People v Haupt: An Uncounseled Suppression Hearing Can Be a “Critical Stage” Triggering Automatic Reversal Absent a Valid MCR 6.005(D) Waiver

1. Introduction

People v Haupt addresses a recurring and practically important Sixth Amendment problem: what happens when a trial court, frustrated by counsel conflicts and delay, effectively compels a defendant to proceed without counsel in pretrial litigation—particularly litigation over admissibility of core evidence—without securing a valid, on-the-record waiver compliant with MCR 6.005(D) and People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 (1976).

Defendant Alexander J. Haupt was prosecuted for producing, distributing, and possessing child sexually abusive material (CSAM) and related offenses after warrants led police to images, communications, and an audio file recovered from his phone. The central procedural issue was not the merits of the warrants but whether Haupt was unconstitutionally left to litigate key pretrial matters—most importantly his July 2, 2019 motion to suppress—without counsel, after the court converted appointed counsel into “advisory” counsel without obtaining a renewed, valid waiver and without advising Haupt of his continuing right to counsel.

The parties’ dispute crystallized into three questions the Court itself posed for argument: (1) whether Haupt validly waived counsel after withdrawals; (2) whether he forfeited counsel by misconduct as in People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98 (2014); and (3) whether the relevant uncounseled periods were “critical stages.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Michigan Supreme Court (Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH, THOMAS, and HOOD) held that:

• The trial court did not substantially comply with People v Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) when it required Haupt to proceed without counsel after granting appointed counsel’s withdrawal (and leaving only “advisory” counsel). Thus, there was no valid waiver for that period.
• Assuming (without deciding) that a forfeiture-by-conduct doctrine exists in Michigan, Haupt’s conduct did not amount to forfeiture because it did not resemble the “purposeful and defiant obstruction” in People v Kammeraad.
• The July 2, 2019 suppression hearing—on the admissibility of phone evidence closely tied to guilt—was a critical stage. Being unrepresented then was a structural error requiring automatic reversal under People v King, 512 Mich 1 (2023).

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated convictions and sentences, and remanded for a new trial.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Michigan right-to-counsel and waiver framework

• People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 (1976): Anderson supplies Michigan’s constitutional/common-law waiver safeguards for self-representation: the request must be unequivocal; waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and self-representation must not disrupt proceedings.
  Influence: Haupt relies on Anderson to reject the idea that a court may infer self-representation from conflict, frustration, or a defendant’s difficulties with counsel—particularly where the defendant does not actually request to proceed pro se.
• MCR 6.005(D) and People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412 (1994): Dennany characterizes the court rule as directing “the timing and substance” of the inquiry when a defendant indicates a desire to proceed pro se.
  Influence: Haupt applies MCR 6.005(D) as a mandatory on-the-record gatekeeper: before an “initial waiver,” the court must advise of charge/penalties/risks and offer consultation with retained or appointed counsel. The Court faults the trial court for failing to advise of the continuing right to counsel after counsel was reduced to advisory status.
• People v Russell, 471 Mich 182 (2004): Russell articulates “substantial compliance” and the need for a colloquy plus an express finding that the defendant understands the waiver.
  Influence: Used to confirm that the trial court’s June 10, 2019 handling fell well short of substantial compliance.
• People v Williams, 470 Mich 634 (2004): Cited for the baseline proposition that defendants facing incarceration have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical stages, applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
  Influence: Frames the constitutional floor; the dispute becomes whether the challenged event is a “critical stage” and whether there was a valid waiver.
• People v King, 512 Mich 1 (2023): King is the case’s doctrinal pivot. It holds that violations of MCR 6.005(D) resulting in deprivation of counsel at a critical stage are structural and require automatic reversal; standby counsel does not cure an invalid waiver.
  Influence: Haupt operationalizes King: once the Court of Appeals acknowledged an invalid waiver, the only remaining question was whether a critical stage occurred while uncounseled. If yes, reversal is automatic.
• People v Carines, 460 Mich 750 (1999): Carines is the ordinary plain-error framework that the original Court of Appeals panel used to deny relief.
  Influence: Haupt shows Carines yields to King when the error is structural deprivation of counsel at a critical stage (and reinforces King’s point that requiring a pro se defendant to object to an invalid waiver is impractical).

