Pending Discovery Does Not Bar Summary Judgment, and Independent Decisionmaking Can Defeat Cat’s-Paw Liability

A. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 56(d) requires an explanation of what discovery will accomplish

The court rejected the premise that summary judgment must await the formal close of discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), a party ordinarily may move for summary judgment before discovery ends. The critical protection for an opposing party is Rule 56(d), which permits postponement or other relief when specified reasons prevent that party from presenting essential facts.

The Eleventh Circuit does not rigidly require a formal affidavit or a motion expressly invoking Rule 56(d). It does, however, require meaningful notice: the opponent must identify the needed discovery and explain how the anticipated facts could create a genuine dispute about an issue material to judgment.

Bird’s submissions did not meet that standard. She referred generally to ongoing discovery and stated in a footnote that the physicians’ depositions would allow her to “probe the factual bases” of evaluations and a counseling letter. But she did not explain what facts she expected to uncover or how those facts would undermine the defendants’ showing. Her pending motions to compel likewise did not identify the physicians’ depositions as necessary to oppose summary judgment.

Context reinforced that conclusion. Discovery had been extended repeatedly, and almost two years elapsed between its commencement and the summary-judgment ruling. Although pandemic-related cancellations affected depositions, Bird still did not specifically request that the court postpone its ruling until those depositions occurred. At the hearing, counsel instead emphasized that the existing evidence already supported an inference of discrimination.

The holding is therefore not that unfinished discovery is irrelevant. It is that a discovery dispute must be connected to the evidence needed to resist summary judgment. Awareness that discovery remains outstanding does not itself satisfy Rule 56(d).

2. Review of summary judgment is confined to the contemporaneous record

The court reviewed the merits of summary judgment de novo, viewing the relevant evidence favorably to Bird. But it refused to consider evidence obtained after that ruling, including later trial evidence. The question was whether the district court correctly ruled on the record then before it—not whether subsequent developments might support a different record.

This distinction matters because the physicians’ depositions occurred months after summary judgment. Their later existence did not retroactively enlarge the evidentiary record against which the original ruling was reviewed.

3. Hostile-environment liability requires discriminatory hostility, not merely workplace hostility

The court separated the conduct Bird identified into three categories: conduct she did not personally experience, conduct not shown to be sex-based, and conduct that could support her claim. It declined to count coworkers’ accounts of incidents occurring outside her presence as establishing the hostility of her own environment on this record. It also rejected the proposition that, because Stringer had made sexist remarks, every criticism or unpleasant interaction involving him necessarily reflected sexism.

After those exclusions, the court considered seven incidents over approximately three clinical years:

1. A direction that Bird give operating-room cases “to the guys.”
2. A photograph showing female residents cooking with pots and pans in Stringer’s kitchen.
3. Patting a female resident’s head while suggesting that she was unintelligent.
4. A sexualized comment about how a prospective female resident would “roll[] in the hay.”
5. Dismissing Bird’s request for an “equal opportunity” to practice urology as “ridiculous.”
6. Suggesting a practice location near her children without making the same offer to her physician husband.
7. Yelling at Bird at close range in front of a female undergraduate student, with spittle striking Bird’s face.

The court expressly recognized that the sex-based character of several incidents was ambiguous. It nevertheless included them in the analysis, giving Bird the benefit of favorable inferences.

Bird’s subjective perception of an abusive environment was not disputed. The failure concerned objective severity or pervasiveness. The court considered frequency, seriousness, physical threat or humiliation, and interference with work. Seven incidents over three years—approximately one every five months—did not establish pervasive harassment. Nor did the incidents individually or collectively establish sufficiently severe harassment.

The frequency comparison was illustrative, not a numerical rule. The governing standard remains severe or pervasive: a sufficiently serious isolated incident can qualify, and repeated conduct must be assessed contextually. Likewise, the court’s comparisons with cases involving sexual touching do not make physical contact a prerequisite to sex-based harassment.

4. Discrimination and retaliation require different causal connections

For the employment-discrimination claims, Bird needed evidence that sex was a motivating factor in the challenged decisions. For the alleged retaliatory hostile environment, she needed evidence that protected activity was a but-for cause of the harassment.

Her retaliatory-environment theory had an initial pleading defect: she attempted to advance it in opposition to summary judgment without having properly asserted it as a claim. The court nevertheless addressed the merits as an alternative ground. Bird described substantially continuous mistreatment beginning when she started working, rather than harassment shown to have arisen or changed because she complained. She presented no evidence that the mistreatment became worse or different after protected activity.

