Date: Apr 10, 2026

Penal Law § 265.03(3) Upheld: “Good Moral Character” in New York’s Post-Bruen Shall-Issue Licensing Is Not Unchanneled Discretion (People v. Santana)

1. Introduction

People v Santana (2026 NY Slip Op 02172 [248 AD3d 1429] [3d Dept Apr. 9, 2026]) addresses a recurring post-Bruen question: whether New York may criminalize the unlicensed public possession of a loaded handgun under Penal Law § 265.03 (3) when the state’s licensing regime requires an applicant to be of “good moral character” under Penal Law § 400.00 (1) (b).

The case arose from a September 18, 2023 shooting in Troy. The defendant, Gustavo Santana, was indicted for murder in the second degree (count 1), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (count 2), and assault in the first degree (count 3). At trial, the jury received a justification instruction as to counts 1 and 3 and ultimately acquitted on counts 1 and 3, but convicted on count 2 (unlicensed possession of a loaded firearm outside the home or place of business). The Third Department affirmed the conviction while reducing the sentence in the interest of justice.

Key issues included: (i) whether the defendant had standing to facially challenge § 265.03 (3) despite never applying for a license; (ii) whether New York’s “good moral character” licensing criterion is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen; (iii) whether § 265.03 (3) is unconstitutional as applied to a person claiming public carry for self-defense; and (iv) whether the enhanced penalties for unlicensed public carry violate the Second or Eighth Amendments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Standing: The court held the defendant had standing to bring a facial constitutional challenge even though he never applied for a firearm license, relying on People v Johnson.
Facial challenge rejected: The court upheld New York’s “good moral character” requirement in Penal Law § 400.00 (1) (b), concluding it is not the type of “unchanneled discretion” condemned in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen and is consistent with historical tradition as described in United States v Rahimi and applied by Antonyuk v James.
As-applied challenge rejected: Because § 265.03 (3) prohibits only unlicensed public carry, and the defendant’s possession was unlicensed, his claim that he carried for self-defense did not invalidate the statute as applied.
Penalty scheme upheld: The legislature may impose harsher penalties for unlicensed public carry than for certain in-home possession offenses; this did not violate the Second Amendment, and the sentence range was not “gross[ly] disproportional” under the Eighth Amendment.
Sentence modified: Exercising interest-of-justice discretion, the court reduced the prison term from 12 years to 8 years (plus five years PRS), emphasizing the acquittals on homicide/assault, lack of criminal history, and remorse/acceptance.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Standing and post-conviction constitutional review

The threshold dispute was whether a non-applicant can challenge the licensing framework that functions as the statutory “escape hatch” from criminal liability. The People argued no; the court rejected that position on the authority of People v Johnson, holding that “a defendant has standing to bring such a challenge even if he or she never applied for a firearm license.”

Doctrinal significance: This treats the licensing statute and the criminal prohibition as legally intertwined for constitutional purposes. If the state criminalizes unlicensed conduct, courts must be open to examining whether the pathway to licensure is constitutionally defective—even when the defendant never attempted to use it.

B. The facial-challenge burden and presumption of constitutionality

The court framed the facial challenge using the “every conceivable application” standard, citing People v Emmanuel D., and reiterated the “exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality” for legislation, citing Matter of Kelsey v Hochul and Stefanik v Hochul.

Function in the opinion: These authorities set a high bar before the court even reaches Second Amendment merits: the defendant must show wholesale constitutional impairment “in every conceivable application” and do so “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

C. Bruen and the meaning of “shall-issue” licensing

The defendant’s principal argument relied on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, which invalidated New York’s former “proper cause” requirement for concealed carry as incompatible with the Second Amendment because it invited discretionary denial untethered to objective criteria.

The Third Department distinguished Bruen by emphasizing New York’s post-Bruen legislative response, the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (L 2022, ch 371), which the court characterized as converting New York from “may-issue” to “shall-issue” (license “shall be issued” if threshold eligibility requirements are met).

Critically, the court used Bruen against the defendant: Bruen favorably cited multiple “shall-issue” regimes that still include character/suitability screens, including: Del Code Ann title 11, § 1441 (a) (good moral character), Conn Gen Stat § 29-28 (b), (c) (“suitable”), and RI Gen Laws § 11-47-11 (a) (“suitable”).

The court further relied on Bruen’s discussion of “suitable” in Connecticut by quoting Dwyer v Farrell (via Bruen), where suitability was defined as lacking “the essential character o[r] temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.”

