People v Kurowicki: Denial of Postconviction Leave for Failure to Satisfy MCR 6.508(D) Despite Proffered New Impeachment Evidence

Introduction

In People of Michigan v. Joel Dean Kurowicki (Mich Sup Ct, May 15, 2026; SC: 168409), the Michigan Supreme Court issued a short order denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals’ denial of postconviction relief. Defendant, convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (MCL 750.520b(1)(a)) based on allegations that he repeatedly sexually abused his stepson (WH), sought relief through his first motion for relief from judgment, proffering posttrial materials intended to impeach WH’s credibility—specifically, evidence suggesting WH had made false accusations of abuse against others.

The case presented two interlocking questions typical of Michigan postconviction practice: (1) whether defendant could clear the procedural and substantive bars of MCR 6.508(D), and (2) whether new impeachment evidence concerning the complainant’s alleged history of false allegations could make a different result probable on retrial (or establish prejudice under an ineffective-assistance framework).

Summary of the Opinion (Order and Dissent)

Majority order: The Court denied leave because defendant “failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).” The order did not elaborate on admissibility, materiality, or prejudice.

Welch, J., dissenting (joined by Bolden, J.): The dissent would have remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. Justice Welch emphasized that the trial was “essentially a credibility contest” between defendant and WH, and that the new evidence—police and affidavit materials suggesting WH made false accusations against PW, “Leandro,” and Benjamin Rickard— could materially affect WH’s credibility. The dissent also indicated the evidence likely would be admissible under MRE 608, and distinguished the prosecution’s reliance on People v Musser, 494 Mich 337 (2013). In a footnote, the dissent questioned the lower courts’ earlier application of the rape-shield statute to exclude evidence that WH sexually assaulted KH.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Postconviction gatekeeping: MCR 6.508(D) and related standards

  • People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50 n 11 (2008): Cited for the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel may supply the “good cause” needed to overcome the procedural bar in MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a). The dissent uses Gardner to argue defendant “probably satisfies” the procedural hurdle because he claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the impeachment evidence.
  • People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692 (2003): Provides the “newly discovered evidence” materiality standard that the dissent frames as central: whether the new evidence “would make a different result probable on retrial.” Justice Welch’s dissent is structured around this inquiry, emphasizing the thin corroboration at trial and the potential power of credibility impeachment in a case that turned on WH’s testimony.
  • People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 400-401 (1995): Cited for the prejudice component of ineffective assistance. The dissent treats Reed as an alternative route to relief: even if framed as counsel’s omission rather than “newly discovered evidence” strictly speaking, defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different outcome (prejudice).

2) Impeachment, credibility, and limits on testimony

  • People v Musser, 494 Mich 337 (2013): Raised by the prosecution to argue inadmissibility. The dissent distinguishes Musser as a case about a police officer improperly vouching for a complainant’s credibility (bolstering), not about the defense impeaching a complainant with prior false allegations. The distinction matters because impeachment by prior false allegations implicates confrontation and credibility in a direct way.
  • People v Butler, 513 Mich 24, 31-32 (2024) and People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 348-349 (1984): The dissent relies on these cases for the principle that a complainant’s history of making false allegations may be admissible for impeachment purposes. They underpin the dissent’s view that the proffered materials could be used to attack WH’s credibility.
  • People v Williams, 191 Mich App 269, 272 (1991): Quoted for the proposition that prior false accusations “directly bear on the victim’s credibility” and that preclusion can “unconstitutionally abridge the defendant’s right to confrontation.” The dissent uses Williams to connect evidentiary admissibility with constitutional confrontation principles.

3) Rape-shield doctrine and its purpose (raised in dissent footnote)

  • People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1, 10 (1982) and People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347-348 (1984): Cited in the dissent’s footnote to describe the rape-shield statute’s general operation—excluding evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct when offered to prove consent or for “general impeachment.”
  • People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313, 324 (2018) and People v LaLone, 432 Mich 103, 123-124 (1989): Used to explain the historical and legislative rationale of rape-shield protections (i.e., countering stereotypes about fabrication and “chastity” as probative of consent). The dissent invokes these cases to question whether rape-shield principles should extend to evidence that the complainant previously raped someone—suggesting possible overextension in the lower courts’ pretrial rulings.