That reasoning concerns causation. The opinion should not be read as simply importing the sex-based hostile-environment severity standard into retaliation law.

5. Criticism without employment consequences was insufficient

The court distinguished negative feedback from actionable employment consequences. Bird’s 2015 evaluation stated that she achieved standards despite identifying areas for improvement. The 2016 counseling letter expressly disclaimed formal discipline and described possible future consequences if problems persisted. Neither document produced an immediate material change in her employment.

By contrast, nonrenewal and reassignment from clinical duties to research were adverse employment actions. Their adverse character was not disputed away by the University’s decision to permit a final research year. The decisive issue was whether discrimination caused those actions.

6. An independently justified decision can break the cat’s-paw causal chain

Bird did not contend that Su, the ultimate decisionmaker, personally harbored sex bias. Her principal theory was that Stringer’s bias infected Su’s decisions through negative assessments and recommendations.

The court rejected that theory because the unrebutted evidence showed that Su independently assessed the problems supporting nonrenewal and reassignment. Particularly important was Su’s firsthand experience performing procedures on patients whom Bird had referred after suspected bladder tumors. According to his affidavit, those procedures revealed no tumors or only nonconcerning findings, meaning patients had undergone unnecessary invasive procedures under anesthesia.

Su also relied on reports from multiple sources, resident evaluations, institutional concerns about patient care, and his own difficulties communicating with Bird. His assessment therefore did not depend solely on evaluations authored or influenced by Stringer.

Bird responded that Su had not observed her examining patients. The court accepted that factual point but found it insufficient: observing the surgical consequences of her diagnoses was itself an independent basis for evaluating clinical performance.

The important limitation is that an investigation does not automatically immunize an employer. A biased recommendation may remain causally significant if the decisionmaker incorporates it without determining that the action is entirely justified apart from that recommendation. Here, the court found no genuine dispute that Su’s independent observations and investigation supplied that separate justification.

7. A “convincing mosaic” is not a substitute for evidence of discriminatory motivation

The court treated the “convincing mosaic” formulation as a description of ordinary circumstantial-evidence analysis, not an independent legal test. All the evidence must be considered together to determine whether a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination.

Bird’s evidence principally disputed whether the University fairly assessed her abilities. She relied on an earlier, more favorable evaluation, a credentialing email, and a technologist’s favorable assessment of a procedure. Those materials did not adequately undermine Su’s stated beliefs about her continuing clinical and interpersonal problems.

The distinction is between showing that an employer’s judgment was mistaken and showing that its explanation concealed discrimination. A court does not resolve whether an employee was objectively good at the job merely because that issue is contested. The pertinent inquiry is whether the asserted performance concerns genuinely motivated the decision or instead masked unlawful bias.

This does not mean that proof of error is always irrelevant. Contradictions or implausibilities can support an inference of pretext. The court held that Bird’s particular evidence did not establish that inference.

8. The remaining rulings followed from separate procedural and evidentiary limits

The individual § 1983 claims failed because Bird had not established the underlying sex-based harassment or discrimination. Although the physicians had invoked qualified immunity, the appellate opinion did not separately resolve the familiar qualified-immunity questions.

Reconsideration was reviewed for abuse of discretion. The district court relied on the motion’s timing shortly before trial, its dependence on evidence obtained after the nearly two-year-old summary-judgment ruling, and its failure on the merits. The appellate court accepted those grounds.

Finally, the trial record did not support a cat’s-paw instruction on retaliation. Stringer did not testify, and Su’s limited testimony established only that he and Stringer discussed faculty performance when Su became chair. That evidence did not support a rational finding that Stringer’s retaliatory animus caused the challenged decisions. A legally recognized theory does not warrant an instruction unless the trial evidence supports its application.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Discovery, Rule 56(d), and management of summary judgment

Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1983)

This decision supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing summary judgment entered before discovery is complete. It also directly answered Bird’s reliance on pending motions to compel: a district court need not treat ordinary discovery motions as satisfying Rule 56(d). The connection between outstanding discovery and opposition to judgment must be communicated.

Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990)

This was a central procedural authority. It establishes that courts need not await the discovery deadline and that vague predictions of useful evidence are inadequate. The requested postponement must be tied specifically to facts capable of rebutting the movant’s showing. Its consideration of an approximately two-year litigation period also supported the conclusion that Bird had adequate discovery opportunities.

Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 859 F.2d 865 (11th Cir. 1988)

The court drew two complementary principles from this case: the opponent must have an adequate opportunity for discovery, but an affidavit is not invariably necessary to request protection. Thus, Bird’s problem was insufficient substantive notice, not merely failure to use the correct document or rule number.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

This Supreme Court authority identifies Rule 56(d)’s predecessor as the mechanism for addressing genuinely premature summary-judgment motions. The court also invoked its rejection of a claim that a litigant had been “railroaded” where substantial time had passed before the motion. It supported a practical assessment of opportunity rather than automatic postponement.

Burns v. Town of Palm Beach, 999 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2021)

This supplied the closest developed analogy. A homeowner opposing summary judgment had identified categories of desired discovery—records, legislative history, expert evidence, and possible depositions—but had not explained the particular facts those materials would reveal or their significance. That showing was inadequate even though presented in a declaration. Bird’s less specific statements necessarily fell short under the same reasoning.

The decision also explained that the 2010 relocation of former Rule 56(f) to Rule 56(d) did not substantively change the protection, making older decisions applicable.

Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2015)

This authority placed the burden of establishing entitlement to Rule 56(d) relief on Bird. It also distinguished a court’s awareness of a discovery dispute from notice that the missing discovery is necessary to oppose summary judgment. That distinction defeated her contention that pending motions alone were sufficient.

Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1980)

This decision reinforced that vague and conclusory references to possible conflicts in testimony do not establish a sufficient need for additional discovery. Its role was to confirm that speculation about what depositions might reveal does not discharge the opponent’s burden.

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

This institutional precedent explains why the former Fifth Circuit decision above binds the Eleventh Circuit: decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, were adopted as binding precedent.

Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1989)

The court cited this case for the relevance of a litigant’s ample opportunity and lack of diligent pursuit of discovery. It supported considering the history of extensions and postponed depositions rather than examining the unfinished depositions in isolation.

Nesbitt v. Candler County, 945 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2020)

This case recognizes that counsel’s concessions and admissions at oral argument can bind a party. It supported the district court’s reliance on counsel’s repeated assurances that the existing record already contained sufficient evidence, without establishing that such assurances invariably waive a properly supported alternative discovery request.

2. Appellate review and the relationship between statutory claims

Bearden v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 945 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2019)

This case supplied de novo review of the substantive summary-judgment ruling and the requirement to view the evidence favorably to the nonmoving party. The court therefore distinguished independent review of legal sufficiency from deferential review of discovery management.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1992)

The former, quoting the latter, confined review to evidence before the district court when it ruled. These decisions prevented Bird from using later depositions or trial evidence to attack the original summary judgment directly.

Jones v. United Space All., LLC, 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)

This decision explains that Florida courts interpret the FCRA using Title VII caselaw. It allowed the court to analyze Bird’s corresponding federal and Florida harassment and discrimination claims together rather than duplicate the analysis.

Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007)

This case organized the substantive inquiry into two routes: a hostile environment that changes working conditions, or a tangible employment action. It also supplied the crucial limitation that Title VII prohibits discriminatory harassment, not harassment disconnected from a protected characteristic.

3. The boundaries of actionable hostile-environment harassment

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)

This decision supplied the essential elements: harassment based on sex, sufficient severity or pervasiveness, and a basis for employer responsibility. Because the second requirement was not met, the opinion did not need to develop a separate employer-liability analysis.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)

This foundational Supreme Court decision supplied the requirement that the workplace be permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently serious to alter employment conditions. It anchored the court’s ultimate conclusion that offensive incidents did not establish an objectively abusive environment.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)

The opinion used this case to distinguish actionable changes in working conditions from isolated offensive incidents. Its qualification that an isolated incident may suffice if extremely serious is important: infrequency was relevant but not independently dispositive.

Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

This decision establishes that degrading comments about other women can contribute to a plaintiff’s hostile environment even when not addressed to her. The court emphasized the employee’s exposure to the language and also relied on the disjunctive formulation that severity or pervasiveness can suffice.

Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., LLC, 754 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014)

This was central to defining the relevant experiential record. The opinion described the distinction between firsthand racist conduct and information coworkers voluntarily shared about conduct elsewhere. Applying that reasoning, it declined to treat coworkers’ reports of Stringer’s conduct outside Bird’s presence as establishing her own hostile environment.