Finally, the court invoked Bruen’s concern with “unchanneled discretion” by quoting the limiting concept from Bruen itself, specifically: “unchanneled discretion” (and it cited Bruen’s discussion and a concurrence reference: “New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, 597 US at 79 [Kavanaugh, J., concurring]”).

D. Antonyuk v James and the Second Circuit’s validation of New York’s character provision

The decision leans heavily on Antonyuk v James, where the Second Circuit upheld key aspects of New York’s post-Bruen licensing framework. Two quoted propositions matter:

The court cited Antonyuk v James for the empirical/legal point that “more than a dozen” licensing regimes described in Bruen “confer some measure of discretion,” with many using terms “nearly identical” to New York’s character provision—undercutting the argument that any discretion is per se unconstitutional.
The court quoted Antonyuk v James for the substantive thesis that “dangerousness is the core of New York’s character requirement,” and that such provisions fall within the “historical tradition of preventing dangerous individuals from carrying guns.”

E. Rahimi and “dangerousness” as historical tradition

For the historical inquiry, the court cited United States v Rahimi for the proposition that, “[s]ince the founding,” firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms. This supported the court’s conclusion that the “good moral character” test targets dangerousness rather than imposing freewheeling policy preferences.

F. Licensed vs unlicensed possession: rejecting the as-applied Second Amendment claim

To address the defendant’s claim that he carried for self-defense, the court invoked the licensed/unlicensed distinction, relying on: People v Tucker (quoting People v Hughes) for the proposition that § 265.03 (3) “prohibit[s] only unlicensed possession” and that a valid license negates criminality. The court also cited District of Columbia v Heller to acknowledge that self-defense is central to the Second Amendment, while using Bruen (Kavanaugh concurrence) to reiterate that licensing is not categorically forbidden.

G. Deference to legislative grading of offenses and Eighth Amendment proportionality

Against challenges to New York’s penalty structure, the court cited People v Broadie for the principle that legislatures may distinguish social ills and prescribe different punishments. For Eighth Amendment proportionality, it cited People v Harris and People v Guity, concluding the statutory range (up to 15 years) is not “gross[ly] disproportional” given the public-safety risks of unlicensed, loaded public carry.

H. Additional post-Bruen New York appellate support

The court cited People v Watts “generally” as consistent authority rejecting similar Second Amendment challenges in the New York courts.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s organizing move: separate the right from the regulatory mechanism

The opinion treats the Second Amendment right to armed self-defense as compatible with licensing, provided the licensing criteria are not so discretionary that they function like the invalidated “proper cause” standard. This is why the analysis pivots on whether “good moral character” is (i) sufficiently channeled and (ii) historically grounded as a dangerousness screen.

B. Why “good moral character” is not “unchanneled discretion” after the CCIA

The court reasons that the CCIA’s post-Bruen structure is “shall-issue”: licenses must issue upon satisfaction of threshold requirements. Within that structure, “good moral character” is portrayed not as an invitation for subjective denial, but as a familiar suitability/dangerousness screening criterion—one Bruen itself did not condemn and, in discussing other states, arguably assumed permissible.

The court’s reliance on Delaware/Connecticut/Rhode Island exemplars underscores a key interpretive step: if Bruen described these regimes as consistent with the Second Amendment (or at least not undercut by its holding), then comparable New York criteria are not automatically suspect.

C. History-and-tradition: reframing “character” as “dangerousness”

The opinion’s historical analysis follows the post-Bruen template: locate a tradition supporting the modern regulation’s purpose. By using United States v Rahimi to establish a founding-era tradition of disarming dangerous persons, the court treats “good moral character” not as a moralistic judgment, but as a public-safety proxy: whether an applicant can be “entrusted” to use firearms without endangering self or others.

Doctrinal payoff: If “character” is operationalized as dangerousness, it can be aligned with historically accepted disarmament categories, reducing vulnerability to a Bruen-style attack alleging novelty or lack of analogue.

D. The as-applied claim fails because the statute targets licensure status, not self-defense purpose

The defendant’s “I carried for self-defense” theory collides with the court’s statutory framing: § 265.03 (3) does not ban public carry outright; it punishes public carry without a license. Under People v Tucker and People v Hughes, licensure is the dispositive separator between lawful and unlawful possession.

