Pattern-and-Practice Standing for Highway-Stop Injunctions; Federalism Limits Remedies to Necessity; Two-Step Injunction Rejected Under Tenth Circuit Consent/Seizure Precedent

Case: Shaw, Bosire, Erich, Maloney v. Smith (captioned in record as Shaw v. Smith)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: January 29, 2026
Panel: Federico, Hartz, Kelly (Hartz authors remedial-scope portion; Federico dissents in part)

1) Introduction

This appeal arises from a long-running challenge to Kansas Highway Patrol (“KHP”) traffic-stop practices on major Kansas highways—especially I-70—against out-of-state motorists perceived to be traveling to or from Colorado. The factual backdrop is the interstate “marijuana mismatch”: Colorado legalized marijuana; Kansas did not. Plaintiffs (several drivers and passengers) alleged that KHP leveraged that mismatch to justify stops, prolong detentions, and conduct canine sniffs and searches without proper Fourth Amendment justification.

After individual damages trials (with juries finding Fourth Amendment violations against certain troopers) and a two-week bench trial on equitable relief, the district court entered a broad, four-year injunction. The injunction restricted KHP’s reliance on “drug corridor”/“drug source” rationales and constrained KHP’s “Kansas Two-Step” re-engagement tactic; it also imposed significant compliance measures (documentation, consent forms, recording, supervisory approvals, training, and reporting).

On appeal, KHP’s Superintendent (sued in his official capacity) challenged: (i) Article III standing for prospective relief; and (ii) whether the district court exceeded equitable bounds—particularly given federalism concerns and existing circuit precedent on consensual post-stop encounters.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed that Plaintiffs have standing to seek prospective injunctive relief because they face a “substantial risk” of being stopped again and because the record supported a pattern/practice of unconstitutional conduct that KHP trained or permitted.

On the merits and scope of relief, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded:

• State-of-origin / “drug source” rationales: The court held the district court went too far. While KHP’s continued misuse of state-of-origin factors violated Vasquez v. Lewis, the appellate court concluded the injunction’s operational mandates were overly intrusive at this stage. It held that the appropriate initial remedy is essentially limited to mandatory training unless plaintiffs show broader measures are necessary.
• “Kansas Two-Step” restrictions: The court vacated the portion of the injunction regulating the Two-Step. It reasoned that Tenth Circuit case law has repeatedly upheld similar post-stop questioning as consensual and that the district court’s restrictions conflicted with binding precedent and Rule 65’s specificity principles.

Judge Federico dissented in part, agreeing that some injunction provisions were overbroad but arguing the record reflected intentional disregard of Vasquez v. Lewis and warranted more than training alone; he also disputed the majority’s approach to the Two-Step analysis.

3) Analysis

A) Precedents Cited

1. The “state of origin” rule and reasonable suspicion

• Vasquez v. Lewis (10th Cir. 2016) is the doctrinal anchor for the “drug source/destination” issue. The opinion reiterates Vasquez’s categorical admonition: using state residency (or broadly, travel from certain states) as a suspicion factor is “impermissible” and “so broad as to be indicative of almost nothing.” The bench-trial record was notable because multiple troopers testified they still used state of origin as a factor and were trained to do so, despite Vasquez.
  The appellate court’s key move is remedial, not substantive: it treats Vasquez v. Lewis as settled law, then asks how intrusive the federal remedy may be against a state agency.

2. Standing for forward-looking police-practices injunctions

• City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) supplies the standard hurdle: past injury is not enough; the plaintiff must show likelihood of future injury from the challenged practice. The court distinguishes Lyons by emphasizing: (i) traffic stops are routine and not fully avoidable even with lawful driving; (ii) out-of-state motorists were disproportionately stopped; and (iii) the district court found KHP trained or authorized the unconstitutional conduct—matching the “ordered or authorized” pathway discussed in Lyons.
• O'Shea v. Littleton (1974) is used both ways: KHP invoked it for federalism and speculation about future proceedings; the court uses it to support the “assume law-abiding behavior” premise while still finding future traffic-stop risk sufficiently substantial.
• Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA (2013) frame “certainly impending” vs. “substantial risk.” The court expressly relies on the “substantial risk” formulation.
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021), Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016), Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife (1992), and Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med. (2024) are cited for modern standing structure (injury, causation, redressability) and the evidentiary burden “at the successive stages of litigation.”
• The opinion also draws support from other circuits recognizing standing when plaintiffs are targeted as a group by an officially sanctioned pattern: Melendres v. Arpaio (9th Cir. 2012) and Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir (2d Cir. 1998).

