People v. Merino: CPL 420.45 Voids Real-Property Instruments Beyond Forgery When a False-Instrument Conviction Triggers a Rebuttable Presumption

Appellate Division, Second Department (Quirk, J.) — 2026 NY Slip Op 05196 (Decided Sept. 2, 2026)

1. Introduction

People v. Merino addresses the scope and operation of CPL 420.45—New York’s statutory procedure (enacted in 2019 and later expanded) that allows a district attorney, on behalf of a victim, to seek an order declaring a real-property instrument “void ab initio” following certain criminal convictions. The dispute arose after a Brooklyn deed was recorded in a scheme in which Elizabeth Merino and her son, Bryan Merino, defrauded Elizabeth’s mother (the homeowner, Marta Merino) and obtained loan proceeds secured by a mortgage.

The key issues on appeal were raised by a nonparty lender, Bil-Man Asset Management, LLC, which argued that CPL 420.45 should be limited to forged deeds and that the People failed to prove forgery; it also claimed it rebutted the statute’s presumption that the deed was void from inception.

Parties and posture

  • Respondent: The People of the State of New York (Kings County District Attorney).
  • Defendants: Elizabeth Merino and Bryan Merino (pleaded guilty to larceny-related charges; Elizabeth also pleaded guilty to offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree).
  • Nonparty-appellant: Bil-Man Asset Management, LLC (lender affected by the property’s title issues).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department affirmed an order declaring the May 21, 2019 deed void ab initio under CPL 420.45. The court held:

  • CPL 420.45 is not limited to deeds containing forged signatures; it covers instruments containing “false statement or false information” tied to convictions under Penal Law §§ 175.30 or 175.35 (at the relevant time).
  • The People established the statute’s rebuttable presumption of voidness because Elizabeth Merino pleaded guilty to Penal Law § 175.35 in connection with an instrument material to a residential real-property transfer.
  • The lender’s submissions—speculation about family dynamics and references to a notary’s grand jury testimony and a civil complaint—did not rebut the statutory presumption.
  • The People were not required to overcome a purported “presumption of due execution” based on notarization because CPL 420.45’s focus is the qualifying criminal conviction and falsity in the instrument, not proof of a forged signature.
  • A facial constitutional challenge to CPL 420.45 was not properly before the court, and the court declined to reach it in the interest of justice.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Statutory interpretation methodology

  • People v Hernandez, 44 NY3d 630; and People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199: The court relied on these cases for the core interpretive rule that legislative intent is best discerned from statutory text, and that plain language is the “clearest indicator” of intent. In Merino, this methodology drove the court to reject a forgery-only limitation because nothing in CPL 420.45’s text imposed it.
  • Matter of Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker, 42 NY3d 46; and Matter of T-Mobile Northeast, LLC v DeBellis, 32 NY3d 594: These reinforced the “plain language first” principle and supported the court’s view that it should not add limitations the Legislature did not enact.

Substantive real-property doctrines (void vs. voidable)

  • Faison v Lewis, 25 NY3d 220: Cited for the rule that a deed with a forged signature is void ab initio. The lender invoked this doctrinal backdrop to argue CPL 420.45 should track the forgery category. The court used Faison to acknowledge the traditional property-law distinction—but then distinguished the statutory inquiry under CPL 420.45.
  • Marden v Dorthy, 160 NY 39: Cited for the complementary proposition: when the true owner actually signed, but was induced by fraud, the deed is generally voidable (not void from inception) and can still allow good-faith encumbrancers to obtain protection. The court cited Marden to show the rule the lender wanted applied—then held CPL 420.45 can produce a different outcome by legislative design.

Examples of “false information” offenses not limited to forgery

  • Matter of Jacques, 247 AD3d 40: Used as an illustration that “offering a false instrument” encompasses false information schemes beyond signature forgery.
  • People v Decker, 218 AD3d 1026: Cited similarly to show Penal Law §§ 175.30 and 175.35 reach false information (e.g., income information), reinforcing that CPL 420.45’s trigger offenses are broader than forgery.

CPL 420.45 practice and remedies affecting third parties

  • People v Morgan, 78 Misc 3d 1122 (Sup Ct, Queens County): Played two roles: (1) supporting that the CPL 420.45 presumption applies once the statutory prerequisites are met; and (2) supporting the court’s point that even if an instrument is voided, affected bona fide lenders/purchasers may have other remedies (including via restitution orders).

Preservation and appellate review limits

  • People v Lawrence, 226 AD3d 827: Cited to support the court’s refusal to entertain an unpreserved facial constitutional challenge and its decision not to reach the issue via interest-of-justice jurisdiction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) CPL 420.45 is not “forgery-only”

The central move in the opinion is textual. The court noted that CPL former 420.45(3) creates a rebuttable presumption of voidness where a party is convicted of Penal Law § 175.30 or § 175.35 in connection with an instrument material to a residential real-property transfer. Those Penal Law provisions criminalize offering an instrument for filing “knowing that [it] contains a false statement or false information,” with § 175.35 adding intent to defraud the state (or related public entities) in relevant circumstances.

Because the Penal Law triggers focus on false statements/false information—not forged signatures—the court reasoned that CPL 420.45 likewise cannot be judicially narrowed to forgery-only instruments. The court further reinforced this reading by pointing to CPL former 420.45(4), which requires the voiding order to describe “the nature of the false statement or false information contained in such instrument.” That statutory phrase, tracking the Penal Law, would be oddly underinclusive if CPL 420.45 were limited to forged signatures.

