3d Dept 1998], supports the final conclusion that the verdict was consistent with the weight of the evidence. It appears alongside People v Lerario at the point where the court completes its neutral review.

4. The threshold for a justification instruction

  • People v Heiserman, 39 NY3d 988, 990 [2022], supplies authority for examining whether any reasonable view of the evidence, considered favorably to the defendant, supports justification. The court applied that test only to evidence legally available for that issue.
  • People v Saylor, 173 AD3d 1489, 1492-1493 [3d Dept 2019], provides further support for refusing an unsupported justification charge. Neither authority eliminates the defendant-favorable perspective; both operate within the requirement of an adequate evidentiary foundation.

The limitation on the psychiatric statements itself rests directly on CPL 60.55 (2). The justification precedents govern the next step: assessing whether the remaining evidence meets the instruction threshold.

5. Prosecutorial comments and trial fairness

  • People v Monahan, 250 AD3d 1256, 1267 [3d Dept 2026], supports the alternative conclusion that the challenged summation remarks did not amount to misconduct so pervasive as to deny a fair trial.
  • People v Wilson, 61 AD3d 1269, 1271-1272 [3d Dept 2009], reinforces that fair-trial assessment. These authorities explain why even assumed impropriety would not necessarily require reversal.

6. Disclosure materiality and effective use of delayed information

  • People v Giuca, 33 NY3d 462, 474 [2019], supplies the reasonable-probability materiality standard used to evaluate whether timely disclosure could have changed the outcome.
  • People v Saunders, 244 AD3d 1581, 1586 [3d Dept 2025], supports applying that standard to reject reversal on this record. The pickaxe information did not materially establish justification for the killing.
  • People v Cortijo, 70 NY2d 868, 870 [1987], provides the separate principle that the defense must have a meaningful opportunity to use allegedly exculpatory information in cross-examination or its own case.
  • People v Barney, 295 AD2d 1001, 1002 [4th Dept 2002], reinforces that opportunity-to-use analysis. Recalling the housemate was significant because it permitted actual trial use of the information after discovery.

7. Claims requiring collateral factual development

  • People v Brown, 248 AD3d 1415, 1418 [3d Dept 2026], supports addressing ineffective-assistance allegations involving both record and nonrecord matters through CPL 440.10.
  • People v Dorvil, 234 AD3d 1106, 1117 [3d Dept 2025], supports the same procedural treatment. These decisions explain why the adequacy of counsel’s preparation of the psychiatric defense was not finally resolved on direct appeal.
  • People v Kot, 126 AD3d 1022, 1025 [3d Dept 2015], appears as a comparison in the competency discussion. Its role highlights the significance of what the appellate record does—or does not—show about a defendant’s ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.
  • People v Passino, 25 AD3d 817, 818 [3d Dept 2006], supports developing the competency-related ineffective-assistance allegation through CPL 440.10 where the necessary supporting facts are absent from the record.

8. Meaningful representation and jury-selection strategy

  • People v Dunham, 231 AD3d 1437, 1439 [3d Dept 2024], states the totality-based meaningful-representation standard, evaluated in light of the evidence, law, circumstances, and timing of counsel’s performance.
  • People v Wright, 25 NY3d 769, 779 [2015], provides further support for that governing approach. These authorities frame the court’s assessment of counsel’s overall performance rather than isolated imperfections.
  • People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 418-419 [2002], supports evaluating a prospective juror’s assurances in context. It informs the conclusion that the juror’s responses adequately addressed the concerns raised during questioning.
  • People v Clark, 244 AD3d 1613, 1615 [3d Dept 2025], reinforces the contextual assessment of impartiality, including whether qualifying language actually makes an assurance equivocal.
  • People v Colburn, 123 AD3d 1292, 1297 [3d Dept 2014], similarly supports the conclusion that the phrase “I think” did not, in these circumstances, invalidate the juror’s assurance.
  • People v Gibson, 240 AD3d 1054, 1059 [3d Dept 2025], supplies the additional point that jury selection is quintessentially tactical. Morrison did not establish the absence of a strategic explanation for retaining the juror.

9. Alternative defenses and forensic preparation

  • People v George, 242 AD3d 1447, 1453 [3d Dept 2025], supports finding a possible strategic basis for declining an extreme-emotional-disturbance defense in light of the evidence concerning Morrison’s demeanor and emotional presentation.
  • People v Schumaker, 136 AD3d 1369, 1372 [4th Dept 2016], provides additional support for rejecting that ineffective-assistance claim. The question was counsel’s reasonable strategic choice, not whether every conceivable alternative defense had been attempted.
  • People v Harris, 95 NY2d 316, 320 [2000], is cited comparatively. The comparison signals that the viability of such an omitted-defense claim depends on the particular record rather than a categorical rule.
  • People v Sirico, 17 NY3d 744, 745 [2011], supports requiring evidence that intoxication affected the capacity to form the relevant intent; evidence of consumption alone was insufficient here.
  • People v Pagan, 155 AD3d 779, 781-782 [2d Dept 2017], reinforces the conclusion that counsel could strategically forgo an intoxication charge on this evidentiary record.
  • People v Sposito, 193 AD3d 1236, 1240 [3d Dept 2021], supports rejecting the claim based on failure to retain a rebuttal expert. Effective cross-examination of the prosecution’s pathologist provided a legitimate alternative means of contesting the injury evidence.