3. Federalism/comity constraints on structural police injunctions

• Rizzo v. Goode (1976) and O'Shea v. Littleton (1974) are KHP’s primary federalism authorities. The court distinguishes O'Shea (no intrusion into ongoing state prosecutions here) and Rizzo (there, rogue officer misconduct contrary to policy; here, training/practice was found pervasive and agency-sanctioned).
• The remedial narrowing is grounded in circuit authority emphasizing minimal intrusiveness: Eaglemed LLC v. Cox (10th Cir. 2017) (“no broader than necessary”), alongside general equitable-respect language in Signature Properties Int'l Ltd. P'ship v. City of Edmond (10th Cir. 2002).
• The court cites Supreme Court caution that declaratory relief can be an “alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction”: Steffel v. Thompson (1974).
• Comparative remedial tailoring examples include: Knox v. Salinas (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing detailed injunction absent showing agency reforms inadequate), Ruiz v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1982), Toussaint v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1986), and Marie v. Mosier (D. Kan. 2016) (escalation from declaration to injunction upon noncompliance).

4. Fourth Amendment “Two-Step” consent/seizure doctrine and Rule 65 specificity

• Substantive consent framework: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) (totality of circumstances; no coercion), Florida v. Bostick (1991) (reasonable person free to decline/terminate), and Tenth Circuit consent-encounter cases such as United States v. Manjarrez (10th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Wallace (10th Cir. 2005).
• The court’s core reason for vacating the Two-Step portion is that circuit precedent repeatedly approves similar “farewell + immediate re-engagement” encounters as consensual: United States v. West (10th Cir. 2000), United States v. Bradford (10th Cir. 2005), United States v. Ledesma (10th Cir. 2006), United States v. Guerrero (10th Cir. 2007), United States v. Hunter (10th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Mercado-Gracia (10th Cir. 2021).
• The opinion also turns the dispute into a standards-of-review and uniformity point: United States v. Little (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), United States v. Abdenbi (10th Cir. 2004), United States v. Spence (10th Cir. 2005), and Supreme Court guidance in Ornelas v. United States (1996) (de novo review of ultimate Fourth Amendment questions to ensure uniformity).
• Independently, the court highlights injunction-drafting constraints: Rule 65’s specificity requirement and the prohibition on “obey the law” decrees, supported by Schmidt v. Lessard (1974) and Tenth Circuit’s Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. (10th Cir. 1990).

5. “Universal injunctions” and scope-waiver by stipulation

• The opinion addresses Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025) in a footnote, concluding it does not bar the district court’s order because (i) the injunction is not nationwide; (ii) “complete relief” may include indivisible remedies that incidentally benefit others; and (iii) KHP stipulated that equitable relief for named plaintiffs would benefit the putative class, waiving certain scope objections.

B) Legal Reasoning

1. Standing: turning “routine traffic enforcement” into “substantial risk”

The standing holding is the most practically significant doctrinal move. The court does not treat future traffic stops as speculative in the Lyons sense. Instead, it stresses three evidentiary pillars developed at trial:

• Traffic stops are common and imperfectly avoidable (even law-abiding drivers may commit minor infractions or be passengers with no control).
• Disproportionate targeting of out-of-state drivers (supported by Professor Mummolo’s statistical work, credited by the district court).
• Agency authorization/training (troopers testified they used state-of-origin factors; KHP did not meaningfully incorporate Vasquez v. Lewis into training until after suit; leadership statements suggested resistance to the rule).

This combination allows the court to satisfy Lyons’s concern that future injury must be more than conjecture: Plaintiffs showed both a meaningful likelihood of re-encounter and evidence that KHP “ordered or authorized” the challenged practices in functional terms (through training and culture), even absent a formal written policy.

2. Equitable relief against a state police agency: “no broader than necessary” as a remedial gatekeeper

Having found standing and an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, the court pivots to remedial restraint. The key limiting principle is not that federal courts lack power to enjoin unconstitutional policing (they do have that power via Ex parte Young), but that federalism and comity require the least intrusive effective remedy, particularly at the outset.

That logic yields the majority’s most controversial holding: although KHP’s continued reliance on “drug source/destination” logic defied Vasquez v. Lewis, the appellate court concluded plaintiffs had not shown that anything beyond mandatory training was necessary right now. The court leaves open escalation if misconduct persists (expressly citing examples where courts move from declaratory relief to injunction upon noncompliance).

3. The Two-Step: uniform Fourth Amendment standards over district-court innovation

The Two-Step portion is vacated for a combination of (i) doctrinal consistency and (ii) institutional role:

• Doctrinal consistency: the opinion reads the district court’s operational requirements (step-away distance, time gap, “free to go” messaging, consent-notification rules) as incompatible with a line of Tenth Circuit cases holding that officers need not say “free to go” and may re-engage immediately after returning documents, so long as coercive factors (weapons, commands, detention, retention of documents, physical restriction) are absent.
• Institutional role: invoking United States v. Little and Ornelas v. United States, the court emphasizes that whether facts amount to a seizure is an “ultimate” Fourth Amendment question reviewed de novo—ensuring uniform rules for law enforcement and avoiding district-by-district divergence.
• Rule 65 specificity: the court also rejects the idea of an injunction that amounts to “use the Two-Step lawfully” without concrete, permissible specificity—because generic “obey the law” injunctions violate Rule 65 and are unfairly vague.

