Peeler Errors Are Nonjurisdictional and Nonretroactive on Collateral Review

Commentary on People of Michigan v. Todd Douglas Robinson, Michigan Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 2026)

1. Introduction

In 2013, Todd D. Robinson was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The prosecution began not with the usual preliminary examination leading to an information, but through a two-count “indictment” signed by a circuit judge acting as a one-person grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 (the “one-man grand jury law”). Robinson unsuccessfully sought a preliminary examination or to quash the charging document before trial; his direct appeal and first postconviction motion also failed.

After the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022)—holding that the one-man grand jury law does not authorize a judge to issue a criminal indictment and that defendants are entitled to a preliminary examination—Robinson filed a second motion for relief from judgment. He argued (i) Peeler applied retroactively and (ii) the improper indictment meant the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering his convictions void.

The trial court denied relief; the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Peeler was not retroactive and did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, but it also stated that Peeler did not announce a new rule. The Michigan Supreme Court granted oral argument on the application and addressed jurisdiction, “new rule” status, retroactivity on collateral review, and entitlement to relief under MCR 6.502(G) and MCR 6.508(D).

2. Summary of the Opinion

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Welch, the Court held:

• No subject-matter-jurisdiction defect: A Peeler violation (indictment by a one-person grand jury and/or lack of preliminary examination) does not deprive a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a criminal case.
• Peeler announced a new rule: The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the contrary and held Peeler established a new rule of law because it ended a longstanding, judicially accepted practice and decided a first-impression issue not dictated by prior precedent.
• But no retroactivity on collateral review: Despite being “new,” Peeler is not retroactive on collateral review under federal principles and under Michigan’s Linkletter v Walker/People v Hampton factors.

The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the denial of Robinson’s successive postconviction motion, affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment on alternative grounds, and vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals analysis stating that Peeler was not a new rule.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. One-person grand jury charging and the meaning of Peeler

• People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022): The anchor precedent. The Court treated Peeler as establishing two propositions: (1) entitlement to a preliminary examination when the one-man grand jury process is used, and (2) no authority for a judge to issue a criminal indictment under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4. Critically, Peeler did not address subject-matter jurisdiction or retroactivity—gaps this case fills.
• People v Doe, 226 Mich 5 (1924): Cited through Peeler for historical framing of the “one man grand jury” label. Its role here is contextual, reinforcing that the statutory scheme is investigative in character.

B. Subject-matter jurisdiction: class-of-cases authority, not case-specific correctness

• People v Washington, 508 Mich 107 (2021): The Court relied on Washington to define subject-matter jurisdiction and to underscore the consequence of true jurisdictional absence—void ab initio judgments—and the availability of jurisdictional claims even in successive postconviction motions.
• Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23 (1992): Used (via Washington and People v Goecke) for foundational subject-matter jurisdiction principles and the “expressly denied” concept.
• People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998): Central to the Court’s “class of cases” analysis—subject-matter jurisdiction is presumed, and charging defects generally do not negate it.
• People v Lown, 488 Mich 242 (2011): Quoted (via Washington) for the key idea that subject-matter jurisdiction is “not dependent on the particular facts of the case,” but on the class/character of the case.
• In re Elliott, 315 Mich 662 (1946): Reinforces the proposition that defective charging does not remove subject-matter jurisdiction.
• People v Scott, 513 Mich 180 (2024): Cited to distinguish truly void judgments (absence of subject-matter jurisdiction) from errors that are “jurisdictional or procedural” but non-voiding.

C. Limits tied to preliminary examination returns (in personam/charge-scope principles)

• People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698 (1973) (citing People v Evans, 72 Mich 367 (1888)); and People v Dochstader, 274 Mich 238 (1936): The Court included a cautionary footnote: its holding does not disturb precedent that a circuit court’s jurisdiction is limited to offenses specified by the examining magistrate’s return. This signals that the Court’s “nonjurisdictional” treatment of Peeler errors should not be read to dilute preliminary examination constraints where they apply.

D. Retroactivity doctrine—federal and Michigan frameworks

• People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265 (2018): Provided the general presumption against retroactivity for new rules and the analytical sequence: (1) determine if “new,” (2) apply federal retroactivity exceptions for substantive constitutional rules, then (3) apply state-law retroactivity factors.
• League of Women Voters v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 520 (2022) (quoting Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675 (2002); and quoting People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63 (1982)): Used to define what counts as a “new rule” (overruling precedent or deciding an un-adumbrated first-impression question).
• People v Walker, 328 Mich App 429 (2019) (quoting Chaidez v United States, 568 US 342 (2013)): Used to restate the “dictated by precedent” test for newness; supports the Court’s conclusion that Peeler was not dictated by preexisting precedent.
• Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016) (quoting Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989)): Provided the federal requirement of retroactivity for new substantive constitutional rules and the definition of “substantive.”
• Edwards v Vannoy, 593 US 255 (2021): Noted for eliminating the federal “watershed rule” exception; this tightens federal retroactivity and helps explain why procedural rules like Peeler ordinarily do not apply retroactively.
• Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965); People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669 (1971): Michigan’s state-law retroactivity test (purpose, reliance, and administration-of-justice effect).
• People v Poole, ___ Mich ___ (January 22, 2025) (Docket No. 166813): A recent Michigan retroactivity decision used as a template for applying the Hampton factors and for distinguishing substantive categorical rules from procedures regulating culpability determinations.