Legal Reasoning

What the Court did (and did not) decide: The majority’s denial order is conclusory: it applies MCR 6.508(D) and finds defendant did not carry his burden. Because the order contains no reasoning beyond the rule citation, its operative legal effect is narrow: it denies discretionary review and leaves intact the lower courts’ rejection of postconviction relief.

The dissent’s reasoning, step-by-step:

  1. Trial posture was credibility-driven. Justice Welch characterizes the case as “essentially a credibility contest” between defendant and WH, with limited corroboration. PW’s testimony that a physician found no physical evidence of abuse despite WH’s claim of daily anal penetration is emphasized as a fact that could heighten the importance of credibility assessment.
  2. New evidence targets the hinge point: WH’s truthfulness. The new materials (police report re PW/“Leandro”; affidavit re Rickard) are framed not as tangential, but as direct impeachment suggesting WH made false accusations of physical/sexual abuse.
  3. Admissibility likely under MRE 608. The dissent invokes:
    • MRE 608(a) (reputation/opinion for truthfulness/untruthfulness), and
    • MRE 608(b) (specific instances of conduct on cross-examination if probative of character for truthfulness)
    to argue that, at least as a threshold matter, the impeachment evidence may come in—undercutting the prosecution’s inadmissibility theory.
  4. Musser is not controlling on this issue. Because People v Musser dealt with improper vouching, the dissent treats it as inapposite to defense-led impeachment with alleged prior false accusations.
  5. Materiality/prejudice is plausible under Cress/Reed. Given the lack of physical corroboration and the centrality of WH’s testimony, the dissent finds it plausible that the new impeachment could “make a different result probable on retrial” (People v Cress) and/or demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s omission (People v Reed).

Impact

Immediate doctrinal impact (limited): Because the Court issued a denial order without substantive explanation, it does not meaningfully develop Michigan law on newly discovered evidence, impeachment, or rape-shield doctrine. The practical result is procedural: defendants seeking postconviction relief on similar grounds must still overcome the stringent burdens of MCR 6.508(D) in the trial court and Court of Appeals without new guidance from the Supreme Court.

Persuasive and practical impact (from the dissent): The dissent may influence future litigants and lower courts by:

  • Highlighting that, in “credibility contest” prosecutions, impeachment-only new evidence can be outcome-determinative, particularly where corroboration is minimal.
  • Emphasizing MRE 608 as a pathway for using evidence of alleged prior false accusations to attack a complainant’s truthfulness, consistent with People v Butler and People v Hackett.
  • Signaling continued controversy over the scope of the rape-shield statute when the excluded evidence concerns allegations that the complainant was a perpetrator (as raised in the dissent’s footnote).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MCR 6.508(D): Michigan’s rule limiting postconviction relief. It includes bars for issues already decided and imposes procedural requirements (like “good cause” for not raising issues earlier) and substantive requirements (like showing prejudice).
  • Motion for relief from judgment: A postconviction request asking the trial court to set aside a conviction based on errors such as constitutional violations, newly discovered evidence, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • “Newly discovered evidence” (People v Cress): Evidence found after trial that, if a new trial were held, would probably change the outcome. The dissent’s point is that credibility impeachment can satisfy this in a case that depended on one witness’s truthfulness.
  • Ineffective assistance prejudice (People v Reed): Even if counsel performed poorly, relief requires showing that the mistake likely mattered— i.e., there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different.
  • MRE 608(a) and (b): Rules about attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness. They allow (a) reputation/opinion evidence and, in limited circumstances, (b) inquiry into specific acts on cross-examination if those acts are genuinely probative of truthfulness.
  • Rape-shield statute: Generally prevents using a complainant’s sexual history to imply consent or attack credibility by “general impeachment.” The dissent questions whether it should block evidence that a complainant previously committed sexual assault (a different use than suggesting consent).

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in People v Kurowicki leaves the conviction undisturbed on the ground that defendant failed to satisfy MCR 6.508(D). The dissent, however, offers a detailed roadmap for why this case warranted appellate scrutiny: where the prosecution’s case turns almost entirely on a complainant’s credibility, evidence suggesting prior false accusations may be admissible under MRE 608 and may be material enough to satisfy People v Cress (or prejudice under People v Reed). Although not binding, the dissent underscores an enduring postconviction tension in Michigan criminal practice—how strictly to apply procedural finality rules when newly developed impeachment evidence could substantially alter the credibility calculus that drove the verdict.