4. The dissent’s competing remedial philosophy

Judge Federico accepts that the district court’s Section III compliance architecture may be too extensive, but argues the majority over-corrects by reducing the remedy essentially to training. For the dissent, the record shows intentional noncompliance with Vasquez v. Lewis, making stronger (but still administrable) relief appropriate. On the Two-Step, the dissent emphasizes that voluntariness is fact-intensive and that this record—troopers staying close to windows, re-engaging within less than a second, and apparent training-driven coercion—could justify injunctive oversight focused on unlawful implementations.

C) Impact

1. Standing: an actionable pathway for pattern-and-practice injunctions outside class certification

The court’s standing analysis will likely be cited in future “highway interdiction” and “corridor policing” challenges. It provides a blueprint for meeting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons where plaintiffs can prove:

• high likelihood of future encounters (routine policing context), and
• official sanction (training/culture/data patterns), not merely isolated misconduct.

This is especially important where class certification is absent or impractical; the opinion also underscores the litigation consequences of a defendant’s stipulation that equitable relief for named plaintiffs will benefit putative class members.

2. Remedies: training-first, escalation-later

The opinion is a strong signal that, within the Tenth Circuit, federal courts must justify operationally detailed police-reform injunctions with a record showing necessity beyond training and/or declaratory relief—particularly when the remedy dictates reporting structures, supervisory approvals, recording policies, and public reporting. Plaintiffs in later cases may respond by developing evidence of:

• post-judgment noncompliance,
• failure of training interventions,
• internal disciplinary breakdowns, and
• continuing statistical disparities after remedial efforts.

3. The Two-Step: limiting district-court experimentation

By vacating the Two-Step injunction based on prior circuit approvals of similar encounters, the court narrows a district judge’s ability to impose prophylactic “best practices” (e.g., mandatory “free to go” advisals) as constitutional requirements in injunction form. Unless Tenth Circuit precedent evolves (en banc or Supreme Court intervention), litigants seeking Two-Step reforms may need to:

• attack the underlying stop/extension on traditional seizure grounds (retention of documents, commands, physical positioning that blocks departure), or
• build a record distinguishing their facts from United States v. Ledesma and related cases in a way that fits within existing factors.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reasonable suspicion: a specific, articulable, fact-based justification that criminal activity “may be afoot.” The opinion reiterates that broad generalizations—like “I-70 is a drug corridor” or “Colorado is a drug source state”—do not, without more, lawfully transform innocent travel into suspicion, especially after Vasquez v. Lewis.
• “Kansas Two-Step”: finishing a traffic stop (returning documents; farewell) and immediately re-engaging to ask additional questions or request consent to search. The constitutional question is whether this becomes a seizure (driver not free to leave) or a consensual encounter.
• Consent (and voluntariness): a search is lawful without a warrant if the person voluntarily agrees. Under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, voluntariness is assessed under the “totality of the circumstances” and need not include a warning that consent may be refused (a point emphasized by United States v. Bradford).
• Standing for injunctions: to obtain forward-looking relief, plaintiffs must show a real likelihood of being harmed again. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons is the classic barrier; this case explains how “substantial risk” plus “officially sanctioned pattern/practice” can satisfy it.
• Ex parte Young: the doctrine allowing suits against state officials (in their official capacities) for prospective relief to stop ongoing federal-law violations, notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity.
• Rule 65 specificity: injunctions must clearly state what is required or forbidden. Courts generally cannot issue vague “obey the law” commands (cited here via Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. and Schmidt v. Lessard).

5) Conclusion

The decision does three major things. First, it holds that out-of-state motorists previously subjected to unconstitutional KHP stops can have Article III standing to seek prospective relief when they prove a substantial risk of recurrence and an officially sanctioned pattern of violations. Second, it sharply limits the breadth of permissible structural injunctions against a state police agency absent a strong showing that anything beyond mandatory training is necessary—casting federalism as a remedial constraint rather than a jurisdictional bar. Third, it vacates the injunction’s regulation of the Kansas Two-Step, emphasizing that district courts cannot effectively constitutionalize more restrictive “consent” conditions than those recognized by binding Tenth Circuit precedent, nor can they rely on vague “use it lawfully” injunction language.

The remand posture matters: the court leaves room for stronger relief if training fails or unconstitutional practices persist, but it requires plaintiffs to make that necessity showing. In the interim, the opinion stands as a significant Tenth Circuit guide for (i) proving standing in prospective Fourth Amendment policing challenges and (ii) calibrating equitable remedies to avoid over-intrusion into state law-enforcement administration while still enforcing constitutional baselines.