B. Forfeiture-by-conduct and related doctrines

• People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98 (2014): Kammeraad adopted a forfeiture-of-counsel doctrine in “rare” and “exceptionally egregious” circumstances involving defiant nonparticipation and obstruction.
  Influence: Haupt distinguishes Kammeraad factually and declines to endorse forfeiture doctrine broadly; even if it exists, it did not apply because Haupt did not refuse the courtroom, refuse participation, or deploy the kind of purposeful obstruction seen in Kammeraad.

C. “Critical stage” doctrine and suppression hearings

• United States v Wade, 388 US 218 (1967): Wade provides the canonical statement: an accused must not “stand alone against the State” at any stage where counsel’s absence might derogate from the right to a fair trial.
  Influence: Supplies the normative anchor for treating adversarial pretrial confrontations about evidence as potentially critical.
• Van v Jones, 475 F3d 292 (CA 6, 2007): Van catalogues multiple formulations of “critical stage” and emphasizes assessing the likelihood of significant consequences from counsel’s absence, including whether the defendant later had a chance to “recover” a lost privilege.
  Influence: The Michigan Supreme Court uses Van as an analytical guide: it asks whether Haupt later had a meaningful opportunity to recoup what was lost at the uncounseled suppression hearing, and answers no.
• Henderson v Frank, 155 F3d 159 (CA 3, 1998) and United States v Hamilton, 391 F3d 1066 (CA 9, 2004): Both treat suppression proceedings as critical stages, particularly where the result may effectively settle the case and where testimony is taken.
  Influence: The Court of Appeals tried to distinguish them because Haupt called no witnesses. The Supreme Court rejects witness/no-witness as dispositive and instead stresses the functional stakes: admissibility of key phone evidence tied directly to guilt.
• Additional authorities situating “critical stage”: Bell v Cone, 535 US 685 (2002), Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52 (1961), White v Maryland, 373 US 59 (1963), Coleman v Alabama, 399 US 1 (1970), Lundberg v Buchkoe, 389 F2d 154 (CA 6, 1968).
  Influence: These are used (through Van and otherwise) to show “critical stage” is a functional inquiry: whether defenses/rights can be lost, whether substantial prejudice inheres, and whether consequences are significant.
• Michigan critical-stage applications: People v Lewis, 501 Mich 1 (2017) (preliminary exam is critical stage, though denial of counsel there is reviewed for harmless error under binding federal precedent), People v Loew, 514 Mich 158 (2024) (reiterating critical-stage guarantee), People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281 (2011) and People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019) (standards of review).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Waiver: “advisory counsel” is not a substitute for a valid waiver

The Court draws a sharp constitutional line between (i) a defendant’s voluntary choice to proceed pro se after a compliant colloquy and (ii) a court’s unilateral decision to force self-representation because counsel relationships have soured.

• The Court emphasizes that after counsel was reduced to an advisory role on June 10, 2019, Haupt did not make an unequivocal request to represent himself; the trial court instead told him “you are on your own” and that advisory counsel would merely answer questions.
• The Court treats the absence of a renewed Anderson/MCR 6.005(D) inquiry as fatal: the court did not advise of charges/risks/consultation opportunity and did not consider disruption.
• The Court rejects the prosecution’s theory that a prior October 2018 waiver remained operative through subsequent events, reasoning (with a presumption against waiver) that a waiver cannot simply “coexist” indefinitely while the defendant later exercises the right to counsel.

B. Forfeiture: even if the doctrine exists, it is exceptional and was not met

The Court assumes arguendo that forfeiture-by-conduct could exist, but confines it to the Kammeraad-like extreme: defiant refusal to participate, refusal of any lawyer, refusal of self-representation, refusal to remain in the courtroom. Haupt’s record—though marked by conflict and delay—did not approach that level. Notably, the Court also corrects factual overreach from the Court of Appeals (e.g., defendant did not “fire” retained counsel; he opposed withdrawal).