(B) Legislative choice to broaden the statute confirms the reading

The court cited legislative history describing CPL 420.45 as a mechanism akin to enabling a DA to move to “quiet title” on behalf of an aggrieved homeowner after a criminal conviction tied to the instrument transferring the property. It also noted the 2023 amendment (effective Dec. 14, 2023) expanded the statute from specified false-instrument crimes tied to residential transfers to “any crime that affects the title to, encumbrance of, or the possession of, real property,” and likewise broadened the presumption. This expansion supported the conclusion that the Legislature was moving outward, not inward.

(C) Relationship to common-law property protections (void vs. voidable)

The lender’s strongest normative argument was that New York’s common-law distinction (forged deeds are void; fraudulently induced signatures yield voidable deeds potentially protective of good-faith encumbrancers) should limit CPL 420.45. The court rejected that as a matter of statutory interpretation: CPL 420.45 presents “a separate issue,” keyed to the existence of a qualifying conviction connected to a material instrument. Where statutory text and legislative history support a potentially different outcome from common-law real property rules, the court held the Legislature’s design controls.

Importantly, the court did not treat third-party lender interests as irrelevant; it observed (citing People v Morgan) that lenders may have other remedies, and it highlighted that this case involved restitution orders, suggesting the criminal process can address lender losses even if the title instrument is voided.

(D) Application of the statutory presumption; burden shifting

Once the People showed the statutory prerequisites—Elizabeth Merino’s guilty plea to Penal Law § 175.35 in connection with a deed material to transfer of residential real property—the rebuttable presumption attached that the deed was void ab initio. The court held the appellant’s counterarguments were speculative or insufficient:

  • Speculation based on the familial relationship did not establish a legitimate transfer agreement.
  • The notary’s grand jury testimony (that he had never seen the mother before the grand jury proceeding) did not rebut the presumption.
  • The mother’s civil complaint did not rebut the presumption.

(E) Notarization and “presumption of due execution” did not control

The lender argued the People had to overcome a presumption of due execution because the deed was notarized. The court treated this as misframing: CPL 420.45’s operative question was not “was the signature forged?” but “was there a qualifying conviction tied to an instrument containing false statement/false information?” Thus, notarization did not impose an additional People’s burden to prove forgery as a condition of CPL 420.45 relief.

(F) Unreached facial constitutional challenge

The court declined to reach the appellant’s facial constitutional claim because it was not properly before the court and the panel chose not to invoke interest-of-justice review. Practically, Merino leaves constitutional questions about CPL 420.45 for future cases with proper preservation and record development.

3.3. Impact

(1) Clarifies CPL 420.45’s scope: falsity, not forgery

The decision provides a clear appellate statement that CPL 420.45 (at least in its pre-2023 form and by logical extension in its broadened form) is not confined to forged deeds. This matters because many title-fraud schemes involve misrepresentations, fabricated authority, or other “false information” that may not fit classic forgery disputes, yet still compromise real property transfers.

(2) Strengthens the practical force of the statutory presumption

The court applied the rebuttable presumption in a way that signals meaningful burden shifting: once the qualifying conviction and nexus to a material instrument are established, third parties must come forward with substantial rebuttal proof, not conjecture or collateral ambiguity.

(3) Interaction with bona fide lender/purchaser expectations

By acknowledging (without resolving in detail) that voiding an instrument may collide with common-law protections for good-faith encumbrancers, Merino signals that CPL 420.45 can re-order outcomes traditionally governed by the void/voidable distinction. Lenders and purchasers in New York should expect more litigation over:

  • What counts as sufficient rebuttal evidence under CPL 420.45(3).
  • How restitution, civil remedies, or title insurance respond when an instrument is voided “from inception.”
  • How the post-2023 “any crime that affects title/encumbrance/possession” expansion is applied in mixed civil-criminal fact patterns.

(4) Litigation behavior and prosecutorial practice

Prosecutors are likely to use CPL 420.45 more aggressively in property-related fraud cases because Merino confirms that a false-instrument conviction can yield powerful title-clearing relief without requiring the People to prove “forgery” in the property-law sense. Defense counsel and interested third parties, in turn, should focus on the hearing record and rebuttal evidence, not solely on attacking forgery proof.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Void ab initio”: Treated as invalid from the start—legally as though it never existed—so it cannot pass title as a valid deed would.
  • “Voidable”: Potentially valid unless and until set aside by a court; meanwhile, it can sometimes support downstream rights of good-faith purchasers or lenders.
  • “Rebuttable presumption” (CPL 420.45[3]): A rule that assumes the instrument is void once statutory conditions are met, unless the opposing party proves otherwise with sufficient evidence.
  • “Offering a false instrument for filing” (Penal Law §§ 175.30, 175.35): Presenting a document to be filed/recorded with a public office while knowing it contains false information; § 175.35 adds a heightened intent-to-defraud component in specified contexts.
  • “Presumption of due execution” (notarization concept): A common evidentiary idea that a notarized document is presumed properly executed. Merino held that this does not displace CPL 420.45’s conviction-based framework.
  • “Quiet title”: A lawsuit (or, here, a statutory mechanism) aimed at resolving competing claims to real property and clarifying who owns it.
  • “Restitution”: A criminal-court order requiring a convicted person to repay victims for losses caused by the crime (here, tied to the loan proceeds).

5. Conclusion

People v. Merino cements an important operational rule for CPL 420.45: the statute is not limited to forged deeds and does not require proof of forgery to void a recorded instrument. Instead, when the People show a qualifying conviction (here, Penal Law § 175.35) connected to an instrument material to a real-property transfer, CPL 420.45 supplies a rebuttable presumption that the instrument is void ab initio, and speculative or collateral disputes will not suffice to overcome it.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its willingness to let CPL 420.45’s text and purpose override traditional property-law distinctions between void and voidable deeds—while gesturing to restitution and other remedies as potential off-ramps for affected good-faith lenders and purchasers.