The court further notes the defendant did not identify a constitutionally deficient element in the licensing scheme (having rejected the “good moral character” attack), leaving no constitutional basis to excuse unlicensed carry as applied to him.

E. Sentencing-tier challenge: legislative line-drawing plus public-risk rationale

The defendant argued it is unconstitutional to punish unlicensed possession more harshly outside the home than inside. The court’s response is twofold:

Because licensing itself is constitutionally permissible (as acknowledged by the court through Bruen’s discussion), criminalization of unlicensed possession is likewise permissible.
Under People v Broadie, the legislature may grade offenses; the court found it “neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional” to view unlicensed public carry as posing greater danger than in-home possession and to penalize accordingly.

F. Eighth Amendment proportionality and interest-of-justice sentencing discretion

The court upheld the statutory range under proportionality principles (citing People v Broadie, People v Harris, and People v Guity), but still reduced the sentence as a discretionary, individualized remedy based on acquittals on the more serious charges, absence of criminal history, remorse, and acceptance of responsibility. This illustrates the separation between (i) constitutional validity of a penalty range and (ii) appellate discretion to tailor a specific sentence.

3.3. Impact

Stabilizing New York’s post-Bruen licensing framework: The decision reinforces that the CCIA-era “good moral character” requirement is likely to survive broad Second Amendment attacks—at least facially—within the Third Department, especially when paired with Antonyuk v James.
Expanding access to constitutional review (standing): By recognizing standing even without a license application, the opinion invites more direct constitutional litigation in criminal cases charging unlicensed carry, rather than confining challenges to administrative applicants.
Channeling future challenges into “as applied” factual records about administration: Having rejected a facial attack, future litigants may focus on proving “unchanneled discretion” through evidence of how licensing officers actually implement “good moral character” (e.g., inconsistent standards, lack of articulable criteria), though this opinion suggests courts will view “dangerousness” as the controlling lens.
Reinforcing the licensed/unlicensed distinction: The court’s approach makes clear that a generalized self-defense narrative will not, without more, excuse unlicensed public carry under § 265.03 (3).
Sentencing practice: Although constitutional attacks on the grading scheme failed, the sentence reduction signals meaningful appellate willingness to moderate weapons-possession sentences where the record shows mitigation and acquittals on related violent counts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial challenge: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in all (or virtually all) its applications. The burden is very high: the challenger must show the law suffers “wholesale constitutional impairment” in “every conceivable application” (as the court quoted from People v Emmanuel D.).
As-applied challenge: A claim that a law may be generally valid but is unconstitutional when applied to the specific facts of a defendant’s case.
Standing: The legal ability to bring a claim. Here, under People v Johnson, a criminal defendant charged with unlicensed possession can challenge the licensing scheme’s constitutionality even if he never applied for a license.
“May-issue” vs “shall-issue”: “May-issue” regimes give officials broad discretion to deny carry permits even when objective criteria are met (the problem identified in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen). “Shall-issue” regimes require issuance once specified criteria are satisfied, though they can still include objective or cabined screening (e.g., disqualifying criminal history, training, and—per this opinion—dangerousness-based character/suitability standards).
“Unchanneled discretion”: Discretion so open-ended that officials can grant or deny permits based on subjective preference, rather than enforceable standards. The court held New York’s “good moral character” requirement (as defined in § 400.00 [1] [b]) is not that kind of discretion.
History-and-tradition test (post-Bruen): The method of evaluating whether a modern firearm regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Here, the court used United States v Rahimi to support a tradition of disarming dangerous individuals and treated “good moral character” as a dangerousness screen.
Proportionality (Eighth Amendment): The constitutional idea that a punishment cannot be grossly disproportionate to the offense. The court held the statutory range for § 265.03 (3) was not grossly disproportionate given public safety risks of loaded, unlicensed public carry.

5. Conclusion

People v Santana consolidates a post-Bruen appellate framework in New York criminal prosecutions for unlicensed public carry: (1) defendants have standing to challenge the licensing regime even without applying (People v Johnson); (2) New York’s “good moral character” requirement, as amended in the CCIA, is treated as a cabined, dangerousness-focused threshold consistent with New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, United States v Rahimi, and Antonyuk v James; (3) § 265.03 (3) survives both facial and as-applied Second Amendment attacks where the defendant’s possession is unlicensed; and (4) the legislature may impose higher penalties for unlicensed public carry without violating the Second or Eighth Amendments, though appellate courts may still reduce individual sentences in the interest of justice based on case-specific mitigation.