C. Critical stage: the July 2, 2019 suppression hearing functionally shaped the trial

The centerpiece is the Court’s functional conclusion that this particular suppression hearing was a critical stage because it concerned admissibility of the very evidence driving guilt, was adversarial, and the loss was not later repairable.

• High stakes: The evidence sought to be suppressed (phone data/images from the first search) went to “ultimate guilt or innocence.”
• No meaningful cure: Reappointment of counsel on the morning of trial did not restore the lost opportunity to litigate suppression pretrial. The Court rejects the idea that trial objections necessarily replicate pretrial suppression litigation; once suppression is denied, “trial posture changed.”
• Different evidence, different motion: Counsel’s later suppression motion targeted different evidence (hardware search after extraction), so it did not “wholly recover” what was lost at the July 2 hearing.
• Not a transcript-only formality: The Court rebukes the Court of Appeals’ minimization that defendant “simply read” his motion; the context was a court-created forced self-representation environment, and defendant’s professed confusion underscored why counsel mattered.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical rule for Michigan trial courts

• When a defendant is left without full representation after counsel withdraws (or is relegated to “advisory” status), a court must not proceed as if a prior waiver automatically carries forward; it must ensure a valid waiver consistent with People v Anderson and MCR 6.005(D).
• Courts should treat high-stakes suppression litigation—especially over central incriminating evidence—as a likely “critical stage,” at least where a later opportunity cannot realistically restore what was lost.

B. Appellate consequences: structural error and automatic reversal

• The decision strengthens the post-People v King landscape: once an invalid waiver is established, the decisive inquiry is whether any uncounseled proceeding was “critical.” If yes, the remedy is automatic reversal, not Carines-style outcome speculation.
• The opinion signals skepticism toward expansive forfeiture arguments. Even while leaving the doctrine undecided, it makes clear that ordinary friction, distrust, or delay does not equal forfeiture.

C. Doctrinal development: suppression hearings are not categorically critical, but can be

The Court stops short of adopting a categorical rule that all suppression hearings are critical stages. Yet it firmly holds that suppression hearings can be critical stages and provides a concrete template for when: where the hearing determines admissibility of evidence central to guilt and the defendant cannot later meaningfully recreate the lost opportunity with counsel.

Justice ZAHRA’s concurrence underscores this limiting principle: the holding is fact-bound and should not be read to convert every suppression motion into an automatic critical stage without regard to circumstances.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Critical stage”: A step in the criminal process where what happens can significantly affect the fairness or outcome of the case—especially where rights/defenses may be lost or where the proceeding shapes the trial in a way that cannot later be undone.
• Waiver of counsel (valid waiver): A defendant may represent themselves only after a clear request and a court’s on-the-record warnings and findings that the choice is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (Michigan’s Anderson requirements plus MCR 6.005(D) advisements).
• Standby/advisory counsel: A lawyer present to assist a self-represented defendant if asked. Under People v King, standby counsel does not fix an invalid waiver or make deprivation harmless.
• Structural error: A fundamental constitutional breakdown that requires reversal without measuring whether the error changed the verdict (contrast with “harmless error” or “plain error” analyses).
• Forfeiture by conduct: A controversial concept (not adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court here) where a defendant can lose the right to counsel through extreme, obstructive misconduct—distinct from ordinary disagreement with counsel or rejecting a plea offer.

5. Conclusion

People v Haupt reaffirms that self-representation cannot be imposed as a case-management tool. When a trial court removes full representation and leaves a defendant to litigate a consequential pretrial dispute—here, suppression of key phone evidence—without a renewed, compliant waiver under People v Anderson and MCR 6.005(D), the constitutional violation is not cured by later reappointment on the eve of trial. Because the July 2, 2019 suppression hearing was a critical stage under these facts, the deprivation of counsel was structural and required automatic reversal under People v King.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its functional approach: Michigan courts must assess whether an uncounseled proceeding caused an irretrievable loss of a meaningful litigation opportunity, particularly where evidentiary rulings reshape the entire trial posture. At the same time, the opinion—reinforced by Justice ZAHRA’s concurrence—avoids a categorical declaration about all suppression hearings, leaving future cases to develop the “critical stage” contours in context.