E. Standards of review and postconviction procedure

• People v Christian, 510 Mich 52 (2022): Abuse-of-discretion standard for relief-from-judgment rulings.
• People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385 (2008): Retroactivity is reviewed de novo.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why a Peeler charging error is not subject-matter jurisdictional

The Court’s jurisdiction analysis turns on a strict separation between: (i) subject-matter jurisdiction—the constitutional and statutory power to adjudicate a class of cases; and (ii) case-specific errors in charging procedure—potentially serious, but not class-of-cases stripping.

Invoking Const 1963, art 6, § 13 (“original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law”) and MCL 600.601, the Court reasoned that Michigan circuit courts possess subject-matter jurisdiction over “criminal cases” as a class. From there, Goecke does the heavy lifting: defective charging documents do not defeat that class-based authority; at most they may implicate in personam jurisdiction or other procedural limitations.

On that framing, the Court treated Robinson’s complaint—an indictment issued by a one-person grand jury and no preliminary examination—as an “erroneous charging procedure” that did not alter the criminal character of the case. Therefore, the resulting judgment is not void ab initio on jurisdictional grounds.

B. Why Peeler is “new,” yet still not retroactive

The Court corrected the Court of Appeals on the threshold “new rule” question. It found Peeler new for three interlocking reasons:

• It ended an established practice: one-person grand juries had, as an “unchallenged assumption,” issued indictments for years.
• It decided an issue of first impression: no earlier appellate decision had addressed whether MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 authorized indictments.
• It was not dictated by existing precedent: the outcome was not compelled under the “dictated by precedent” approach.

Having labeled Peeler “new,” the Court applied the presumption against retroactivity and then tested whether Peeler falls within the federal exception for new substantive constitutional rules. It does not:

• Not substantive: Peeler regulates the pretrial route to trial (preliminary examination and charging mechanism), i.e., “the manner of determining a defendant’s culpability,” not categorical limits on punishment or criminalization.
• Not constitutional: the Court emphasized that Peeler is statutory in nature—construing MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4—so it is not a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application under Montgomery v Louisiana.

The Court then turned to Michigan’s state retroactivity analysis and applied the Linkletter v Walker/People v Hampton factors:

• Purpose: the rule concerns pretrial process, not trial fairness; this weighed against retroactivity.
• Reliance: prosecutors and judges relied on the “unchallenged assumption” that indictments were permissible; this weighed against retroactivity.
• Administration of justice: the practice existed for decades and potentially affected numerous convictions obtained after fair trials beyond a reasonable doubt; reopening them would substantially burden the system; this weighed against retroactivity.

On balance, the Court held Peeler does not apply retroactively on collateral review, foreclosing the “retroactive change in law” path under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a) for successive motions.

3.3 Impact

A. Postconviction litigation and successive motions (MCR 6.502(G)(2))

The decision substantially narrows the viability of collateral attacks premised on one-person grand jury indictments issued pre-Peeler. Defendants seeking to file successive motions under MCR 6.502(G)(2) cannot generally:

• recast Peeler violations as subject-matter jurisdiction defects to bypass the bar, or
• invoke Peeler as a retroactive change in law under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a).

Practically, the remaining avenues are narrow: new evidence, (where applicable) the rule’s innocence waiver (“significant possibility” of innocence), or other independent grounds not dependent on Peeler retroactivity.

B. Trial-level consequences and prospective compliance

Prospectively, Peeler continues to govern charging practice: no indictments by one-person grand juries and preliminary examinations are required. This case does not retreat from Peeler; instead, it confines remedies for old violations to direct review (or to other applicable postconviction doctrines) rather than broad collateral reopening.

C. Jurisdiction doctrine: reinforcing a disciplined, class-of-cases approach

The Court’s reasoning reinforces a trend visible in People v Washington and People v Scott: Michigan courts will treat many serious procedural defects as non-voiding unless they truly negate the court’s authority over the class of cases. This predictability is consequential: “void ab initio” remains a narrow category, not an all-purpose vehicle for collateral relief.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• One-person grand jury (MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4): A judge-led investigative mechanism to subpoena witnesses and issue arrest warrants; Peeler clarified it does not include power to issue criminal indictments.
• Preliminary examination: A pretrial hearing (typically in district court) testing probable cause and defining the charges that can proceed to circuit court.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s authority over a type (class) of case—e.g., criminal prosecutions. If absent, the judgment is void ab initio.
• In personam jurisdiction: Power over the particular defendant; defects in charging or process may affect this but do not usually erase subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Retroactivity on collateral review: Whether a new judicial rule applies to cases already final (past direct appeal) in postconviction proceedings. New procedural or statutory rules are usually not retroactive.
• “New rule” of law: A legal rule not dictated by prior precedent—often because it resolves a first-impression issue or displaces a previously accepted practice.

5. Conclusion

People v Robinson supplies the missing remedial framework for People v Peeler. The Michigan Supreme Court held that Peeler errors—though real—are not subject-matter jurisdiction defects and therefore do not void convictions. It further held that Peeler announced a new rule, but one that does not apply retroactively on collateral review under either federal substantive-rule principles or Michigan’s Linkletter v Walker/People v Hampton factors.

For Michigan practitioners, the takeaway is structural: Peeler remains a strong prospective charging rule, but Robinson sharply limits its use as a collateral “reopening” tool—especially in successive motions under MCR 6.502(G)(2).