10. Sentencing advocacy and appellate sentence review

  • People v Lindsey, 172 AD3d 1764, 1768 [3d Dept 2019], supports finding meaningful representation at sentencing where counsel presented mitigation and advocated for the defendant.
  • People v Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746 [3d Dept 2002], provides additional support for that conclusion. Counsel’s submission of the mother’s letter and reliance on mental-health mitigation were central to the application.
  • People v Brisman, 43 NY3d 322, 330-331 [2025], supplies general guidance for appellate review of whether a sentence is unduly harsh or severe. The court considered mitigation but declined discretionary reduction given the crime’s particulars and severity.

11. The additional unpreserved claims

  • People v Pascuzzi, 173 AD3d 1367, 1375 [3d Dept 2019], is cited in the footnote addressing preservation of the prospective-juror challenge.
  • People v Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1131 [3d Dept 2015], is cited alongside it concerning preservation of the objection to the pathologist’s intent-related testimony.

These authorities support procedural dispositions. Because the court declined discretionary corrective action under CPL 470.15 (3) (c) and (6) (a), those rulings should not be expanded into substantive resolutions of the unpreserved objections.

C. Potential Impact and Limits

1. Evidence must be matched to its authorized purpose

The opinion is especially useful where defendants advance both psychiatric nonresponsibility and justification. Counsel must distinguish evidence admissible to explain a mental-health opinion from evidence admissible to prove the historical circumstances necessary for self-defense. A single statement may be relevant to both subjects but legally usable for only one.

2. Psychiatric defenses require a functional and causal showing

Future litigants cannot rely solely on a diagnostic label. Expert testimony should connect the asserted disorder to the defendant’s substantial inability to appreciate the conduct’s nature, consequences, or wrongfulness at the relevant time. The decision also confirms that postoffense behavior may inform the responsibility inquiry, without making any one behavior conclusive.

3. The knife’s recoverability does not resolve tampering

The decision reinforces the distinction between recovering an object and recovering it in an unaltered evidentiary condition. An openly accessible item may still have been altered with the prohibited intent. The prosecution must nevertheless prove the statutory mental elements; the opinion does not make every act of cleaning an object criminal.

4. Late disclosure requires a practical prejudice assessment

The pickaxe ruling emphasizes both outcome-related materiality and the defense’s actual ability to use information. Future courts will need to examine whether recall or other remedial measures genuinely preserved a meaningful opportunity, not simply whether disclosure occurred before the verdict.

5. Direct appeal and collateral review remain distinct

The treatment of psychiatric preparation and competency claims illustrates the limits of an appellate record. Lawyers pursuing such claims may need evidence of communications, preparation, observations, or evaluations that the trial transcript does not contain. Routing those allegations to CPL 440.10 preserves the distinction between an insufficient record and a merits rejection.

6. The holding should not be overstated

The opinion does not establish that mental illness is irrelevant to intent, that a calm defendant cannot have acted under extreme emotional disturbance, that delayed disclosure is automatically cured by recall, or that a mental-health defense precludes justification. Its significance lies in applying separate evidentiary rules, burdens, and procedural standards to each issue.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Legal sufficiency
Whether the prosecution presented legally adequate proof of the charged offenses. Appellate review ordinarily requires a properly preserved objection.
Weight of the evidence
A broader appellate assessment of the evidence’s persuasiveness, including conflicting testimony and competing inferences, with appropriate respect for the jury’s credibility decisions.
Affirmative defense
A defense the accused must establish under the applicable burden. Here, Morrison had to prove lack of criminal responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance of the evidence
Proof that something is more likely true than not. It is a lower burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mental disease or defect
For this defense, the important question is not diagnosis alone, but whether the condition caused the substantial incapacity specified in Penal Law § 40.15.
Justification
A legal basis for conduct that would otherwise be criminal, such as qualifying defensive force. The jury receives the instruction only when a reasonable view of admissible evidence supports it.
Limited-purpose evidence
Evidence usable for one issue but not another. Morrison’s statements to the examiners could bear on criminal responsibility without proving justification.
Competency and criminal responsibility
Competency concerns the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and participate in the defense. Criminal responsibility concerns the defendant’s legally relevant mental capacity when the offense occurred.
Extreme emotional disturbance
A distinct affirmative defense potentially mitigating an intentional homicide. It is not interchangeable with mental disease or defect, intoxication, or justification.
Brady materiality
The requirement that withheld favorable information be sufficiently important to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome if timely disclosed.
CPL 440.10 motion
A postjudgment procedure that can permit factual development of claims that cannot adequately be resolved from the trial record alone.

5. Conclusion

People v Morrison reinforces the need to keep criminal intent, psychiatric nonresponsibility, and justification analytically separate. Its central evidentiary lesson is that statements restricted to the mental-responsibility inquiry cannot establish a separate justification defense.

The decision also confirms the importance of preserving objections, connecting psychiatric diagnoses to statutory incapacity, evaluating delayed disclosure in practical context, and developing nonrecord representation claims through the proper collateral procedure. The unanimous affirmance rests on these established distinctions rather than a broad new restriction on mental-health defenses.