The ruling concerns the hostile-environment significance of those experiences on this record. It should not be generalized into a universal evidentiary prohibition on secondhand information in every discrimination claim.

Tonkyro v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2021)

This decision performed several functions. It required contextual evidence that facially ambiguous conduct was sex-based; supplied the subjective and objective components and the four circumstances relevant to severity; and recognized that conduct witnessed rather than personally directed at the plaintiff may be less severe. It also supported the requirement that a retaliatory environment arise because of protected activity.

Yelling v. St. Vincent's Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2023)

The court used this case to reject attributing a protected-class meaning to ambiguous remarks without contextual support. Elsewhere, it supported the motivating-factor standard and the requirement to assess circumstantial evidence collectively rather than treat the mosaic metaphor as a special framework.

Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

This decision showed that some conduct by a person who also engaged in sexual behavior can nevertheless be nonsexual in context. It additionally supplied a comparison involving touching, staring, and suggestive conduct that the court had found insufficiently threatening or humiliating. Those comparisons supported the conclusion that Bird’s isolated confrontation did not cross the objective threshold.

Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2023)

For the hostile-environment claim, this case reinforced that federal law targets hostility caused by impermissible discrimination. For cat’s-paw liability, it distinguished investigating an employee’s alleged misconduct from investigating the recommender’s possible bias. Both uses focused the inquiry on the legally necessary causal connection.

Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501 (11th Cir. 2000)

The court contrasted Bird’s seven incidents over three years with approximately fifteen serious incidents over four months, including unwanted touching and threatening sexual behavior. The comparison concerned both frequency and gravity; it did not establish a minimum incident count.

Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2004)

This case furnished the opposite severity benchmark: repeated attempts at intimate touching, removal of clothing, and physical restraint while attempting to grope the employee. It illustrated unmistakably threatening and humiliating supervisory conduct, rather than prescribing those extreme facts as necessary in every successful harassment case.

4. Retaliatory harassment and adverse employment action

Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020)

The court cited this case for the pleading rule that a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint by introducing a new claim in opposition to summary judgment. It provided a procedural objection to Bird’s retaliatory-environment theory independent of its evidentiary weakness.

Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)

This Supreme Court decision required but-for causation for Title VII retaliation. It defeated the theory that continuous workplace hostility, without evidence linking its occurrence to a discrimination complaint, necessarily becomes retaliatory after the employee engages in protected activity.

Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010), and Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001)

These decisions supported the opinion’s conclusion that criticism and counseling, without a serious and material employment consequence, did not constitute the adverse actions alleged in the tangible-action analysis. Their application here should not be read as resolving every possible retaliation claim involving a warning or evaluation.

5. Cat’s-paw causation, circumstantial evidence, and pretext

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999)

This case supplied the “mere conduit” and “rubber stamp” descriptions of cat’s-paw liability. It framed Bird’s burden as connecting a biased nondecisionmaker’s recommendation to the ultimate action, rather than merely establishing that a biased colleague participated somewhere in the employment process.

Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2021)

This decision confirmed that an employer may be liable where a nondecisionmaking employee’s discriminatory conduct causes the decisionmaker to act. It also supported using the motivating-factor standard for the Title VII discrimination claim.

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011)

This was the principal Supreme Court authority on causal contamination. The court relied on its requirement that a discriminatory supervisory act, intended to cause an adverse action, proximately cause that action. Crucially, an independent investigation does not automatically remove a biased report from the causal chain. The question is whether the action was determined to be entirely justified apart from the biased recommendation.

The court found that condition satisfied through Su’s independent clinical observations and additional sources. Accordingly, its reasoning depended on the substance of the investigation, not simply the fact that someone labeled it independent.

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)

This case appeared among the authorities addressing statutory causation. Its relevance was the need to identify the causation standard applicable to the particular claim. The opinion expressly applied motivating-factor causation to Bird’s Title VII discrimination theory, not the but-for standard governing her retaliation theory.

Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2002)

This case cautioned against turning discrimination litigation into a general adjudication of whether the plaintiff was a good employee. It supported rejecting disputes about medical competence and interpersonal skill that did not show discriminatory motivation.

Dershowitz v. Cable News Network, Inc., 153 F.4th 1189 (11th Cir. 2025); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)

These authorities supported the requirement of affirmative evidence rather than generalized attacks on a witness’s credibility. Bird could not create a genuine dispute merely by asserting that Su’s affidavit was untrustworthy. The principle does not authorize credibility determinations against a nonmovant where competing evidence actually creates a material conflict.

Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)

This decision recognized direct and circumstantial routes to proving discrimination and focused pretext analysis on the employer’s actual beliefs. It explained why evidence that Bird disagreed with the clinical assessment did not, without more, show that the stated concerns were dishonest or discriminatory.

Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)

This case supplied the “convincing mosaic” formulation: circumstantial evidence can permit an inference of intentional discrimination even without fitting a single rigid evidentiary pattern. It furnished an alternative way to evaluate the record as a whole, not a relaxed burden of proof.

Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019)

The court drew from this decision examples of relevant circumstantial evidence: suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, systematically better treatment of comparable employees, and pretext. These were illustrative sources of an inference, not mandatory elements of a separate mosaic claim.

McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024)

This decision clarified that “convincing mosaic” is a metaphor for the summary-judgment inquiry, not an independent test or framework. It also explained that a plaintiff preserves the substance of the issue by arguing that the evidence permits a reasonable finding of discrimination, without needing particular terminology.

Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87 F.4th 1313 (11th Cir. 2023)

This case articulated the pretext inquiry: whether the employee has cast sufficient doubt on the stated nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a finding that they did not actually motivate the action. The court concluded that Bird’s evidence disputed the wisdom of the decisions without creating that inference.

6. Reconsideration, circuit precedent, and jury instructions

McClendon v United States, 892 F.3d 775 (5th Cir. 2018)

Bird invoked this out-of-circuit decision to seek de novo review of the denial of reconsideration because the district court considered additional evidence. The Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt that proposed standard in conflict with its own controlling precedent.

United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th 830 (11th Cir. 2023), and In re USA, 624 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2010)

These decisions established that another circuit’s decisions cannot displace controlling Eleventh Circuit authority and that an on-point prior panel decision must be followed. Their function was institutional rather than employment-specific.

Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2020)

This supplied the controlling abuse-of-discretion standard for denial of reconsideration. It foreclosed Bird’s attempt to obtain fresh de novo review through her reconsideration motion.

Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014)

This decision supported refusing a requested instruction when the evidence does not support the proposed theory. It supplied the governing circuit principle for evaluating the trial court’s decision.

Dedmon v. Staley, 315 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2003)

This persuasive authority addressed the same kind of requested instruction: a cat’s-paw charge unsupported by the trial evidence. It reinforced the conclusion that refusing the instruction was within the district court’s discretion.

C. Impact and Limits of the Decision

Procedural implications

The opinion emphasizes that a party seeking additional discovery should identify the particular witness or material, the facts expected, the issue those facts affect, and why the evidence is not yet available. Merely noting that discovery remains open—or that motions to compel are pending—does not explain why judgment would be premature.

It also underscores the importance of preserving distinct requests. A party may believe the existing record is sufficient while alternatively seeking additional discovery, but the alternative request must be made clearly. Similarly, evidence obtained later must be presented through an appropriate procedural mechanism rather than inserted directly into appellate review of an earlier ruling.

Substantive implications

For discrimination cases involving several participants, the decision highlights the distinction between evidence of someone’s prejudice and evidence that the prejudice caused the challenged employment action. Independent firsthand observations and corroborating information can defeat a cat’s-paw theory when they establish a genuinely separate justification. A nominal investigation or uncritical repetition of biased accusations would present a different case.

The opinion also illustrates the substantial evidentiary threshold for a hostile-environment claim. Stereotyped, degrading, or sexualized remarks may be relevant and objectionable without necessarily establishing an objectively altered employment environment. Their context, frequency, seriousness, and connection to the plaintiff remain essential.

What the opinion does not establish

• It does not create a numerical minimum for harassment incidents.
• It does not make physical touching necessary for actionable sex-based harassment.
• It does not make every independent investigation a complete defense to cat’s-paw liability.
• It does not require but-for causation for the Title VII sex-discrimination claim.
• It does not establish a separate substantive rule governing employee claims under Title IX; although those claims formed part of the litigation, the opinion did not independently analyze that issue.
• It does not separately decide qualified immunity for the individual defendants.

Because the disposition is unpublished, its principal value is persuasive and practical: it demonstrates how existing Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court rules operate together across discovery, discrimination, retaliation, reconsideration, and jury-instruction questions.